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Abstract 
This thesis applies interdisciplinary approaches to explore interactions between 
two forms of community governance in Acholiland from 1898 to 2010, locating itself within 
Peace Studies.  One form, kaka, was “traditional”, featuring varied forms of “facultative 
mutualisms” among two or more gangi agnates – with one gang as dominant in the 
realm.  Gangi were kinship-based polities.  Like kaka, gangi manifested autopoietic 
attributes and strong internal “fiduciary cultures”.  Then in the 1900s, kaka as governing 
systems were reshuffled under colonialism and a tribal unit, the Acholi Local Government 
was created and was subordinated to the Uganda state.  Unlike kaka, Acholi Local 
Government was hierarchal and has consistently been redesigned by various post-
colonial governments in their attempts to renegotiate, reshape and control the Acholi 
people.  
The study advances a concept of community governance as “social-
political” and moral, and counters that kaka was about brotherhoods - not ruler-
subject relationships.  It further distinguishes what was “traditional” from “customary” 
systems, and demonstrates how colonialism in Acholiland, and a crisis of legitimacy 
manifested in a trifurcation of authorities, with: i) the despotic civil service - the 
“customary system”, fusing modernity and the African tradition, ii) a reshuffled kaka 
system as traditional, and, iii) the cross-modern, manifested as kinematic lugwok 
paco, linking ethno-governance with the nascent national and global arenas.  
 The study concludes that both colonialism and “coloniality” have reshuffled 
the mores of kaka along an African neo-patrimonial legitimacy.  Conversely, 
Acholiland is a “limited statehood” – manifesting a higher order of societal entropy - 
where the “rule by law and customs” dovetail with violence and poverty, 
demonstrating a genre of exceptionalism. 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
This Chapter is an overview of an epistemology of community 
governance practices of the Acholi of Uganda.  Using peace studies as the field 
of inquiry, the study advances arguments that community governance is a moral 
obligation.  In this scholarship I provide some historical insights into how the 
present Acholi community in Uganda became a tribal outfit and a theatre for 
political endurance during colonial and post-colonial eras.  The study espouses 
Critical Theory in advancing an insider’s understanding and interpretations of 
some of the Acholi’s governing words and terminologies, by offering meanings of 
the changing architecture of local governance.  It attempted to answer key 
questions: What is community governance; how and why has the quality and 
form of governance practices in Acholiland changed over the years, and 
especially in the last thirty years?  
An Overview of the Study 
This thesis is an attempt to periodise institutional change outcomes or 
governing practices associated with community governance of the Acholi of 
Uganda from 1898 to 2010.  It seeks to explore the nature, extent and outcomes 
of various social-political interactions that defined the Acholi traditional and 
contemporary praxis, and explain how and why violence was a significant 
manifestation of such interactions (see: Finnström, 2008:33,54,106-107; Dolan, 
2011:6, 256; Branch, 2011)1.    
As such, the study falls within the scholarly realm of peace studies.  It is 
a systematic and qualitative examination of the quality and forms of community 
governance practices, with the view of explaining the trajectory between the 
different modes of governing interactions and the violence that has characterised 
                                                          
1 The periods considered as colonial era began from 1898 – when colonial authorities 
began to sign treaties with rwodi Acholi - through to 1962, a total of up to sixty-four 
years.  The post- colonial era considered in the study is from 1962 to 2010, which is 
a cumulative total of forty-eight years.   This means that the contemporary Acholi 
being studied claims some one hundred and ten years.  I have provided evidence to 
justify that all these periods - the sixty-four years of colonialism and the thiry-two 
of post-colonialism - manifested significant political violence.   
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most of the contemporary Acholiland.  Specifically, the study seeks to correct the 
misconceptions that kaka – as the social-political structures and ideations for 
community governance of the Acholi macon2 - were a façade of authoritative and 
hierarchal arrangements by nature (Atkinson, 2010:70-110).  Additionally, the 
study built on this analysis to construct a new version of the concept of 
community governance, which focuses on the moral elements of political 
interaction between what Jan Kooiman (2003:7) refers to as the social and the 
political actors.  In this study, three governing elements are used to explore how 
Acholi respondents perceive the progression in the quality and forms of 
community governance practices over time and how it dovetailed with violence3.   
These elements include: (i) the Acholi governing images, (ii) its governing 
instruments and, (iii) its governing actions – which are the parameters of political 
activities as explained later below4. 
To clarify from the onset, the new version of the concept of community 
governance seeks to advance it as a moral, social-political and an interactive 
process between the social and the political (see: Kooiman, 2003:4-6)5.  As a 
focus for inquiry, community governance embraces the different governing actors 
within the social-political governing space and situations by applying a conflict 
and peace lens.  As such, it is structured by analyses of context, societal 
problems, moral dispositions, values and norms, and how in turn they are 
                                                          
2 “Acholi macon” literally refers to the old Acholi customs-the organisations, culture 
and systems prior to any form of imperialism.  This is what I consider as traditional 
and I consistently make reference to it as indigenous to the society.  It therefore 
defines the values and aspirations or the informal systems that the people are 
associated with although were not necessarily in agreement with. This terminology 
recognises that while there were relationships and exchanges in Acholiland, a large 
part of it was based on mutual trust and consultation. Colonialism and neo-
colonialism were imperial conditions that imposed conditions of extraction instead 
of partnership and what came with it became formal and formed the customary 
laws of the Acholi people. Periodising the changes in “informality” is in a way 
documenting the modernisation processes that accompanied Acholiland’s 
development.  
3 The choices of these elements were influenced by the outcomes envisaged but also 
availability of information on governance during the period of the research. 
4 In the study, governing images refer to perceptions - how social actors viewed the 
performances of both the institutions and leaders that governed them. Whether 
these were either embedded or detached from their social issues.  Governing 
instruments on the other hand are the rules of the games applied by the leaders – 
and whether they were relevant or not; while governing actions are the measures 
of their interactions with the people – whether these were participatory or not. 
5 Jan Kooiman sees “social” as actors to be led while “political” as actors that lead, 
something that I have elucidated in the coming Chapters in discussing interactive 
governance among kaka Acholi. 
  
 
3 
reinforced, shaped, compromised or annulled by mixes of a multi-layered and a 
multilateral governing efforts as a general practice.  The study is, therefore 
normative and in some instances cognitive, allowing for comparison between the 
different governing entities6.  This is because governance seeks to describe the 
abilities and capabilities of these different and diverse governing actors, 
not only to create and enforce social rules, but also inclusive development 
opportunities by delivering quality societal services.  
Conversely, there is a growing awareness and positive realisation 
today that indigenous practices and “modernity” have cross-fertilised 
contemporary governing practices in most societies (Kooiman, 2003:7).  
This reality is demonstrated by the way the principles of rationality and 
humanity are blended – with the increasing manifestation of the attributes 
of self-governance or autopoiesis, co-governing and hierarchical practices 
in contemporary governance (Girling, 1960:80-150; Kooiman, 2003:7)7.  
These forms of interactions and the governing equilibrium sought, are 
dependant on the state and quality of these mixes of interactions.  I have 
argued in the case of Uganda that in the last thirty years, there have been 
increasing attempts by the state to re-centralise power, with the political 
principle demonstrating a form of neo-patrimonial legitimacy (see for 
instance: Rubongoya, 2007:8).  This action in governance has fused the 
functions of the state with that of the community.  Subsequently, conflicts 
and contestations have turned violent, undermining moral approaches to 
community governance (see: Roberts, 2011:34; Missier, 2012:3-6).  
The study objectives 
Two core objectives underpin this study.  Firstly, is to explore the nexus 
between the major governing practices exhibited in Acholiland, from 1898 to 
2010, and violence, by isolating some elements of governing interactions and the 
corresponding responses and political behaviours that were exhibited by both 
                                                          
6 In Chapters Six and Seven, I explore some aspects of the qualitative and 
quantitative cognitive views of leadership in Acholi when talking about the 
different leaders and their individual political powers, to lead.  
7 For a general discussion of the principle of autoposis as self-governance, Jan 
Kooiman offers a good text, which is relevant for the situation. 
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internal and external political actors8.  Secondly, the study seeks to isolate some 
of the exceptional practices in community governance within the Acholi that have 
evolved over time.  In particular, the study focuses on identifying coping 
strategies in community management under crisis, to understand the logic behind 
them and the changing trends under pluralistic legal systems.  The study also 
documents identity shifts especially in gender-based social categorisation and in 
the factors that have consistently catalysed and sustained the process of change.   
In particular, the study challenges the misconceptions by earlier scholars 
that kaka, as a description of the political macro level governing structures, were 
authoritative and hierarchal in nature and therefore, were synonymous with 
chiefdoms (e.g., Atkinson, 2010: 261)9.  As such, this scholarship provides 
detailed analytical evidence of kaka’s governing instruments, to demonstrate the 
logic behind diffused power that characterised kaka, arguing that decentralised 
power base was essential for peace building - in respond to societal diversity in 
the complex geopolitic that defined the Acholiland as a political territory – as 
discussed in the next sections.   
The study, therefore, sets out to comprehend the effects of new 
practices in community governance brought about by modernity, and how these 
new approaches or governing actions interacted with kaka’s governing structures 
and their specific concepts of governance.  The study then explains the observed 
impacts – that is, the extent of actual and perceived change in governing 
practices: how and why these changes happened at some particular time and in 
some specific periods, and whether violence was actually an outcome of, or a 
trigger or both of these dynamism.  
  “Tradition” as consistently used in this study suggests that there were 
some practices and aspects of the Acholi culture that were indigenous, in the 
sense of having evolved internally in response to the complexities and diversity 
that prevailed.  These complexities, which have been discussed in detail in 
                                                          
8 By internal actors, I refer to the different social and political governing actors that 
formed the kaka as a political unit.  The social are the society, which are further 
categorised into households (dog odi), extended families (dye-kal or jo pa), villages 
(dog gang), etc.  The political, on the other hand, were the elders (ludito or lutela 
kaka), women (megi kaka). External actors include the central government and all 
those others, who were not part of the internal Acholi dynamics. 
9 Professor Ronald R. Atkinson has substantially discussed the historical perspective 
of Acholi’s socio-political organisations prior to colonialism. 
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chapters one and seven, in turn arbitrated the evolution of some governing 
practices that seem to have remained relevant even today.  One of such 
practices is the search for consent and participation.  As such, these features, I 
argued, were a part of the Acholi’s core values of existence. I have advanced that 
facultative mutualism as mechanism in governance existed among the different 
macro kaka authorities and lineage-based or meso kaka authorities.  In 
responding to vulnerability and in providing safety nets to smaller units, fiduciary 
practices existed - dominated kinship levels of governance as attributes of 
community governance.  Governance, I argue, is a contested space, because it is 
multi-layered and complex (Newell, 2012:229-314). 
Research problem statement 
The Acholi of Uganda, as a community of polities today, is a product of 
cultural mixing, organic evolution and colonialism.  Arguably, the different ethnic 
groupings that formed the Acholi in the modern time were geographically, 
territorially and locally situated and were socially related to each other in one way 
or the other.  As such, they were culturally, historically, socially and politically 
interconnected with each other in what Graeber (2011: 145, 149) describes as a 
human economy when he explored the life of the Tiv of Nigeria10.  By 1898, there 
were probably nine distinct political zones in the area, each with a distinct Luo 
dialect.  According to Atkinson (2010:138-139) these political partitioning 
provided significant markets for macro-level interactive governance among each 
other (see also: Crazzolara, 1954:326)11.  Evidently, there were trade and 
intermarriages and occasionally fighting would break as they scrambled for space 
and dominance (Atkinson, 2010:260-265). 
This territory also had frequent droughts and famine, which induced 
movement, displacement and increased tensions for space between the 
opposing groups while at the same time, mediated cooperation among 
                                                          
10 In Chapter Two, I have conceptualised the evolution of a “community in place” 
through interpolation, mixing and intermarriages.  The underlying point is that the 
social flux that charasterised the Acholiland in the past created a culture that 
renegotiated any strong form of primodial attachment in redefining the kaka 
model of governance that became a dominant feature of the Acholiland by 1800s.  
Thus, the definition of ethnicity in the case of Acholi is argued here in the context 
of political economy and embraces three core elements of common descent, 
common location and common history – which embrace the two paradigms of 
primodialism and constructivism as further discussed in Chapter 4. 
11  These 8 political zones actually became the first County administration 
arrangements under colonialism  as further discussed by Uma-Owiny, 2013 
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likeminded groups.  By 2010, the Acholi relationship with modernity had clocked 
over one hundred and ten years.  Unfortunately, the most memorable parts of this 
period were marked by political violence, displacement and turmoil (Atkinson, 
2010:261-274; Dwyer, 1972:10-11, 130-159)12.  The wider view today is that 
Acholiland is - if not the least - one of the least understood political system 
failures in Uganda’s domestic, political, and economic development processes 
(Finnström, 2008; Dolan, 2011).   
By 2010, almost one in every three persons of an Acholi origin was living 
below the poverty line (Attallah, et al., 2005:4; UBOS, 2010).   And, of those aged 
thirty-five and below, at least one in two had suffered directly and, or indirectly 
from political tortures by the same period (see: Dolan, 2011:224-226).  Violence 
has influenced the way of life in Acholiland and built monuments that naturally 
should worry the leaders and demands a comprehensive examination.  Evidently, 
most of the Acholi given names are linked to events like wars, and the majority of 
them tend to express the notion of mistrust.  A random survey of given names of 
participants in a World Bank funded workshop in 2001 in Gulu and Kitgum 
indicated that more than sixty five per cent of the Acholi given names of the 
participants were about mistrust or unhappiness.  
Social tortures in Acholiland, it seems, are multifaceted based on 
studies, but the modes and the history of social-political governance seem to play 
some important role.  According to Dolan (2011:1, 219-252), social tortures are 
mass or widespread torture and “violation, dread, disorientation, dependency, 
debilitation and humiliation, all of which are tactics and symptoms typical of 
torture, but perpetrated on a mass rather than individual scale”13.  Branch and 
other scholars see these forms of violence in Acholiland as a challenge of 
legitimacy – that is, the mental relationship between those who lead and those 
led engendering the belief of respect and submission to their authority (Allen, 
2006: 96-117; Atkinson, 2010: 85-89; Branch, 2011:45-71).  In the case of 
Acholiland, the dominant view is that as a political community, the society has 
been categorised as unsubmissive to higher governing authorities (Finnström, 
2008: Chapter 3).  From a succession of scholarships that have informed our 
                                                          
12 The majority of Acholi I spoke to contend that the first post independent regime 
(1962 to 1971) provided the only memoriable space and time for peacefulness.   
13 Chris Dolan sees a multitude of perpetuators including governments, the LRA and 
the donor community in Uganda when he discusses the social torture in Acholiland 
during the NRM regime. 
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understanding of the processes and outcomes of social and political change 
elsewhere, the influences of induced as well as demand-driven socio-political 
factors in causing societal change have been elucidated.  Regrettably, 
sometimes the impacts of political change on society can be devastating.  As 
such, the Acholi situation, as seen from this perspective, may not necessarily be 
that different. 
The Acholi case, however, has generated a rather unique brand of 
prejudices, interpretations, and occasionally, damaging ethnic categorisation and 
labelling (see: Finnström, Chapter 2)14.  These narratives build on a prolonged 
history of isolation, racial segregation, stigmatisation and unprecedented 
sufferings that quite often are presented as Acholi’s internal weakness and 
therefore its governing image (Gertzel, 1976:12; Finnström, Chapter 2).  When 
National Resistance Movement government (NRM) captured power in 1986, 
Uganda was automatically proclaimed as a peaceful country even when violence 
was devastating in Acholiland (see: Museveni, 1997:177).  The denial of 
damaging civil wars and the isolationary manner explained how an ethnic group, 
for years, was confronted with the stark reality of tortures and the politics of 
governance (Branch, 2011:246).15   
In terms of a search for knowledge, my preferred standpoint is to 
imagine that there are phenomena within Acholiland which pre-date these 
graphical and redemptive images of hopelessness, even if they are not felt or 
even imagined today.  Some of what is referred to as social violence could 
actually represent and be shaping the realities in Acholiland that have been 
misunderstood, misrepresented and have unclear meanings.  
                                                          
14 I have also referred to the Acholi in this study as an ethnic group.  As elaborated 
later on, as a political community, they shared common descent, common history 
and location (see: Green, 2006:1).  These elements have constructed some 
collective culture and common identity that are generally claimed by them but are 
also recognised by the other ethnicities.  In this definition, I recognise and embrace 
both the primodialism and constructivist viewpoints in discussing ethnicity in 
Acholiland (see: Green, 2006:1). 
15 However, as Adam Branch noted, there were contradictory reports by newspapers 
and human right watch on atrocities metered in Acholi by the LRA and the UPDF. 
Some of these include: New Vision (August, 1986) “Museveni Denounces Sudan’s 
Treachery” and New Vision (August 1987) “NRA To Cover Rebel Areas”  
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Motivation for the study 
My motivation comes from two standpoints.  One is my long-term insight 
and interactions in Acholi as an insider, an intellectual and rural development 
practitioner.  Secondly is contextual - to fill the gaps in the current knowledge 
about the Acholi.  In particular, I have advanced a concept of community 
governance that underpins moral values - integrating humanity and the right-
based approaches.  Kaka as an institution and community organisation was both 
a means to and an outcome of governing practices.  However, kaka’s ideation 
was patrilineal, and not necessarily patrimonial, as we will see later16.  In 
advancing brotherhood as governing principles, kaka as an ideation sought to 
maintain the identity of the lineage-based authorities, and ensured their growth as 
a moral obligation.   
My relationship with the Acholi and the knowledge of its people and what 
they stand for spans several years back.  I was born and raised by Acholi parents 
and was privileged to have spent part of my student life in Acholi, and I dedicated 
my professional career later on in the same region and similar areas in Africa17.  
In particular, from the 1980s to the present, I have worked on and off in 
Acholiland, undertaking analytical work to generate knowledge in support of the 
reconstruction of the people.  In doing this, I worked either for major donors like 
DFID, the World Bank and the USAID or in partnership with them (see: Oloya et 
al. cited in Amisi and Juma, 2002:116-134; Oloya, 1997; Ayo and Oloya, 2001).  
In the case of the latter, I partnered with Saferworld, Oxfam-UK and CARE 
International, and carried out analytical work in Acholiland during the insurgency 
of 1986 to 2010 (Oloya et al., 1998).  
The most significant engagements I had in the region came from 
international organisations because they valued my intimacy with and knowledge 
of the community.  I led the design of several programmes in the area, including 
two social funds on behalf of SNV (the Netherlands Development Organisation) 
and the World Bank.  These involved an intensive understanding of the social 
                                                          
16 This view became clear after series of discussions regarding the styles of 
governance practiced by the different kaka sampled. 
17 I have worked for the World Bank on fragility and community recovery and 
development in South Sudan (2007 to 2011), Sierra Leone (2004), Rwanda and 
Burundi (2003-2004) and Northern Uganda 1998 to date.  But I also worked for SNV 
in South Sudan, in addition to supporting works in Liberia, Somalia and 
Mozambique but also earlier on. 
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and political context of the Acholiland profiling of the social-political interactions of 
the community with other actors, in order to design area-based programmes that 
are responsive to the realities on the ground.  I was also privileged to manage 
and later supervise these activities.  These in-depth interactions with the 
community enabled me to form opinions on the persistent derogatory narratives 
about the Acholi in the media as cited in Branch (2005:24-26)18 as well as in 
earlier scholarships (Postlehwaite, 1947 cited in Branch, 2005:24-26).  Some of 
the insights were outrageous, lacking originality, while others were limited in 
depth and breadth because Acholiland in its present context cannot be viewed 
from a single discipline, to make true sense of the situation19.  For instance, there 
were views that Acholi lacked the types of leaders required by the new regime of 
president Museveni to end the political impasses (See: Branch, 2011:63-66; 
Atkinson, 2010:306-307).   
Justification for the study 
Firstly, violence, it seems, has colonised Acholiland because it has a 
long history of co-existing with the Acholi – that is, when violence is 
contextualised from the respondent’s viewpoints as discussed later.   Before 
1986, Acholiland had experienced some 130 years of mixed forms of 
governance, little comprehended by the majority of local as further discussed 
later (see Table 1.1 below). Of these years, the bulk – which totalled 118 years 
were a period of the aconya20, and all forms of governing interactions exhibited 
                                                          
18  The papers include: “Museveni denounces Sudan’s treachery”. New Vision, 25th 
August 1986; Anon (1987) “NRA to cover rebel areas”. New Vision, n.d, August 
1987.   
19 I held discussions with Professor Tim Allen in Gulu when he was investigating the 
question of International Criminal Court and the LRA in 2005 and later on had a 
healthy disagreement on his viewpoints as we discussed Acholi on his next visit.  I 
also met several times with Professor Atkinson and have been working with him in 
2013 to 2015 in the development of a land conflict research for the Joint Leaders of 
the Acholi sub-region.  I had some phone and e-mail exchanges with Professor 
Finnstrom in 2011 and many after that. 
20 The word “aconya” was previously used by Odongo-Onyango to describe the Arab 
speakers who fused trade in slave and ivory with robbery in Acholiland.  In this 
study, it has been used in its right context as explained by elders in Achoil, to mean 
enemies of the society.  Hence, both pre-colonial and colonial interactions have 
been described as oppressive and therefore an aconya period 
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by these outsiders aimed to radicle local authorities, to subdue the entire system 
and subjected them to new and oppressive orders worse than their own21.  
Regrettably, post-independent governments since October 9, 1962, 
retained most of the governing traits adopted by colonialism and as such, political 
violence remained a landmark feature within the Acholi establishment, weaved in 
the daily rituals of an Acholi – manifested even in the naming of children and in 
the popular songs22.  As such, most Ugandans, especially of Acholi origin, and 
external scholars were bewildered by the narratives of violence in Acholiland, its 
continuity especially after January 25, 1986.  In fact, the intensity, widespread 
effects and legacy of these dissonances are epitomised by unprecedented 
abductions23, rapes, and the deepening political divide between Acholi and the 
rest of Uganda over the last one hundred and fifty years (Allen, 2006:53-72; 
2003; Branch, 2011:63-66). 
Secondly, the core function of narratives, which is to organise, contain, 
and even probe these acts of violence, was, in many ways, compromised, not 
only by the visibility of the outcomes of physical violence, but also the meaning 
given to it thus far (Varadharajan, 2008: 124).  The lack of broad-based analyses 
and the outlook of violence on the one hand, and the perceptions and 
orientations of the narrators on the other hand, have changed the meaning of 
suffering in Acholiland – both the old and the contemporary reality24.  In essence, 
it altered the understanding of how violence dovetailed with structural and 
intentional dimensions of governance.   
The other justification is rooted in kaka’s shifting legitimacy.  Trust, 
demonstrated by forms of reciprocities, is an ingredient of legitimacy.  However, 
with continuing reforms in the governing structures, the demand to reconstruct a 
new political identity has automatically shifted to the state and its analogues.  The 
question is how the state’s political agents have redefined the parameters of 
                                                          
21 Dennis Pain and Uma have provided information regarding Acholi’s interaction 
with the Arab.  On the relationship of the Acholi with colonial powers, Finnstrom, 
2008, Branch, 2011 and Onek-Adyanga, 2011 are good examples of analytical work. 
22 Finnstrom, 2008 in Chapter 4 discussed the tragedy of governing interactions the 
Acholi community has experienced since precolonial era. 
23 Phuong, et al, 2008 discussed that at its peak, close to 38,000 children had been 
abducted by the LRA according to some sources. 
24 Most scholarly analyses followed single discipline.  Examples are political (see Bere, 
1947; Branch, 2006, 2011), historical (see: Crazzolara, 1953; Atkinson, 1986,1999, 
2010), anthropology (See: Allen, 1998, 2006; Finnström, 2003, 2008). 
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political identity, and the corresponding contents, in ensuring that the Acholiland 
change for the good, instead of getting stuck in the past, especially the daunting 
poverty levels.   
In the construction of comprehensive knowledge of such complexity, 
embodying multifaceted concepts and multiple periods, one needs to use what 
Coney (1984) refers to as language games, which embrace all areas of 
knowledge (Coney, 1984, cited by Smith, 1998:286).  This is because these 
issues require construction in their own context, without “over” generalisation 
(Sawyer, 1992, cited from Smith, 1998:326).  Thus, constructing knowledge and 
giving meanings and interpretations to such a complex situation requires not only 
innovation, but also a good understanding of the meanings expressed by those 
who have lived it, seen it and felt it.  This is because violence of the stated 
magnitude is highly differentiated and often socially mediated and transcends 
technicality or imagination.  In the case of Acholiland, violence seems to be 
deeply inscribed in modernity.  It is presumably caused by social liabilities, which 
are specific to a society and therefore need to be understood, preferably by 
someone who has lived it and understands the narratives from a local point of 
view, and has a good grip of national governance issues, and global perspectives 
and context (Denzil and Lincoln, 2003:9).  
Hence, with such lived experience, studying the Acholi as a researcher 
who is also an Acholi is, if anything, the most informative, self-reflective and 
introspective “bricolage” when applied with respect and “objectivity” (See: Denzil 
and Lincoln, 2003:8-12).  There is a large amount of literature for researching into 
one’s own society, or a system that one is familiar with (Example:  Vidich and 
Lyman, 2003).   In fact, I argue that researching into a familiar culture, especially 
when it can “bring into perspective the invisibility of the new and previously 
obscured image of the society” is perhaps the most compelling contribution to 
knowledge generation.  Denzil and Lincoln (2003:9) for instance, agree that one’s 
knowledge of a society is important because, in any case, an interpretive 
“bricoleur” understands that research is an interactive process shaped by one’s 
personal history, biography, gender, social class, and by those of the people in 
the setting.   
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Scope of the study 
The period of this study spans three political eras of historical 
significance; the aconya25 period or colonial era (1898 to 1962); the early post-
colonial period (1962 to 1985), which was further categorised into different sub-
eras that correspond to the political regimes of Obote 1 (1962 to 1971), Idi Amin 
(1971 to 1979) and Obote II (1979 to 1986); and the latter part of the postcolonial 
era under Yoweri K. Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM), 1986 to 
2010.  In the analysis, I also used Pax Oboteca to refer to his two terms, 1962 to 
1971 and again 1980 to 1985, which was cumulatively thirteen years.  Similarly, 
Idi Amin’s regime is also referred to as Pax Aminca while Museveni as Pax 
Musevenica (Rubongoya, 2007:4)26.   
Table 1.1 – Key Political Eras in the History of the Acholi of Uganda 
Political Era Regimes Periods Years Total Rank 
The Aconya Slave Trade 1840 to 1898 54 54 2 
Colonialism 1898 to 1962 64 64 1 
Post-colonial Pax Oboteca 1962 to 1971 8 12 4 
1980 to 1985 4 
Pax Aminca 1971 to 1979 8 8 5 
Pax Musevenica 1986 to 2010 24 24 3 
Source: Field Data Analysis, 2014 
In my attempt to conceptualise change outcomes in community 
governance, I have reasoned that viewing outcomes of change in community 
governance over a long time frame enables a characteristic understanding of the 
changing mantra in governance from a traditional praxis27.  The year 1898 was 
chosen as a start point for several reasons.  However, the principal reason for this 
                                                          
25 The word “aconya” was previously used by Odongo-Onyango to describe the Arab 
speakers who fused trade in slave and ivory with robbery in Acholiland.  In this 
study, it has been used in its right context as explained by elders in Achoil, to mean 
enemies of the society.  Hence, both pre-colonial and colonial interactions have 
been described as oppressive and therefore an aconya period. 
26 Joshua R. Rubongoya (2007) used Pax Musevenica to refer to the period of his rule 
and thus the political order ushered by the NRM, which I have adopted.  Similarly, I 
have used Pax Aminica and Pax Oboteca with respect to their own political orders. 
27 See Hohne, 2006 in the case of Somalia 
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project is that Major MacDonald of the Imperial British Corporation (IBCL) signed 
treaties with a number of rwodi Acholi in that year.  The treaties, henceforth, legally 
subordinated Acholiland to the Uganda Protectorate (Gertzel, 1974:57).  The year 
that followed, in 1899, Major Delme-Radcliffe began to identify rwodi for indirect rule, 
a task that he found difficult to complete because Acholiland lacked the autocratic 
forms of leaders required for indirect rule (Bere, 1947:57).  The year 2010 was 
chosen for this project because a number of the Acholi community had begun to 
settle in their homes after leaving in the infamous protected camps for internally 
displaced persons, where they had stayed for over twenty years28. 
This study discusses the NRM regime (1986 to 2010) extensively since 
this, based on Table 1.1 above, has been not only a very long post-independent 
era but also one with significant and distinctive contributions to the issues of 
community governance in Acholiland (Branch, 2004, 2011:40-63; Finnström, 
2008; Dolan, 2010).  Evidently, the memories and symbols of the Pax 
Musevenica are also very fresh in the minds of most Acholi29.   Within the 
boundaries of these social sciences and humanities milestones, I have drawn 
some conclusions regarding outcomes of changes in community governance 
practices.  These conclusions include the nature of change in the governing 
actors and in the practices associated with the governing institutions.  These 
changes are linked to the corresponding behaviours of the communities, both in 
the short and long-term.  
Some Relationships, Definitions and Terminologies 
In the study, I have used the terms “conflict”, “violent conflict” and 
“violence” repeatedly.  In the case of conflict, I concur with the respondents that 
                                                          
28 Displacement started as early as in the 1986 following the capture of Acholiland by 
the NRA in March 1986.  However, the official version of displacement in Acholiland 
has been tied to the LRA war periods, which started in the 1987 and often to the 
official announcement by government in 2002 that people, should move to the 
camps.  This, however, is not correct.  In this study, I have relied on field versions of 
these events as communicated by the respondents.  Similarly, return to ancestoral 
lands or where people were displaced has also been spread over a long period 
beyond the official point referred to as in 2006.  Even to-date, some areas still have 
displaced people who are no longer being served by the INGOs. 
29 By 2010, some 75 per cent of the Acholi population were either born during the 
NRM period or were less than 8 years old when the NRM came into power in 1986.  
Also, the numerous “protected camps” that remain the legacy of the regime were 
still found in Acholiland and so were the absence of public services and the high 
level of poverty associated with the regime. 
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conflict often symbolises disagreements or differences in the contents, opinions 
or principles30.  Especially in matters of governance, the contents of governing 
issues and the manner in which they are sometimes communicated or 
implemented can cause disagreements. However, such disagreements can be 
resolved amicably.  Conflicts are therefore inevitable and are clearly the 
manifestation of human behaviours and situations.  Conflict, however, can turn 
violent when the parties involved take positions on matters that are equally 
important to them.  Violent conflicts include wars – whether civil wars, 
insurgencies, genocides or any form that encourage the use of force.   
Violence on the other hand, includes unwarranted or unjustified exertion 
of authority with the view of undermining ones rights or laws as manifested in 
shouting at, labelling and suggesting that others are inferior or less significant.  
As further discussed in chapter three, prejudices are violation of people’s rights 
and are forms of violence.  The latter can be physical, psychological, sexual or 
through deprivation.  It can also be self- inflicted or caused by others. 
Social-political 
Jan Kooiman (2003) argues that “social-political” is the interaction 
between the social and the political in response to diversity and complexity of 
governing efforts and the resulting governing outcomes, mediated by 
differentiated actors (Kooiman, 2003:6-9).  “Social-political”, however, is 
contextual and more complex in fragile situations as further discussed later in 
Chapters 4 to 7.  Acholi macon therefore, was social-political - with multi-layered 
and multilateral governing realms and interactions - embracing diversities in the 
content and modes of governance.  Unlike the contemporary one, Acholi macon 
as a system, demonstrated forms of facultative mutualisms – that predominantly 
exercised hierarchical authority at a primordial level - while the contemporary 
one, as we will see later, manifests forms of “limited statehood” (see: Risse, 
2011: 1-6).   
In the case of the former, there are shared responsibilities based on 
mutual respect and carrying capacities of the stakeholders.  However, in the case 
of limited statehood, the state delegates some of its core governing roles to non-
state actors in an arrangement that misses the hierarchical bureaucracy typical of 
a modern state (see: Branch, 2001:47).   These changes in the governing modes 
                                                          
30 See also: Jehn and Mannix, 2001 for more discussion on the dynamics of conflicts. 
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have not only challenged state legitimacy.  They have equally reshuffled the 
governing structures and introduced violence as a preferred mechanism for 
enforcing governing actions.   
The Acholi macon’s different governing entities, namely: i) dog odi (dog 
ot for singular), which were the foundation or the households, ii) dye-kal or paci, 
were groups of odi that were lineages or corporate families – identified by a 
common wang oor or the evening bonfire and patrilineal shrine or kac; (iii) dog 
gangi (gang for singular) - collections of these related paci/dye-kal that 
recognised a common eponymous ancestor.  Gangi were the modern villages, 
and first level of ethnic identity.  In ethnic term, this was the communal level of 
governance because they were in their own terms, identified by common village 
shrines, abila – which were a collection of all lower shrines or kac of the 
corporate or lineages that were linked to the specific abila and mwoc, which were 
bragging flirtations symbolic of gangi establishments; and (iv) kaka, which were 
the consociations of a number of gangi agnates and therefore, the second level 
of ethnic identity.  Atkinson referred to the latter as chiefdom (Atkinson, 2010:61-
66, 77-78).  
Dog in Acholi refers to a unit and literally translated as “mouth of” and 
therefore, an entry point.  Thus, dog kaka refers to kaka a political unit, which 
was named after the eponymous ancestor of the governing realms or physical 
features (Crazzolara, 1954: 325-328)31.  Ot was a hut headed by a man, a won ot 
literally the father of the hut.  Every ot also had a wife or dako ot – literally wife of 
the house/hut.  Dako (mon for plural) owned the hut and therefore was min ot, 
translated as the mother of the hut32.  The hut sometimes had children or litino 
(latin for singular).  Litino were girls, anyira (nyako for singular) or boys, that is, 
awobe (awobi for singular).  Dako ot was also min ot – min referring to 
motherhood and mego as title of respect and recognition in the clan.  As a sister 
of one’s father, she was an aunt, wayo (waci for plural).  As mother of the 
children, megi litino, she graduates fully into a member of the clan she is married 
into.  Hence, mego was a status that legitimised her as a recognised and putative 
clan member.  
                                                          
31 Kaka like Payiira, Patiko and Pabbo were named after their eponymous ancestors.  
However, some like Lamogi according to Crazzolara were not although from 
discussion, Mogi was a brother to Boya who was the founder of Pabbo. 
32 Huts like anthills are some of the rear things that are personified in the Acholi 
custom.  This is unlike children, who tend to remain a belonging of the entire clan. 
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Won (wego for plural), on the other hand was the head of the hut, that is, 
a leader (latela), a pater or wego/won and also a husband (cwar).  Lacoo (male) 
is the opposite of dako (female).   He is won ot (wegi odi for plural) – literally, the 
father of the house.  He is the patrilineal elder or ladit (ludito for plural) in the 
household.  Together with his brothers or omego (omin for single) and sisters or 
lumego (lamin for single), they constitute the corporate family, the dye-kal of their 
father.  The Acholi considers extended families as kinship or wadi obeno / remo 
(wat obeno / remo for singular), which is translated as blood relatives.  When a 
man grew old, he became not only ladit, he would also become a grandpa or 
kwaro while his wife becomes dayo as grandma.  
Social-political systems 
In this study, a social-political system includes the pattern of interactions 
or relationships across and outside the community.  Within the Acholi system, this 
involved the dog odi, dye-kal/dog paci, dog gangi and dog kaka.  Within these 
different layers of governing entities, three modes of governing interactions were 
exhibited.  These were interference, interplay, and interventions (Kooiman, 
2003:4-6).  Interference was an informal kind of interaction.  It was less organised 
and based on the predominant governing practices of the Acholi. It was the 
primary process of societal interactions33.  Interplay, on the other hand, depicts 
informal exchanges between social-political actors who occupied similar social 
hierarchy.  For instance, interplay represented the dominant interactions of ludito, 
megi and other social categories - leaders of the different communal groups34.  It 
was collective rather than an independent form of interaction by nature35.  The 
interactions were regulated, gender differentiated and more supportive and 
specialised.  The last type of intervention was hierarchical.  It was often formal 
but also in the case of informality, regulated - and carries with it authority, yet 
interactions inhabited mutuality and learning.  Won paco as a headman of the 
                                                          
33 The general view I get from oral narratives when discussing hierarchial governance 
in kaka is the portrayal that it was embedded in interactions that were regulated 
rather than commanded.  However, commands were applied and were very 
evident at the household and corporate levels, in enforcing corporate values as a 
form of communal identity.  However, at other levels, values were regulated and 
demanded self-enforcement most of the time.  This, I have discussed further in 
Chapter 4-7.  
34 “Ditto” in Acholi describes a status and is therefore neutral – used for both women 
and men.  However, ladit as a title is gender bias for men.  The female analogue is 
mego, which is a title for respected women. 
35 Discussion with Charles Alai, in Gulu dated April 2004 
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dye-kal had both a duty and the authority to ensure compliance with patrilineal 
codes of behaviours.  
As a social-political system, Acholiland is what Fiona (1998) referred to 
as a “community in place” or a society defined by both the contents and 
contestation of the societal structural dimensions of interactions, namely the 
cultural norms and the value systems of its people (Kooiman, 2003:8; De Angelis, 
2001:7).  But gangi agnates were community groups, or a sub-society of a 
collective, the kaka, which was defined by interests (Crazzolara, 1954:325-326).  
As discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, Acholi’s terms for these sub-
societies of clans, the gangi agnates were also kaka.  This is because kaka was 
about brotherhood – an economy that traded on human currency - entrustments.  
These gangi formed “multiple systems of overlapping and intersecting socio-
economic networks” of differentiated authorities that shared common purposes 
and interests, values and cultural norms (Mann, 1982:2).  Dwyer (1972:14) 
counters that the traditional political system of the Acholi was unique because it 
was neither segmentary nor centralised.  It consisted of these sub-systems, each 
with relatively independent decision making organisations, which collectively 
became known as the Acholi tribe.     
Study location – the geographical aspect 
Acholiland, in this study, refers to a geographical location within Uganda, 
which in 1902 was politically designated as an ethnic territory (See Map of 
Uganda).  Today, Acholiland consists of the Amuru, Nwoya, and Gulu districts, 
which traditionally are the lupiny or the Acholi living west of Aswa River, which 
split Acholiland North-South into two, while the Kitgum, Lamwo, Agago and Pader 
districts are occupied by the lumalo - the Acholi of the east (Finnström, 2008:33).  
The territorial components represented human settlements, which were 
occupied by the different gangi agnates.  According to scholars, these gangi 
agnates were the foundations of the Acholi political identity and ethnicity (see: 
Crazzolara, 1951; Atkinson, 2010:41,66,75,77; Bere, 1947:3-5).  As discussed in 
Chapter Four, the agnates, according to scholars, were “of equal interests and 
significance” (e.g., Girling, 1960:82).  In other words, gangi agnates had high 
attributes for autonomy or autopoiesis as a means of maintaining and preserving 
patrilineal identity. 
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Defining the Parameters of Research 
In trying to place the outcomes of institutional change in context, this 
study looks at the complete spectrum of the Acholi’s lived experiences over one 
hundred and ten years.  In doing so, it attempts to link and compare 
contemporary governance outcomes and experiences with traditional praxis (see: 
Allen, 1998:18).  This, I argue, is in tandem with earlier work by scholars in Africa 
(e.g., Hohne, 2006:4-5). In spite of the difficulties associated with collecting some 
concrete supporting evidence over such a long period, the study avoided 
conflating myths and folklore, or selective representation, with realities.  It thus 
sets observed interactions and discourses against what Allen (1998:48) called 
the “hypothesised archive of knowledge” – the realities that are often not spoken 
of, but lie just beneath the surface of daily governance activity, and are generally 
better understood by living them.  
In the study, institutional change is broadly viewed as the struggles, of 
varying intensity, over shared expectations, and evolving governing fundamentals 
that pitched the Acholi community against other social-political agencies, most of 
them external to the Acholi systems.  The assumption is that institutional change 
often aims to improve governance, which is bettering societal governing 
interactions.  However, the reality as detailed in Chapter Five shows that most 
interactions with external forces have exhibited complex and diverse 
perspectives.  The core argument in the thesis is that these external sources 
applied excess social powers and with conflicting interests, leading to outright 
overturning of the Acholi’s interests, which was the growth of its agnatic identity 
through facultative mutualism.  
 Institutional change in the study is seen as the difference in the form, 
quality, or state of governing and governance from 1898 through to 2010.  This I 
have determined by carefully observing changes in the indicators of the selected 
governing attributions for each of the governing periods, on a number of 
dimensions as laid out in Table 1.1.  The specific periods for when data were 
collected for a given regime varied.  For instance, most data on colonial regimes 
were collected from reports and literature.  In some instances, they are not 
specific about the period.  However, data in the last thirty years or so could easily 
be traced in some instances to specific dates.   
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Institutional change outcomes on the other hand are understood as 
practices, precedents or habits resulting from actions and activities of the 
different governing social-political actors – who were diverse and in many 
instances varied with the regime types.  Change outcomes are designed to 
satisfy the various social and political needs of the system.  In addition, they 
cannot easily be specified to a period because they are incremental in nature.  As 
such, institutional outcomes are reports and/or measures of actual or perceived 
effectiveness, relevance, and appropriateness of change in the governance 
practices by the governing entities that constituted or replaced kaka Acholi. While 
community expectations are dynamic, the distinct dimensions, or indicators, of 
governing elements considered below, are specific: 
(i) Actual and/or perceived quality, form or state of the 
governing entities, kaka, and their political leaders as 
perceived by the community since 1898 through to 2010 – 
as the Governing Image;  
(ii) Actual and/or perceived quality, form or state of both the 
general, and especially the specific social rules, in guiding 
governing actions by governing actors since 1898 through 
to 2010 – as the Governing Instruments; and  
(iii)  Actual and/or perceived quality, form and state of 
governing practices or behaviours of the governing actors 
since 1898 through to 2010 – as Governing Actions. 
 A broad definition of institutional change outcomes is used to try to 
capture community governance as a multilayer concept, which affects a wide 
variety of institutional types.  However, this study has placed emphasis only on 
political institutions because it discusses governance.   This is because political 
institutions deal with power distribution (see for instance: Fukuyana, 2013).  
Table 1.1 below, highlights the indicators for measurements or reporting changes 
in the elements identified. 
The central logic of the study 
Community governance in Acholiland’s past and present, and how 
violence has shaped its course, has been researched in a reflective, 
interdisciplinary, dialectic and critical manner.  Conversely, community 
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governance as a concept is a contested space and in exploring realities 
associated with it, an interdisciplinary lens is the most desirable (Newell, 2010a).   
This is because peace studies draw explicitly on the different disciplines, to 
provide insights about the lived and felt experiences of the Acholi with the 
intention to integrate these insights into new products, new knowledge and with 
new meanings (e.g., Bal, 2002:27). 
Table 1.2: Change Outcomes Indicators for Governance 
Conceptual Areas Types Measures 
Governing images of the 
governing bodies in 
relation to expectations 
Constitutive 
attributions 
- Changes in legal and policy 
frameworks for good governance  
 
- Enacted Institutional 
arrangements for implementation 
of collective action 
Operational 
attributions  
- Effective, embedded and 
responsive governing actors  
 
- Effective, functional and 
responsive political institutions of 
governance 
 
- Effective, responsive and 
demand-led political systems 
Governing actions aimed 
at enhancing community 
expectations 
Constitutive 
attributions  
- Effective legal and policy 
framework for service delivery 
embracing all areas of community 
needs 
 
- Framework for interactive 
governing actors 
Operational 
attributions 
- Effective and responsive 
provision of demanded services in 
social safety nets and human 
security 
 
- Effective, functional and 
responsive governing interactions 
involving public, private and civil 
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societies 
Governing instruments 
enacted and shaping 
community expectations 
Constitutive 
attributions 
- Relevance and embeddedness of 
general rules built on societal 
bases 
 
- The balancing of soft and hard 
governing instruments for general 
acceptance 
Operational 
attributions 
- The practices and applications of 
formal and informal instruments  
 
- Acceptability of and applicability 
of selected governing instruments 
for transformative change 
 
Source: Field Data Analysis, 2013 
For more than sixty years – 1898 to 1962 - the colonial authorities 
deliberately managed Acholiland under a separate and unique customary law36.   
This was followed by another forty-eight years -1962 to 2010 – of “coloniality” 
with mixed and varying regularities37.  In all these reforms, the Ugandan state and 
other external actors, sought to transform kaka’s pluralism into singularity, where 
“rights-based” moralities dominate governing actions (see for instance: Woods, 
2003:1)38.  This thesis makes the argument that imposed change - however 
significant – normally fails to be transformative in nature (McAdams, 2000).  
Rather, as McAdam (2000) explains, such phenomena transpose older conflicts 
and cultures within new structures.   
                                                          
36 The customary laws, according to my analysis, were hybrids of selected customs 
from both the Acholi and the Baganda and were fixed with the British’s own 
colonial rules, creating a despotic regime that had uncontrolled authority as I have 
further discussed in Chapter Three in some more details.  
37 Since independence in October 9, 1962, there has been in total seven types of 
central governance that had different relationships with the Acholi people, namely: 
1962 to 1966, 1966 to 1971; 1971 to 1979; 1979 to 1980; 1980 to 1985; 1985 to 
1986; and 1986 to date 
38 Woods (2003), where he argues that the dominant discourse of right-based 
morality is the autonomy of an individual, i.e., right bearing individual. 
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Conceptualisation of the Research  
The underlying research assumptions 
The study assumes that, by 1898, the governing structures that 
constituted kaka polities were homologous in spite of their different levels of 
political and structural development and maturity (Atkinson, 2010:80-82, 125-
126).  Each governing level of each kaka had its rules, systems and leaders, 
mediated by their different circumstances and ethnicity (Atkinson, 1999, 2010:66, 
70).   This means that the methods of analyses used for each are transferable to 
the other (see: Casey, 2010:351).  However, the older and larger ones might 
have been better governed and developed internal agnates (Atkinson, 2010: 84-
86).  As such, changes might have impacted each of them differently.  In part 
also, all these governing entities had distinct cultural orientations and political 
ways of ‘adapting’ to different types of institutional change39.  
Secondly, insights into the history of their interactions, and the nature of 
such interactions and behaviours can best be understood from an 
interdisciplinary approach. This is because insights from a single discipline 
cannot explain adequately the pervasiveness and especially the typologies of 
violence as a reality in Acholiland.  Rather, what is desirable is to apply a 
problem-based approach to situate these complex issues of prolonged 
insurgency, high mortality amongst children, and rocketing poverty in the twenty-
first century within the real world (Tepstra et al., 2010: 509). 
Case selection and composition 
The entire kaka Acholi as a political community is selected as the case 
for this study.  As such, the Acholi constitutes the fundamental focus of the 
analysis, that is, the object of the study (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009:124).   The 
Acholi is a contemporary political community or at best, a colonial society.  Its 
“traditional” aspects were made up of several homologous governing entities – 
the dog odi, dog paco/dye-kal, dog gang and dog kaka – and these structures 
                                                          
39 See some of the differentiations in culture between lumalo and lupiny groups or 
lwak agnates and the luker agnates in the Chapters that follow. 
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constitute the units of observations.  These governing levels are indicated in 
Table 1.2 below in column one and are discussed in detail in Chapter Four40.    
In the selection of Acholiland as a unit of analysis, a number of steps 
were taken to ensure good interpretation.  Foremost was narrowing the focus of 
this research to the specific concern – understanding the trends of change 
outcomes or governing practices at these different political units at different time 
over the last one hundred and twenty years.  With this clarification, only those 
units of observation that demonstrated diversity in governance, had a recognised 
history of governing practices and were accessible to the research team, were 
selected.  
Finnica (2001) notes that units of analysis are sometimes selected so 
that they are estimated to produce similar outcomes or literal replication.  In some 
instances, however, they are selected to produce contradictory outcomes or 
theoretical replication.  In this study, the Acholi community is selected as a unit of 
analysis to achieve a combination of both these aspects – which is to ensure that 
the diversities and similarities within the governing realms arising from their 
maturity, characters and human differences and localities are included in 
generating the desired data for interpretation.  The data for comparative study of 
the change outcomes was observed across these different governance levels.  
Table 1.3: Levels and Units of Analysis in a Study of Changes in Governing 
Practices, 1898 to 2010 
Levels of analysis Units of analysis 
Acholi Territory Quality and forms of governing image, instruments and 
actions from the different kaka Acholi 
Dog Kaka (a) Average views collected regarding (a) to (c) below 
from the dog gangi levels of governance; (b) issues that 
have been consistent and those that are location specific 
Dog Gang a) Average views collected regarding (a) to (c) below 
from the dog odi levels of governance; (b) issues that 
have been consistent and those that are location specific 
                                                          
40 Three traditional governing levels correspond to and in some instances, are 
subsumed in the current Local Government structures.  Village or parish levels are 
in most instances the traditional gang agnates.  Counties on the other hand, are 
the kaka and in some instances combined with other kaka as discussed elsewhere 
in the report    
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Dye-kal – focusing 
on the unit as a 
cluster of 
governing units in 
relation to outside 
and internal 
governance 
 
Cumulative effects of (a) to (c) below 
Dog ot/keno -
focusing on the 
units and the 
individuals in the 
unit 
(a) Changes in levels of autonomies for units and 
individuals; b) changes in nature and quality of 
interactions within households and outside; c) changes in 
the quality and form of governing policies and rules 
affecting households. 
 
Source: Field Data Analysis, 2013 
Its historical context, patterns and dynamism encapsulate the three major 
eras: pre-colonial, colonial and post-independent, with significant similarity (see: 
Atkinson, 2010).  Second, there were commonalities in the political governance 
structures and systems among the different polities from 1898, going forward 
(Girling, 1960: 174-204).  Therefore, focusing this research on a few units of 
observation increases the feasibility of the analysis.  Moreover, understanding the 
history of governance in Acholiland under the investigation is an important basis 
for understanding the conflict cultures of the present41.  
Overall, it can be generally concluded that the differences in change 
outcomes within kaka were significantly more than between them.  Within kaka 
like Lamogi, the various governing entities – the dog odi, the dye-kal and the 
gangi - held some level of autonomy that was further enhanced through the 
creation of formal administrative systems at the County levels, which is most 
instances corresponded a collection of kaka levels42.  Many of the changes within 
                                                          
41 Five kaka were studied rather extensively although others were reviewed as well.  
These were Lamogi and Alero from the western political zone, Patiko and Payiira 
from the central and Pajule from the eastern political zone.  In each case, three 
gangi agnates and between 2-3 dye-kal were sampled and studied from 2001 to 
2014.  These units of observation were combined with the rich data in Girling 
(1960) and other cases.  For gangi and dye-kal a lot of viewpoints were collected 
from different individuals in Gulu, Kitgum and Amuru during functions like funeral 
rites or visits to schools. 
42 As further discussed in Chapters Four to Six, in some instances, a number of 
smaller kaka units were amalgamated into a County as a modern administrative 
centre.  Thus, several gangi, sometimes as many as hundred or five kaka made up a 
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these polities also took place within agnatic settings, mediated by both internal 
and external factors43.  The external logic included induced policies and to some 
extent, markets.  The existence of Churches in some areas, for instance, also 
significantly affected change in the institutions of governance.  Consequently, the 
cases of the selected kaka and the associated agnates were representative of 
the whole society. 
The research questions and analytical methods 
Specifically, this study is guided by the following questions: 
a)   What have been the impacts of change in the quality of community 
leaders and ii) how do Acholi now conceptualise community 
governance? 
b) What has been the nature of change observed in kaka as community 
governance system, and (ii) what factors account for the changes? 
c) , What have been the key changes in community governance 
practices? And, 
d) Why and how has violence remained a significant factor in Acholiland 
over the years? 
In addition to addressing the research questions above, an important product of 
this research is the development of a hermeneutic approach to the method of 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)44, which is the analytical tool.  It explicitly 
and implicitly examines, through a case study, the processes and outcomes of 
societal change in terms of its political content and contestation for political 
space.  Changes involve the entire political structures and how they influence 
relationships: political allegiances, purposes, legitimacy and authority, and their 
responsiveness to the different governing constituencies.  
Some changes within the governance systems reviewed include the 
struggles to restructure authorities, accountability and representation of all 
                                                                                                                                                               
County as was the case with Kilak Country where Lamogi, Pagak, Parabongo, Toro – 
which made up the new Lamogi sub-county, combined with kaka Atiak, Pabbo and 
Alero to make up Kilak County in the 1950s 
43 One can argue that markets could have been part of the factors.  However, market 
was not given the opportunity to prime demands as both colonialism and 
coloniality undermined perfect market operations. 
44 Hereon, the word ‘hermeneutic’ is understood as interpretative and 
understanding, in contrast to the usual causal application by Ragin (1987, 1994a) 
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internal actors45.  As such, this research focuses on institutional change 
outcomes that embrace the entire Acholi society.  It is a comprehensive focus 
that embraces a number of disciplines.  It is historical as it traces events across 
periods and space.  It is political as it engages on the issues of power 
relationships among the stakeholders.  It is also anthropological, that is, 
embracing social, legal and economic anthropologies, as it seeks to understand 
the culture of change in the context of humanity, and it is psychological because 
it looks at behavioural change. 
Approach to the Research 
I have used a mixture of variance and process theories to explain 
change outcomes (see: Van de Ven, 1992; Mohr, 1982).  Firstly, this approach 
identifies institutional change outcomes as a key independent explanatory 
variable that statistically explains changes in perceptions over time from 1898 
through to 2010.  Secondly, it develops the narratives in order to explain why the 
sequences of discrete social-political events occurred at the specific time in 
history within the associated context thereof.  
The outcomes are reported and measured as they unfold within the 
pluralistic systems of governance.  On the basis of participant observation and 
literature reviews, a framework for comprehensive dialogues - structured and 
open-ended interviews, focused group discussions and individual interviews were 
carried out46.  As part of the research interaction, a number of indicators that 
report on changes in the three governing elements were developed, as detailed 
in Annex 1.3.  As an approach, the investigation began by focusing on the most 
recent events and worked backwards into the far past, the details of which were 
mostly available from literature47.  This was because it became evident that the 
memories and experiences of the most recent events were still vivid and easily 
remembered (Allen, 1998).  Insights into the state of events, such as the 
                                                          
45 Examples are the rules and norms for participation and representation of the 
polities, and rules and/or norms against conflict of interests 
46 In Chapter Eight, I enumerated in some detail, the encounters and experiences of 
data collection during the project.  
47 Hence, the difference in the quality and form of the observed changes in 
governance at several points, corresponding to the different political regimes, is 
assumed to capture changes in perception of the respondents.   
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effectiveness of leaders, were reported based on the viewpoints of the 
respondents48.  It was rated 1 (one) when the contributions were effective and 
had positive impacts in the lives of the people, or set some precedents, and if so, 
what kind of precedents these were.  However, it was 0 (zero) if the contributions 
were the opposite.  The dimensions for these measurements were either 
cognitive, normative, or clarity in regulations.  Where dimensions were cognitive, 
they were discussed in focus groups to generate the required evidence for such a 
judgement.  The differences observed between the regimes are expressed both 
qualitatively and statistically in comparison to the past as well as the expected 
dimensions.  
Hence, any noticeable difference (perceived or real) was used to make 
conclusions about change, and the reported extent of such changes was 
attributed to the event and its magnitude.  The study has, therefore, given 
considerable attention not only to the landscape of the difference, that is, the 
qualitative nature of what has changed, it also profiled how change happened, 
the process of change (See also: Scouvart, 2006)49.   
Processes, as a category of concepts or variables, normally pertain to 
actions and activities and, therefore, are associated with the “variance theory” of 
change, in which a set of independent variables statistically explain the variations 
in some outcome criteria, the dependent variables (e.g., Mohr, 1982)50.  
However, processes under certain instances also provide a narrative description 
of how political events ensued and changed (Van de Ven, 1982).   As such, it is 
                                                          
48 For instance, the quality of community leaders as a measure of their 
embeddedness in the society was reported by categorising the responses of the 
different respondents on how they felt such leaders were effectiveness on the 
achievements of community goals.  In the early 1900s to 1962, we looked at the 
successes achieved by leaders on priority issues like amalgamation of tribes, the 
land questions and education.  Similarly, in the last 30 years we focused on the land 
issues, creation of districts and insecurity in the region. 
49 For instance, the institution of marriage was said to have changed significantly 
based on what the practices were by the 1960s.  Respondents were also able to 
walk me through how this happened in each period of political governance and the 
likely reasons thereof.  Thus, the study captured the processes of change, the 
extents and as well, the qualitative nature of the difference between them.    
50 For instance, displacement as a phenomenon was triggered through actions and 
activities of the government and the LRA.  The most traumatised episodes, which 
ended in 2010, were a combined result of governing actions - including policy 
statements that triggered forceful or interactive movements of people as an 
activity - and voluntary movements into the camps.    
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associated with a “process theory” explanation of the temporal order and 
sequence, in which a discrete set of change events, in this case influencing the 
management of, responsiveness to, and involvement of, the Acholi community, 
occurred based on a story or historical narrative (Van de Ven et al, 2000; Abbot, 
1988).  
Data collection methods and strategies 
In order to adequately capture the spectrum of the project, including 
what Kant refers to as “knowing the subject”, I abstracted from my primary and 
secondary sources the precise attributes of social-political governance of the 
Acholi people (Kant, 1781/1987 cited in Smith, 1998: 280; Sayer, 1992:86).  I 
used secondary sources and the results of my own fieldwork in Acholiland to 
guide my exploration in both specific and broad issues on community governance 
(see for instance: Oloya et al., 1998; Ayo and Oloya, 2001).  As such, the 
research undertaken here was more extensive than originally envisaged because 
it benefitted from my earlier professional work in the region but also overlapped 
with other projects that I was responsible for in the territory.  The data from these 
additional works, to the best of my knowledge, has not been published 
elsewhere.  However, a number of reports have been written following these work 
and they reflect my contributions as a lead or member of the team51. 
As an entry point sometime in 2003/2004, following possibly three years 
of participant observations and intensive literature reviews of major scholarships 
on the Acholi of Uganda52, I interviewed twenty informants, both local and 
foreign53.  The core objectives of the interviews were three-fold.  Firstly, I wanted 
to get first-hand viewpoints from these experts on the current narratives on the 
Acholi following the LRA war and their knowledge of the general trends in 
community governance in Acholiland.  I also wanted to get their opinions on the 
sampling of observations for representative information for the topic.  Secondly, I 
                                                          
51 See for instance the World Bank’s Appraisal Document for NUSAF project, 2001 
and the subsequent supervision reports, 2001 to 2005 referred to in the 
bibliography.  
52 These include: Girling, 1960; Atkinson, 1999; Allen, 1998; Crazzolara, 1950, 1954. 
53 I have referred to these resource persons as trailblazers because they helped me in 
setting on the path for full-scale interviews.  These comprised eight men and 
tweleve women, thirty-seven and thirty eight per cent respectively of these were 
foreigners. They were scholars, administrators, local and opinion leaders, 
politicians, development workers and members of civil societies.  Most of them had 
worked in Acholi for not less than ten years. 
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wanted additional and an authoritative list of informants to consult going forward.  
Finally, as an insider, I needed their own take of my engagement in this work and 
things I needed to take note of apriori. This initiative helped me not only to “bind 
the case” conceptually, but also gave a list of useful informants both within and 
outside Acholiland54.  
In order to focus the data collection, I identified seven of the known kaka 
found in Acholiland as my prime observations55.  Within each of the kaka 
selected, I examined at most a minimum of two-gangi levels governance, three 
dye-kal and ten dog odi entities.  For dog odi, I was able to speak to one hundred 
and fifty of them, spread over the research period.  They were randomly picked 
but involved both the luker and lwak lineages.  I also talked to ten households 
that represent the lubong.  Of these, three households were from kaka Palabek 
Kal. The selection of observations was influenced by the outcomes of desk 
studies, the guidance of the initial respondents, the trailblazers, and accessibility 
due to the prevalent of insecurity in Acholiland. In the case of Patiko, Payiira and 
Pajule, the availability of secondary data was also a strong selection factor 
(Atkinson, 2010:84-91). 
The data gathered from the seven core observations consists of some 
ten years’ of participant observations56, about fifteen questionnaires, fifty semi-
structured interviews, and thirty focused group interviews with specialists 
representing interest groups, politicians, opinion leaders, administrators, 
researchers and the media57.  These formal discussions were complemented by 
                                                          
54 Grateful to Retired Bishop Mac Ochola, Denis Pain, Caroline Opok of the World 
Food Program, Father Joseph Okumu and John Odongo-Onyango among others for 
this part. 
55 The numbers of kaka that made up contemporary Acholiland have been contested 
and further discussed in Chapter Four.  Others claim that it varied from 45 to 77.  
The kaka I used in the study were Kaka Patiko, Kaka Lamogi, Kaka Payiira, Kaka 
Pajule, Kaka Alero, Kaka Atiak and Kaka Koch. 
56 I distinguish in this research between observations and participation.  In the former 
case, I relied on my fieldwork to validate through observations, the findings that 
emerged during my earlier work for Oxfam-UK and the other donors.  One case was 
in how ludito kaka continued to enforce patrilineal norms while in the camps 
during meetings organised by other NGOs or camp leaders.   However, in the case 
of participation, I was involved in most of the discussions of events like children, 
marriages and kaka with my peers as well as my elders (female and male) on 
events that were familiar to whole of us, to compare notes on how we perceived 
these things. 
57 In total about four hundred and fifty four, covering the seven cases over a period 
of ten years. 
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numerous informal in different forums.   These exercise was spread over the ten 
years with most of them carried towards the end of the war in 2006 and 
thereafter.  The data collection methods benefited from specialised approaches 
of the different disciplines.  I then systematically validated some emerging issues 
around governance, violence and institutions through focus group discussion, 
structured interviews and informal probing during meetings, funerals, and over 
Skype.  This was extended over a very long time and it helped to resolve some of 
the inconsistencies in the information that were being collected58. 
Relevant change outcomes for the study 
In the case of Acholiland, it is sometimes very difficult to separate 
induced and extemporaneous change because of the overlapping nature of 
interests under fragility.  Induced change tends to come from outside and from 
the top, and is not necessarily detrimental to society (North, 1994).  In this 
research, it is irrelevant whether the main issue of debate relating to a specific 
change outcome is purely or only partly induced.  A change outcome becomes 
relevant for this study if the political discourse related to the change is found to 
impact on what I have termed here social-political governance, and in particular, 
the three key concepts or variables for measuring governance outcomes.   
Definition of attributes in change outcomes 
The institutional change outcomes in the governance structures and 
community practices were isolated by first identifying the attributes of the 
governing practices and arrangements in the Acholi macon.  In the study, I 
focused on both the “operational” and “constitutive” rules and practices, which 
have been the object of collective efforts by the community of polities that formed 
Acholiland.  The violation of these collective efforts, I have suggested, constitutes 
human rights abuse.  This is because the three parameters used: the governing 
                                                          
58  Several of these informal discussions or focus group interviews I had planned with 
key respondents while attending funerals can not be assigned any specific names or 
location to keep these as informal and diffused.  However, the majority of these 
engagements were planned either individuals or groups but turned out into groups 
meetings mainly based on self-interests of the others, who were pulled into the 
discussions because of the issues being discussed.   In most cases, these became 
exchanges of views and important forums in which we validated core concepts and 
governing outcomes experienced in Acholiland. I had plenty of time to engage 
them in a participatory manner, challenging some the core evidence of for instance 
chiefdoms, lyweny kaka, and meanings of many of the Acholi’s words used in 
governance like gen, ribbe, dito.  What was relly rewarding about these meetings is 
the follow on meetings that I was able to secure with specific respondents that had 
compeling information that could validate or contradict earlier ones. 
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image, the governing instruments and actions, report on the fundamentals of the 
rights of the Acholi community.  I also looked at selective incentives - which are 
formal instruments and practices due to institutional arrangements.  Thus, the 
process and extent of change in community governance were examined at all the 
governing levels: dog keno/ dog ot, dog dye-kal, dog gang and at the kaka levels, 
and how other social-political actors contributed to the governing interactions59.  
Table 1.3 in the Annex shows the Categories of Rules and Practices that have 
been studied. 
Research Strategy and Methods 
Two complementary research strategies and methods are used to 
explore institutional change outcomes.  These are case study (CS) and 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and are discussed below. 
Case study (CS) 
Gerring (2007:115-116) makes two important conclusions for choosing 
case study as a research strategy.  First, there is significant growth in interest in 
the case study as a design tool in comparative studies.  Secondly, case studies 
as a method are capable of taking on many forms and can be used within any 
paradigm.  In other words, the case study approach has an affinity with the 
interpretivist metatheory adopted for the study (Gerring, 2007:98-109).   
Furthermore, this study involves practice-based problem solving, in 
which the context of the governing actions is critical.  Bonoma (1983) contends 
that case study strategy is well situated in capturing the knowledge of 
practitioners and in documenting the experiences of the practice (Cepeda and 
Martin, 2006).  Lor (2011:11) also notes that case study is quite useful for 
exploring phenomena and in determining causal relationships, in addition to the 
fact that it offers insights into research while dealing with heterogeneous entities.  
In spite of some arguments against the relevance of single case studies 
(E.g., Danton, 1973:46-52; Krzys and Litton, 1983:27-29; Sartori, 1991:252), 
Gerring (2007) asserts that in comparative politics, social and political units like 
                                                          
59 The effects of change were explored at the level of both the individual operational 
and constitutive rules and practices, including how they are perceived and 
conceptualised at the different levels of governance.   
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Acholi District Authorities or institutions like kaka “can also be chosen” instead of 
countries, which are the dominant type of cases (Gerring, 2007: 94-95).  
Furthermore, even when a case study does not itself constitute comparative 
research, “good descriptions of individual cases are useful as raw material for 
comparison, or as the first step in a comparative study” (Landman, 2008: 5).  
Case studies as comparative research designs 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was chosen both as a strategy 
and as the method of analysis for comparing the cases (Ragin, 1987, 1994a). 
Comparative strategy, according to Finnica (2001), is often interpreted differently 
in relation to qualitative and quantitative methods.  As Alestalo (1992) affirmed, 
qualitative case-oriented and quantitative variable-oriented studies are normally 
considered as the two basic types of comparative strategies.  Furthermore, he 
suggests that strategies of case-oriented comparisons can be based on 
searching for differences and similarities, universals or variation.  Ragin (1994b) 
also distinguishes ‘comparative research to study diversity’ as the third main 
research strategy in addition to ‘qualitative methods to study commonalties’ and 
‘quantitative research to study covariation’.   
In conducting comparisons of the units of observations, which were the 
kaka and their associated lower governing entities, focus is placed on first and 
foremost exploring commonalities, differences and diversity among them, rather 
than on searching for the universal truths60.   In the case of information related to 
governance during Acholi macon, the most credible information from these cases 
came from specific studies by earlier scholars.  Hence, a key decision for the 
study has been the choice of the observations for the purpose of generating or 
testing the set hypotheses.   
A case is “a spatially delimited phenomenon observed […] over some 
period in time” (Gerring, 2007:94-95).  It is often defined by research questions, 
which in this study, relate to change outcomes in community governance 
(Pennings et al., 1999:10-11).  Accordingly, the focus is on Acholiland as a 
social-political unit in its historical specificity and full context (Gerring, 2007:92-
95; Landman, 2008:5).  As such, the reason for this case selection is on account 
                                                          
60  Finnica (2001) also agrees that this is a common strategy of the method of analysis 
used in Qualitative Comparative Analysis.  Additional focus ensures a good 
understanding of conflict culture as a case. 
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of its potential explanatory value, that is, the potential to collect reliable 
information regarding the study.  An intensive study of a single kaka as a unit of 
observation for the purpose of understanding the whole society is limiting in its 
ability to portray the society as a whole.  Thus, additional units of observations 
were included to broaden the intensity of analysis.  Broadening samples, I argue, 
is technically a continuum of a single case study or what some scholars consider 
a cross-case study (Gerring, 2007:95).  The choices of the additional samples 
were based on a number of justifications, including accessibility, importance in 
relation to the study, availability of earlier work on them, and evidence that some 
elders still existed to corroborate literature on the social groups61. 
Research processes 
This research is based on Ragin’s (1994b) notion that social research is 
characterised by a constant interplay between ideas and evidence.  In Figure 1.2 
below, I presented a model of the social research process, the logic from which it 
is applied in this research.  Ideas and theory represent a “reservoir of inclusive 
theoretical ideas” used to interpret the concepts and phenomena associated with 
change outcomes62.  Critical Theory constitutes the main theoretical foundation 
for this research63.  This is because it shies away from “over” generalisation and 
biases, hence, permitting researchers to be more critical and analytical of basic 
knowledge, and to provide grounded knowledge that is comprehensive (Casey, 
2010:345-359).  
Other important ideas include epistemological pluralism, which supports 
the understanding of the dynamic challenges in Acholiland and apply the learning 
to the analysis and interpretation of the phenomena (Welch, 2011:32).   
Additionally, scholarly work in the fields of political or social capital (See: 
Kooiman, 2003: Chapter 2), structural violence (e.g., Galtung, 1969:167-197), 
conflict cultures (e.g., Galtung, 1969:167-197), and transitional justice (e.g., De 
Greiff and Duthe, 2009) and how they relate to the governing elements, are also 
                                                          
61 At the start of the research, I interviewed fifteen contact persons who are 
knowledgeable about the Acholi and who have had a strong attachment to the 
region.  Through them, and our work at the World Bank, I was able to identify 
strong resource persons for the four kaka and the various agnates that were 
studied.   
62 The core concepts are discussed in Chapter Two and include community, 
governance, moral and legitimacy.  These are seen from an interdisciplinary context 
63 Critical Theory has influenced the reservoir of ideas because it embraces peace 
studies, which is the field of inquiry.  
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important sources of ideas.  Ragin, for instance, characterises analytic frames as 
conceptual tools that “constitute ways of seeing”64.   
Ragin (1994b) also points out that analytic frames have two 
components: when concepts are used to classify phenomena, they frame by 
case; however, when concepts are used to characterise the cases, they frame by 
aspect.  Framing by case in this study is largely about answering what change 
outcome is a case of.  I have clarified earlier that this research represents the 
reactions of a conflict culture to social power imposition.  As such, change 
outcome in this study is a case of governance, which is the responsibility of the 
different governing units in the pluralistic settings. Framing by aspect on the other 
hand is about specifying the key features that differentiate the cases in a broad 
category (e.g., Ragin, 1994b:63).   
Figure 1.2: The Research process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Finnica, 2001: 18 
In addition to descriptive approaches to changes and change 
management applied by a variety of change scholars (Finnca, 2001:2-7), the 
construction of the analytic frame for this research was influenced by an 
integrated viewpoint about societal governance as advanced by Jan Kooiman 
                                                          
64 They are constructed through the interaction of theories and evidence that are 
revised during the research process.  See for instance: Ragin, 1994b: 60–66 
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(2003: Chapter 1).  The frame was also influenced by the views of the 
respondents that emphasised morality as the basic elements of institutional 
change but also in the management of political change65.  Evidence, on the other 
hand, can illustrate a whole range of potential data66, from which the ideas and 
analytic frames direct attention to specific types of evidence (Ragin, 1994b).  In 
order to focus the collection of data on the most relevant evidence, a desk study 
was conducted that guided the collection of material.  The data for each of the 
seven cases67 consists of over ten years’ of participant observations, fifteen 
questionnaires, fifty semi-structured interviews, and thirty focused group 
interviews with specialists representing interest groups, politicians, opinion 
leaders, administrators, researchers and the media68.  The data collection 
methods benefited from the specialised approaches of the different disciplines 
that were integrated in the approach.  
Ragin (1994b) states that images (refer to Figure 1.2) are the product of 
an effort to bring coherence to the data.  They draw from sets of lenses that 
reflect the assumptions and theories used.  As such, they avoid bias towards any 
one perspective.  Hence, images were implemented by relating them to the very 
ideas and frames that motivated the collection in the first place. The interview 
data were organised separately for each of the key conceptual areas69.  This was 
in accordance with the structure of the analytic frame adopted from Finnica 
(2001) and analysed by using hermeneutic text interpretation.  
Data analysis 
The analysis was constructed in two phases.  First, the empirical 
typology approach to QCA was used to condense the categorised qualitative data 
and bring coherence to it.  In the second phase, the condensed data was 
                                                          
65 During focus group discussions and personal interviews, the majority of the 
respondents – mainly men - felt that because aid is tied to institutional change, no 
attempts have been made towards the basic elements of change, which includes 
attitude by the people to certain modes of governance including corpral 
punishments.  The use of corporal punishment by the court system, to men in 
particular, abused them culturally and set them to hate even the good within the 
new system.  
66 Examples of data are: documentation, archives, records, interviews, observations, 
and physical objects. 
67 The cases are the seven kaka – which provided variegated observable levels  
68 In total about four hundred and fifty four, covering the seven cases over a period 
of ten years. 
69 The key conceptual areas that constituted the groups were: entrustment, 
legitimacy, community governance, practices, violence, and fragility. 
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analysed by using the new hermeneutic approach to QCA.  During the analysis 
with QCA, analytic frames, as well as the images, were considered flexible.  
Thus, the idea of re-introduction as shown in Fig. 1.1 – the combination of 
interactive and deductive approaches – was central to this phase of analysis, 
although interactive was the dominant approach.  The research process, in 
reality, often overlapped to such a degree that it resulted in a constant interplay of 
ideas and evidence.  This dialogue, conducted through systematic methods of 
analysis, culminated in social representations of political changes that occurred in 
the different tiers of governing structure that constituted kaka. The resulting ideas 
include, for example, the construction of models of change, which is presented in 
part in Chapter Three when I discuss fragility within Acholiland. 
Methodology Issues and Approaches  
The overall methodological inclination within conflict and peace studies 
is drawn from an “interdisciplinary” approach70, which I consider is more 
insightful, embracing, and permits contextualisation of the Acholi community in a 
less dogmatic and a more specific way than a single-disciplinary approach e.g., 
Sayer, 1992, cited from Smith, 1998:326).  Scholars of peace studies agree that, 
as a methodology, it shies away from “over” generalisation and biases, hence, 
permitting researchers to be more critical and analytical of basic knowledge, and 
to provide grounded knowledge that is comprehensive (Casey, 2010:345-359).  
Secondly, it permits origination in the investigation and an analysis of 
relationships between the different variables in a research project. This I find is 
very supportive in the case of Acholiland, which represents a complex context 
and one that guarantees that the knowledge and results of the study and the 
policy recommendations does not marginalise the community under investigation. 
A rejection of other methodological approaches was based on two key 
reasons.  One is that both the post-positivists and positivists would look at the 
Acholi as a static society, even with the many opportunities and shocks and 
change that have influenced its original culture (see: Atkinson, 2010:137-139).  
Secondly, they demand objectivity, which conflicts with the subjectivity of the 
                                                          
70 Multi-disciplinary approach is used interchangeably with interdisciplinary 
approaches – meaning the application of a number of disciplines and in this case 
social sciences, humanities and professional disciplines, to shed light on the 
subject. 
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investigator that is required in the study.  And because both the voices of the 
researched and the researcher are important in the analyses, the other methods 
that said otherwise, were rejected. 
Determination of outcomes 
One of the major difficulties in studying outcomes of institutional change 
is determining exactly what outcomes to examine.  This is because outcomes 
tend to be a constellation of actions that are broader than the narrowly defined 
activities of this research.  Additionally, different disciplines have different 
perspectives of change outcomes.  Firstly, the purpose and the capabilities of the 
social-political actors change radically with time - even in cases when changes 
are supply induced.  In some instances, supply induced changes built on 
spontaneous changes in social practises that are supported by institutional 
structures (Todd, 2000:2).   The other concern is that these change outcomes are 
sometimes derived from unintended consequences and are often not in keeping 
with the objectives of the community.  In addition, because of different fluxes and 
events like migrations, droughts, displacements and the “abnormality” that comes 
with these events, the qualities associated with shifting cultural values, the 
dynamic in the articulation of group identity, and the premise upon which 
allocation of power and social accountability is negotiated, have been rather 
elusive to assess71. Furthermore, increasing the number of dependent variables, 
number of interviews and their coverage increase the reliability of the study, 
providing greater confidence in the theoretical conclusions (Campell, 1975:25). 
Research dilemma 
Change outcomes in community governance as a phenomenon of this 
research was influenced mainly by the presence of violence. This makes 
researching in northern Uganda politically challenging (Whitmore, 2010:5).  
Firstly, violence is, arguably, instituted by different categories of factors – cultural, 
political, economic and social - all reinforcing one another, working in a 
continuum and with multiple causes, some of which are difficult to discuss openly 
(Finnström, 2008:221-223; Willis, 1993:353-360).  To study and understand 
violence systematically presents a number of constraints, most of which are 
                                                          
71 This made the causal links between changes in identity categories, for instance, 
how people related to each other, or even dealt with each other, and the changes 
in political arrangements become complex, especially with a time lag.  
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politically and socially sensitive.  Secondly, change is both highly complex and 
context specific, just as violence is.  An attempt to unearth how various 
institutions are engaged in this complex socio-economic situation can be 
problematic and, especially by someone who is a native of the area.   
Most people I met knew the consequences of being identified as the 
source of important information that are rated as confidential by the authorities72.  
Thirdly, perceptions about change, as with violence, do affect a community’s 
wellbeing even when they are not borne out by statistical evidence.  In the case 
of Acholiland, by the middle of the LRA insurgency in the 1990s, the entire 
population was displaced and had no source of wealth other than their memories 
and knowledge of Acholiland in the past.  Historically, the Uganda Governments 
and the Acholi society have been at inevitable crossroads, something we will see 
in the empirical chapters.  This took a rather disturbing trend during the NRM 
regime.  This was for two reasons.  First, the explanations for the official and 
preferred approaches to the conflicts did not conform to the ideals of resolving 
internal conflicts (See also: Finnström, 2008:131-136; Dolan, 2011).  It generally 
concluded that the Acholi were perpetrators and collaborators, as discussed in 
Chapter Four.  Secondly, the overall expenditure on the war, which was the 
official discourse preferred for neutralising the LRA, did not translate into visible 
and positive change for the benefits of the Acholi (see: Finnström, 2008:239,240-
244;Branch, 2011 and ARLPI www.arlpi.org)73.  Overall, much as donors 
supported the general principle because they were made to believe in the 
approach, the efforts did not embrace the human dimension of the political 
equation (Finnström, 2008:124, 174-178).  Research by civil society showed how 
war was costing the country some three per cent of the GDP per annum and yet 
things were not improving (CSCOPNU, 2005).  
Probing the northern conflicts, where these facts were common secrets 
and where poverty numbers – the reasons for foreign aid - have consistently 
remain higher than elsewhere in Uganda during the NRM era, was seen by both 
government and donors as incongruous and disturbing in some ways.  Uganda 
                                                          
72 Further discussion on this can be found in Weeks, 2001; Pain, 1998; Whitmore, 
2010 
73 For a good discussion of the failure of military approach to resolving the LRA war 
based on the Acholi people, please see: anthtropological discourses by Severen 
Finnstrom, 2008; political analysis by Adam Branch, 2011 and also work by ARLPI 
<www.arlpi.org> 
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was after all a “modern” African country that was responding to western donors’ 
ideals of change and was doing very well statistically.   These economic growth 
figures apparently had better political prospects and meanings to donors 
compared to the problem in Acholiland.  In any case, Acholiland hosted only five 
per cent of the Ugandan population and its troubles have not deterred the growth 
of the Uganda economy, seen from the statistics generated.   
The dilemma was that the Acholi’s humanitarian aid became 
disgracefully pathetic and, on their part, the Acholi envisioned more helping 
hands coming from “outsiders” as its own government had turned a blind eye on 
its problem and continues to see the entire society as the cause of Uganda’s 
backwardness (IRIN, 2004)74.  Fourthly, the priorities of the Acholi people as the 
object of my research, regarding how they see the different categories of 
violence, could most certainly differ from those of the state, local politicians and 
policymakers.  Identifying these differences in opinion, without violating the 
specific confidence of the respondents, or their privacy, is important.  
Finally, any categorisation is static by nature.  In reality, political, cultural, 
social and economic aspects of the Acholi interact, reinforcing linkages between 
the different types of violence.  For instance, boo kec, as a violent phenomenon 
is an outcome of absence of law enforcement, culture of impunity and 
economics75.  The identification of the strength of the relationships and their 
effects, as well as the priorities at the micro, meso and macro levels are vital for a 
reconstruction of meanings, yet present sensitivities in many aspects.  As an 
Acholi, these presented some challenges in the analysis of the research.  Thus, 
part of the challenge in this research project arises from my own association with 
Acholiland.  The concern here is whether I may be compromised and tempted to 
“overlay my authentic” version of the facts (Pooling, 2002:534).  Indeed, the 
history of qualitative research was born out of the conviction by foreigners to 
                                                          
74 It should be noticed that members of parliament from Acholiland, more than once, 
sought parliament to declare a disaster because of the mounting concerns of 
humanitarian needs.  Politically, this was seen as incorrect and lives in Acholi were 
traded for such political correctness. See also: Uganda: Humanitarian challenges of 
northern crisis (IRIN, 2004) <www.irinnews.org>   
75  Finnström (2008) noted that rouge boys who used the prevalence of insecurity 
and the absence of law and order, exploited their youthfulness to raid and 
occasionally kill people in Acholiland by robbing them of their money because 
these boys needed to feed themselves on valuable food rather than the ones get 
would get from the NGOs. 
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understand “others”, and these others were perceived to be the less “civilized” 
and normally from different cultural backgrounds to the western world (Vidich and 
Lyman, 1994).   
The Acholi case study is one of the many recent developments that 
depart from this misconception.  As an Acholi, I have seen, experienced and 
have been a part of those who worked with the society pick up pieces of hope in 
the course of its adjustment, especially in the last forty years.  I have chosen to 
give attention to these issues because they not only matter to me but also 
because there are gaps in current narratives that demand an insider perspective.  
The meanings of what the Acholi is and was have been changed by lack of 
understanding our words, spoken or written.  
My knowledge of the Acholi society as I stated before, was important 
because it influenced an undifferentiated image of what was being investigated 
and it also solicited the reality that could not possibly be trusted with a foreigner.   
My knowledge of Acholi as a language also helped in clarifying social nuances, 
but also in probing critically some of the phenomena that are linked to 
governance.  F.K. Girling (1960), when discussing the socio-political 
organisations of the Acholi, appreciated this aspect.  He, like Allen (1998) 
admitted that Acholi words like kaka had several usages and therefore, giving 
different meanings, some of which could not easily be translated in foreign 
languages or corroborated with what exists in their own societies, and some 
similar ideas from Opiyo Oloya when he researched child soldiers in Acholi 
(Girling, 1960:8; Opiyo-Oloya, 2013:Location 1210-6). 
As an Acholi, I have learned that the Acholi language is about how it is 
constructed, presented and spoken, hence, how the questions are constructed 
and responded to.  It is when one really knows and understands it well that one 
can identify the expression of intentions and can probe further the meanings of 
the discussions, to get to understand whether it is about kinship, about territory or 
about ethnicity for instance76.   It was in this context that the desire to add value to 
existing knowledge and narratives about the Acholi became increasingly relevant.  
There were secondary sources of information from libraries, internet and several 
                                                          
76 Lacito Okech wrote a book “Leb Acoli Kur” in which he expressed the art of 
constructing Acholi as a language, to give the meaning of what is said in Acholi.  
“Leb Acholi Kur” literally means Acholi language is odoriferous or marvelous   
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other sources: the archives of the colonial, central and local governments, published 
secondary data, and private records from the key respondents became handy, to 
broaden my understanding of what actually existed and became sets of issues for 
discussing governance with elders in Acholi.  These provided the qualitative and 
quantitative information that I used to formulate the research ideas.  
Pouligny (2002), nonetheless, contends that there are times when a 
researcher may involuntarily engender false hopes or raises unrealistic 
expectations, driven by such form of relationships.  While this was a true 
challenge for me, considering the political environment, I relied on a good 
framework of analysis – which consisted of spaced out and multi-layered 
approaches, including reliance on the large volume of secondary information 
(Hilberg, 1996 and Kershaw, 2000, both cited from Bartov, 2002).  My strength 
has also been my knowledge of and long time interactions with similar post- and 
in-conflict societies in other parts of the world. 
Resolution of ethical issues 
In order to address these ethical issues, my investigation adopted a mix 
of what is considered formal and with a large part, however, being informal.  This, 
from my experience working in fragile situation, allows for breaking the impasse 
that characterises fragile context.  Formal investigations were used to firm up 
some critical views that emerged as a result of long standing observations.  For 
instance, in understanding the oppositional behaviours of the youths towards the 
elders in the community, I held formal focus group discussions with both groups, 
first separately and later with them both combined. Additionally, in understanding 
changes in governing efforts and the link to domestic violence within Acholi 
households living in protected camps, I arranged both formal and informal 
meetings with victims and perpetuators, to discuss what I felt I have observed 
and read from literature over a long period. I had an opportunity to contextualise, 
from these actors why resorting to violence was seen as a viable means to 
addressing household issues.  
Use of research innovativeness combined with my background, provided 
me with the richer meanings of the change outcomes.  It was very easy to 
contextualise why traditional community governance during pre-colonial era was 
predominantly co-governance.  From the economic perspective, it made sense in 
terms of cost-effectiveness.  From sociology, it was able to explain the relevance 
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of the arrangements, while from management science it capably explains how 
“carrying capacity” of the different actors was critical.  There was also the 
question of added value and the leverages these different actors had to 
contribute.   
As such, data collection, and the analysis of the data, was spread over a 
much longer period of time than earlier envision, from 2004 to 2014.  Partly, this 
was to fit in with my own schedule of work.  However, and importantly, this also 
gave some moments of detachment, reflection and regurgitation of some 
stressful moments in my encounters.  It particularly enabled me to revisit some of 
the historical data in some detail, as I was able to reflect on them based on new 
meanings.  These spaces of time were received as blessings but often came with 
new challenges.  There were moments where I had to balance the case of shared 
risks with my respondents.  As a “son of the soil” and an opinion leader, an elder, 
I had a duty, rights and responsibilities to my core respondents, most of whom 
lived in the “protected camps”.  In some cases, where I found disturbing 
information that worried the community, I reverted to the appropriate authorities 
with such information and persistently followed up if they were implemented77. 
But it is at such moments that one gets to understand better the nexus 
between governing and governance (Kooiman, 2003:1-5).  There were certain 
moments in 2012 and 2013 when set meetings with some key respondents from 
Acholi failed without any logical explanations.  The persons would refuse to take 
my phone calls on the day we had agreed for meetings.  While theoretically, I 
was a public servant/consultant, an opinion leader from Acholi and son of the soil, 
I was also a researcher bound by the rules of ethics in research, which was a 
duty.  However, in practice, it became difficult to separate my identity under most 
circumstances because, if anything, they complemented each other, for most of 
the time for the mutual benefit of everybody involved.   
In ensuring that the information I needed was relevant and appropriate, I 
worked also with officials who had close and strong social contacts with both 
government and the people.  I adequately ensured that I acted my role as “son of 
the soil” in solving problems I felt needed due attention.  My engagement in the 
design of the NUSAF project was definitely significant, and I often used the 
                                                          
77 I was in constant interaction with the local leaders, in particular the RDC and 
members of parliament, who directly could deal with such situations. 
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people who were part of my research team to ensure that the problems 
highlighted by the people were followed up (Aly, 1999b: 153-183 cited from 
Bartov, 2002).  My follow-up would be to get their feedback on such actions, and 
this built the confidence of the respondents. 
It is absolutely true that field research is likened to a series of moral 
dilemmas (Coy, 2001:598 and Goduka, 1990).  While some I was able to 
negotiate quite well and they were happy about them, others were not and these 
meant most likely that the informants felt betrayed.  Using the Acholi in the 
NGOs, who were within the systems and were familiar with the situation, were 
both helpful but I thought also distorted.  They were associated with gifts and 
goodies that was not entirely the object of my work.  In light of the importance of 
this work both for the people and I, I had to carefully tread the path that ensured 
that my own profession as an international public servant, my safety and those of 
the informants, and my credibility with the systems, were not put at stake (e.g., 
Sluka, 1995:285).  This was not so difficult, considering that I was aware of the 
political economy in Acholi and Uganda and for many years, have followed how 
the political dynamics worked.  
The limit into how far a researcher can get involved, it seems in my 
experience, is defined by the degree to which one needs to maintain some 
objectivity and clarity on the issues at hand.  Often these issues are mixed and 
because of fear of reprisal by the authorities, most respondents would not claim 
first hand knowledge of them.  Rather, it was often “that is what I heard” from so 
and so.  Objectivity in my view is being “clear headed”, paying attention to the 
issue and using the advantage of language to validate the truth, ensuring safety 
in all its dimensions, and collecting verifiable and quality information that are 
validated data on time (see: Coy, 2001: 592).  
I found in the end that the mixed methodology helps balance tension 
between detachment and involvement (e.g., Emerson, 1981:368; Kriesi, 1992).  
This, according to Coy (2001:589) is a creative tension, one that if managed 
carefully can produce a synthesis leading to “dialogue” between the informants 
and the researcher.  Hence, I often chose to suspend my research work by 
breaking off from my enquiry, letting my support team revert to what they do most 
often.  However, because this research is so linked to my personal work, I would 
get calls providing some useful information to follow.  In some instances, because 
I found the information rather intriguing, I sought to validate it innovatively.   
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The break facilitated me to think through from a distance and consult on 
the best way to dig in again, while doing my primary role as a development 
expert.  These forms of detachment are temporal because the work I was 
engaged in dealt exactly with what I was researching about.  Most of my 
information was obtained in the course of doing my official work, and, for that 
matter, the research was partly paid for by my organisations, as the outcomes 
would feed into their strategic work in Uganda.  In many ways, it reaffirmed my 
interest in the research and especially in the issue of governance. 
In line with the Pouligny (2002) enquiry, did the events, and especially 
the mood of the Acholi, compromise my research focus, and did my work “overlay 
my authentic” version of the facts? I think not at all.  First, facts are subjective, 
and evidence of them justifies whether they are facts, and not opinions from 
some societal perspectives.  My professional conduct in undertaking this 
research was a critical factor in ensuring that facts remain what they should be.  
Where out of observations I was able to verify evidence of events that I 
considered are relevant for my research, I sought an opportunity to disclose with 
the core respondents my intentions of sharing them in my work.  And if the 
respondents disagreed - which did not occur – I would dutifully comply as I deem 
that is professional.  Critical Theory seeks to give back to the people and in the 
cause of my research I was able to work with my organisations, to address these 
things to the extent possible. 
In addition, the focus of the research was on community governance, 
which in many ways carries no prejudicial feelings and are not so much about 
facts but practices that are easily verifiable. However, it was in the course of 
collecting evidence of such practices that innovation was required.  There were, 
in some instances, revelations about important information and events that were 
difficult to verify except through observations.  However, informal means of 
inquiry allowed me to get my way to the right stuff.  By listening, sharing a 
common dialect and probing deeper into similar experiences elsewhere, I was 
able to understand the issues, even when informed consent, it is argued, 
demands an informed position, which quite honestly, may be unknown by the 
objects of discourses (Coy, 2001:584).   
I do think that professional ethical considerations should not only include 
issues of inhumanity (e.g., Gautier, 2002:512).  It should also embrace the other 
dimensions that often are overshadowed by the fact that these rules of 
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engagement are about foreigners working in an alien society.  Mine was not.  I 
felt obliged to know what made my core respondents intimidated, uncomfortable 
and naturally, to help relieve them of such mental tortures by disclosing to the 
right authorities such events in a manner that was just whenever that opportunity 
came by.  Wars and the aftermaths are always challenging because even the 
soldiers have been in such difficult moments.  Unfortunately, researchers and 
development actors often tend to look at the civilian cases, turning a blind eye to 
what they see as the offenders.  But social interactions in an informal setting, 
demand being truthful and scholarly, complicity is an aberration, and political 
naiveté can be very unprofessional even when I must admit, this is beyond 
professionalism (Gautler, 2002).  It is about knowing and living it, to turn the 
corners that many professionals have no clue about. 
Hence, by working within principles of consent, and using a well thought 
out framework that engages the informants and the stakeholders, I believe that 
compromises and expectations were reduced significantly within the threshold of 
any professional human being (e.g., Pouligny, 2002; Hathzfeld, 2000).  The 
methods of data collection that were chosen – the focus group discussion, in-
depth interviews, participant observations; all reduced any expectations from the 
communities. 
Organisation of the Study 
This thesis is presented in eight Chapters, broadly divided into three 
sets.  Chapters One to Three draw together a series of acumen and experiences 
from academic literature and provide the conceptual frame and the analytical 
context of the study.  While Chapter One introduces the study and provides 
definitions of key Acholi terms, Chapter Two lays out the analytical and 
theoretical frame that discusses concepts and scholarly viewpoints on community 
governance (Part One) and such related concepts like institutions, institutional 
change and change outcomes (Part Two).  As such, Chapter Two provides the 
frame, linking the contents and discussions in Chapter One to those in Chapters 
Four to Eight.  Chapter Three, on the other hand, is contextual - situating 
Acholiland within existing scholarships that are national, regional and global.  
The subsequent Chapters Four to Eight are empirical chapters, 
combining critiques of earlier analytical narratives about the Acholi governance 
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and providing arguments that build on, support and occasionally depart from the 
first part of the research.  In Chapter Four, I present the social-political baseline 
and analysis of Acholiland by 1898 based on literature and fieldwork.  Chapter 
Five on the other hand, looks at governing institutions and change outcomes.  In 
Chapter Six, I discuss the politics of governance and the evolution of political 
leaders.  In Chapter Seven I look at the political practices of community 
governance while Chapter Eight summarise these lessons from the study.  
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Chapter Two –Theoretical Framework 
Introductory Remarks 
In outlining the definition and concept of community governance, and in 
elaborating how it is connected to institutional change and change outcomes, I 
sought to narrow down what a community is made up of.  Then, what 
communities claim to hold in common, and to justify with evidence, the claim of 
communality.  The other dimension of this debate, however, is to conceptualise 
how and why community governs itself.    
In the first set of issues - what a community is made up of – I sought to 
conceptualise this within the literature of social capital, which is an 
interdisciplinary field that embraces identity politics.  However, scholars see 
identity politics as problematic because it is not easy to distinguish all forms of 
identities (see: Abdelal et al., 2005:2).  The second set of issues draw heavily 
from the literature on governance, and engages with change outcomes or 
practices in an interdisciplinary context.  As such, it frames communality within 
institutional and organisational perspectives and how they dovetail with 
institutional change and change outcomes (see for instance: Hodgson, 2006; 
2007).    
This Chapter is broadly divided into two parts. The first part deals with 
the first set of issues narrated above and set clear arguments for community 
governance.  A specific section in this part outlines the application of these 
concepts to the African context.  Part two, on the other hand, presents 
discussions on the second set of issues, which deal with institutions and 
institutional change outcomes.  The entire Part Two is discussed and attached at 
Annex 1.   
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PART ONE 
What is Community Governance?
 
In capturing the moral value of this conceptual framework, as voiced by 
respondents in the field, I set first a comprehensive literature review of the 
interconnected concepts, namely community and governance.  
What is a community? 
Anthony Cohen asserts that “community” as a concept has become a 
normative concept rather than a descriptive term for an analytical category with 
scientific rigour (Cohen, 2002: Locations 3660-79).  This, he noted, is justifiable 
and appropriate in an ethnographic and anthropological context.  So far, two 
conceptual fields on community have emerged in the literature.  One field sees 
collective social attachment and a form of homogeneity in character as its two 
important defining features.  Here, community is synonymous with society.  This 
is the Gesellschaft version where out of multiplex, longstanding interpersonal 
relationships and familiarity, as are the case with kinships, a subtle charge of 
community is established (Amit, 2002:96).  It presupposes a belonging that has 
clear boundaries – rules, laws and conventions - separating one community from 
another, and one that emphasises relational attachment (see: Cohen, 1983, 
1985).  Thus, community becomes a distinct cultural entity aware of the rules for 
belonging as a collective identity, that is, society and culture.   
The second notion, on the other hand, introduces the idea of the 
Gemeinschaft version of community, where social units of varying sizes share a 
common value.  Unlike in the first case, Hyden (2006) suggests that here 
community is synonymous with collectivity.  As such, it is a matter of choice to be 
and this can include primordial relationship.  This is an idea of an imagined 
community, a claim of togetherness that lacks homogeneity thereby seeing 
community as more than locale.  In this aspect, community is seen to embrace 
any form of cultural consciousness as an association with limited purposes 
(Cohen, 2002:52).  It is an ideation “with the juxtapositions of constructing social 
attachment solidarities” (Amit, 2002:18).  It presupposes a community “without 
place” but as “peoplehood”, which is independent of an on-going relationship 
(Amit, 2002:18). 
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Historically, however, social analysts in particular conceptualised 
community as a medium for the interrogating interaction between modernity and 
society (Amit, 2002:17)78.  Their preoccupation in these analyses was to 
understand the consequences of modernity to the principles, logic and concepts 
of social affiliation.  Hence, anthropologists like Evans-Pritchard (19C) and 
Margaret Mead (1930/1942) frequently made reference to societies or cultures as 
their objects rather than community (Evans-Pritchard, 1940:12).  The use of 
community, however, gained analytical prominence and currency with the 
emergence of pluralism in societies within urban lives.  Here bio-political social 
categories emerged as a component of a pluralistic community.  The term 
community, as Vered Amit puts it “resonated as a limited sub-unit, inextricably but 
also problematically embedded in wider social and cultural contexts” (Amit, 
2002:182).  The significance of this is the analytical definition in which sub-sets of 
community or categories are recognised based on clear boundaries that separate 
them from the overall community system. 
Appadurai (1996) submits that community by locality was “primarily 
relational and contextual” with regards to life, and that it was unmistakably explicit 
and direct.  Implicit in this embeddedness is how a context like fragility mediates 
collective definitions of such relationships and identity categorisation (Todd, 
2004:12).  Neighbourhoods, on the other hand are situated, existing social forms 
in which locality is recognised.  As such, they are contextual79. 
Flora (1998) sees neighbourhood as “a community in place”, noting that 
familiarity, sharing and proximity are critical in measuring the quality of 
interactions and in actualising social form.  However, for scholars working within 
the space and legal pluralism frame, community-in-place can be seen as an 
instrument of control.  Von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann (2009: 
Location 318) for instance, notes that in the contemporary state system, space is 
constructed as a homogeneous map and therefore results in what Blomley calls a 
centralisation of legal authority (Blomley, 1994:107; Von Brenda-Beckmann et al., 
2009: Location 148-68 to 759-73).  This, as Amit (2002:18) comments, “illustrates 
                                                          
78 Here Amit see modernity as the preserve of the western world.  I maintain that 
modernity is location and culture specifics and cannot be a preserve of a race or 
tribe. 
79  This actually means that neighbours are characterised by their actual existence, 
both virtually and spatially.  This is typically contrasted with what was intended, 
expected, or believed.   
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the visceral nature of what is community” – that these are affectionate 
relationships, affiliations and attachments with a high sense of belonging and 
experienced as personal and collective.  Gufta and Ferguson (1997:13) on the 
other hand see the construction of community within a relational context; that is, 
based on space as a politically intended “equivalence” that depends on the 
construction of various forms of exclusion and constructions of others. 
Community-in-place is, therefore, viewed as an organised, planned and 
a demand-led phenomenon that appropriately actualises social form as either 
hostile or friendly.  It presupposes that social rules exist, are enforced and are 
obeyed by the society.  However, some recent insights by scholars have radically 
changed how community is conceptualised (Rapport, 2002: Location 187-12).  
These viewpoints see collective identity as more forward-looking and the multiple 
attachments of its members as a form of contract that overrides the notion of 
social interaction (see: Rapport, 2002).  This detaches the importance of social 
relations as a property of social life (Appadurai, 1996:199).  This notion also 
embraces the idea of state formation with constellations of diverse relationships, 
organisations and also conflicts (see for instance: Epstein, 1964).  Proponents of 
this viewpoint have demonstrated that commonality and mutual identification 
were developed several centuries back in Britain with the influence of the media 
(e.g., Anderson, 1983/1991).  He argues that the imagination of shared identities 
and lifestyles actually led to the development of nationalism in UK.   
This notion of imagined community is a top-down idea and is presented 
as capable of galvanising and mobilising identity categories without the overrated 
actualisation of solidarity (Anderson, 1983).  Imagined community, avers 
Appadurai, posits a “disjuncture between locality and neighbourhood”80.  Herzfeld 
(1997:1-38) used the concept “cultural intimacy”, to highlight the interplay 
between official and social discourses.  He pointed out that felt solidarity, one that 
seems to bolster the experience of belonging, lay inside and is stimulated through 
intimacy and digging into archives of memories. In other words, ideas and 
actualisation are connected and in my view essential.   
                                                          
80 It is viewed that social media technologies, education and government efforts 
including coercion can manipulate the limits of imagined communities of the 
nations.  However, some scholars note that the sources of the emotional impact of 
formal abstraction are still difficult to substantiate.  See for instance Herzfeld, 1997. 
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Cohen (1985) and Appadurai (1996) contend that as a result of the 
weakening social boundaries and the indulgence of state policies or globalisation 
forces in the integrity of ‘neighbourhoods’, “communality increasingly has to be 
asserted or imagined symbolically rather than structurally” (Amit, 2002:10).  It is 
certainly an idea so connected in the contemporary world where digitalisation and 
innovations conjure closeness and even social touch81.   Nevertheless, 
community demands consciousness and choice.  This brings us to the question 
of what does the community consist of?  In answering this, scholars (e.g., 
Blomley, 2006:17-34) have, in some instances, ignored the relationship between 
physical space, social space, boundaries and the contradictions that comes with 
pluralism in the legal systems that mediate such interactions (see for instance: 
Taylor, 2006: 1-16).  
Suggesting that community-in-place - whether about neighbourhoods or 
primordial attachments – has a strong correlation with intimacy, sociality and 
social mobilisation might be an overstatement in my experience.  Similarly, 
primordial attachments are “a given” form of relationship.  However, the 
intentional levels of interaction between kinships and the demonstrated retaliatory 
responses witnessed in some ethnic conflicts questions the assertion or meaning 
of the claimed intimacy (see for instance: Dolan, 2011: 1-49)82.  As such, 
regardless of the levels of social categorisation or physical attachment, Rapport 
(2002) argues that an individual has a choice to resist or opt out of any norms or 
expectations that undermine their own convictions83. The character of relational 
attachment is as “likely to be derived from the multiple attachments of the parties 
that make up its membership as from contrasts with collectivises in which they 
are not members” (Amit, 202:10).  However, it is in how this is managed and the 
reasons thereto that I turn to now.  
                                                          
81 Some scholars like Rapport (2002) reckon that it is perhaps through such irony of 
interplay and incongruity between actualisation and the categorisation of 
community that there is an appreciation of the “malleability and mutability of all 
social rules and realities, and the contingency and ambiguity of cultural truth.”   
82  The events in Acholiland following the LRA insurgency in my experience, showed how kinship as a 
form of relationship became destructive and led to impunity in a number of instnaces, questioning 
the traditional view that it was a form of social trust, to protect rather than destroy. 
83 This argument is certainly important in the case of Acholi as will be discussed in 
Chapters 6-8 
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Some influencing literature on governance 
According to Bevir (2009) and others (e.g., Von Benda-Beckmann et al., 
2010:1-30), the term ‘governance’ was coined following the reforms of 
government in the 1980s and 1990s (World Bank, 1997:0-85).  These reforms 
“rolled back the state”, introduced the possibility of engaging multiple governing 
agents in new modes of exercising power, which often were guided and 
legitimised by ‘alternative’ legalities (Von Brenda-Beckmann et al., 2010:1-30).  
This changed the conceptualisation of governance from a normative conception 
of government as solely tied to the national state, based on the constitutional and 
international law, to one that is a functional characterisation of governing 
activities (Brenda-Beckmann, et al., 2009: 12-30).  It further introduced the notion 
of specialisation where service delivery is separated from the funding and policy-
making, which includes setting moral standards in these services - the latter is a 
core function of government and the former is a plurality of non-state actors or 
social actors.   
This new form of engagement is the social-political governance - one 
that fuses the efforts of formal and informal institutions, those of public and non-
state organisations  - where multilateral relationships of varying nature and forms 
are exhibited between the different and diverse governing actors (Kooiman, 
2003:10-15).  Governance has been used at numerous levels and within various 
theoretical contexts (Kooiman, 2003:224-228).  For instance, theories of 
governance commonly submit that patterns of rules originate as conditional 
outcomes of assorted actions and political manoeuvres that are informed by the 
wide-ranging beliefs of situated agents (Bevir, 2010: Location 104-22).   
Engel and Olsen (2005) have identified two constituent uses of the 
concept.  The most dominant strand focuses on policy, and sees the sovereignty 
of the state as the central concern in the policy debate.  This is especially in the 
wake of the internal and external reshuffling of state authority following the 
reforms and the emerging practices in globalisation.  Thus, policy around these 
issues – the rationalisation and the realignment of state power to the new centres 
of legitimacy and how to ensure effective governance under the emergent 
globalisation – has been discussed (see also: Girndle, 2004:524-548; World 
Bank, 2004).  The second strand focuses on lessons learned from the reform on 
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the quality of service delivery84.  The World Bank report (2004) for instance, 
views community engagement as one important innovation in service delivery.  
The Bank’s principle moral value for this has been the concern for ownership and 
sustained improvement of life85.   
Overall, however, most studies of governance have unreservedly 
focused on understanding political institutions that limit or check power, that is, 
issues of democracy, accountability and the rule of law, and less on community 
governance or political institutions that vet morals and allocate power (Fukuyama, 
2013:349-356).  In other words, recent measures of governance have not given 
sufficient attention to the state and its associated bureaucracies.  This omission 
or commission comes at the height of increasing tied aid programmes by 
developed countries to developing countries on democracy, rule of law and 
accountability (Fukuyana, 2013:350)86.   
Fukuyama (2013:350) defines governance as “government’s ability to 
make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that 
government is democratic or not”.   He sees differences between the execution of 
services on one hand, the politics and making of laws and policy on the other.  
For him, governance is not concerned with setting goals.  Rather, it is about the 
performance of the political and social agents in service delivery.   
Fukuyama’s (2013:351) conceptualisation of governance follows the 
strand that is state-focused and he sees the state as a hub that has immense 
capacity and capability to dispense power.  He also disputes the rhetoric that 
democracy and “good governance” are connected because, he argues, it is 
empirically difficult to see the connection.  In other words, authoritarian regimes 
can be well governed – as recently seen with China delivering with high 
economic growth – as much as it is also true that democratic systems can be 
mal-administered.    
                                                          
84 This notion has taken rather a descriptive and analytical stance in understanding 
the dynamics of both the intended and unintended outcomes of the changes in 
governing activities.  See for instance: World Bank, 2004.  
85 Note that here, unlike in the first strand, the constituent part is not concerned with 
the centrality of the state but rather, the community. 
86 Francis Fukuyama asserts that because the state wields immense political power, it 
is imperative that how this power is distributed, is checked.  The negligence of 
community governance and the state in these analyses has left a gap and, to a large 
extent, signal how the end products of the reforms in government have been 
misunderstood, which I have discussed in the case of Uganda. 
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This point is important when conceptualising community governance.  
The governing interaction between the social and the political, epitomises a mix 
of governing interactions in multi-lateral relationships.  For this to be effective, 
democratic tendencies by the state can support effective and coordinated actions 
that are based on moral values and differentiated carrying capacities of the 
social-political actors87.   
On the basis of these submissions, governance can be considered as 
made up of two inter-related and mutually reinforcing dimensions.  One is the 
capacity for service delivery.  The political principal mandates the bureaucrats, to 
deliver services.  The second dimension is the autonomy of the bureaucrats to 
execute the mandated tasks in an effective and innovative manner in line with the 
context.   
Capacity consists of physical resources and the degree of 
professionalism for service delivery.   Autonomy in service delivery on the other 
hand, is the degree of independence granted by the political principal to service 
providers and is considered desirable for professional conducts.  Often, granting 
broad mandates enables political actors to interpret the tasks in a more specific 
and context-based manner (Fukuyana, 2013: 352)88.  Hence, autonomy gives 
political agencies the right incentive for innovations and for rightsizing the tasks 
based on the available resources.   Subordination by the state introduces the 
difficulty in separating governance – seen as the tasks of execution - from the 
normative ends that are the government’s responsibility (Rothstein, 2011:23-27).  
Conceptualisation of community governance 
Governance is about politics - which is the realm of relations that 
allocate and distribute power in any given relationship89.  In other words, 
governance is about how power is used in a dynamic, diverse and complex 
                                                          
87 The social-political interactions enable one to systematically experience clearly 
whether there is cohesion or disjunction in governing activities because it assumes 
that political as well as social actors and the governing agencies practice inter-
dependency in order to deliver on the goals of the state.   
88 In the event that the political principal issues multiple and overlapping or 
contradictory mandates, the quality of services envision are normally affected.  This 
form of subordination, which dominates neo-patrimonialism governing style, limits 
the autonomy to innovate with the capacities and capabilities of the political 
actors. 
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situation with outcomes that would depend on the structural dimensions of 
interactions.  The conceptualisation of governance describes political 
relationships in two main ways (Bevir, 2010: Location 124-41)90.  In the first case, 
governance is conceptualised along what Fukuyama (2013) refers to as a 
principal-agent framework discussed earlier above.  Within this framework, 
governments set goals and targets and through delegation, the political agents 
are mandated to execute them.  Here, governance is about the politics of 
delegation and mandates91.  However, the broader and more recent definition of 
governance includes democratic politics and all forms of governing interactions 
(see for instance: Kooiman, 2003:62-75; Thomson, 2009: Location 5445).  Here, 
governance refers to all patterns of rules and interactions that embrace different 
political actors at different levels and in different forms in response to societal 
pressing issues.  
Global governance for instance, refers to a pattern of rule at the 
international level with the objective of addressing global problems.  In 
conceptualising global governance, states are regarded as the principal actors.  
However, they are engaged within overlapping and interlocking processes, 
mediated by the UN, to ensure global order92.  Corporate governance, on the 
other hand, refers to patterns of rule within companies or businesses.  It 
expresses how business corporations – their governing systems, institutions, and 
norms – are directed and controlled (e.g., Bevir, 2009: Location 1110-1168).  In 
both these examples, governance expresses a condition of growing awareness of 
how different forms of power and authorities can secure order.  It points to the 
different ways in which the informal authority that exists in the markets and the 
networks, constitutes, supplements, and supplants the formal authority of the 
government (see: Bevir, 2009: Location 104-610; Brenda-Beckmann, et al., 
2009).   
                                                          
90 Mark Bevir categorises governance concepts as old and new.  The new governance 
concept in his view refers to an institutional shift that embraces the whole 
spectrum of governance, from bureaucracy to markets and networks. 
91 See: Grindle, 2004; Heady, 1991; World Bank, 2004 for this additional view in this.  
Conversely, through manipulation of incentives, which, I argue, should be morally 
driven, the principal enforces sound financial administration, thereby improving the 
accountability of the political institutions.   
92 Here the authority of political actors and their respective legitimacy are too weak 
to impose their will over any territory.  This is the case with the UN system as 
evident by its historical failure in the Rwandan 1994 genocide, the Somalia and DR 
Congo as well as in the current conflict in South Sudan.   
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Community has a form of authority – informal or formal – with networks 
and constituencies in governance that complement, supplement, supplant and in 
some instances, supersede formal or informal systems of governance (Levitsky, 
2006: Location 81-90).  As a social-political system, community is both an 
organisation and a special institution.  As an organisation, it has members and 
leaders who hold common interests, and share values and cultural norms.  As 
institutions, the community mediates social-political interactions with political 
agents, who in turn influence its values system (Hodgson, 2006).  The effects of 
the interaction between community as an organisation and the political agents 
show the critical link between community governance, institutional change and 
institutional outcomes93.  Particularly in a fragile situation, governing issues and 
especially the daily management are complex and diverse, demanding different 
modes and types of governing interaction.  Community governance, therefore, 
represents shared responses by a constellation of governing actors and entities – 
individuals or corporates, female, male, young and old - to governing problems 
and actions from both within and outside the society.  In this study, I have defined 
“community governance” as a concerned action of the “social system”; and 
“social system” as all patterns of interaction across and outside the said 
“community” (see: Annex 2.1).  I have used the word “concerned”, to emphasise 
the moral values of this action - the fact that it recognises diversity and the need 
for collaboration and/or co-management (Kooiman, 2003:15-24).  It recognises 
the state as an important partner with immense power that cannot be abused.  It 
also recognises the other social-political actors in the governing space, who are 
morally bound to contribute to defining governing problems and responding to 
these governing issues in their own right.  
I have also defined “community” as a system that holds common 
interest, values and cultural norms, that is, a collective identity that varies along 
two dimensions – content and contestation of the substance of the content (see 
for instance: Abdelal, et al., 2005:8)94.  Amit (2002:182) suggested that the term 
                                                          
93 It assumes that many of the internal relationships within the community, as a 
constellation of social groups, are based on respect and inter-dependencies within 
and outside the community.   
94 Abdelal et al., (2005:8) explain that the content of identity describes the meaning 
of such collective identity, which often include the normative contents - like the 
rules that define membership, purposive content, relational content – which 
expresses the viewpoints of the group about others, and the cognitive content or 
the groups ideology.  Contestation is the degree of agreement over the contents of 
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community “resonated as a limited sub-unit, inextricably but also problematically 
embedded in wider social and cultural contexts”.   These subsets are what I call a 
“communal” system (see also: Cohen, 2002).   
In a communal system, members act as organisations and have leaders.  
As such, a communal system has strong internal ties based on common 
interests, shared ideology and purpose – which constitute the fiduciary culture 
(see: Shipton, 2007).  Inter-communal bonds are forms of collectivity, often 
enabled by a special kind of social capital – relational contents - that bridge 
interactions across the different communal entities.  
Kooiman (2003:5) uses “social-political” to describe any form of quality 
societal governance that is collective95.  In this case, governing efforts become an 
interactive process that includes all forms of governing efforts involving 
individuals, organisations and institutions.  In other words, social-political 
governance is synonymous with interactive governance.   
Kooiman (2003:22) sees governing interactions as exchanges that 
recognise the immense diversity, complexity and dynamics of social reality.  
While informal interactions are mutually influencing, most formal interactions are 
structured to exert formal influences with proviso attached.  I would argue, in 
contrast with Kooiman, that social-political interactions are not necessarily 
mutually-influencing.  They can be accommodating, supporting, dominating and 
retaliatory, reciprocating or even vigilant96.   This situation depends on the 
structural dimension of interaction, that is, the context – the material, cultural 
norms, existing power structures – of social-political actors.   
Relationships may be enduring or not, depending on how social powers 
are deployed by the participating actors.  However, an interaction is in my view 
                                                                                                                                                               
the shared category.  I argue that it is the levels of agreement that further 
categorises community into the different subsets of members tied by those beliefs. 
95 This is a case where governing efforts are mixed and generally shared among the 
different forms of social-political actors – both internal and external - on the basis 
of their “carrying capacities, recognising that different modes of governing actions 
are demanded, to respond to identified governing problems.   
96 The important point to note is that these interactions shape the identity (either as 
partners or subject-ruler) and their intended development.  The critical point in this 
interaction is the equilibrium or the threshold at which it defines the forms and 
meanings of that relationship that emerges as an outcome of the interaction..   
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never a one-way relation because there is often a reaction that is equal to the 
action although not necessarily similar.  Rather, the relationship can be contested 
and contestation can be in form of disengagement or engagement with the 
issues.  
The Evolution of States 
In this section, I explore some of the scholarship regarding the political 
evolutions of community governance and its relationship with formal systems of 
governance.  Kurtz (2004) used earlier work by Giddens (1979) and Roscoe 
(1993) to contend that the levels of differentiation and specialisation in the politics 
as well as those of the community institutions, and the associated organisational 
complexity of the social-political systems, are critical in determining the extent of 
the political evolution of community governance models.  
Kurtz’s (2004) evolution of politics is determined by increased 
effectiveness in political leaders through accumulation and dispensation of 
political power97 as a practice of community governance.   However, those 
holding political powers often abused it.  Similarly, the notion of political evolution 
of community institutions often comes with the related issues of capacity and 
autonomy especially in the case of centralisation of power (see: Fukuyana, 
2013:357).  While I am sympathetic to some of the viewpoints expressed by Kurtz 
(2004) and others about authoritarianism as a recipe for social transformation 
(e.g., Apter, 1967:426-428), I challenge the moral value of political violence that 
instrumentalises governance as visibly observed in the context of fragility, the 
case of South Sudan recently98.  
Emergence of community leaders 
Scholars that wrote about the evolution of community systems have 
variously alluded to the important roles community leaders play in influencing the 
                                                          
97 Political power is subsumed as both material and ideational resources of power. 
The material resources include tangible (movable assets) and human resources, 
which can be in form of allies, benefactors, etc. Ideational resources on the other 
hand are ideologies, information and symbols. 
98 By the time this thesis wasbeing drafted, South Sudan had relapsed into conflict 
with the state misusing its political power in trying to break down the rebel group.  
By using the state power, the war had spiraled engaging external forces from 
Rwanda and Uganda. 
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material and environmental forces that ensure political evolution (see: Giddens, 
1979; Roscoe, 1993:111-140; Kurtz, 2004:155).   Kurtz (2004), for instance, 
asserts that the evolution of politics is accounted for by the efficacy of political 
leaders to not only accumulate political power but also for entrenching their 
authorities and ideas in the political communities (Kurtz, 2004:158).  However, 
Bailey (1969) states that there are two dimensions of politics that safeguard 
against conflict of interest (Bailey, 1999:5-16).  
The first case is what he calls normative politics - where moral and 
ethical standards are set by the system to gauge political practices by leaders.  
This sets a precedent for good governance as they check on the practices of 
political leaders.  The second dimension is pragmatism.  Here, the politics of the 
leaders partly influenced by their acceptable manoeuvres and characters.  In this 
regard, the most redolent convergence of ideational power by leaders universally 
is demonstrated through their practice of hegemonic acculturation.  Gramsci 
(1971:57) considers hegemonic acculturation as the practice of “intellectual and 
moral leadership”. 
Kurtz (2004:155) further postulates that there is dynamism in the 
interaction between these “ideal conditions” for change – namely the material 
elements in the community – the context or environmental conditions, ideational 
construct and the human practices in shaping evolution the direction of change.  
These variables reinforce each other and their contributions are not similar.  
Instead, Kurtz (2004:158), argues that “they are historically and ethnographically 
situational, contextual, and contingent, always fomenting in the social, cultural, 
and physical environments of political communities, evading epistemological 
priority; at any given historical or ethnographic moment some pulse or pulses 
may be more important than others”.  
Legitimacy in the “modern” system must be authentic.  This means that it 
has to be an exclusive legal domination that is an institutionalised bureaucracy.  
In patrilineal and hereditary power systems that many modernists view it as 
archaic, political legitimacy evolved through charismatic legitimacy through to 
rational and legal authority (Kurtz, 2004:158).   It required the emergence of 
political institutions that are capable of enforcing the rule of law and taking charge 
of the state as a legitimate power.   
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The civic public realm as early state formation 
Historically, communities lived in some kind of organised societies, 
which in the case of Africa varied in terms of customs and politics.  Some of the 
earlier socio-political organisations were more egalitarian or simply stateless (see 
for instance: Claessen, 2002:101; Thomson, 2010: Location 303-313)99.   These 
stateless communities were however, politically complex and hierarchical100 in 
culture (Claessen, 2002:2-6; Thomson, 2010:10).  Others, on the other hand, 
were repressive, centralised systems and hierarchical in culture.  Examples of 
state-like polities were chiefdoms and kingdoms (see for example: Woodburn, 
1988b).  These pre-colonial systems were characterised as non-hegemonic 
(Thomson, 2010:10)101 and lineage-based, suggesting that their political power 
bases were weaker - a judgement call that often underpins this perception, that 
autocracy was a necessary condition in the formation of states, something that 
western donors are advancing in changing governance practices in Africa 
(Mamdani, 2002).   
It was from these variegated forms of governance that the current states 
emerged, largely triggered by “indispensable conditions”, of which political 
violence was a big part102.  In the case of Africa for instance, Thomson (2010:9) 
asserts that variegated societies existed over a long period, engaged in strong 
land and marine trade with the Arabs and the Europeans.  Since the socio-
political organisations of these societies differed in complexity, power was highly 
differentiated and integrated more or less in tandem with the prevailing 
circumstances.  Power was also gender and age segregated103.  While 
                                                          
99 The general view from these authors is that these social-political systems were 
customized to the specific individual societal environments.  They had varying types 
of leaders, obligations, rules and other forms of interactions.   
100 Heterarchy is used in this case to depict power relations among social-political 
organisations that are sub-systems of a larger system. 
101 In non-hegemony states like those considered dominated in Africa, scholars like 
Alex Thomson (2010) see diffused power, limited power ranges, lack of political 
boundaries as some of the key features.  On kinship, they see power based on 
social ties rather than ideas as predominant. 
102 State, it seems, is an advanced stage of community governance model that 
followed what Grinin and Korotayev (2009) refer to as politogenesis, which is the 
development of polities like chiefdoms and kingdoms for the hierarchal models or 
stateless ones for the heterarchy culture. 
103 Among the egalitarian system of governance, age groups were a status symbol 
and particularly for elders, they differed from one society to another.  In some 
cases as we will see in the case of Acholi, elders were advisors rather thn rulers, 
leading non-leaders.   
  
 
61 
matriarchal authorities existed in some communities in Angola, Namibia, Ethiopia 
and Ghana for instance, the majority of Africa had a patriarchal culture as the 
dominant power base (Claessen, 2014: 3-7). 
Ethnographically, there were many cases of hierarchy and heterarchy 
cultures.  The “indispensible conditions” for change varied with different societies 
and these energised the evolution of governing institutions, procedures and rules.  
Kurtz (2004) for instance, submits that most explanations about the social-
political evolution of community governance systems relied on either material 
forces, such as ideologies and/or environmental forces, such as droughts and the 
accompanying famine (Carneiro, 2002:96; Cohen, 1968).  However, evolution is 
too complex to be explained by a single cause or prime mover.   
In the case of Africa, the evolutionary process was, it seems, too slow 
and unfortunately rudely interrupted by colonialism (Thomson, 2010: 1-8.).  
Additionally, the specific forms of societies that emerged were different with 
social-political organisations, in some cases, less despotic, influenced by the 
context.  Works of earlier scholars, including Coquery-Vidrovitch (1980: 268-285), 
point to the fact that the path taken by the African societies differed substantially 
from their counterparts in Europe and Asia (e.g., Itandala, 1986:29-45).  Due to 
the variegated nature of colonialism, modern states in Africa at independence 
were largely missed.  Rather, a bifurcated power was established, which, 
according to Mamdani (1996), established a modern system in the urban areas 
and retained a form of reformed tradition in the rural areas.  In other words, class 
formation was based on locality in Africa. 
Kurtz’s (2004) genetic pulse model submits that synergies from material 
forces, environmental factors, political practices, and an ideological hegemonic 
acculturation are required to galvanise transformation.  This is because all of 
these conditions, as a group, impact on the institutions, culture, and human 
practices of a given political community.  They are, according to Kurtz (2004), 
historically and ethnographically situated and contextualised, fomenting in the 
social, cultural, and economic lives of the political community. 
Typologies of community organisations 
Claessen (2014) sees chiefdoms as part of the early state organisation.  
Chiefdoms, for instance, were a common model of community governance in 
  
 
62 
some parts of Africa.  Chiefdom as explained in the anthropological theory, is a 
form of social organisation that was arguably closer to what Western civilisation 
categorised as kingdoms104.  Carneiro defines chiefdom as "an autonomous 
political unit comprising a number of villages or communities under the 
permanent control of a paramount chief" (Carneiro, 1981:41).  He asserts that 
some of the key features of chiefdoms included centralised authority to the rulers 
and pervasive inequality (see: Claessen, 2010:101-117; Earle, 2011: 22).  Implicit 
in these features was the permanence of control by paramount chief and social 
stratifications, in which there were rulers and subjects.  The defining process of 
chiefdoms, argues Claessen (2014), is an emergent political economy that 
“mobilized resources” used to sustain institutions of rule and social stratification.  
In some of the cases, individuals could change social class during a lifetime, for 
instance, if one is married into the elite class, or if one was aged and attractive, it 
could change one's social status and role.  The rulers, who were the elite, ruled 
with the greatest influence, power, and prestige.  
Canerio (1981) suggested two typologies of chiefdoms based on the 
extent of power exhibited.  One was the more ordinary while the other was more 
autocratic.  The ordinary one was made up of two sub-systems: one, a nucleus 
community that was enfolded by, or living close to, a number of smaller non-
cores as the second sub-system.  The non-core communities recognised the 
authority of core as a single or an individual with hereditary centralised power, 
found in the core community.  Each of these social groups had their own leaders 
who were usually in a tributary and/or “had a submissive relationship to the ruling 
elite of the primary community” (Claessen, 2010:101-117).   Then, there was the 
complex type.  The communities in this case were controlled and ruled by a 
single paramount chief.  This type of chiefdom has two or more tiers of political 
hierarchies.  There were the nobles, who were the ruling class, and then the 
working class.  “Chiefs” were the political leaders of these organisations (Cook, 
2005; Claessen, 2010:110).  The term “chiefs”, Claessen (2010) comments, has 
been used in anthropological, archaeological, and even historical literature but 
with no agreement on the content of the concept.  Most anthropologists, he 
                                                          
104 Chiefdoms are highly variable, but they are all about power and political 
legitimacy, which is the essence of governance.  It could be an existence of 
clientage system that was based on cattle ownership as Beattie (1960) noted in the 
case of Bunyoro, or a form of patronage system based on land ownership that 
typified the Buganda kingdom. 
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asserts, have included many aspects of social and economic incentives when 
they define chiefs (Claessen, 2010:101-117)105.   
The households of chiefs are royals. The royal, it is alleged, considers 
that performing censored rituals was their obligation and a payback to the 
subjects for their contributions to the sustenance of the chiefdoms.   In addition, 
they made token symbolic redistribution of food and other goods (see: Cooks, 
2005; Timothy, 2011).  Carneiro (1981) observes that in the case of two or three 
tiered chiefdoms, higher-ranking chiefs have control over a number of lesser 
ranking individuals.  In the case of Baganda in Uganda for instance, the higher 
tier was termed a Kabaka while the lesser ones were the basazza106.  
Each of these chiefs controlled specific territory, clans or social units.  
Political control typically rests on the chief's ability to maintain access to a 
sufficiently large body of tribute, passed up the line by lesser chiefs. These lesser 
chiefs in turn collect from those below them, from communities close to their own 
centres.  I have laid out this information to enable us discuss the Acholi situation, 
which scholars have continued to call chiefdoms.  By 1898, there were probably 
seventy or more of these types of centralised organisations in Acholiland.  My 
view, though, is that these structures, the kaka, do not meet the descriptions of 
what scholars have called chiefdoms. 
The evolution of state as collectivity 
State as a concept has been difficult to define because of the ideological 
divide between those in support and those against it.  Some scholars, like 
Caessen (2010), present the evolution of state as a continuum where there was 
an early stage with limitations in community governance to one with some kind of 
advancement (Caessen, 2010:106-110).  Others, like Hyden (2006: Location 
771-783), see states as interventions, a reform of existing systems of 
governance107.    
                                                          
105 For instance, chiefs are considered as ascribed or inherited top positions in 
societal social structures.  In some instances, they were central in a redistributive 
economy, had sacred capacities, commissioned the erection of great works in the 
public sphere, and had an inclination to warfare.  
106 Discussion with Prof. Latigo Ogenga in his farm in Nwoya in May 2010. 
107 From the various literature dispositions, the theorisation of states may have 
largely been speculative, driven by what it should or should not be.  Be that as it 
may, its development was based on the creation of despotic relationship between 
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There are a number of viewpoints advanced, which suggests that the 
formation of states was only one of many developments in support of community 
governance.  Other scholars even felt that the force applied in some instances in 
the formation of state was not necessary.  Patrica A. Shifferd, for instance, 
acknowledges that state formation was in many instances, a decadent (Shifferd, 
1987: 39-53).   
…’The emergence of the state, whatever its benefits, carried economic 
and political costs for most of the individuals and corporate groups in 
the affected societies.  The enlarged coercive, expropriate, and 
imperialistic potential of the state, even the very early one, was paid for 
by some loss of independence and discretionary action by the majority 
of the people” (Shifferd, 1987: 44ff ). 
Clastres in “La Societe l’Elat” is quoted as saying that the formation of state 
would have been prevented if people knew the danger associated with it 
(Clastres, 1974: 1).  
Historically, the state was formed to address problems that were 
inherent in the autocratic traditional systems in Europe, where hereditary power 
of the lord or king prevailed (Weber, 1947).   Warren (1980) sees preservation of 
traditional communities, including the patrimonial chiefdoms, as a folly that 
negatively undermines the welfare purpose of modern states in Europe.  This is 
an important point, especially when discussing state formation in Africa, because 
the context was quite different (Chilver, 1959: 378-381).  A state, therefore, 
became a form of community, a collectivity, created to serve a political 
relationship that had pitched patrimonial regimes against their subjects.  Hence, 
as a product of societal relations, it is envisioned not to be reified, personalised, 
or sacralised (Claessen, 2002:102).  This, ideally, is the welfare state, one that 
aims to rectify historical distortions.  It is a demand-led reform in traditional 
governance. 
Defining states 
Radcliffe-Brown’s (1940) viewpoint is that ‘it is a collection of individual 
social beings connected by a complex system of relations”. Within that 
organisation different individuals have different roles, and some are in possession 
of special power or authority’ (Radcliffe-Brown, 1940:ix-xxiii).  However, most 
                                                                                                                                                               
social class and the state.  This was in response to the need for redistribution, 
which we will see, was not so much applicable in the case of Acholi. 
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forms of states are hierarchical organisations with systems of power that are 
legitimised for specific functions.  This seems to agree with Thomson’s (2010: 
Location 383) minimalist definition of a state, which recognises three main 
components, namely, a set of political institutions or community, governed within 
a delimited sovereign territory, by a specific type of government.  Yet, in the 
modern state, power is not limited to the bodies of these institutions and the 
territory.   
Scholars contend that the reason that state is the dominant model of 
authority has to do with the specific type of government or its governance realm 
(Hyden, 2006: Location 771-791; Thomson, 2010:8-23).  Two important features 
of the state, the political centralisation – where power is concentrated in the 
political institutions, the bureaucrats – and specialisation in administration, are 
arguably, the two pillars of the modern theory of the state that set it apart as a 
governing model.   Weber (1947) cited in Berrand and Birnbaum (1983:20) 
argues that the development of the rational and bureaucratic forms of 
administration was what gave state and the civilisation its modern character (see 
for instance: Bertrand and Birnbaum, 1983:20).   As a model of organisation, it 
expresses specific and despotic form of orders in the society.  Additionally, it 
defines social, political and economic relationships in the society as well as the 
concepts of power, authority, force, justice and property rights (see: Engel, 
1972:232).  
Yet, bureaucracy cannot be said to have been specific to the state only 
(see: Kristiansen, 1998:5-12).  There are others that are arguably worse 
(Kristiansen, 1998:5-12).  However, the necessary conditions for state formation, 
including the existence of ideology - to justify hierarchical administration and an 
inequality of the society based on their vulnerability (Earie, 1991:1-15) - immense 
danger that triggered population pressure and organisation in the formation of a 
critical mass of societies differed significantly, especially in Africa (Coquery-
Vidrovitch, 1980:104).   Nevertheless, the development of a convincing political 
legitimacy and shared norms were however, critical (e.g., Webster, 1964; 
Beetham, 1991). These necessary conditions were very unlikely to be achieved 
in any single case (Shiffered, 1987:102). 
In summary, the state, it seems, is a social-political organisation that, as 
Fukuyama (2013:348) noted, dominates the control of power.  This power is 
centralised in the hands of bureaucrats, who are special administrators.  As a 
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centralised organisation, it occupies a territory under its jurisdiction. The principal 
or political leader is a special government, elected by the people, and it has the 
mandate of the stakeholders to issue laws and regulations and, as such, it is the 
legitimised power to maintain these laws through the use of both authority and 
force, or threats of force. The principal also has a duty to ensure separation of 
roles, impartiality and maintaining order in the system.  There are a couple of 
salient points emerging from this discussion that are important for communal 
governance.  First, from the historical narratives, the state is a delegated 
authority entrusted to maintain order with a high level of impartiality and 
specialisation.  This bestows upon the state significant governing power that have 
often been abused in the case of most African countries.  Secondly, the logic of 
new governance weakens the distinction between states and the other domains 
of social order by smuggling in the importance of markets, networks and non-
state actors.  
Debating the African’s Gridlock in Governance  
In conducting this analysis, I have adopted a subtle and creative 
synthesis of the theoretical debate on Africa’s stalemate in political governance, 
which revolves around two diverse schools of thought: the modernists, and the 
communitarians (e.g., Mamdani, 1996:3; Hyden, 2006:location 166; Thomason, 
2010: Locations 275-317).  
The African scholars of the modernist school 
The African scholars of the modernist school, which include William 
Ochieng and Areoye Oyebola and others, contend that the problem of Africa’s 
gridlock arises from its historical trajectories (see: Ochieng, 1974: 1-10; Oyebola, 
1976: 1-13; Hyden, 2006: Locations 159-194 and Thomson, 2010: 8-23).  Central 
to this is the absence of liberal democratic institutions. These groups of scholars, 
as Mamdani (1996) pointed out, are Euro-centric in their views, contending that 
reforms in these political institutions should conform to western systems of 
democracy since this model is applicable world-wide (Thomson, 2010: Location 
275-317; Hyden, 2006: Chapter 3)108.   
                                                          
108 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see for instance Alex Thomson (2010 and 
Goran Hyden, (2006). These scholars have categorised pre-colonial issues as non-
  
 
67 
This argument, however, has a number of limitations. First, it denies 
heterogeneity in governing styles as an innovation that is capable of shaping 
global political discourse.  As such, it sees modernity as simply embedded in 
Western democracies.  It also, as Fukuyama (2013) alluded to, makes the wrong 
assumption that there is correlation between good governance and democracy, 
even though these two concepts reinforce each other.  Good governance, as in 
economic growth, has been synonymous with China, which generally is seen by 
the West as nondemocratic.   
For me, some of the highlighted “weaknesses”, including the traditions of 
the “weak forms” of the indigenous state and kinship allegiance, are opportunities 
when taken in their own merit.  Kaplan (2008) admits that preoccupation with 
what is common to the West has often faulted innovations in the North that 
served generations of people as valuable resources (Fukuyama, 2013:348)109.   
Seen from a moral economy of inequality, Africa’s future lies within its abundant 
resources, including fiduciary cultures; and to expound on the failed neoliberalism 
policies without offering meaningful alternatives represents an immorality (see: 
Sachweh, 2011: 419-445; Shipton, 2007; Sachweh, 2011:426).  States, based on 
the historical experience in the West, were outcomes of negotiation reached 
between the subjects and the rulers.  In the case of Africa, states could at best be 
seen as an end and not the means for emancipation because these communal 
systems lack the perfect coordination, which is a form of the co-management 
type of interaction.  As further elucidated in the context of Acholiland later in the 
study, the moral economy as a paradigm is about marketplace and public issues 
as much as it is also about human economy and the private sector110. 
                                                                                                                                                               
hegemonic systems, which are mainly about centralising authority as was the case 
in Europe, and the weak civic-public allegiance arising from stronger societal bonds 
that gives powers to the status leaders rather than “formal political office” and the 
associated patronage built in it. Colonial legacies, however, tried to create states in 
Africa based on the models found in Europe – arbitrary borders, foreign 
governments in control and no civil societies linked with it as was the case in 
Europe, among others.  
109 Fukuyama (2013:348) comments that most studies and aid programmes in non-
democratic African countries mainly focus on addressing pertinent issues like 
democracy, accountability and the rule of law, suggesting that the West has 
conceded that the political institutions that check power are critical in advancing 
western democracy in Africa.   
110 Fiduciary culture, like kinship, constitutes common or corporate property that 
demands the right approach to reconstitute into forward-looking entities.  If it can 
effectively specialise in collective violence today, it does imply that, given the right 
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This is because the history of reforms in governance, aimed at situating 
Africa within the Western capitalistic model, has thus far been disappointing111.  
Harmonisation of the political “rules of the game” with those of the West, based 
on the instruments prescribed by Western institutions, will not, it seems, yield the 
desired outcomes (See: Afigbo, 1985; Kapteijins, 1979; Betts, 1992; Kaplan, 
2008: Location 529-537).  There is a general consensus today that contexts 
require specificity and relevance, and that no two countries, or even two locations 
within a country, are exactly the same and require the same “rule of the game” 
(See: World Bank, 2002). 
The African issue is either a case of limited statehood or states at risk 
(see: Risse, 2011: Location 96-118 to 859-64).  The question of state at risk or 
fragile states is also presented normatively towards the highly developed 
Western and democratic states (See: Rotberg, 2003, 2004).  The benchmarks for 
these are prescribed in the western democracy, capitalistic production and the 
rule of law (Liefried and Zum, 2005).   This, argues Risse (2011:11-15), is 
problematic on both analytical and normative grounds.   First on the normative 
ground, it presupposes that the Western form of statehood is synonymous with a 
market economy.  In fact, when states are seen as political entities that provide 
services and public goods, many states including some in the west do not qualify 
(Risse, 2011:11-15).  Second, it undermines the viewpoint of pluralism, including 
pluralistic modernity or civilisation that is driven by variegated cultures and 
context. 
African scholars of communitarian viewpoints 
In contrast, the communitarian’s viewpoints are entrenched in defence of 
African “traditions” and cultures, arguing that traditional political systems are still 
essential to politics in the continent and especially to the building of democracies.  
Simply, they argue that traditional institutions like kaka are more accessible, 
flexible, respected and legitimate (see: Logan, 2008:1; Mamdani, 1996:8; 
Keulder, 1998:11).  As Logan (2008:1) pointed out, proponents of African 
“traditions” argue that traditional institutions have proved both “malleable and 
                                                                                                                                                               
incentives, it can be appropriately skilled for effective interaction with other 
entities within the social-political system.  In doing this, the right people, the 
Africans, can best shape it course as they have lived it and can understand it. 
111 Even with the optimism from the donor community, the persistent reports of civil 
societies particularly in Africa points to increasing inequality and desperation.    
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adaptable” and can draw on their “good” history in a very valuable way.  
However, there are features of traditional systems that are contestable, for 
instance - that the traditional system is not accountable and often “demands 
consensus” instead of consent (See: Molutsi, 2004:162 and Mattes, 1997:5).  
Furthermore, the system appears to promote domination by male elders at the 
expense of the youth and women112.  Governing interactions demand 
coordination and most traditional systems are seen as lacking the impartiality or 
objectivity as well as the capacity of administration desirable for governing 
interactions (Molutsi, 2004:162).  Even then, the content of “tradition”, and the 
identity of the so-called elders or leaders as status leaders, has been contested 
(Branch, 2006: 45).  The decades of manipulation of what Africa was in the past 
by colonialists and post-colonial regimes raise more questions on the validity of 
these traditions (Driberg (1927:155-171)113.  Ranger (1998) in his compelling 
argument on “invented traditions” explains how people with different political 
backgrounds, incentives and affiliations, have cast the past in a mystery of 
manipulation and distortion.   
Both the colonial officials and their local interpreters “invented” traditions, 
which are now considered the authoritative past (See: Mamdani (2002:7)114.  
Mamdani (2002:7) puts it even more starkly by claiming that the “political project 
called indirect rule aimed to unpack native tradition, to disentangle its different 
strands, to separate the authoritarian from the emancipatory, thereby to repack 
tradition as authoritarian and ethnic and to harness it to the colonial project. By 
repacking native passions and cultures selectively, it sought to pit these very 
passions and cultures against one another.  
Hence, traditional institutions that were constructed based on these 
                                                          
112 This point, I have argued, may be over generalisation.  However, it points to 
concerted perceptions that need to be considered while arguing for traditional 
models, which are also very diverse. 
113 J.H Driberg (1927:155-171) in his Anthropology in Colonial Administration 
confirmed the extraneous purpose and the handiness in which expert colonial 
administrators “were given a very wide latitude and authority” to modify or 
completely change tribal customs and constitutions even when nothing 
scientifically was known about the organizations of these natives 
114 See: Mamdani (2002:7) where he applied political science as a lens in 
understanding the reform by colonialists in Africa. 
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reform agendas could not be presented as democratic115.  At most, they were, as 
the Bible says in The Book of Mark, “new wine in an old wine skin”, with the old 
agenda that the independent countries had fought to change (Mark 2:22).  
Branch (2008), in his study of displacement in Gulu town, has already alluded to 
this fact: 
However, while some revival of ‘traditional authority’ seems to be 
widely supported among Acholi, there is controversy over just what 
their authority will comprise, and its domain will be, in the post-war 
period. Among women and youth, especially those in town, a return 
to the pre-war order, or the idealisations of the pre-war order 
advocated by many male elders, would neither be practical nor just 
(Branch, 2008:15) 
While these are certainly compelling arguments and there is noticeable 
divergence between the two schools of thought, Africa is characterised by 
institutional pluralism.  The two most noticeable ones are the formal and informal 
sets of institutions.  They co-exist and are supplemented by a third pillar, a 
hybrid, which some scholars have argued are informal behaviours rather than 
social rules (See: De Soya and Jutting, 2006; Hemlet and Levitsky, 2006: 
Location 384).  In fact, the hybrid, as Mamdani (2014: Location 429-48), 
observes, is what constitute what is considered as customary.  Logan (2008:2) 
for instance, states that the sharp contrast that is often drawn between these 
schools of thought, “reflect a false dichotomy” in real terms.  As such, it is difficult 
to make a generalised conclusion about the relationships that exist between the 
formal local authorities and the informal traditional systems, something I have 
discussed extensively in the last part of this Chapter (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006: 
Location 3367-3672).  But in economies that are emerging out of wars, like in the 
case of South Sudan, Somalia, Liberia and Northern Uganda, there are strong 
indications that the two systems work in support of community governance in a 
complementary manner.   
I have, therefore, adopted a more informed theoretical perspective that 
critiques and evaluates the different and competing perceptions with a clear 
notion that reality is multi-faceted and needs to be appreciated in that context.  
                                                          
115 A recent study of the relevancy of traditional leaders in Africa, carried out by 
Logan (2011), notes that traditional authorities are not fundamentally in 
competition with the state or with elected leaders and the support for “chiefs” is 
far more intrinsic than instrumental, thereby placing their performance at best as a 
minor issue in keeping them relevant. However, in Acholiland, these “chiefs” enjoy 
the backing of the state and thus far, have not depended on local support. 
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My viewpoint is that cross modern, which is an appropriate combination of the 
two, is appropriate for Africa.  This is because for more than one hundred and 
fifty years, the authoritative modern states have not taken root in Africa and is 
unlikely to.  To the contrary, states have remained predatory to the citizen and 
misused their powers to destabilise even good customs.  Some scholars of social 
capital for instance see the operation of formal institutions as moderated by 
available civic traditions that are in turn shaped by historical trajectories (e.g., 
Putnam, 1993).   
In Annex 2.3, I used literature to analyse how pluralism have influenced 
community governance in fulfilment of the Second Part of the Chapter.  Thus, 
Part Two (put as Annex 2.3) starts with an overview of what scholars say 
institutions are - linking community governance to institutional change outcomes 
and also discussing the different types of institutions.  The three main theories of 
institutional change are also discussed. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this Chapter, I sought to link governance to institutional change 
outcomes, which are governing practices that are multilateral and multi-layered.  
My aim has been to unmask the continuing discourse in the conceptualisation of 
community governance and institutional change outcomes particularly in the 
context of fragile situations.  The literature on these two concepts is diverse and 
thus far, inconsistent.  Research on these matters is challenged by such 
divergence and, at the same time, acknowledges the successful intellect and 
creativity of the interdisciplinary approach as a powerful tool in imagining, 
abstracting and integrating the different disciplines.    
This Chapter has clearly unmasked the persistent scholarly 
contradictions in the theories and conceptualisation of community, governance, 
institutions and institutional changes, which, I have argued, are the 
consequences of disciplinary orientations.  In framing institutions as comprising 
sets of rules, both formal and informal - conventions, habits and norms and 
values - we acknowledge that institutions are independent from the social-political 
agencies.  Actors draw from these institutions and, in doing so, reproduce or 
change them, depending on their usefulness to their activities.  
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In the contextualisation of the Acholi as an object of research as well as 
in the discussion of empirical results, institutional change outcomes as a 
governing practice is discussed based on these arguments.  The equilibrium view 
provides a closer insight into the Acholi’s situation because it treats both informal 
and formal rules, and their enforcement, within an integrated framework.   
Even when formality has been introduced, the formal rules are not 
necessarily straightforward, enforceable and enforced by the state, as it seems 
likely the experiences of institutional changes have been mixed and largely driven 
by some political desire.  Furthermore, the various kinds of “informal” constraints, 
or at best pluralistic innovations, are not clearly differentiated or understood by 
the new systems.  The analysis employs empirical evidence to identify how the 
various kinds of informality in governance work, how they change, how quickly 
they change, and how they interact with formal rules in both a static and dynamic 
sense.   
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Chapter Three –Contextualising the Politics of the Acholi of Uganda 
Introductory Remarks   
Three bodies of scholarly writing within peace studies have been used to 
situate the politics of Acholiland within national, regional and global context.  The 
first body of writing is rooted in the contemporary literature on social capital, a 
concept that generally refers to institutions, relationships, attitudes, and values 
that govern societal interactions (World Bank, 2011).  In itself, social capital is a 
multidisciplinary field that includes social anthropology, political science, 
economics and political history (e.g., Woolclock, 1998:151-200; Hogg, 2001:23; 
Hogg et al., 1998:56).  In the field of community governance as a tool of inquiry, 
social capital is synonymous with social-political capital (see: Kooiman, 2003:62; 
Shipton, 2007:17) or “fiduciary culture” – which is the culture of trust and 
entrustment (Shipton, 2007:12).  In other words, social capital is the “bonds of 
shared values” or the glue that holds social groups and societies together116.  As 
such, it demands investing in its growth.  This is because social obligations and 
expectations, norms and effective sanctions, and leadership, are some aspects of 
social capital that are critical for contextualising relationships. 
In the study, the social capital concept is used to contextualise 
phenomena as varied as community support mechanisms, social control and 
contracts, trust and social organisations.  Berman and Kawachi (2000) see social 
capital as a subset of social cohesion, and social cohesion refers to first and 
foremost, an absence of latent conflicts.  However, it also denotes the existence 
of strong social bonds among the members, measured by the high levels of 
entrustment, norms of reciprocation, and strong institutions for conflict 
management.   
The explicit and implicit concern about social capital is that it is relational 
and a resource of the community rather than for individuals.  Contextualise in this 
way; social capital is a political capital that members and social groups can draw 
upon.  This however, means that for continued benefit it demands continued 
mobilisation (Bourdieu, 1980).  The notion that it is a group property and can be 
                                                          
116 Examples of conceptualisation of social capital is found in: Putnum, 1957; 
Bourdieu, 1980; Coleman, 1990; Woolclock, 1998; Horowitz, 1998; Anderson 1983 
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constructed or destroyed, and that it is institutionalised by long-term and durable 
relationships, is important in explaining the moral significance of community 
governance in creating cohesive societies.   
I have used social capital to discuss and contextualise both the positive 
and negative notion of entrustment and obligations, relationships, 
equality/inequality, inclusion/exclusion, and agency/structure (Shipton, 2007:12-
24).  Both Atkinson (1999) and Hills (1998) presented three aspects of social 
exclusion that are relevant in my case: first, as a relative aspect, that is, when 
exclusion is identified with a given set of community - say women, at a particular 
time and place (Atkinson, 1999:15 and Hills, 1998:13); the second is as an 
intended act by a system, hence, an agent; and finally, as a dynamic response to 
future significance without a predetermined intention.  Overall, scholarly work 
points to the fact that even in organised and cohesive society, social capital can 
be used to undermine cohesion and to fragment the society.  For instance, 
Colleta and Cullen (2001) have demonstrated in the case of Rwanda and 
Cambodia how the existence of strong exclusionary bonds within social groups 
when combined with weak links with the central authorities and the other social 
systems can present a strong recipe for violence.   
The second body of writing is found in the literature on structural 
violence and, like social capital, it adopts a multidisciplinary perspective117.  
Within this theoretical framework, the study contextualises how structures and 
policies have constrained the people of Acholi from enjoying their full potentials 
(e.g., Galtung, 1969; Schepre-Hughes, 1992).  Two salient and rather 
indefensible aspects resonate with the Acholi case study.  These are inequality - 
which has some historical dimension (see: Leys, 1962; NUSAF Report, 2004:3-6) 
- and human right violations (see for instance: Dolan, 2005, 2011:107-150).  
Inequality in this context, conjures images of marginalisation, deprivation and 
exploitation as manifested by extreme poverty indices and the levels of individual 
or group hopelessness (World Bank, 2001, 2006).  As later presented in the 
empirical chapters, it is difficult to contextualise whether extreme poverty has 
been actually the cause or is a consequence of both conflicts and violent ones.  
Unfortunately, inequality cannot in this case, be identified specifically with a 
                                                          
117 Structural violence is a popular phenomenon in law as a professional discipline, 
various anthropological research fields, history, sociology, political science, 
psychology and economic studies.   
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specific actor.   On the other hand, human rights violations, which have been 
highly interrogated in the case of Acholiland – during both colonial and 
postcolonial eras - present visible images of sustained tortures, displacements, 
and physical damages that are easily isolated with specific perpetuators (e.g., 
Finnström, 2008:131-136; Dolan, 2011: Chapter 3 and 8; Branch, 2011: 95-99).   
Ndlvou-Gatsheni (2011), while lamenting on the endemic nature and 
longevity of violence in Africa submits that “coloniality” – which is rooted in 
colonialism but is also distinct from it – is one of the key conceptual tools 
underpinning structural violence (see also Torres, 2007:243).  “Coloniality”, he 
maintains, symbolises dependency, which is defined by the long-standing 
patterns of power that continues to define culture, labour, relations and 
knowledge generation.  The immorality of “coloniality” as a vice includes in this 
case, how gender and age group are contextualised in community governance.   
It also seeks to validate the notion that race and ethnicity sit at the centre of 
“coloniality” and that “modernity project” is the instrument of its realisation 
(Escobar, 2007:179-210).   
In the study, I have contextualised the implications of such governing 
actions enacted to modernise the Africans118.  In particular, the study discusses 
the implications of policies that reinforced all forms of prejudices and constrained 
all social groups in Acholiland from reaching their potential.  This includes, for 
instance, understanding how the culture of the Acholi have continued to relate the 
different social groups like the women to the other social groups.  I have also 
looked at the formal rules and procedures that were enacted to govern the Acholi, 
including those that were specifically structured for the “pacification” of the Acholi 
during colonial and post-colonial eras (Branch (2011:18-19)119.   
In contextualising community governance during the NRM, I have 
argued that through the use of selective governing actions and instruments, 
Uganda as a state - together with sets of its development partners - concurred to 
delegitimise and dehumanize a set of its people in the process of its 
encapsulation within a state that has evolved from a colonial legacy of dominance 
                                                          
118 For some of these analyses, see Finnstrom (2008:Chapter 3) and as well some 
narratives from Uma-Owiny, 2013: 55-105.  
119 See for instance:  Odoi (2010) in discussing some of the Ordinance used during 
colonial period and Branch (2011:18-19) for series of governing actions and 
instruments used during post-colonial eras. 
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to a global frontier of capitalist enslavement (Schepre-Hughes, 1992; Iliffe, 1979).  
That through the modernity project, there has been systematic and sustained 
erosion of the Acholi community systems, which has prevented the Acholi from 
achieving their collective and individual potential (e.g., Dolan, 2005, 2011:184-
187).    I further submit that the shift in strategy away from what is generally 
considered the domain of moral economy has distorted relationships in 
Acholiland, established a chain of command with a linear flow of ideas from the 
government for implementation at the decentralised level.  This has created a 
chain of dependency on foreign goods and services for which the Acholi have no 
control and remained chained to it conditions (P’Ojok, 2007:1-12).  This sustained 
development underscores the forms and processes of transformative governing 
actions that are immoral because the outcomes are humiliating, some of which 
resulted in the forceful dismantling of an organic processes of state formation in 
Acholiland that had been going on for centuries (see: Atkinson, 1999, 2010:333-
335).  
The third and final body of work is founded in the literature on 
Transitional Justice (TJ), which is a self-conscious interdisciplinary field (Fischer, 
2011:406-430).  Its origin can be traced to the post World War II period in 
Europe. Since then, TJ has gained momentum and coherence with its early 
epistemology of jurisprudence of human rights, shifting to embrace strong 
elements of democratisation and development.  In the thesis120, the TJ concept is 
used to contextualise the history of governing actions, violence and policies 
towards transitional human rights, criminal persecution, truth telling, and 
reparations as important community governance issues (see for instance: De 
Grieff and Duthie, 2009).  As such, it is state driven, because Acholiland is being 
viewed as part of the Uganda state.  The various attempts to reconstruct and 
develop Acholiland are top-down, embedded within the legal framework of the 
Uganda state.  
Although nationally driven, the response of TJ is grounded in 
international experiences (Hayner, 2005 and Boraine, 2004).  Additionally, TJ is 
arguably, targeting civil and political rights (Gready and Robins, 2014: 1-14).  Yet, 
                                                          
120 For an Acholi specific discussion on this issues there are wide ranging discussions 
by scholars and civil societies including for instance a summary report by the JRP: 
Justice and Reconciliation Project, August 25, 2011 in Landmark Hotel, Soroti, 
Uganda.  Also see Refugee Laws Project at: www.refugeelawsproject.org.  
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in the case of Acholiland human rights need to be contextualised as indivisible 
and interdependent because of the structure and history of violence as discussed 
later (see for instance Dolan, 2011:67).  Within the TJ framework, I examined 
how acknowledged expert powers of the “traditional system” coped with the 
legacy of violence and the associated changing rules and regulations enacted in 
pursuance of “coloniality”.  Specifically, I examined the legacy of “coloniality” legal 
practices manifested through the “modernity project” - which attenuates legal-
rationality as a governing realm of the political elites (see for instance: Quijano, 
2000:1)121.    
For instance, while the acknowledge expert views of the Acholi macon 
rested in promoting transformative justice, Mamdani (2002) avows that under 
“coloniality”, the African politics have shifted course, from pursing political justice 
to promoting reconciliation122.   The transformative justice of the Acholi system 
adopts multi-sectorial and interdisciplinary approaches and unlike TJ, takes 
human rights and social justice as diverse and localised and therefore contextual 
and community-driven (see for instance: Gready and Robins, 2014:2).  Hence, 
the blind push for reconciliation as a top-down response to conflict presupposes 
that human rights are universal in nature and therefore, can be moderated by 
legal and state-based measures.  However, top-down driven reconciliation merely 
accentuates the rights of the parties engaged in the conflicts.  As such, it gives 
less attention to empirical and evidential approaches (Gready and Robins, 
2014:2).   
Appealing as this argument may be, I argue that rights need to be 
understood from a diverse context and understandably, should be visited in the 
courts of law.  Insistence on reconciliation, which is a top-down prescription in 
response to violence, undermines the promulgation of social justice for those that 
seek it.  Whenever this is adopted in the absence of true justice, there is 
likelihood that new conflicts will recur and with high possibilities of becoming 
more violent (see: Collier, 2004).  This is why when Mbeki and Mamdani (2014) 
politicised criminal actions by African leaders in the debate regarding the 
                                                          
121  My argument as presented above is to suggest that TJ is sort of the 
transformative approach that is desirable for the Acholiland where change during 
transition should be multilayered process, stimulated by empherical evidence of 
living it. 
122 See: Collier, 2004 – who submitted that violence often recurs after sometime 
following miscourage of justice 
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International Criminal Court (ICC), I shudder as I see African states under the 
façade of legal pluralism, set to reconstruct criminality as political constituencies 
(See: Mamdani, 2014) 123. 
The gist of this debate presupposes that violence is political because 
they are inspired by valid political differences between the parties.  As such, the 
proponents of the debate suggest that criminalisation of political violence is 
wrong because the issues involved are not substance for the court of law.  They 
for instance, argue that the courts are blunt tools of instating political orders 
because they are limited to making only two choices – either guilty or not, yet in 
the case of political violence, making this distinction is not only difficult.  It is also 
wrong (see: Kagwanja, 2014:1-3).   The logic behind this argument is that often 
there are no obvious victims or by standers or perpetuators of political violence.  
In fact, all the parties involved do at one point or the other ascribe to these 
different positions.  
In the case of the recent violence in Acholiland that set the rouge LRA 
bandits against the UPDF, the interpretation of this scenario would be that the 
Acholi, the LRA and the state - all had at one point on the other – had a stake in 
the violence as victims, perpetuators and/or by standers.  This logic, shares the 
brand of a top-down prescription of reconciliation by the state in resolving long 
time conflicts like the LRA case.  In both these instances, sufferings are 
politicised rather than addressed. The core of the violence that rocked Acholiland 
had a constituency in social power.  As such, those who wield the power had 
more to do with its longtivity and the ugly face, it administered.  
However, violent conflict in Acholiland has a history of reoccurrence 
since the nineteenth century.  Finnström (2008) and Branch (2011) admitted that 
most violent conflicts in Acholiland carry similar traits of brutality.  They are 
ingrained in the policy of “coloniality” that seeks to torture the Acholi and submit 
them into subjects of the authorities.  Additionally, reconciliation in the case of 
such violence is unattainable as the ultimate point of contention is about power 
                                                          
123 The original article on this debate appeared in the New York Times on February 5, 
2014. Professor Mahmood Mamdani further moved the debate to the podium at a 
public lecture “Can courts end civil wars?” organised by Kenyatta University and 
the Nation Media Group’s East African University Debate Series on February 14, 
2014.  In his debate, Mamdani is decriminalising the actions of politicians by 
arguing that the events that happened in Kenya following the national election in 
2008 was political.   
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play.  As such, reconciliation is more like a means to “bribe” the subjects and 
coerce them into accepting the outcomes of the power play.  This shift in policy 
away from pursuance of justice has resulted in sustained violence in Acholiland 
since the nineteenth century.  It has pitched the powerful outsiders, seen by 
community as perpetuators, against political leaders from Acholiland, who have 
been perceived as weak and incompetent, having failed to coerce the society to 
succumb to centralise patronage.  
This shift in ideology and practice contradicts the basic tenet of the 
societal social practice, which is all embracing and with positive implications for 
long-term stability and restoration of trust.  While earlier consultations carried in 
northern Uganda might have revealed that the population overwhelmingly 
demanded for frontloading of amnesty to the perpetuators because it would 
enhance peace, the meaning of this gesture was misunderstood and distorted 
(see: Allen, 2006).   
Contrary to the perceived blanket amnesty rhetoric – which fits into the 
new paradigm being advanced by African leaders - the Acholi that I interviewed 
indicated that front loading of amnesty to the LRA sought to secure an end to the 
two decades of unsuccessful military adventures by the UPDF, that failed to 
restore stability (Branch, 2005:1-21)124.   The Acholi had been made to believe 
that amnesty would stop the uncoordinated troops movements within its territory 
and pave way for truth telling and search for social justice125.   Especially, since 
the core of the LRA fighters were abducted children from Acholiland, the 
community felt obliged to forgive and reconcile with them, subject, however, to a 
Commission for social justice that would embrace the entire community126.  It is, 
in my opinion, the sequencing of these concepts that was of concern.  At no point 
could one state categorically that peace in Acholiland would prevail without 
investing in social justice127. 
                                                          
124 For various attempts by the government to win wars against the rebellion in the 
north see detailed analysis of the strategies and failures by UPDF beyond the camps 
periods. 
125 These feelings came out very clearly in the interviews and focus group discussions 
held over the years. 
126 See for instance the views of the community collected by CSOs in the ARLPI 12 at 
http://www.arlpi.org (Accessed: several times) 
127 Both a number of focus group discussions and interviews with youth, women and 
men were carried in Atyak and Awer camps.  This issue was central in all direct 
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This is because justice seeks to redress impunity and, in doing so, 
resuscitates the emergence of social/political capital that is desirable for social 
integration and co-existence (see: Mamdani, 2002:2-6.).  Reconciliation, on the 
other hand, merely accents the rights of the conflicting parties thereby, 
undermining the genuine process of forgiveness.  I have focused on this 
perspective because both retributive and restorative justices have been central in 
the Acholi community governance system128.  Arguably, most lweny kaka I have 
been told about, sought to manage internal conflict and ensure social justice.  
Yet, the on-going failure in achieving social justice and peace in Acholiland has 
left the people in the eyes of political storms.129  
In the views of the respondents, both the government and the LRA have 
a duty to genuinely confess for the atrocities they have committed, to take away 
the burdens of guessing about the motives behind the heavy handedness they 
both metered on the community.  The LRA and the government need to publicly 
accept their roles and repair the damages caused to the people. It is only then 
that reconciliation can be meaningful.  The sequencing of these events is critical.  
So, why decorate political violence?  
My argument is that with legal pluralism in Africa, there are competing 
and sometimes, contradictory governing instruments selectively applied by the 
state to manipulate its options.  Fakuyama (2013) asserts that the state is an 
organisation that distributes political power.  In undemocratic systems, political 
powers have been misused by the states, to undermine true reconciliation.  A 
case in mind in Uganda was the offering of blanket amnesty to warmongers since 
this conflict with existing laws that seek accountability for war crimes130.   
Regardless of the shortcomings in pushing for reconciliation ahead of or without 
justice, the state as a monopoly of power has the right in an undemocratic system 
to set laws like the Amnesty Act 2005, which has been applied to compromise the 
                                                                                                                                                               
interviews since the central part of the research aimed to help Acholi find a way to 
resolving the situation 
128 Most people I talked to in Uganda think that Acholiland has rich experience in 
peace building because of its historical trajectory. 
129 Chapters 4 to 8 discuss most of the empirical data collected from the field, and 
social justice is one of the major areas of discussions. 
130 See for instance various consultative meetings and studies conducted on the 
Amnesty Act of 2000 summarised in an issue paper, The Amnesty Law (2000) Issues 
Paper: Review by the Transitional Justice Working Group, April 2012, available at: 
http://www.judicature.go.ug/files/download (Accessed:03/03/2013) 
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path of social justice131.  Through reconciliation, there are no losers.  However, 
violence and impunity are stoppable through the right governing actions.   
Underlying this thesis is the view that institutional change outcomes can 
have direct bearings on societies.  However, such outcomes are not the end by 
themselves, nor do they create completely new forms of identities and politics 
(see: Collison, 2004; Calhoun, 1994).  For instance, for close to one hundred 
years now, attempts to break down kinship in favour of class ideation have not 
been as successful as envisioned (Hyden, 2006: Location 852, 1057).   My 
conviction is that in the build-up to these protracted reforms over the years, some 
exceptional traditional values and core governance principles have survived 
because they are mediated by the environment and most of these have not 
changed.  Secondly, some new practices are still unknown to the wider 
community because they are considered immoral to the general community.   In 
this context, I have explored tela or leadership landscape and the ideals of 
collectivity or entrustment as two areas of exceptional behaviours that might have 
not changed significantly over time. 
The Political History of State and Wars in Uganda 
The context of this research combines a complex political environment 
with the dynamics of history making.  In the case of the former, the study 
investigates the numerous social-political actors that have been engaged as part 
of the social-political system in which the Acholi was but a sub-system.  In the 
latter case, I have periodised institutional change outcomes with the help of 
scholarly literature over the major political eras covering over one hundred and 
twelve years.  This is mainly to compare how events of the last thirty years were 
quite similar to those in the past.  
This study, in part, comprises résumés concerning constructive ways of 
describing and analysing the processes of social-political change, in a social 
system that has suffered from violent conflicts, from a multidisciplinary 
perspective.  It draws considerably on my personal experience and knowledge of 
                                                          
131 See important arguments from the legal fratanity on how amnesty in its enacted 
form was a hinderance to justice in northern Uganda in: JLOS (2012) The Amnesty 
Law (2000) issues paper prepared for consideration by the Transitional Justice 
Working Group. JLOS, Kampala-Uganda.  
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the Acholi society.  In discussing governing interactions – the politics, wars and 
nationalism in state formation in Uganda – I looked at the structures of power and 
how political manoeuvres and manipulations either propagated enduring 
relationships or otherwise.  This discussion is a critique of on-going debates on 
state as a model of governance.  In particular, it advances the viewpoint that 
diversity, complexity and dynamism in governing practices demand governing 
interactions that enable enduring relationships.  This is an outcome of a moral 
governance system.   
Some narratives about Uganda state 
Uganda is an eastern African country132.  It gained independence from 
the British on October 9, 1962.  Uganda state came into being when Buganda 
Kingdom (e.g., Ehrlich, 1965:452)133 became a British Protectorate in 1894 (Wild, 
1954:36; Onek-Adyenga, 2011; Leggett, 2006; Odhiambo et al, 2003).  Its 
formation into a state was not easy because there was no history of serious 
political engagements among the units that eventually formed Uganda by 1962.  
Additionally, the British Government was not enthusiastic about its responsibility 
over the territory.  However, this changed when on 23rd November 1892, the 
Christian Missionary Society (CMS) offered to meet all the colonial costs of the 
administration of Buganda (Ehrlich, 1965:452). 
 Unlike Kenya or the present Zimbabwe, Uganda was a protectorate, 
meaning that its territory, while accountable to the British crown, was governed 
under indirect rule.   As a result, the British never invested adequately in technical 
and infrastructure development to propel the western model of a state that was 
authoritative and forcefully legitimate (see: Thomson, 2010:13-14).  This, argued 
Gardner Thompson (2003:15), is because the “British colonial state in Uganda 
was alien to not only in origin but also in purpose”.  As such, the Uganda state 
was a bifurcation with the modern – representing the interests of the British 
colonialists - and the tradition systems working in tandem. 
                                                          
132 The colonial authorities governed Uganda for over seventy years as an 
independent but not sovereign state.  Postcolonial governments have been in 
existence for 48 years by 2010 and it can be divided into: (i) the Obote regimes, 
1962 to 1971 and 1980 to 1985; Idi Amin, 1971 to 1979; Okello Lutuwa’s 
transitional period of 6 months in 1985 and the UNLF period, 1979.  The NRM in 
total by 2010 had ruled for 24 years. 
133 In the bid for independence, the Buganda Kingdom insisted that the 1894 
Agreement was signed between its rulers and the British’s IBEAC and therefore 
sought the handing over Buganda Kingdom to the Baganda royal. 
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Nonetheless, the formation of Uganda State became a reality, compelled 
by external interests rather than those of the units that finally constituted it.  The 
British had to apply force, conquered additional ethno-cultural entities and 
annexed them into the mainstream Buganda kingdom to create a Uganda state.  
In total, forty-eight ethnic tribes, most of them delineated by the British colonial 
authority, formed the Uganda state.  These polities were diverse culturally and 
politically (Atkinson (2010, 1999:81-84; Baker (1874: Locations 5383-5394)134.  
Rubongoya (2007:17) contends that they had no prior history of political 
engagements nor shared common political ideologies.   
Onyango-Odongo’s (2007:9-13) “How the British Ruined Uganda 
Civilisation”, on the contrary states that Buganda, Bunyoro and Luo-Gang or the 
Acholi had some form of political interactions that might have evolved into some 
common political objectives - including the refining of political institutions that 
seemed to have occurred particularly between the Luo-Gang and the Bunyoro 
Kingdom.  The point to note, however, is that the incentives and behaviours of 
the proponents of the state as a model of governance failed to galvanise a 
governable realm that was desirable for a modern state formation (see also: 
Hyden, 2006: Location 1038-1045; Thomas, 2010:8-23).   
The arbitrary lumping together of politically diverse ethno-cultural groups 
served the interests of the colonialists.  It constituted the first set of political 
discourses that failed the moral litmus test.  Only sustained and institutionalised 
force of arms, use of patronage and the policy of divide and rule glued the union 
(see: Thompson, 2003:9-39; Thomson, 2010: 8-23).  To this end, colonial 
administration was compromised when it hired the notorious Nubian forces as 
foreign mercenaries to establish order in the new Uganda.   
The Nubians were Sudanese ex-slaves turned slave traders.  They were 
driven out of Acholiland in the 1880s for their notoriety.  They raped, killed and 
destroyed society in Acholiland as they set clans against each other (Finnström, 
2008:59-61).  However, in 1889, the British enlisted them and together with its 
                                                          
134 Both Crazzolara (1951-3) and Sir Samuel Baker (1874: Locations 5383-5394) 
underscored the outstanding difference in the governance styles of the Luo and the 
Luo Gang in particular compared to Bunyoro and Buganda Kingdoms.  While 
Atkinson (2010) argues that the Acholi’s political structures of the 18th and 19th 
centuries adopted some form of the Banyoro, I have questioned in Chapter 2 some 
of these assertions.  
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own elite force, they formed the first contingent of the Uganda “national army”.  
And they, together with Baganda loyalists, were deployed to pacify the new State 
of Uganda, including the new Acholi (Wild, 1954:36-39). 
Seen from this depraved historical context, the first national army in 
Uganda was foreign.  It had no remorse for the social groups that formed 
Uganda.   This demonstrates that from the start, the Ugandan state ignored the 
key drivers of stability on several accounts.  In addition to the above, it also 
ignored the societal differentiated political configurations that had emerged in the 
early 1800s (Rubongoya, 2007:62-67).  These organic configurations135 had the 
potential for supporting political order and in the construction of political 
commonalities (Roberts, 1986:70).  For instance, A.D Roberts (1986) in “The 
Sub-Imperialism of the Buganda” made the observation that by extending 
colonialism to northern Uganda, which includes the present Acholiland, colonial 
authority “brings into the Protectorate a group of tribes whose organisation and 
customs were different” (Roberts, 1986:70). 
The character of Uganda state during colonialism 
The Uganda state during colonial era was a neo-patrimonial legitimacy 
characterised by a bifurcation of power (see: Rubogoya, 2007:6-11; Thomson, 
2010: 1-8; Branch, 2011:46-50).   A neo-patrimonial legitimacy is a façade of 
legal-rational bureaucracy that instead centralises power in the hands of the 
political principal, who in turn distributes it through patronage (see: Thomson, 
2010:1-8 and Rubogoya, 2007: Chapter 1).  The bifurcated authority was 
characterised by, on one hand, the so-called modern state - a seemingly legal-
rational legitimacy where the state-societal relationship was defined by the 
western models of liberal democracy.  While on the other hand, was a composite 
of diverse forms of “traditional” hegemony that were considered customary and 
tribal.  Most of these tribal outfits including the Acholi District Administration had 
differentiated forms of political power structures. Four of these were identified as 
kingdoms, which were forms of African despotic of varying proportion and where 
power was centralised to political principal.   Then, there were eleven “stateless” 
                                                          
135 The Acholi speaking Luo Gang as an ethnic group is currently found in northern 
Uganda, Eastern Equatoria State in South Sudan and Gambela region of South 
Western part of Ethiopia. However, the Acholi of Uganda, which is the focus of this 
study, numbers about 1.6 million people by mid-July 2011, with 75 per cent of its 
population aged under 30 years, the majority of whom have little awareness of the 
history of the region. 
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polities that were named as districts.  All these governance systems were at 
different stages of evolution into statehoods during colonial period (see: 
Rubogoya, 2007:2-14).  
The new Uganda state was an imperial one, envisioned as a modern 
state, that is, a delegated authority entrusted to maintain order with a high level of 
impartiality and specialisation as conceptualised in Chapter Two.  Its formation, 
however, was not an outcome of a negotiated agreement.  Rather, it was 
superimposed on these numerous traditional systems.  The Uganda state never 
replaced these traditional outfits.  Where applicable, as was the case in 
Acholiland, it created a parallel and competing despotic structure alongside the 
old, which ended up with pluralistic governing realms.  The state during the 
colonial period was also non-sovereign.  This was because the state was 
accountable to the British crown, and the Church136.  The power of the state was 
foreign-based and modelled for practicing a Western form of liberal democracy, 
even when the prerequisites for this were missing.    
The traditional aspects, on the other hand, were complex and diverse.  
They were also dynamic, vibrant and opportunistic.  For instance, the Buganda 
kingdom became the lead agency in the reform of the stateless units.  Acholiland 
became one of the eleven districts that were designated as tribal units, largely 
constructed arbitrarily based on commonality in spoken languages (Finnström, 
2008:54).  The management of these districts was initially outsourced to the 
Baganda elites who set to retrofit them into the despotic model deemed important 
for indirect rule.  As such, Acholiland was both a casualty of distortion and, a 
perpetuator of pluralism and political delegitimisation processes.   
There was no serious commitment by the colonial power to establish a 
central authority and systems associated with a modern state.  This is because 
Uganda was a protectorate.  As such, except at the traditional levels of the 
community, Uganda, as a state did not attract any constitutional struggle, such as 
was seen in Kenya and Zimbabwe (see: Rubogoya, 2007:4-5; Thomson, 
2010:13-14).  This meant that Uganda’s national leadership was based on 
                                                          
136 Both Joshua Rubogonya (2007) and Onek-Adyanga (2011) wrote extensively on 
the Uganda historical transition.  The consistent viewpoint of these Ugandan 
writers is that the missionaries’ patronage resulted in the political identity 
formation, participation and contestation that were defined by religion that 
complicated the ethnic lines. 
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tribalised despots (Karugire, 1980:49-97).  Furthermore, there was a tripartite 
governing architecture that did not crystallise into any form of national consensus.  
In the arrangement, the Buganda kingdom retained a federal set-up while the 
remaining three kingdoms and the eleven districts joined the state in their own 
rights.  In other words, colonialism promulgated ethnic communities and identities 
that became a permanent landmark of Uganda state.  
Postcolonial Uganda, 1962 to 2010 
Uganda by 1962 comprised some forty-eight tribes, four kingdoms and 
eleven tribal districts.  Acholiland was the largest of the eleven districts by size.  
After over one hundred and ten years of contemporary politics, Uganda as a state 
still lacks cohesiveness, having failed to foster conducive and legitimate social 
contracts with the dynamic and differentiated traditional ethno-polities to form a 
legal and modern state (Ginyera-Pinycwa, 2001:1-23; Rubongoya, 2007:13-17).  
The dominant modern governance realm is a variant of neo-patrimonial 
legitimacy that increasingly resembles an emerging monarchy.  It increasingly 
represents a one-man rule characterised by patronage, state coercion and a 
brand of clientelism that is violently regressive (see: Rubongoya, 2007:4-5; 
Thomson, 2010:1-8). 
Understandably, the British colonialists arbitrarily fixed tribal and political 
boundaries and proceeded to use an “independent constitution” in 1962 that 
established these political outfits with some elements of federalism and despotic 
decentralisation.  The postcolonial regimes have not addressed these historical 
wrongs.  On the contrary, they have made use of these differences and extended 
the colonial policy of divide and rule, which aims to stratify Ugandan society into 
classes according to tribes.   This is what I have continuously referred to as 
“coloniality”.   Unfortunately, Acholiland has taken a hard-hitting version of this 
policy.  It was a new creation in the image of centralised authority in the first 
place, with an important geopolitical vantage that needed to be directly governed.   
The power structures in contemporary Uganda have been dysfunctional 
because they do not conform to the model of central governance as advocated 
by the proponents of state (Rubongoya, 2007:33). As such, the process of the 
acquisition of power during the postcolonial era has involved delegitimisation, 
with two indicators of instability.  First, power allocation has been more by 
chance, ensuring that it was politically correct, rather than the enduring 
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governance realm (Rubongoya, 2007:34-38).  Obote’s assumption of leadership 
in the 1960s, arguably, lacked the legitimacy of competitiveness or charisma 
(Jogensen, 1981).  Rather, Obote, according to Rubongoya (2007:34-39), came 
in by chance amidst other competent and more senior members of his party.  The 
rest of the other postcolonial leaders, including Amin, Okello-Lutwa and 
Museveni, shot their ways into power, demonstrating how masculinity and 
militarism have created legitimacy in Uganda’s political governance. 
However, the NRM, unlike these others after ten years of military rule, 
bowed out to the international pressure and organised a general election, which it 
has successfully rigged since it presided over (Onyango-Obbo, 2014).  Secondly, 
power allocation during these periods has been based on an individual’s qualities 
and less on the institutions that supports them, something that contradicts the 
essence of this whole western-based process of democratic dispensation.  It 
seems unlikely that a political reconstruction that would allow mutual 
accommodation of the different social groups will emerge at any point soon.  This 
deep-rooted problem has been gravely misunderstood by all postcolonial 
governments, and most certainly now by the current NRM regime, which has 
been in power for over twenty-four years (see: Mamdani, 2002:1-4; Onyango-
Odongo, 2009: 1-13; Mwenda, 2010:1-6). 
The NRM initially set to legitimise and consolidate its authority by 
exploiting the general hatred for the northerners – who generally were referred to 
as the Acholi - which, from the perspectives of the southerners, embraced all 
those non-Bantu and those who are territorially labelled as from the political north 
of Uganda (see: Finnström, 2008:71-75, 78-84.  They exploited the general 
malaise about the northerners and especially the armies – which included the 
Uganda Army during Pax Oboteca and Pax Aminica.  Museveni and the NRM 
cleverly used their character and history as a southern-based social movement 
that would rid Uganda of the northerners (Finnström, 2008: 84-96; Dolan, 2011: 
48).  The most noticeable element of this politics was the political capital that 
flowed from Museveni as its leader (See: Tripp, 2008). 
Incorporating of Acholiland into Uganda Protectorate 
In order to situate the Acholi’s politogenesis within scholarly context, a 
brief discussion of its historical background is important.  As far back as the 
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eighteenth century, there were increasing waves of Europeanization in the entire 
Eastern and Central Africa.  In particular, there was a build-up of European 
interests and legitimacy along the Nile Basin.  In that context, Acholiland became 
a buffer zone for the British, sheltering its interests against other European 
colonialists in Central Africa (Onek-Adyanga, 2011:69-75).  This strategic 
importance meant that Acholiland would remain a focus of foreign interest for as 
long as the situation demanded. 
Conversely, the British had a prior and informal control over the present 
Acholiland as far back as the mid nineteenth century.  As part of the Eastern 
Equatoria Province, Acholiland was under the Khedive of Egypt, who ruled it 
through the Turko-Egyptian administration.  From 1863 to 1889, the Khedive of 
Egypt appointed three prominent British and German citizens namely, Sir Samuel 
Baker, General Charles Gordon and Emin Pasha respectively, as governors of 
the Eastern Equatoria Province (see: Odoi, 2010; Onek-Adyanga, 2011:41-53).   
These explorers-cum-administrators wrote extensively about the people who 
occupied the current Acholiland and their writings are seen as some of the 
earliest documentation of the Acholi of Uganda. 
By the nineteenth century, Acholiland was an important source of trade 
in ivory, cattle and slaves.  It also provided an important trading corridor, linking 
Khartoum in the north with the Eastern Coast (Grey, 1951:128; Girling, 1960:54).  
Additionally, it was a point of convergence, embracing three main and diverse 
societies - the Central Sudanic, the Eastern Nilotic and the Western Nilotic Luo.  
These ethnic groups were distinct but shared many social-political similarities 
(see: Atkinson, 1999:76; Crazzolara, 1950: 69-72), which included kinship and 
ideology, in addition to some common customs and beliefs that enabled and 
enhanced social interactions.  Other non-hegemonic features of these societies 
were the free movement of people and the limited range of governing authorities 
by each of the groups (Thomson, 2010:10). 
While Thomson (2010:14) sees the absence of political boundaries as 
one of the key features of pre-colonial communities in Africa, the situation that 
prevailed was different.  Noticeably, the social construction of space and 
boundaries delineated governance and conflicts for economic and political 
interests.  Uma-Owiny (2013) and Atkinson (1999, 2010) submit that Acholi 
territory was well known to the owners and res nullus was an internal debate 
among the social groups.   Since the area was prone to droughts and famines, 
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and it was a contact zone, it was insecure, forcing social groupings into   larger 
associations (see: Atkinson, 1999, 2010:138-139).  
Ronald R. Atkinson’s (1994:97-102; 2010:138; 1978:123) “The Roots of 
Acholi Ethnicity” (1994) and his other earlier study: “A History of Western Acholi 
of Uganda, 1672 to 1900: A study in the utilization of oral data” identified five 
tribes as core within the three social groups.  These were Moru, Madi, Teso, the 
Karimojong (Ateker) and the Luo. The Moru and Madi tribes are the Eastern 
Central Sudanic speakers.  Historically, they occupied and dominated three of the 
eight major political zones in Acholiland.  These three zones were the western, 
the north western and the north-central political zones, which constitute the three 
local government administrations of Amuru, Nwoya and Kitgum districts.  On the 
other hand, the Ateker were the Eastern Nilotic.  They entered the present 
Acholiland from the east with the majority of them settling in eastern Acholi (Odoi, 
2010:6).  They occupied three zones, namely, the north-eastern, the east-central 
and south-central zones, which have Pader, Lamwo and Agago Local 
Government Administrations. 
The Central Luo on the other hand, were the Western Nilotic.  According 
to Atkinson (2010), they came much later into the present Acholiland.  The Paluo 
or the people of Luo, he asserts, was the branch of the Luo who actually entered 
Acholiland from the south.  Atkinson (1999, 2010) reckons that Luo played an 
insignificant role in the development of the Acholi identity, a viewpoint that Okello-
Pacoto (2012) has recently contested.  According to Okello-Pacoto, the Luo 
entered Acholiland from both the south and the north.  From the north, they 
settled in the current districts of Agago, Pader and Kitgum.  Conversely, the 
Central Luo might have occupied, in addition, the south-central and the central 
zones, which are the current districts of Nwoya and Gulu.  The dominant kaka 
that can claim a direct link to the Central Luo, it seems, are the Patiko, Pajule, 
Koch, Alero and Payiira.  
Atkinson maintains that by the end of the sixteenth century, these 
societies had already evolved into semi-centralised political organisations 
(Atkinson, 2010:21).  For instance, they had leaders, ludito kaka, of different 
power bases as status leaders.  In addition, they were practicing social norms 
that included entitlements and entrustments, symbolised by rites and rituals – 
mediated by institutions of social rules and contracts and social obligations that 
were both materially and non-materially reinforced.  Some of these included tyer 
  
 
90 
or gift giving, communal hunting137 and intermarriages (Mamdani, 1999:21; Okec, 
1953).  I discuss these social-political organisations in Chapter Four. 
Sometime around the 1840s, however, the first set of external traders 
who spoke Arab and Ethiopian languages arrived in Acholiland (Girling, 1960: 
128; Uma-Owiny, 2012:2-7).  The Kutoria (1840s to 1872) and the Jaidiya (1872 
to 1888) were official representatives of the Khedive of Egypt.  These outsiders 
envisioned the creation of what in the modern world are industrial parks, for 
trading in ivory, cattle and slaves (Atkinson, 2010:267).  They used cattle and 
firearms as media for exchange.  Cattle were initially used in exchange for labour, 
paying rwodi for providing labour for transporting ivory to Khartoum in the north 
and Mombasa in the east (Girling, 1960: 129-132).  By the 1850s, trade in ivory 
had significantly grown in volume and competitiveness and slave trade also 
became a complementary enterprise.  
Foreign firms converged for trade in Acholiland from Khartoum in the 
north and from the Indian Ocean in the south.  The Acholi belt, asserts Mamdani 
(1992), became the largest supply of human trade and the antithesis of what 
began as a fair trade in only ivory.  The Arabs who traded in Acholiland had a 
history of immoral trade and unfairness138.  They were greedy, relied on 
firepower, and exploited the existence of local rivalries among competing kaka in 
Acholi, thereby fusing trade in ivory and slave with robbery (Finnström, 2008:33).  
They constructed satellite-trading centres all over Acholiland, which also served 
as centres for torture.  By demarcating trading areas into contract zones, it 
seems, these private traders facilitated unknowingly the consolidation of local 
politics and dialects that had begun to form by the 1720s (see: Atkinson, 2010: 
265-270).  In other words, the slave trade regime in some ways supported the 
definition of categories within the community-in-place.   
                                                          
137 “Tyer” is an Acholi word for sacrifice and is broadly used also for gifting especially 
to the “rwodi”.  It does hold some implications to the ranking of “rwodi” with the 
eponymous ancestors to whom most “tyer” were offered.  The use of communal 
hunting grounds – the ogwee - a seasonal event was discussed with community 
elders in the Pabbo, Atiak and Amuru displacement camps in 2005 and 2006. 
Seasonal game hunting combines livelihoods, sports, and tourism, involving multi-
ethnic groups.  
138 From October 2005 to August 2011, I lived Kapoeta in South Sudan and was able 
to get first hand information about how southern Sudanese were abducted and 
taken to the north as slaves.  
  
 
91 
The legacy of trade in slaves and ivory, and the history of the Arab 
speakers between 1840 and 1898 are well documented elsewhere (see:  Medrad 
and Doyle, 2007; Webster and Onyango ku Odongo, 1972; Uma, 1971; Atkinson, 
2010:265-270).   Regrettably, most of these inhuman activities by the Arabs, 
which led to the mass displacement of the Acholi from 1862 to 1879 into Bunyoro 
- were occasioned under the British ambit as a partner to Khedive Ali, who was 
the ruler of Egypt (Girling, 1960: 132-150).  Although the Brussels Act of 1890 
implored Britain to take immediate action and stop the trade, this did not happen, 
probably because of a lack of infrastructure, capacity for immediate resolutions 
and the usual bureaucratic procedures that delayed implementation of colonial 
projects.  Inevitably, by 1898, some fifty years thereafter, continued insurgencies 
by the Nubians or the Nubis through the promotion of lweny kaka, abductions and 
killings, continued in Acholiland.   
The creation of the Acholi ethnic society 
By 1898, there was arguably, some seventy or so kaka in the current 
Acholiland.139  Some, like kaka Payiira, Pajule and Padibe, had evolved 
significantly into governing forms with powerful rwodi moo as their noticeable 
influence (see: Leys, 1962: 5-10; Atkinson, 2010: 137-144).  The present 
Acholiland was enlisted as part of the Uganda Protectorate on June 30, 1896140 
following a number of military expeditions in the late 1890s led by decorated 
military men (See: Gertzel, 1974:57; Bere, 1947:8)141.  The IBEAC and its 
partner, the CMS, and later the Roman Catholic Church (RCC), then proceeded 
to apply a foreign and military occupation of the Acholi - a practice, which Onek-
Adyanga (2011) referred to as “external juridical and political control”.  By 1912, 
Gulu – now the regional town in Acholiland - became the new administrative 
                                                          
139 There has been some contradiction in the figures that scholars have suggested for 
kaka by the turn of 1900 and I have discussed this in Chapter Four. 
140 There is contradicting information on when Acholiland actually became officially 
under the colonial authority.  Scholars including Bere (1964) confirm that an 
administration for Northern Uganda was established in Gulu in 1910.  However, 
the excursion by Major Delme-Radcliffe (Langa Langa) established military 
administration over Acholiland by signing treaties with “Rwodi” Acholi in 1898.  JV 
Wild (1954:39), however, noted that Acholiland became part of the protectorate 
on June 30, 1896.  It should also be noted that British operations in Northern 
Uganda were dictated by its interest in the area.  Rather, it needed to establish its 
foothold on the Upper Nile in order to monitor its European rivals: the Belgians 
and the French over the Nile valley countries. 
141 Noticeably were Major MacDonald in 1898 and Major Delme-Radcliffe, 1899 to 
1902 
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centre, taking over from Keyo and Nimule.  
The colonial legacy in Acholiland, 1898 to 1962 
The entire epoch of colonisation (1898 to 1962) was, in the words of 
Dwyer (1972:5), an “imperial relationship” characterised by hostile and foreign 
domination sustained by military democracy, which forcefully superimposed a 
formal tribal unit over social groups that lived in the area, introducing immense 
internal governing confusions.  This development escalated, feeding inter and 
intra kinship rivalries within Acholiland, distorted traditional power structures and 
established a political identity that was institutionalised through despotic state 
agencies with alien manipulations and dominant values.  The coercive system 
created a colonial form of political order that was maintained through police 
forces (e.g., Sathyamurthy, 1986:343; Mamdani, 1996; P’Ojok, 2007:5-6).  
Acholiland became a politicised modern grid of legal interpretation that was 
forcibly imposed upon a traditionally variegated, contextual and deeply local 
space with the view of controlling the new colonial community ring-fenced inside 
the territory. 
Table 3.1: Some selected political events periodised from 1898 to 1962.  
Periods Significant political events that Influenced local governance in Acholiland 
 
1. By 1888 the pacification of Acholiland by the IBEAC’s military wing began.  Key military 
officers: Major Macdonald (1888), Major Delme-Radcliffe (mid-1898 and others started 
establishment of authoritative political and social infrastructure for “modern rules” in Acholiland 
(Gertzel, 1974:57).  Major Delme-Radcliffe secured control of the border post at Nimule as a 
new administrative centre.  In 1899, he recruited back the militant Nubis as “modern 
administration” of Acholiland, a move that exacerbated the IBEAC’s relationship with Rwot 
Awic of Payiira (Bere, 1947:8).  Rwot Awic then became the British’s pronounced “rebel 
leader”, viewed by the system as anti-modernity (Wild, 1952) 
2. Rwot Awic was arrested in 1901 for one year, replaced and temporarily released in 1902 
and re-instated as rwot Payiira in 1904. He was again re-arrested in 1912 and deported to 
Buganda.  Rwot Awic, however, became the first elected lawii rwodi or a paramount chief of 
the Acholi and the chair of the Dawan Council of chiefs. 
3. From early 1900 until the 1930s, colonial authorities targeted changes in leadership code 
that did not conform to the Acholi’s traditional succession to power (Girling, 1960:84; Gertzel, 
1974:58) but it did not work in their favour. A policy to end Acholi’s succession to power was 
decreed by Postlethwaite as District Commissioner in 1915 but all these were suspended in 
1935 (Bere, 1947:8) or 1937 (Gertzel, 1974:58.  This was further supported by the 1919, a 
Native Authority Ordinance formalised the powers of native chiefs with unlimited executive 
powers, legislative and judicial authorities (Mamdani, 1996:Chap 3). 
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3. In 1906, Keyo became the new administrative centre for northern Uganda after Wadlai and 
Nimule respectively.  It also housed the CMS, which settled there in 1904. The administration, 
however, moved to Gulu in 1910 and by 1912, Gulu had become the northern administrative 
town (Gertzel, 1947:8). The “modern administrators”, the Nubis continued to enforce orders all 
over rural western Acholiland from here. By 1912/13, they also effected the compulsory 
dislocation of people in western Acholiland.  These actions together with implementing violent 
disarmament raised considerable resistance in Acholi.  Over 1000 Acholi men were trained by 
1915 as new agents, and later in 1915 a new district, Chua in present Kitgum, was 
established, to gain grips of eastern Acholiland. (Postlethwaite, 1947:66) 
 
 
Results – The creation of authoritative structures with the view to extract tax and forced 
labour was increasingly being contested leading to broadening engagement of the people 
 1. In 1931, Uganda census was carried and Acholi’s population found to be only 4.4 per cent 
of the Uganda project.  In 1937, Chua district was re-amalgamated with Gulu.  The nine 
counties were renamed based on physical features, to delink them from ethnic contestations 
arising from the original kaka that formed them.  In the same year, the Acholi Dawan Council 
(ADC) – which was a council of only rwodi was expanded to include nominees representing 
the Acholi people (Bere, 1947:8).  And in 1938, displaced persons from Anaka, Nwoya, Alero 
began to return under controlled migration policy (Bere, 1947:8).   
2. By 1939, a Native Administrative Note was signed by Governor Sir Phillip Mitchell.  It 
sought to broaden local engagement in local governance (Gertzel, 1994:17).  However, by 
mid-1940s, ADC was establishment was only limited at the district level.   The parish council – 
which replaced kaka’s council of elders - only came in force in 1950 following the 1949 African 
LG Ordinance provision that had explained how district and parish councillors could be 
elected.  According to the Ordinance, 6 colonial appointees – the county chiefs, local 
government officials, and senior jagi were ex-officio. In addition, the District Council nominated 
8 members while the District Commissioner nominated 8 and 22 elected by the chiefdom 
heads (Gertzel, 1974:58). Parish and District Council elections only began in 1955. 
 1. By 1953, the Uganda National Congress (UNC), a national political party was established in 
Acholiland in the present East Acholi sub-region mainly by.local traders. The party began to 
raise awareness on national issues, challenging local administration and the Acholi Local 
Government.  The growth of nationalism began to open up Acholiland into the global discourse 
of governance 
2. By 1955, the African Local Government Ordinance abandoned the earlir provision for 
special chiefdoms’ representations in the local council and it set for free election of 
representatives to started.  This followed the African LG Ordinance of 1955 
3. In 1961 there were about 7,215 Acholi employed.  This was the peak year.  This dropped by 
about 1,500 in 1962 and in 1963 went up to 7,074. By and large, Acholi, which had 4.4% of 
the country population, had 7.2% of the African employed in Uganda (Leys, 1967:49).  
4. By 1962, Acholi had more secondary school per capita (4 instead of 3 in 1965) in Uganda, 
and the District Authority had assumed responsibility for primary education in Acholiland with 
53% of the children of primary school age enrolled (Leys, 1967:52) 
Source: Field Work, 2015 
Essentially, colonial administrators decided to draw borders and labelled 
everyone inside the borders as the Acholi, regardless of whether or not they 
agreed.  The colonialists used language and similarities in culture, including what 
was understood by them as kinship to redefine communal and ethnic boundaries 
when creating the Acholi (Amone, 2014: 8-11).  As a consequence, Girling (1960) 
submits that the British had difficulties in convincing the Acholi that they were 
indeed the Acholi - and not members of the different gangi they belonged to 
(Girling, 1960:9).  Truly, these scholars did not deny that social interactions never 
existed among these social groups prior to this legal construction of boundaries.  
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Rather, they maintain that Acholiland was a home of many clan groups or tribes 
prior to when colonialists labelled all of them the Acholi (see: P’Bitek, 1970 cited 
from Finnström, 2008: and Crazzolara, 1954: Chapter 1).    
Since the fundamentals for indirect rule - the administrative class and 
the hierarchal organisations – were lacking in the Acholi macon’s architecture, it 
had to be established to enable the implementation of rules.  In other words, 
“indirect rule” was a formalised despotism that contracted local systems to deliver 
on their “immoral” missions – to tax local incomes and invest to sustain the 
interest of the colonialists (Branch, 2011:49).  However, the implications of the 
“indirect rule” for the tribal setting in Acholiland had to take a different context 
because of the existing social-political arrangements142.  
The first step was to create and superimpose new and parallel 
administrative arrangements to implement the colonial mandates.  This new outfit 
set to push out the kaka model of governance in some specific areas of 
community governance – the governing contents and methodologies as 
discussed in detail later.  The new governing model, both the chiefdoms, in the 
1890s and early 1990, and Local Government – thereafter, did not replace kaka 
but reshuffled its functions.  Since chiefdoms and Local Governments were 
predatory, despotic and centralised systems for the extraction of taxes and free 
labour, they allowed the kaka system to flourish, offering the moral aspects of 
governance.   
The chiefdom-cum-local government had two characters, adopted from 
both the colonial and what Mamdani (1996:105) refers to as the traditional African 
governance system.  On one hand, it had the Buganda despotic and old setting 
that appealed to the British because of it autocracy, and missing in the kaka 
model.  This particular aspect was made ethical by domesticating selected 
parameters of Acholi traditions – the leadership and the content of the customs; 
to right size its punitive contents to model the Acholi as a modern community.  
This was disseminated through the administrative class, initially dominated by the 
Nubis, into the rural society in parallel with the traditional system.  The outcome 
of this was a hybrid product of customary laws that significantly departed from the 
contents of what embraced the kaka – which I have referred to as traditional.  I 
have referred to this hybrid system as Local Government.  The latter combined 
                                                          
142 For similar trajectory elsewhere, refer to Iliffe, 1979 
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what Fukuyama (2013) referred to as the bureaucratic branch of the state but 
also the “toothless” Local Council, handpicked at the beginning by the 
bureaucrats (see for example: Gertzel, 1947:17).   
Then, there was the colonial or civil dimension, the District 
Commissioner - that fitted Francis Fukuyama’s (2013:356) definition of the 
political principal.  It was a white man who manned it, probably to avoid what was 
seen as a conflict of interest when insiders are given the role (see: Hyden, 2006: 
Location 2294).   He supervised and appointed the chiefs and their analogues.  
The new “chiefs” in the case of Acholiland were, in most cases, not rwodi – who 
were the traditional leaders (see: Bere, 1947).  However, they were locals, 
selected with the help of the Churches to govern the community on behalf of the 
District Commissioners.  
So, at the Acholi community level, the reform had two formal pillars.  It 
fused some aspects of Acholi custom with the Buganda, to create a formal 
“African version” of despotic power base as a hybrid, set to implement a new 
Acholi custom that was specific to the Acholi society (Mamdani, 2002: 2).  This 
new custom is what became the popular customary law (see: Mamdani, 2014: 
Locations 7-25 to 25-44).  In this new establishment, the British “imagined proper 
African chiefs” would emerge and “help raise the particular savage Acholi up the 
civilisation ladder toward the model of the Baganda.” (Branch, 2011:48). In other 
words, these chieftaincies and the state represented by the District 
Commissioner formed a bifurcation of local authority that was external to the 
Acholi143.  However, unlike in Buganda or in the kingdoms, there was a more 
pronounced traditional power-base that dominated the rural areas, the kaka.  
Acholiland became a “trifurcated system” with the formal elements as foreign 
despotism, constituting the civil powers.  The third element was the kaka model 
with its functions reshuffled.  It was the latter that the British found inadequate for 
the despotic role of the new local governance but was also the one that featured 
a strong political force in the mobilisation of the community (Branch, 2011: 46-
48).  
                                                          
143 In the later Chapters, I argued that the case of Acholi was an outsourced indirect 
rule because there were no forms of local structures in Acholi that befitted indirect 
rules.  As such a trifurcation of authority emerged, dominated by the British system 
at the apex and the Buganda model in the centres while the Acholi tradition in the 
rural. 
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In recognising the tripartite realm of governance, the 1939 Native 
Administration: Note by Governor Sir Philip Mitchell allowed the incorporation of 
rwodi moo as representatives of the “segmentary people” in the District Council, 
who were tribal authorities that also included some other appointed Acholi petty 
bourgeoisies (Girling, 1960:84; Gertzel, 1974:17).  This council could not, 
however, limit the authority of the appointed chiefs who were, therefore, a 
different tier of governance. 
The reform of local governance that came with colonial rule was a 
painful one.  It displaced social groups, imposed new and foreign leaders and 
created foreign structures that were more despotic (Uma-Owiny (2013: 45-
120).144  It introduced new and autocratic male-based local chiefs instead of 
using existing and charismatic rwodi moo and ludito kaka.   These chiefs were 
not part of the traditional leadership realm in the Acholi clan systems.  
Additionally, their appointments were neither sanctioned nor were the locals 
consulted (See: Branch, 2011:47).  Importantly, most of these local chiefs had no 
prior knowledge of governing the people.  Nevertheless, they were given wide-
ranging powers under the new regime (Sathymurthy, 1986:343).  Having created 
a model that befits what was imagined as proper for African chiefs, the chiefs 
who later became known as rwodi kalam, that is, “chiefs of pens” rather than “real 
Acholi rwodi” set to establish order as envisioned by their supervisors. 
These chiefs had no remorse for the people.  They came from different 
clans and in most instances many had their background as the lubong, and were 
posted to areas far away from their own, and sometimes-enemy clans (Girling, 
1960: 9; Uma-Owiny, 2013:Chapter 7). They were engaged in what was culturally 
immoral, that is, enforcing the production of cotton (awara), collection of taxes for 
foreign regimes and administering forced labour, as directed by the District 
Commissioners in the community (Dwyer, 1972:132-206; p’Ojok, 2007: 3-9; 
Branch, 2011: Chapter 2).  This caused spiralling violence, especially where 
these chiefs overstepped their authorities.  Some of the noticeable and collective 
resistances include the Lamogi rebellion of 1911/12 and the Parabongo revolt of 
                                                          
144  Uma-Owiny’s “History Repeats Itself (2013)” enumerated how changes in the 
territorial arrangements in the entire Acholi were handled during colonial 
restructuring, 1902 to 1936. 
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1912 (Major Delme-Radcliffe (1905:482)145.  This violence against the institutions 
became a trademark of the colonial system as it set to govern a new people 
based on a new system.  Since the traditional system was not formally 
delegitimised by the new state system, Acholiland became a pluralistic system, 
making selective choices based on the efficacies of the formal and informal 
systems.  It also became a new tribal component of the Uganda state as 
imagined by colonialism. 
Post-colonial era tribal identity, 1962 to 2010 
The subsequent postcolonial regimes, from 1962 to 2010, merely 
fortified the colonial reform in community governance, further delineating 
community groups geographically to ensure control and exploitation (Dwyer, 
1972:130-144).  From 1962 to 1985, the northern tribes dominated state 
leadership in Uganda with Apollo Milton Obote, from Lango (1962 to 1971, and 
1980 to 1985), Idi Amin, a Kakwa Field Marshal, from 1971 to 1979 and Tito 
Okello-Lutwa, an Acholi General, from July 1985 to January 1986.  The Acholi 
noticeable contributions during particularly the Obote I regime were in civil 
service, agriculture and in national politics.  However, the Idi Amin military regime 
and especially the NRM that came in force on January 1986 and is still in power 
changed both the content and context of Acholi’s future roles in Uganda state.  
The years 1962 to 1971 also show the Acholi as a political community 
mending its traditional conflicts with the Langi ethnic group, where Obote came 
from.  Indeed, as Branch (2011:53-55) observed, Obote’s early regime propelled 
significant regional political division around the question of equity and national 
governance and this provided a common platform for most of the districts outside 
Buganda kingdom - which had initially joined Uganda state as unequal.  This 
particular aspect appealed to Acholi politicians, but Obote also made other 
positive changes, building on the historical context of the Acholi pre- and colonial 
experiences.   
Foremost, he inspired the prospects for equity in governance, something 
that appealed to most Acholi and showed opportunities for making Local 
Governments morally functional in the line of kaka, in search of equitable 
                                                          
145 Major Delme-Radcliffe who came to Acholiland in 1898 and became of one the 
well-known and feared leading pacifiers of the Acholi wrote extensively about 
the Lamogi rebellion. 
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governance rather than the exploitation that had happened since the nineteenth 
century.  He, therefore, galvanised greater hope than the Democratic Party, 
which, although was dominant and rooted in the Catholic Church in Acholi, was 
still seen as a Baganda political outfit.146  But Obote, like President Museveni, 
was a political warrior of a different kind - something that typically resonates with 
leadership traits in fragile situations.  Again, Branch covered most aspects of 
these in his work (Branch, 2011:53-56).   
In tandem with its kaka philosophy, the Acholi, divided in their support 
for Obote mainly because of religion, elevated his rule, which was further 
consolidated in his second term, from 1980 to 1985.   Remarkably, the Acholi 
respondents acknowledged that Obote I era was the Acholi epitome of glory.  
Interestingly, while Branch (2011:56-58) and Rubongoya (2007:39) see Obote’s 
failure in reforming the tribalised local state, for the Acholi, a tribalised state had 
resolved the micro-level ethnic divisions that were perpetuated by the slave 
traders.   
As some scholars have maintained, the Acholi people of different social 
groups lived as neighbours, knew each other and shared with each other many 
common customs prior to the coming of the British (see: Bere, 1947:4,6; Driberg, 
1932:411-416).  Whitmore (2013: 41) for instance, relying on works of earlier 
scholars like Atkinson (1994:49) affirms that the Acholi were a collective even 
before colonialism except for a lack of a common name, Acholi. However, both 
the Kutoria and the Jadiya slave traders exploited the rivalries that existed among 
these various social groups and it was only during the colonial regime that a 
common identity was imposed on them beyond the violence that existed.   
Hence, a tribalised Acholi was established from a group of nations - the 
kaka that had to forge additional new and binding common interests in the 
evolving global and national politics.  One such interest was a new political 
identity that demanded paramouncy at the new Acholi political level, which the 
British instituted in 1950s.  In fact, this is an example of hierarchal interventions in 
reforms in a fragile situation, which can reinforce the desire for change when 
approached from a moral context.  Thus, Obote’s targeted reform of the central 
                                                          
146 Interview held with Charles Alai (RIP) in Gulu, Roma Hotel in April 2008 and on 
phone with Anywar Kwamogi based in New York on March 2008.  Both of them 
were young men at the time. 
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state apparatus, if anything, made perfect sense for the Acholi, where the kaka 
design was still visible and only rationalisation and harmonisation of the earlier 
reform was needed in the local government (see: Leys, 1967:24).147  
In doing so, he created political patronage that was not completely 
embraced in Acholi, as was demonstrated by the results of the national 
parliamentary elections.148  He worked with the new team of kinetic political 
leaders from Acholiland in forming a new post-independent political elite that 
became a new image of the Acholi in the national arena.  Technically, Acholiland 
had four tiers of leaders, which maintained separate decision levels: (i) those 
political and technical elites that represented it at the state level – the lugwok 
paco, (ii) those in the district politics - in the local councils, (iii) those in the civil 
service at the local or tribal levels, including the chiefs, and (iv) the traditional 
leaders, the ludito kaka.  Most of these were men.  
Amin’s Uganda, 1971 to 1979 
Idi Amin and Museveni’s regimes in total ruled for thirty- four years until 
2010 and are rated differently.  First, both regimes rekindled the militarisation of 
tribes and therefore tribal divisions.  In doing so, they both ejected the Acholi from 
soldiering, something that they had specialised in largely as an alternative means 
for livelihood (see: Pain, 1998: 7-11).  The two regimes also clearly alienated the 
Acholi from the centre, affecting the ethnic dimension of governance.  Both 
regimes are also remembered for social torture in Acholi, by sealing off the entire 
territory from journalists and media, and combing entire villages to root out what 
they felt were “enemies of the state”.  
Amin’s army, according to respondents, was reminiscent of the Nubians 
troops.  They knew the Acholi villages as some had lived there before, and they 
plundered Acholi intensely from day one, starting with the killing of its core middle 
class in the army and the civil service (Pain, 1998:10-15; Kasozi, 1989; Branch, 
2011: 56-58).   While in the early years of his rule, Amin worked with Local 
Government chiefs who were well established during Obote I era, he turned 
                                                          
147 Leys (1967) notes that in the early 1960s, the idea of reviving the traditional 
system was considered by the District Local Council but, somehow, were dropped. 
148  Of the four constituencies in Acholi in 1962, Obote’s UPC won only 1 while the 3 
were taken by the Democratic Party 
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against them, particularly from 1973 to 1979.  They were either killed or had to 
flee, and their assets confiscated.  
Both Amin and Museveni during their first periods of rule in Acholi 
depended on members of the Democratic Party in order to gain local confidence.  
By 1979, when Amin was overthrown, virtually the entire Acholi was empty of 
lutela as most were either killed or fled into exile (e.g., Kasozi, 1994:121).   
Poverty had also deepened as both agriculture and civil services were no longer 
in the domains of the Acholi.  The economic war that Amin declared against 
foreigners provided benefits for local Ugandans and especially the Muslim, but 
not Acholi.  First, there was no such Muslim class in Acholi except for the 
Nubians and migrants from other parts of the world. Secondly, the Acholi were 
classified by the state as enemy of the state (Kasozi, 1994:121). 
Qualitatively, Amin left Acholiland without much in terms of its political 
image as its local institutions and leaders were eroded and there were visible 
gaps, both locally and nationally.  When the combined forces of the Tanzanian 
and UNLF/A reached Acholi, the majority of leaders were what the Acholi would 
term the mak ayang - those who had survived Amin because they were either 
spineless or traitors.  Certainly, there were many leaders who, of course, 
following the eight years of military oppression had to adjust by trading off some 
of the virtues of “normal leaders” in the eyes of an Acholi.  Most educated Acholi 
decided to remain in the diaspora, where their families were already established. 
In summary, the narratives in Table 3.2 below, gives the results of 
governance since 1962 to 1985, providing baseline data for the focus on the 
NRM government, which had indicated that its coming to power was a 
“fundamental change”.  It lays out the fact that especially from 1971, Acholi’s 
political, economic and social bases were deteriorating. 
Museveni’s Uganda, 1986 to 2010 
Museveni found Acholi in a very sorry state.  The five years or so of 
Obote II had not done much in terms of human development or even recovery 
from the eight years of Amin’s torture and killings.  Obote II era made the same 
mistake of the 1960s by creating a national army that became the niche for the 
Acholi youth - a mistake that further deepened the division between the 
northerners as a group, and the southerners (Pain, 1998:12).   
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Table 3.2: Summarising Acholiland after 1962 and prior to the 1986  
Era Significant Political Events Relating to the Acholiland 
 
By 1962, Acholi’s population was 340,000, which was 4.4 per cent of Uganda total 
population. More Acholi [7.2% of the African employed in Uganda] were employed than 
any other tribes and in public sector, where its number was only second to Buganda 
(Leys, 1967:49). Its LG was one of the strongest and with good services. Acholi had 
more secondary schools per capita (4 instead of 3 in 1965) in Uganda, and the District 
Authority had assumed responsibility for primary education in Acholiland with 53% of the 
children of primary school age enrolled (Leys, 1967:52).  It contributed 12 of the required 
36 administrative officers at independence (Onyango Odongo, 2009). 
Its economy was predominantly labour base, with smallholder farmers dominating the list 
of private investors although with restricted but functioning access to markets.  There 
was no industrialisation and supportive infrastructure at all, save for the Uganda Railways 
and Gulu airport.  By 1963 only 445 private traders existed and some 7,074 civil servants 
and while the rest of the population were cattle herders and agriculturalists of small-scale 
levels (see: Mamdani, 1967:2008-2009). The entire Acholi economy was sustained by 
remittance mainly from civil servants and especially the army and the police, where it was 
leading in the numbers of recruits (Pain, 1998; Omara-Otunnu, 1987:51) 
 
The 1971 coup’detat by Idi Amin came at the time when the Acholi identity had been fully 
reified and essentialised along with other political traits that redefined them as a category 
in Uganda (see: Branch, 2011:48-50).  Obote I attempted to establish tribal equality in 
Uganda, to avoid the marginalisation of the non-kingdom districts.  In doing so, he 
stimulated the different and divided Acholi entities of the 1950s to firmly embrace tribal 
unit and thereby, deregulated to a large extent, the perennial internal political 
disagreements within the Acholi elites that were partly linked to religion.  This created a 
social base that later became the basis of resistance to Idi Amin regime. 
By 1973, Amin had consolidated the army base in the north without the Acholi; reshuffled 
Obote’s social bases among the Acholi in a similar manner as the colonialists did in the 
1900s.  He decimated public and most of the UPC functionaries and rwodi moo, replacing 
most of them with his military hoodlums (Omara Otunnu, 1987:104, 133-137). The entire 
period of his regime, which ended in 1979, manifested social tortures; arrests and he 
decimated prominent leaders from Acholi, reversing most of the gains accumulated in 
economic, physical, and human and social services since the 1950s through to 1971 
(see: Mutibwa, 1992:188).  
 
By 1979, Acholi’s internal order had collapsed and its ability to connect with the state 
destroyed.  Most of its capable and educated elites were either decimated and/or had 
been forced into exile. Both the UNLF (1979 to 1980) and the Obote II (1980 to 1985) 
merely created a loll in looming external assaults on the Acholi’s political and territorial 
space. These periods also raised unnecessary political expectations, and for similar 
reasons as in the 1950s, led many Acholi youth into the national military services and with 
devastating consequences to national social capital accumulation and poverty. In 1985-6, 
Tito Okello regime bridged the Acholi society with the dominant Madi and Lugbara tribes 
in West Nile, thereby subdued the inevitable revenge envisioned from the people on the 
capture of power by NRM (See also: Branch, 2011).   
Source: Field data, 2015 
Andrew Mwenda, who was an outspoken political critic and journalist, 
contends that the logic behind the NRM portrayal of Acholi as a bad group was 
tactical and had long-term implications.  The NRM intention for regime longevity 
was achieved by riding on the ethnic dimensions, while early political parties were 
aligned to religion: 
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“Museveni used the war in Luwero in an attempt to realign Uganda’s politics from 
religion towards ethnicity. The prolonged war against the LRA reflects how 
Museveni defined the nature of the challenge he faced from Joseph Kony. 
Although LRA does not represent the popular feelings of the political leaders from 
Acholi or the feelings of ordinary people, Museveni defined it so. Museveni saw 
not just the LRA, but also the Acholi as a whole as the enemy; LRA was only the 
armed wing of the resistance. To get the south behind him, he sought to 
undermine the national platform UPC and DP had built. He presented the military 
brutality of the UNLA as an Acholi assault on Baganda thereby casting political 
rivalry in ethnic terms. This has had powerful implications.” Andrew Mwenda, April 
24, 2010149 
There is a lot of writing regarding the politics of ethnicity in Uganda150.  
The original motive of the NRM, we were told, was to change this politics of a 
divided Uganda151.  As such, its change of guard was at first interpreted as a 
“fundamental change” because its leaders proclaimed that they would solve this 
governing cancer in Uganda.  By 2010, the NRM carders were eating back their 
earlier proclamations because, if anything, it demonstrated that a true Uganda 
politics of survival is ingrained in ethnicity (see for instance: Mwenda, 2010:1-
13.).  Similarly, Dolan (2010: 219-252) and Whitmore (2010) divulged some of 
these mind-boggling expositions on ethnicity by the NRM in its relationship with 
the Acholi.  In their exposition, the war that ravaged the north was methodical, 
meant to deal significant effects on the northern tribes.   Some of the effects 
include a higher than usual concentration of the poor in Acholiland as a political 
community.  Recent analysis by the Oxford Economics (2014) suggests that 
more than eleven per cent GDP growth rate per annum for twenty-five 
consecutive years is what is needed in northern Uganda, for it to fall within the 
Uganda Vision 2040 projection.  This is something that is unattainable based on 
the history of governing action we have seen thus far under the NRM since 1986 
(Oxford Economics, 2014: 1-20). 
From 1986 to 1991, the NRM established the Resistance Councillors 
(RCs) at village, parish, county and district levels as an innovation152.  This 
created a new system and a parallel structure to the existing Local Government 
structures.  Unfortunately, these structures never worked in Acholi as people 
                                                          
149 This can be found at “andremwendasblog.blogspot.dk” 
150 For example Adam Branch (2011) covers substantially the question of ethnic 
divides in Uganda and how the Acholi since colonialism, has been aligned too 
different parameters.  
151 More about this can be found in the book by President Museveni, 1997 
152 For the chronology of the civil war in Acholiland and the trends of human 
displacement, refer to Lamwaka, C. (2002). 
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were living under displacement in camps, where new structures were established 
by GHROs (see: Messier, 2012: 4-12).  The 1997 Local Government Statute 
changed RCs to Local Councils (LCs), maintained at the same levels.  The LC 
Act 1997 has been reviewed annually, to benefit from practices on the ground.  
Unfortunately, the reviews, according to reports, have focused mainly on 
concerns of service delivery systems and financial accountability, but less on 
political governance (Ojambo, 2012:2-7).   Relevant as they are, they are 
inadequately reflecting the diversities in the use of the instrument.  Many think 
that donors have high jacked the process, limiting the scope to merely working on 
what matters most for their parliaments, which is how the money have been 
spent – not so much on how the people benefited from the funds (Missier, 
2012:1-12).  
Besides that, the Acholi have experiences that are not integrated in the 
Local Government Development instrument.  Displacement started as early as 
1986 and most of these were voluntarily.  Following the ultimatum for the people 
to leave their homes in 2002, the RCs and the LCs systems had no ground for 
successful trials in spite of the fact that it resonated with what I consider the 
traditional system (Missier, 2012:3-5).  First, it sought to give leadership to active 
people based on their personalities and capabilities, something that was 
ingrained in the kaka system of governance.  It was, therefore, considered 
apolitical, initially voluntary for service-oriented governance.  In fact kaka like the 
LCs systems were a non-partisan and broad-based form of political movement 
that fuse multiplicities of opposing actors.  Secondly, the NRM system was 
bottom-up, seeking to inform the top about what make sense for community 
governance.  This too, was the case with kaka.   
Instead, in 1997, camp administration was imposed on the displaced 
people by a new and an emergency Committee – the Disaster Management 
Committee.  During the LRA war, which official began in 1988, Acholiland was 
rightly described as a limited statehood with donors and their funded CSOs and 
networks of global NGOs leading governance in the displaced people’s camps 
(Missier, 2012:4-5, Dolan, 2011:178-184).  At the Local Government level, the 
donors largely managed the Disaster Management Committee.  It had Local 
Government representatives and the donor-funded Civil Societies as members.  
In the camps, they introduced new structures for their humanitarian interventions 
and the LCs, who had just been installed following the 1996 general elections 
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together with the “traditional system”, went on recess (Missier, 2012:1-18).  In 
some instances, however, some members of the LCs were elected as part of the 
Committee or as camp administrators. 
Acholi’s Structural Dimension of Interactions 
The structural dimensions of interactions are the non-territorial aspect of 
the Acholi: the cultures, physical materials, such as natural resources, and power 
conditions, of a given society.  I have contextualised them herein below as (i) 
physical and natural features, and (ii) social structures and cultures of the Acholi 
of Uganda. 
Physical and natural features 
Earlier studies, including by Atkinson (1999, 2010) commented about the 
sporadic environmental extremes in Acholiland153.  They made reference to the 
oral history of severe droughts, heat waves and dust storms during ooro or dry 
seasons (Oloya at al., 1998).  These pervasive aspects of the climate were 
seasonal events and historically, have been more devastating in the eastern part 
of Acholiland.  Additionally, in the wet seasons or cwii, there were invasions by 
plagues of insects, worms and grasshoppers, especially experienced during what 
I have referred to as Acholi macon154.  These latter events, however, significantly 
declined during the 1970s and 1980s, according to oral sources, mainly by the 
attentions given to them by the central government155. 
Explicit in these conditions were the devastating famine and droughts - 
like those in the 1937/8, 1966/7 and as recently as 1979/80 that resulted in death 
of people and livestock; and the violent conflicts with the neighbouring 
Karimojong over pasture and water.  However, implicitly, disasters built 
characters in the Acholi people.  Leys (1972), who was a colonial administrator in 
Acholiland admitted that the Acholi men and women were a resilient society as 
hardship had instilled survival innovations in their customs.  For instance, the 
                                                          
153 Colin Leys (1967) made a distinct contribution to sufferings in Acholiland and 
noted that it enhanced the resilience of Acholi men and prepared them for the 
complex environment they lived in. 
154 Some of this information was generated in 1997/8 as part of the Oxfam-UK 
project design studies carried in eastern Acholi landscape in which I participated. 
155 This verification came out from most groups and individual discussions during the 
research. 
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droughts of the 1938/39 as well as in the 1966/67 and 1979/80 coincided with 
heavy recruitment of the youth into the national army.  Records showed that 
these offered the youth alternative livelihood opportunities (see: Pain, 1998). 
Gertzel (1974) and Pain (1998) noted that the 1936/37 hazards enticed 
some sixty per cent of the youth from Acholiland to consider joining the national 
army.  The majority of these youth were from the most affected eastern 
Acholiland, who saw the opportunity as alternative source of livelihoods.  
Understandably, all households had lost the entire harvests to heat waves and 
droughts during the periods (Gertzel, 1974).  The rapid consociation of the gangi 
agnates that began as early as the 1720s, were implicitly caused by these 
hardships as “the necessary conditions” for change (See: Atkinson, 1999, 2010).  
The formation of kaka as governing organisations became a grand attempt to 
form collective efforts to address these forms of extremities. 
Acholi also had restricted economic base as it depended largely on 
livestock and crop production - with low level of material life.  Food production 
has been based on rudimental technologies (Atkinson, 1999, 2010: 46-61).  This 
trend has continued up to date, as there has been no extraordinary attempt by all 
postcolonial regimes to inject positive change in its livelihoods156.  Typically, the 
majority of the Acholi households are smallholder farmers, faced with daunting 
ineffectiveness of the public sector support.  Accordingly, from 1986 to 2006, 
most of them were classified as vulnerable since they were easily affected by any 
sudden shift in the normal structural arrangements (See for instance: Burton, 
1974).   
As such, there emerged a practice of caka, the practice of soliciting food 
aid from relatives and neighbours mostly by weaker households.  Hardship also 
constructed the art of exchange among households.  From historical profile and 
time trends developed in 1997/8, loaning of foodstuff for instance were common 
during the months of May and June157.   Conversely, hardship triggered 
                                                          
156 Most administrators of Acholi origin contend that no state government has ever 
attempted to address the unique situations prevalent in northern Uganda as a 
special governing action.  This might, however, be questionable when one views 
the PRDP framework of the NRM government as an additional support for the 
north. 
157  This information was collected from Mzee Tebere (80 years), who grew up into a 
respected and industrious man after living with a disabled mother who spent her 
entire life practicing caka.  The Acholi call May as mayi, from the Acholi word 
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population movements and migrations particularly from vulnerable households in 
search of fertile land and water for livelihood security.  The practice of caka or 
food trekking was complemented in the 1950s with wild fruit from forests.  
Evidently, while this has substantially declined following acknowledged 
agricultural extension practices in the 1960s and 1970s, it still exists in some 
remote areas.  However, the aftermath of the camp life that officially began in 
2006, has rekindled this traumatic event, as food security has become a 
nightmare158.  
A summary of these hazardous events particularly in the colonial and 
early post-colonial eras, have been developed together with the respondents and 
is appended in Annex 1.3.  The trends and incidences of these events have 
continued albeit.  As recent as 2007, Acholiland was hit in the months of July to 
November by floods, which destroyed bridges, properties and spiralled the 
spread of communicable diseases (Oxfam-GB, 2008).  And from 1998, 
communities in Acholiland noticed the emergence of what became known as 
“nodding disease syndrome”, a disease that government only officially detected in 
2009. More than 5,000 children were affected and continue to battle the disease, 
whose cause and mode of spread remain a mystery, while over 200 children 
succumbed to the debilitating disease (see: Mackenzie, 2012:1-13).  The 
“nodding disease”, the Ebola and many other incidences of hazards have been 
reported especially during camp and as the aftermath of camp life.  These 
hazardous events, according to Oxfam-GB are likely going to reoccur in the 
future (Oxfam-GB, 2008). 
The eminent effects of climate change will most likely help precipitate 
most of these harmful events.  According to Oxfam-GB, the trend of the climate in 
Acholiland indicates that the nature of rainfalls will remain erratic during the onset 
as well as during the cessation.  However, when it rains, it will be more violent 
and heavier than in the past.  There is also a temperature increase of about one 
                                                                                                                                                               
mayo – which is literally to remove or extract, signifying it as a period that 
manifested absence of food. 
158  As part of my research work in the 2008, I discussed in three locations: Pakiri, 
Amii Lobo and in Pawel key pressing issues faced by those who had returned to 
their homes.  In Pawel, I met groups of youth along the roadside, in a trading 
center, as I drove from Juba, South Sudan.  I bought roasted maize from them and 
engaged them on what were their key concerns as they were returning home.  In 
all these three cases, food insecurity was key as they were trying to recuperate 
smallholding, which had degenerated into “caka” while in the camps. 
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degree Celsius per year since 2006.   The effect of climate and nature has been 
further discussed in Chapter Seven.  
The Acholi social structures and cultures 
The Acholi structural dimensions of interactions are embedded in the 
social structures, that is, the dog odi, dog paco, dog gangi and the kaka – which 
represented the convergence of patrilineal legitimacies.  These structures as we 
will see later, mediated social-political interactions with the different actors and 
agencies both internal but also external to the entire Acholi system.  Scholars like 
Giddens (1984) see these structures as both enabling and constraining – and 
therefore, important in explaining the conflict potentiality of any society.   
Girling’s (1960) anthropological narratives of the social-political 
organisation of the people, who later became known as the Acholi, covered the 
period 1860 to 1950.  Unsurprisingly, he confirmed that by 1951 Acholiland had 
transformed from a traditional system into a cross-modern one.  He noted that 
kaka as the “tradition” social-political organisation was by 1951 reshuffled by a 
new “customary” model of governance, the Acholi Local Government that defined 
the “modern Acholi system” under colonialism.   
Girling (1960), however, maintained that even with such drastic 
transformation, there was still a deep- rooted sense of equality among the people 
that made up the new Acholi polity (Girling, 1960:2).  The social structures that 
emerged in the 1950s still exhibited a combination of “right-based” morality with a 
dominating kinship-based fiduciary culture that was a dominant feature of the 
gangi agnates as governing polities.  
“The relative homogeneity of the [Acholi] social order, the absence of 
wide economic class difference, the self-sufficiency of the economy, all 
these factors make it possible to limit the number of factors which 
distinguish between individuals socially to those I have listed.” (Girling, 
1960:28).  
Both colonial and postcolonial ethnographers concur that even with this marked 
homogeneity, Acholiland was a mixed and diverse society (see: Girling, 
1960:165; Hansen and Twaddle, 1994:2; Odoi, 2010).  The original structures of 
the 1898 had more than one type of political organisations, which featured strong 
facultative mutualisms as a bridging culture between the various apex 
organisations and variegated fiduciary cultures associated with kinship levels 
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(see: Dwyer, 1972:28-33).  In fact Acholi, an Acholi elder, Mzee Tiberio Okeny-
Atwoma asserts that Acholi was a family of different “tribes” that became a nation 
by blending kinship, kith-ship and consent in a process that “elicited” shared 
expectations and societal values.159  It was these diverse social groups – the 
gangi agnates - that determined in the beginning, the conflict culture or society’s 
attitudes, beliefs, identity, and values as well as access to power (e.g., Gurr, 
2000; Narayan, 1999:1).  
For instance, whereas Genghis Khan and Alexander the Great created 
empires through violence (Kooiman, 2003: 46,62,219), the Rwodi Acholi of the 
nineteenth century built up kaka through kinship and contests, concentrating on 
internal reconfiguration rather than expansive adventures (Dwyer, 1972:33-36).  
These early societal set-ups were evolutionary, and they epitomised strong 
patriarchal and kinship ties or entrustments – which I have referred to as tradition 
- within dye-kal and gangi governing entities.  However, these have been 
substituted by the “customary laws”, which were the imposition of the outsiders.  
Arguably, these changes have altered the meanings of traditions, as further 
elucidated on in the later Chapters.   
From series of existing writings on these structures, combined with the 
memories of those living today - and together evidence from folk songs, poems 
and reflectivity, three important conclusions can be deduced from these 
traditional governing practices:  Firstly the fiduciary cultures of these homologous 
organisations influenced the type of governing interactions.  This established the 
conditions and value systems that mediated the varying responses of the actors 
to the different intentional dimensions of interactions, political contexts, and 
events.160  For instance, social-political elites, the ludito occupying similar power 
orbits, contended and established their own balances of collective, interactive 
powers, through an interactive interference and interplay.  Evidence of these 
                                                          
159 This is an extract of a semi-structured interview with Mzee Tiberio Okeny-Atwoma 
in October 2007.  Mzee Okeny-Atwoma was an Acholi elder, a member of the first 
Acholi District Council, 1945 and a political leader. He acknowledged that the 
process of soliciting consensus engaged facilitative processes of guiding, 
particularly the weaker agnates, into visioning collective responsibilities.  Latela, an 
Acholi word for a leader, means both “bringing along” and “leading” the way.  
160  Most material used for this discussion came from my own views, which were 
validated by respondents during the various interviews and discussions held from 
1998 to 2010.  It also built on some earlier assertions by scholars like Crazollara 
(1950, 1951, 1953; Finnstrom, 2008; Adams, 2006, 2010) 
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historical practices can be deduced from riddles and folk stories that explain 
relationships and also from reported practices in governance between the 
different systems. 
Secondly, the authoritative interactions aimed at enforcing political 
legitimacy, normally derived from the social norms or cik acoli, are often 
sanctioned by recognised systems and authorities.   This facilitated the balance 
of power by petitioning the sources of legitimacy, relying on elders as peer 
groups that were the library of indigenous wisdom and therefore, sources of 
social authorities.  This also engaged private service providers, the ajwagi, who 
were fortune-tellers – in validating the customs of lapii or casus belli.   
Thirdly the coercive or interventionist’s interactions - where certain 
categories of members like the children and the youth, but also, occasionally the 
women, were directed - arguably through a practice that evoked the principle of 
“separation of roles”.  Although some of these governing directives were 
intentionally structured to enforce patrilineal bureaucracies and as such, were 
culturally biased, they conformed to the distributive power of culture.   Cases of 
coercive governing actions that we reflected on during focus groups’ discussions 
included the socialisation of war captives, and women married into the agnate 
under the jury authority of the won gang 
Often, these new entries - the putative kins, were not arguably forced 
into adopting the new habits since they came from distinct cultures with distinct 
beliefs.  This, if it is true, was a sign of respected and custom, which recognised 
them as a distinct society161.  For instance, women married into the clans who did 
not eat certain food types were disallowed from preparing the food and free not to 
eat it.   Nevertheless, some people also remembered that through peer 
pressures, established precedents by other putative kin, and the need to 
integrate or the awkwardness of remaining detached, most putative kin would 
                                                          
161 Testimonies that women married into different agnates would be allowed to 
return to their place of birth to resolve culturally specific issues are well known in 
Acholi.  This is also true of children that grew up with in maternal villages.  From 
practices as late as in the 1970s, patrilineal orientation in solving such problems 
existed among many clans in Acholiland.  
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give in to the majority practices in their villages162.  This is the cultural submission 
that seems to have dominated the events. 
The application of these governing interactions, however, varied and 
increasingly changed with time, particularly in the 1960s and onwards because of 
modern influences.  In addition, where there was divergence of interests between 
the core or host agnates, and the smaller lineages within, there were always 
possibilities for socialisation by the more powerful partner or, as Girling (1960) 
observed, the disagreeing party would walk out of the relationship and join those 
that were comparable with their interests.  However, with convergence in 
interests, governing interactions were largely informal, and structured along the 
rules of the game (Girling, 1960:125). 
In supporting the diversities, dynamism and complexities of these mixed 
governing interactions sets of governing structures and relationships were 
expressed along two dimensions, with different consequences.  The first of these 
dimensions was  “disengagement”, a condition in which mainly weaker 
participants, especially the smaller polities, improvised households, or the 
women, opted to stay detached or remained consciously distant from the 
governing activities.  Then there was a “normative engagement” as a continuum - 
where the governing interactions were embracing, and the majority of the social-
political actors were responsive, dynamic and consensual in their interactions, 
which was deemed as a good governing image (see: Bratton, 1994; Chazan, 
1994; Landau, 2000).   
The second dimension, however, was from “coercion”, a relationship 
where force or threats were expended to ensure order and compliance - to “co-
optation”, where political governance typically adopted a compromising strategy 
of political favouritism that undermined formal and agreed structural processes.  
Coercion was used to subdue the powerless: women, children, and vulnerable 
captives, into relationships that favoured patrilineal focus.  
Defining the cultural context of interactions 
From the aforesaid, the Acholi cultural strata have oscillated over the 
years, as predominately and normatively patrilineal in orientations.  However, in 
                                                          
162 Women in Pagak and Awer camps in 2004 and 2005 respectively contributed to 
these views during discussion held with them.  
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these progressions, the cultural changes have exhibited what was locally right or 
legitimate at any given time.163  When different aspects of Acholi’s social-political 
customs are mapped onto Sorokin's (1984) three super-cultural systems, one 
gets some insight into not only the nature and the dynamism of the various social 
groups as cultures, but also into the historical movements over the years.  
Throughout its history, the Acholi culture, it seems, oscillated within what 
Sorokin’s super-cultural systems describe as a mixed culture.  This is one that 
combines some of the core features of all the four cultures namely: idealistic, 
ideational, sensate and mixed cultures (see: Sorokin, 1937/1941/1957/1985).   
Within the mixture, relations during Acholi macon were generally described as 
partly solitary, partly contractual, partly based on principles and ideals, partly on 
self-interest, and partly on utilitarian values (see: Anywar, 1947; Crazzolara, 
1951; Uma-Owiny, 2013)164.  These features provided a foundation for ordering 
society, and integrating them within a common macro-level normative system, the 
kaka, within which the society was guided by the constitutive rules, to pursue and 
exchange their lineage-based interests.  It also provided for the polities, the 
ground for intentional interactions with outsiders, including, in modern times, the 
central governments.  
In the “modern” times, the four features of culture associated with the 
Acholi were influenced by the persistence of civil strives, dominant and predatory 
governing interactions and the world of Global Human Rights Organisations 
(GHRO).  Even with the plethora of contradictory actors, evidence show that the 
Acholi remained largely “traditional” until in the recent time - possibly until the 
1970s.  The non-economic elements of its society – the kinship and entrustment 
currency as measures of tribal worth have remained dominant and active even 
today.  
 
                                                          
163  Focus group discussions with a group of elders in Pabbo (September 2005) and in 
Alero Labala (December 2005) and informal discussions with a number of Acholi 
elders point to the fact that culture as power tended to be used appropriately in 
response to the situation in hand. Evidence of flexibility in the use of culture that 
constrains governance were discussed and presented elsewhere in this report. 
164 Reading through the ethnographies of the Acholi macon and the interviews 
conducted, these attributes became very evident in summing up what appeared 
to have been the value identified with the Acholi.  
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The changing cultural strata of the Acholi 
The mixed culture, dominated by utilitarian traits that marked the Acholi 
macon by 1898 reached a point of decline some times in the 1950s as the social 
and economic crises usher in new mentality.  As a result, kaka was unsuccessful 
as it failed to adapt to the new customary laws that were the model of 
governance during colonial and postcolonial eras. This drastic adjustment 
worsens with time.  It took a downward trend following Idi Amin’s fascist 
totalitarianism and only to reach social entropy by 2010, when Uganda entered a 
form of monarchical autocracy of the NRM.  
The expansion of governmental regulations, regimentation, and control 
of societal relationships through customary laws during the last one hundred and 
twenty years, have unsurprisingly, resulted in decrease in the legitimacy of the 
individual households and communal groups.  These efforts, mainly resulting 
from outside pressures, have assumed variegated forms, embracing higher 
tendencies of military democracy during colonial era, a socialistic–cum-mixed 
economy during the Obote I regime, fascist totalitarianism during Idi Amin, and a 
blend of what characterized the colonial era and increasingly by 2010 a form of 
highly monarchical autocracy of the NRM.   
Subsequently, the first trend that emerged was the disintegration of the 
fiduciary culture and the traditional norms that were associated with the principles 
of ideals, self-interest and utilitarianism that became very obvious by the mid 
1980s.  This breakup, Girling (1960:2) noted, started to deteriorate rapidly in the 
1950s.  My own assessment is that the current social entropy in Acholiland 
following displacement in the camps has clearly ended this aspect of the Acholi 
culture.  
There was, among many things, the disintegration of kaka’s moral, legal, 
and other values which, from within, had controlled and guided the behaviour of 
the individuals and dominant practices of the society.  Some of the most senior 
respondents admitted that the emergence of Joseph Kony’s LRA is a 
demonstration of how individuals and groups became the victims of disorder 
when they cease to be controlled by deeply interiorized and moderated moral 
values, which are ethical, aesthetic and respected (see: BT, 1964:24). 
How can that be that latin that is mentored by elders, or, a group of 
awobe, who grew up in gangi, would become a social menace in Acholi?  
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Never.  I say, never, if there were still our system…165 
 The second trend is a positive transformational process, which explains 
the transition from one basic order to another.  This is an epochal struggle 
between the fraudulence and divided present order falsified as a state system 
and the more creative and forward-looking forces of the emerging, integral, 
sociocultural order that is cross modern - born out of lived experiences within the 
global villages.  These new forces are as it is, still very weak and insignificant in 
the face of the daunting aftermath of the camp life.  However, they are slowly 
growing, anchored on the pillars of courage, partnership and realism.  This 
reinvigorated kaka ideology has started not only to fight the disintegration of the 
Acholi, but also to redefine a new socio-cultural order – one that combines 
tradition and modernity, acknowledging that modernity is pluralistic and not 
idealistic.  
The Acholi conflict culture of tolerance 
In closing, I want to argue here that Acholi as a society by 1898 through 
to 1960s could best be categorised as a conflict culture.  This is because conflict 
cultures relate to the general frame in which a certain society – with its typical 
social, political, economic and resource aspects – tends to create certain types of 
conflicts, and respond to them in a very predictable way (Anderson et al., 1997).   
The Acholi culture of the colonial period was a fusion of what were of the different 
ethnic groups and those imposed on the Acholi society from outside.  By 1962, 
this had stabilised with a strong notion of mistrust of autocracies that was 
swamping its lived experiences.  As such, it abhorred internal deceits – in 
ensuring compliance to the principle of entrustment - that remained a strong 
aspect of its internal cultural element for survival166.   
At the climax of these multiple and sometimes oppositional interactions 
stretching from the mid 1800s to the 1960s, the Acholi society adopted a version 
                                                          
165  Charles Alai (RIP) in an interview at Roma Hotel.  The italics were based on his 
emphasis of Acholi words that give meanings to why it could have not been 
possible because “latin” and “awobe” were dependants who under jury duties 
were subjected to the guidance of the elders.  “Gangi” on the other hand,, were 
systems that enforced disciplines and would have acted appropriately. 
166 This analytical viewpoint is reached based series of discussions of known 
upraisings including the Lamogi rebellion of 1911/12 with a number of scholars.  
This was in response to viewpoints of six elders from Lamogi, Pabbo and Payiira 
on the incentives of contestations by ethinic groups to specific outside 
interventions.  This discussion was done during the research period. 
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of fiduciary culture, gen as an internal virtue, to preserve, protect and promote its 
internal order.  Gen was entrustment without trust as Shipton (2007) stated.  It 
had to rely more on its social purpose, to overcome the divisive effects of 
commerce and greed that drove foreign interventions in the belt.  Geno one 
another as community-in-place was a given and this espoused a practice of 
distrust and opposition to any forms of enslavement or domination.  It nurtured a 
feeling of ribbe or unity as a social purpose that had strong faith in leaders like 
Awich of Payiira and this was demonstrated in the Acholi Local Government 
achievements in the 1960s167.  
Gen was not about the fear of powerful outsiders because the Acholi 
had working and mutually supportive interactions with the despotic and powerful 
Buganda and Bunyoro-Kitara kingdoms to the south (Onyango-Odongo, 2011).  
Rather, it was ideation and governing practices.  As Dwyer (1972:5) 
contextualised with regard to the British, the latter never conquered the Acholi 
society.  It subdued its leaders by using the Nubians and firepower but the 
leaders remained opposed to how colonialism was unfair and unjust to their 
people.  
Seemingly, the Acholi society abhorred unfairness in governance.  
Opiyo-Oloya (2013:16-17), while defining the significance of a child in Acholi 
observes that an Acholi recognises a child as an individual of significance – man 
dano adana calo wan!  This particular sense of basic rights as a living thing can 
be identified with both the contemporary and the past.  Hence, the society during 
the past times, it can be affirmed, acted based on casus belli, which is lapii in 
Acholi.  Lapii, it is suggested, formed one aspect of the democratic pillars in 
societal mobilisation against both good and bad (Bere (1947:1-3)168.   Lapii would 
justify the application of the right form of ongon that have followers.  Ongon were 
evidence or precedence that would inform the decision of the society NOT elders, 
as often this seems to be the interpretation.  The latter were in reality, the archive 
of ongon that would swing the directions of the governing actions of the entire 
                                                          
167  Opposition to oppressions, the call for internal unity or “ribbe” against anything 
outside the kaka Acholi are expressed in a number of Acholi folk and war songs 
that today are sang as part of the lyrics for bwola and otole dances. 
168 The legenary split of Gipir and Labongo, the relocation of agnates from one kaka 
to the other, the impression given that the Acholi disagreed among themselves - 
all testify to the independent mindedness individuals held in facing governing 
troubles based on casus belli.  It underpins response to some events rather than 
being a cause of such unpleasant event.  
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society.  Since rwodi and the core agnates did not have their own standing army 
to pre-empt wars, it was lapii and ongon that would rally the non-core agnates for 
actions.  
Conflict culture as discussed in this study is viewed in relation to identity 
traits, one that abhors extremities (see: Anderson, et al., 1997; Crazzolara, 1954: 
Chapter 3).   It reflects fundamentally on institutional values and how it can 
mediate societal responses to even powerful and sometime incompatible others 
or corporate entities.  Gen, as a virtue has lived in Acholiland and influenced 
neighbourhood cultures.  One would geno another because one knew where s/he 
came from, which abila they celebrated or which jogi they follow.  As gen did in 
the past – create resilience over the Arabs slave traders - today gen has built a 
temple in collective views against societal oppression and the various political 
actors in Acholiland have come to terms with it169. 
Silva Finnica (2001), while researching on cultures of different societies 
in the west concluded that some societies have cultures that were conflict prone, 
while some were not (Finnica, 2001:8).   According to Finnica (2001) ‘conflicting 
(sub-) cultures’ relate to situations where the cultural backgrounds of the conflict 
partners are different, to the extent that it creates a conflict.  However, ‘conflict 
culture’ on the other hand relates to the general frame in which a certain society – 
with its typical social, political, economic and resource aspects – tends to create 
certain types of conflicts, and respond to them in a certain way.   
Anderson et al. (1997), for example, argues that natural resource 
conflicts tend to vary from culture to culture, as some societies avoid conflict, 
while others will resort to physical violence to resolve them.  The focus of most 
conflict research has been in describing and analysing ‘conflicting (sub-) cultures’ 
within the dynamisms of individuals.  This research, however, pitches the 
evolving cultural values of the Acholi as a collectivity against globalisation.  It 
presupposes that when Acholi District Administration was created, the societies 
that formed it had to respond to the new norms as the Acholi.  This, unlike in the 
case of kaka consociations, was forced upon the various entities that formed the 
Acholi ethnic society through formal rules.  Nevertheless, the different kaka had 
their own cultural ways of ‘producing’ conflicts in governance and responding to 
                                                          
169 I have discussed in some details what gen, an Acholi word that is often associated 
with trust in Chapter Four and Five 
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them, depending on the context.  In the new system where third parties with 
different intents and cultural backgrounds were involved, the equilibrium that was 
set in the forms of kaka was destabilised.  This introduced new conflicts in the 
rules of the game in communal governance, which had to be dealt with under 
pluralistic legal frame. 
In the case of Acholi, scholars have explained the parallels in the 
historical trajectory of governing interactions with the third parties, including 
central governments (e.g., Giring, 1960: 125-164; Dwyer, 1972:33-36; Branch, 
2011:Chapter 5; Dolan, 2005; 2011:178-184).  From these narratives, it is 
unlikely that the outcomes of changes in Acholiland were based on conflict (sub) 
culture.  Rather, the Acholi people initially welcomed these new forms of 
interaction, hoping that these would build on their competitive and comparative 
advantages170.  In the case of colonialism, the different rwodi met under the 
chairmanship of Rwot Awich, to contest those elements of interactions that 
violated their core governance practices, including the demands that some kaka 
would be subordinating their peers (e.g., see Uma-Owiny, 2013).  As 
demonstrated by the Lamogi rebellion, the leaders attempted to use recognised 
dispute mechanisms, to resolve their difference with the third parties but often in 
vain because outsiders had different motives that demanded outright conquest of 
the Acholi171.   Hence, the Acholi social and ideational values that underpinned 
community governance were under siege and it was forced to violate peace 
based on casus belli (see for instance: Girling, 1960; Onyango-Odongo, 2009; 
Opiyo-Oloya, 2013:43-46).  
The Acholi “conflict culture’, it seems, continues to change but 
expresses a general setting that are increasingly more accommodating, retaining 
its proven history of diversities (e.g., Atkinson, 1985, 1999, 2010).  This is 
because the original governing context of interactions, namely, the geo-politics, 
and typical social, political, economic and resource capitals, approved of societal 
diversities  – the gangi and kaka governance systems.  These architectures were 
both influencing and adapting to new ideas in a manner that eschews violent 
conflict (Girling, 1960:151).    
                                                          
170 For a good discussion of interactions between the Acholi and the Arabs slave 
traders, see Ouma (1972) and also Uma-Owiny, 2013 
171 In Chapters Five to Eight, I have laid out what I see as the manifestations of this 
conquest as the intentions of outsiders. 
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It seems to me that the political actions that established kaka as a 
consociation resonated with the overall constitutive contents of collective 
governance systems.  This influenced those internal actors who were inward 
looking and the proponents of kaka-dom even when they differed in the 
intentional dimensions of interactions.  Under the circumstances, internal stability 
and peace were largely achieved, only later disrupted by interference of third 
parties.  The desire for self-autonomy rallied these internal actors behind their 
rwodi moo, in self-defence.  In other words, the elements of the Acholi culture 
that governed intentional interactions among the internal governing actors were 
stable and enduring thereby permitting co-existence, and therefore peace and 
tranquillity. This culture, the facultative mutualism arrangement, had limited 
governance outreach it seems, to subordination to other actors.  However, when 
social-political actors choose the right instruments and strategies that avoided 
violence, stability was maintained.  This is evident by the fact that most kaka by 
1898 had increase in the numbers of non-core agnates (Kooiman, 2003:59-61).  
Whenever social powers were applied and some groups felt wrongly 
marginalised - which was common - it would lead to contestations of the 
processes, and even the outcomes, whether real or perceived.  This, I am told, 
led to the elaboration of the Acholi renowned mediation tools, mato oput, to 
ensure sustained peace amidst external aggressions. 
In other words, the seat of social conflict is often in the matrix of its 
meanings, the values it expresses, the norms and the perceived status, and the 
hierarchical set-ups it represents (Rummel, 1976:na).  When governing 
interactions aimed at changing existing status quo in a more reinforcing manner, 
the Acholi culture has continued to respond positively (Atkinson, 2010:86-88).  
Wild (1947) made similar sentiment in reference to the work of Emin Pasha in 
Acholi, from 1885 to 1889.  He suggested that Emin Pasha gained the confidence 
of the Acholi society because he attempted to address the ills of the Arabs 
traders in Acholiland.  However, where social power is applied excessively, the 
opposite has been observed. Hence, the social potential for conflict, it seems, is 
defined by its subjectivity, and rarely is in the spontaneous result of unbiased 
facts, conditions, or events.  In the case of Acholiland this can be testify by how 
the Acholi responded to the missionaries and the British Administrators, who 
were both colonial agents.  While they, seemingly, conformed to spiritual justice 
advanced by the Churches, they did not to governance by the administrators. 
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Problematizing Acholi as a Fragile Situation 
In problematizing Acholi as a fragile situation, I summarise the history of 
violence and its link to community governance.  By categorising violence by 
typologies, one can easily see how it impacts on community governance.  
The history and patterns of conflicts in Acholi 
There have been a number of analyses regarding conflict in Acholiland 
and northern Uganda in general (see: Finnström, 2008; Branch, 2011; Dolan, 
2011).  With the help of secondary data, including the one I collected for Oxfam-
UK in 1998 (Oloya et al., 1998) a historical profile of community crisis was 
constructed and is attached to Annex.  This information covers the entire 
Acholiland and it was generated by use of participatory rural appraisal tools.  In 
constructing the study, participants were asked to identify and prioritise all forms 
of individual and community crisis that they had faced since the 1950s.  The 
study compiled gender-based as well as community-based shocks, categorised 
by effects and types, and a refined presentation of this information is summarised 
in Table 3.1 in the Annex. 
Similarly, in 2003 the World Bank, jointly with the Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics (UBOS), undertook a baseline study in northern Uganda in order to 
understand community governance, institutions and investment priorities with a 
view to supporting a community social fund.  This employed mixed methods - 
quantitative and qualitative – and it identified various sources of community 
shocks and factors that precipitated the vulnerability of communities to these 
shocks (UBOS, 2004; World Bank, 2005). I have built on these studies and 
profiled them in Table 3.1 in the Annex.  
Generally, by combining primary data and secondary information, it 
became clear that periodising violence and a delineation of its effects to a specific 
period was very difficult.  This is because violence, according to the respondents, 
is subtle, direct and common, more often than the wild and vivid images of the 
destruction of properties and assets that scream in press reports (Allen, 
1998:25).  In addition, conflicts mutate, feed into other forms and produce new 
kinds that sometimes have different perspectives.  Its presence, they argue, often 
manifests in different forms as it exploits the presence of other factors - including 
poor relationships – to impact upon the community.   
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For instance, political violence since the inception of Acholi as a political 
community, have exploited the vulnerability of the Acholi to factors like weather 
and famine, but also its interactions with other communities within the geopolitics.  
This as we know, built on the past histories of conflicts in the territory – whether 
caused by humans or nature.  Similarly, in the recent past, political violence 
mediated the reshuffling of kaka but also in reshaping the Acholi generations that 
grew up in the protected camps in the twenty first century.  
History of violence in Acholiland 
Veal and Stravron (2003:9) like Allen (2006:25) assert that there is a 
deep-rooted history of endless wars and feuds that fermented in the present 
Acholi area.  The causes, however, were wrongly attributed to culture of violence 
attributed to Africans – that is, the absence of authoritative leaders to create 
political order (e.g., Grove, 1947 cited from Finnström, 2008: 61).  Allen (2006), 
like Grove (1947) argues that wars [read fighting] were ideally part of the 
governing activities of the Acholi past.  While intra and inter kaka rivalries or 
simply lweny kaka were eminent during pre-colonial era and it helped shape 
community governance systems (see: Grey, 1952:3-7) and moral platforms for 
patrilineal governance (e.g., Atkinson, 2010:201-203), most devastating violence, 
were products of external logic (e.g., Crazzolara, 1950:70,72; Finnström, 
2008:214-215).  Internal feuds, like the mythical story of Gipir and Labongo who 
were brothers and they disagreed to resolve household disputes over rights to a 
spear and acquired beads respectively, are cases of governing issues that were 
not and cannot be problematized as social issues (see for instance: Crazzolara, 
1950:Chapter 13).  
Crazzolara (1950), for instance, further reveals that the history of Luo is 
“history of quarrels”, wrongly implying that conflicts and possibly violence were 
problematized as societal and therefore a subject of governability.  To the 
contrary: I shall advance that disagreements and widespread quarrels that 
manifested among kin were demonstrations of competing nature of co-
governance within the kaka governing system.  Kaka, especially from the kinship 
level demanded and expected open-handed fiduciary responsibilities by each of 
the various governing entities inside it realm (Crazzolara, 1950:70, 72; Pain, 
1998:11).  There were often contestations of governing actions at or by dye-kal 
governing levels, where each dog ot was heavily obliged by customs to conform 
to the abila of a single forefather.   
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The fact that pater would legitimised and/or regulated the authority of the 
older households in favour of the collective – that favoured the younger 
households - created both frustration and fear in the older siblings who 
sometimes wilfully comply with care taking of the younger siblings, to safeguard 
such inheritance172.  In addition, there was what Girling (1960: 55-80) referred to 
as the jury authority of the won, which was supplemented by their traditional 
power to curse.  These forms of legitimacy led to contestations or grumbles within 
individual families and among clan members as they would challenge the 
legitimacies of the won, as they sought for social space, social justice and rights 
of individuals (see: Crazzolara, 1950: 70,72)173.   
It was also at this kinship level that fiduciary duties of the wegi paco and 
wegi odi or just the won fused with the traditional power of cursing.  By custom, 
won had the power to curse deviant individuals considered latin me gang, which 
action could negatively affect their societal relationships thereafter174.   This 
created insecurity, especially to married couples, whose attachment to the won 
and his resources, were critical for their take-off as a family.  It also seemed to 
me that the salient view of the women married into the gangi, played a significant 
role in spiralling these internal disagreements175.  It was only when contests were 
problematized by the system as unresolvable that individuals or families affected 
migrated in search of justice.  In such circumstances, lurem or friendly territories 
or societies were known to provide asylum to such deviants.  These friendly 
societies included paneyo, the gangi where one mother’s came from.  As such, 
                                                          
172  On this matter, I had three important discussions in focus groups in Alero, Lalar 
village with 4 elders (November 2008), in Koch with a household – an old man 
and his 2 wives when they visited their daughter in Kampala in 2009.  Building on 
my own knowledge, I also discussed this issue with elders from my clan during a 
funeral organised in January 2011 at Keyo, Palema. 
173 This section is constructed based on focus group discussions with old women and 
men in Gulu town in 2004.  The discussion were based both on memories of 
actual occurrences but also on stories pass on to them from the past.   The 
discussion of the legend about Gipir’s and Labongo’s behaviours, were part of the 
stories remembered.  
174 “Latin me gang” is one who is borned and raised based on the customs and beliefs 
of a given “gang” as a settlement and a political space and landscape of 
community governance. 
175 In four out of six interviews on this matter of a quarrel based on Crazzolara’s 
remarks, the response I got is what I have summarised above.  The other two 
respondents could not tell the reasons for such a quarrel other than that it was 
normal for family members to quarrel.  They associated this to rivalry over breast 
milk.  
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the Retired Bishop Ochola comments that the Acholi clans are scattered all over 
the space, sometimes having moved away in search of such relief.176 
Conflicts since the 1850s admittedly have been predatory and in some 
instances moralistic177.  Finnström (2008) covered these forms of violence and 
violations during the aconya periods, 1850s to 1962, in his anthropological work 
(Finnström, 2008:105-108, 208-211).  He sees structural violence in the form of 
xenophobia and ignorance, as well as physical violence driven by the political 
economy of social power.  Governance dominated modern conflicts in Acholi.  He 
also sees violence mutating from one form to the other.  For instance, from 1862 
to 1875, lweny kaka were fuelled by a combination of economic motives and 
social power, aided by the Arab slave traders who used their superior fire power 
and devastated Acholiland (see: Onyango-ku-Odongo, 1972).   
Onyango-ku-Odongo (1972) narrated how such greed-led actions, like 
killing, rapes and abductions, devastated the entire area and forced people into 
exile in the neighbouring Bunyoro.  In this context, political violence mutated into 
structural ones, reinforced by camp lives.  Similarly, events like military 
excursions by the explorers were always violent and aided by the Nubian forces 
who had historical contentions with the Acholi arising from their actions as slave 
traders (Lwanga-Lunyiigo, 1989).  These confusions were made worse during 
hardship, like when people were sick and when there were epidemics or famine 
that followed bad weather (see: Atkinson, 1999, 2010:262-267).   
The colonial period178 as the second phase of the aconya was even 
more dramatic and it consolidated mistrust in foreign regimes.  The elevation of 
the notorious Nubians as political administrators over the Acholi by the 
colonialists, in spite of their history of torture, broke the trust Acholi nursed about 
the British179.  Nubians had been driven out of Acholi following their acts of 
                                                          
176 Interview with Rt. Revd. Bishop Baker Ochola 
177 Scholars of violent conflicts have proposed several typologies of violence; some 
based on the motivation factors (e.g., Block and Block, 1991) while others on the 
relationships between the offenders and the victims (e.g., Packer and Smith, 
1979). Cooney and Phillips, (2002) and Black’s (1983) typologies are based on 
explanatory factors, while others have combined the relational and motivation 
logics (e.g., Block and Block, 1992; Williams and Flewelling, 1988). 
178  This was from 1898 to 1962 
179  The oral narratives about Sir Samuel Baker and local leaders often gave the impression 
that he indicated that his government was concerned about the tortures in Acholiland 
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impunity and atrocities, but came to aid the pacification of Acholiland from 1902 
to 1935.  This showed that the transition from the era of Arab slave trade to 
colonialism was a mere change of guard in a relationship that was promised by 
the explorers as more supportive (Uma-Owiny, 2013; Veale and Stavron, 2003).   
The subsequent reforms in community governance systems were violent 
and violated the sovereignty of the different social groups in Acholi.  The 
management of these reforms by local chiefs who had no remorse for the locals 
deepened the structural context as well as the physical side of the violence, as 
was manifested by the Lamogi and Labongo rebellions of 1911 and 1913 
respectively (Branch, 2011:46-49).   In the post-colonial era, Allen (2006) for 
instance, talked about the stigmatisation of the Acholi and the emergence of 
contestable and prejudicial notion of the Acholi men as the martial race in 
soldiering.  Both structural and physical violence dominated the scene of post-
colonial governments, hurting the economy, settlements and the morale of the 
people of Acholi (Branch, 2011:45-48; Finnström, 2008:107-108).   
Until recently when natural resources – like farmlands and petroleum 
exploration began in Acholiland (see: Whitehouse, 2012:1-15), Acholiland had 
been viewed as a “county with little or no promise of success” (Barber, 1953:31).  
This image was constructed mainly because of the diffused power centres 
enshrined in the Acholi hierarchical political organisations and especially because 
it lacked the despotic characters of “real leaders” (Branch, 2011:46-49).  In 
addition, geopolitically, Acholi is in the central north, remote from the centre, 
Buganda, without an infrastructure to connect (Barber, 1953:31).  Even as 
recently as 1986, Acholi was believed to be a wild reserve (Whitemore, 2010)!  
This political outlook remains prejudicial even to this day.  
Part of the problem was how scholars and politicians understood and 
gave meaning to heterachical social-political organisations that defined Acholi 
macon.  Western scholars especially, and proponents of state as a model of 
governance, tended to consider that civilisation was embedded in 
authoritarianism (see: Rajai and Phillips, 2002), something that is now firmly 
contested (see: Thomson, 2010: Location 2503-2543).  The perspective that 
heterarchical culture is an equally good model builds on Girling’s (1960) and 
                                                                                                                                                               
by the Arabs and that the British will ensure that the Acholi, once it took power, will be 
accorded its independence from torture from slave trade. 
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Dwyer’s (1972) notion that heterarchy is morally plausible because it nurtures 
mixes of governing actions.  It mediated development on relatively democratic 
and “equal terms” (e.g., Bere, 1957:1; Girling, 1960:126).  It certainly had its 
downside, which I discuss later.  
Acholi’s internal relationships were mixed, particularly towards 1898 and 
especially after the mass displacement to Bunyoro.  The Acholi model of 
governance came under siege both from within and from outside its domain.  The 
internal pressure came from the larger kaka and subsequently from kaka Payira 
under Rwot Awich, in line with Rwot Camo’s long-term vision of ending external 
aggression (Dwyer, 1972:37-38).  At least two political outcomes can be stated 
following this situation.  First, it provided additional safeguards particularly to 
younger, smaller and vulnerable polities, which looked to kaka Payiira and similar 
ones as allies and political mentors (see: Atkinson, 2010: 266-267, 271).  This 
action swelled the capacities of these mentors both politically and numerically.  
Second, it threatened the other larger and egocentric kaka, which quickly sought 
allies with external forces, including the Nubians and Europeans, thereby 
escalating political differences within Acholiland (see: Allen, 2006:28)180. 
As Portes (1998) admitted, the intrinsic characteristic of social capital - 
the glue that enables trust - is that it is relational and therefore needs to be 
nurtured to grow by reinforcing the positive aspects of its purpose.  In other 
words, social capital only exists when it is shared, that is, when it is collective, 
and its influence is therefore most profound in relationships.  Where relationships 
were frail, as was typically the case in Acholiland during the 1890s and the 
colonial era, it withered, exposing the Acholi to external aggressions.   
Moralistic forms of violence in Acholiland 
Moralistic violence, which was present in the form of lweny kaka during 
pre-colonial and colonial times and occasionally during post-colonial periods, was 
used to secure social justice.  This violence was consequences of internal logic 
within the Acholi system and sought to right social wrongs.  It came in form of 
group revenge, or individual acts that represented group aspirations.  Overall, 
these actions aimed to take revenge for wrongs committed and delayed justice.  
                                                          
180 Tim Allen indicated that examples of some of these larger kaka included Atiak, 
Pabbo and Padibbe.   
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It was effective in managing certain conflicts but also in spiralling inter-kaka 
conflicts (Finnström, 2008: 211-214).   
From field interviews, lweny kaka targeted a society and it was a group 
decision not individual (Atkinson, 2010:211-214).  Lweny kaka, under the formal 
laws, is codified as criminal even when it is a form of political violence (see: 
Black, 1983).  Under formal laws, societies can report cases of injustice.  A 
discussion with elders about what lweny kaka that Allen (1998) and others 
considered as routine during pre-colonial time revealed that it was based on 
ongon or precedence and evidence (Finnström, 2008:212-213).   It was often 
violence that arose out of either negligence on the part of the offenders or denial.  
The transgressed would express desire for compensation and reparation based 
on available evidence (ongon) in anticipation that the delinquents would respond 
positively or provide alternative ongon to dispute claims by the transgressed.  
Depending on the outcomes, there would be collective responsibility that had to 
be accepted.  
The local narratives about lweny kaka, which was a form of moralistic 
violence, confirm that it was an act of revenge.  It was triggered by what the 
aggrieved society would have collectively interpreted as wilful abscondment by 
the offenders, from the agreed path to restore societal justice181.  Typically, the 
use of violence to extract justice was reached in clan meetings.  Lweny kaka as a 
form of revenge followed the principle of collective moral responsibility.  This 
recognised that the entire clans of the aggrieved as well as the offenders were 
either innocent or guilty of social responsibility.  Most writing about lweny kaka, 
especially by Western scholars (e.g., Allen, 199; 2006; Grove, 1947), ignored the 
basic tenets that lweny was always the last resort, only applied to restore respect 
and the image of the affected clan.  
Elders admitted that prior to lweny extensive forms of alarms for lweny 
kaka were symbolic, intended to cushion the offenders.  Father Pellegrini (1963) 
wrote about threats of lweny kaka in Acholi, arguing that, most often, they were 
merely verbal threats of wars that never took place.  This, I learned, was the 
intention.  By nature, the Acholi people would be rated as economically 
                                                          
181 Acholi uses lapii to firm up any form of compensation for societal misdeeds.  After 
successful negotiation compensation, which symbolized acceptance of guilt on the 
part of the enermy clan, the latter would agree to settling the “debt” and any 
failure to, would be communicated by a representative from the said clan. 
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unwealthy because by the time of colonialism, they had little accumulation and 
disliked losing even the little accumulation they had in store.  As such, they 
disliked war and being in debt over things as culturally embarrassing as failing to 
pay up societal debts.  The threats were open invitations to the defaulter, to 
comply with agreed positions.  It is only after failure to respond or notify the 
claimants that actual lweny occurs, and even then, only after it was first approved 
by the system and finally carried out by joint forces from all the dye-kal that made 
up the gang or kaka.  This was because physical fighting was often the last 
resort, as spilling of human blood on the soil was against the norms of the Acholi 
people182  Daker, the rwot’s wife, was tasked with this burdensome role of giving 
the last ritual for revenge.  And giving to daker this responsibility was a killer offer 
because she was a mother to all, who loved peaceful resolution of conflicts183.   
Predatory violence in Acholi 
Predatory violence, on the other hand, according to scholars like Tittle 
(1995), represented xenophobia, manipulation, or property extraction that 
showed no recourse, in this case, for the Acholi as a people.  Typically, during 
pre-colonial and part of contemporary Acholi, the actions of the Arab traders, 
colonial authorities and the state can be categorised as predatory.  These were 
actions that sought to neutralise the victims and, in cases where the latter sought 
dialogue rather than outright imposition, it led to outright violence.  Social tortures 
in general and political and structural violence in particular are forms of predatory 
violence because they sought to suppress a group of people. 
Within this category, I argue that violence that was a result of weather, 
diseases and pests that neutralise the victims is a violation and therefore 
predatory (see: Atkinson, 1999; 2010:122-123, 235-236).  Additionally, the 
dominant governing interactions, including the manipulative, exploitative and 
xenophobic actions of the private sectors, are predatory (see: Finnström, 
2008:134-137).  In this circumstance, violence was predicated by social conflicts - 
                                                          
182 Retired Bishop Ochola emphasized this point a number of workshops I attended 
whenever he discussed “lapii” as meaning and reason for acting to redeem order 
in a society.   Bishop’s clarity in this matter is probably well centered in his role as 
a Church leader.  My discussion with three other elders from Acholi regarding 
“lapii” give similar clarity and meaning, centered around fear for tipo or “bad 
spirits” when one acted in bad faith, without clear lapii 
183 There are testimonies of how daker refused to set men to war because they often 
felt it was a wrong thing to do. 
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the latter being actions of an aggregate of individuals or agencies, events and 
societies, rather than individuals.  
 In predatory violence, the agencies are in pursuit of an agenda, which 
may have no root in a disagreement, conflict or incompatibility with the intent of 
the other groups.  For instance, the British colonialist’s core interest was 
imperialism, which was an asymmetrical relationship in which one group is 
superior to the other (P’Ojok, 2007:4-10).  In principle, trade and commerce 
existed with Acholi macon and could have lifted and transformed them if it was 
exercised morally.  However, the architecture set for trade with the Acholi by all 
systems, public and private, optimised the exploitation of the Acholi.  In other 
words, as a form of modernity, the position was set in which Acholi had to comply 
or be forced into submission (see: Finnström, 2008:134-137).   
Additionally, especially in the early part of the NRM and LRA/M 
insurgencies in Acholi, the community was placed in a precarious situation.  On 
the one hand, the Acholi desired a communal change that would shatter the 
prevailing image created by some of the UNLA soldiers that came from its 
territory.  They desired change to correct such isolation and looked to the NRM to 
do that.  On the other hand, as Lamwaka (2002) argued, the NRM sought to 
impose collective guilt on the Acholi for the evils of the past regimes (Lamwaka, 
2002:na). In pursuing this agenda, the community and the LRA were lumped 
together as perpetrators (e.g., Finnström, 2008: 92-97, 99-108; Dolan, 2011: 75-
76).  As discussed in Annex 3.2, this dichotomy played into the hands of both the 
government and the rebels in the politics of governance, damaging the image of 
the Acholi as a society. 
In explaining the history and legitimacy of violence and violations as an 
insider, I explored in Annex 3.2 three strands of arguments that have emerged in 
marginalising and labelling the Acholi as warmongers.  I further provided 
evidence that most analyses of violence by outsiders misconstrued the reality 
that exist in Acholiland, often choosing to give labels that befits but also 
resonates colonial discourses that aimed at degrading and subjectivating the 
Acholi because they bore openness and disliked micro-management of their own 
situations. 
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Concluding Remarks  
In this Chapter, I have used peace studies as an analytical lens to 
contextualise the history and politics of community governance in Acholiland with 
the view of situating it within national, regional and global arena.  The chapter 
contextualises, on one hand, the contradiction in governing practices that pitches, 
cross-modernism, legal-rationalism and neo-patrimonialism and on the other 
hand, it lays out the prevalent contestation of legitimacy.  Contextually, violence, 
based on the analyses, has become the means of establishing credibility and 
capabilities by hegemonic leaders.  The ultimate intent, it seems, is to reconstruct 
Acholiland as a subordinate element of Uganda even when the latter has failed to 
conform to the principles of modern statehood.  
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Chapter 4 – Exploring the Acholi Community Governance Systems 
Introductory Remarks 
This chapter begins the empirical section by drawing from existing 
literature and the views expressed in the various discussions, interviews and 
focus groups with key informants as indicated in chapter one.  Unless stated 
otherwise, I am asserting consensus views amongst these informants184.  In the 
chapter, I have argued that most western scholars considered in the academia as 
specialist on the Acholi of Uganda have done a disservice in conceptualising pre- 
and colonial social-political and governance structures.  To the contrary, many of 
them followed the thinking of the British colonialists who sought to identify 
emerging hierarchical offices and structures, and marginalised the more 
egalitarian structures (Raija and Phillips, 2002). 
I have countered in this work this stance through the use of evidence 
from early written accounts but also contemporary oral testimonies, words used 
in describing governance and songs as narratives passed on through 
generations.  I set, through these sources, to periodise evidence of political 
interactions that might have existed within these homologous structures before 
and during colonial time.  My conclusion is that an attempt to show case of 
hierarchical governing structures, like chiefdoms, were in many instances, a 
distortion that was influenced by what Raija and Phillips (2002) admitted as 
misunderstanding of what community governance of the nineteenth century was 
envisioned by western powers (Atkinson, 2010:84-91, 69-70, 85-89, 148-152).   
Admittedly, periodization of governing interactions cannot be an easy 
exercise in the absence of documented evidence.  However, those who practiced 
these governance systems understand the Acholi words and meaning of these 
interactions have passed on some narratives that support this work.  For 
instance, through the use of Acholi words and terminologies like ker, loc, abila, 
and the evidence and nature of interactions that typically have been documented 
in the case of chiefdoms or kingdoms elsewhere, I have been able to make some 
useful conclusions as discussed below. 
                                                          
184  My informants are the initial 20 respondents who remained an important source 
of validation of what I discussed in the fields but also the others I worked with 
over the years in the field as explained in Chapter One. 
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Acholi Community Identity Politics   
In identity literature, identity politics has been used to examine the 
construction of belonging, whether ethnic or territorial (Bruland and Horowitz, 
2003).  Historians for instance, categorise ethnicity as either primordialism or 
constructivism (Fisherman, 1996:na).  In the case of the former, ethnicity is 
assigned pre-modern or prehistoric origin where ethnicity is considered an 
essential human constitution.  Hence, by reflex one is able to identify with those 
with whom one shares life characteristics185.  However, constructivists see 
ethnicity as a construction that is based on social, political, and historical forces.   
As such, an individual identity changes over time as social context changes 
(Rapport, 2002: Chapter 2).  Under the circumstance, identity becomes a 
dependent variable in explaining issues like the link between community 
governance and violence (Fisherman, 1996:na).  In the case of Acholi, two 
viewpoints have been advanced in the discussion of ethnic identity.  In both 
cases, the core elements of ethnicity have been narrowed into common descent, 
common history and common territory186.  The first viewpoint questions the roots 
of Acholi ethnicity and the second, interrogates its collective identity 
categorisation.   
Regarding the former viewpoint, there are two schools of thought that 
have been advanced thus far.  One argument is that Acholi ethnicity was a 
colonial construction, implying that Acholi as an ethnicity is a colonial society.  I 
have averred to this school of thought as “cultural determinism”.  The second 
school of thought, however, contends that Acholi ethnicity is an evolution of the 
past.  The reconfiguration that happened during the colonial era merely built on 
what existed. I refer to this as the “constructivism” school.  
                                                          
185 See discussion in Chapter Two by Amit, 2002 with regards to community as a sub-
society. 
186 Descent here refers to biological lineages, which Atkinson (1999,20100 discussed 
extensively in his work and summarized later in this section of this Chapter.  In 
taking this path, I aim to reduce the often multiple and convulated meanings 
given to this concept and to domasticate it in line with was is probably more 
correct in the cotext of the Acholi of Uganda (See also: Finnstrom, 2008: Chapter 
Two; Green, 2006).  
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Cultural determinism 
This view states that Acholi ethnicity was an invention by colonialists 
who created an Acholi ethnicity by forcefully bundling different clans within a 
given geographical space, as part of the modernity project, to create an Acholi 
society as a subject of a “modern” Uganda state.  Proponents of this viewpoint 
include p’Bitek (1970), Kabwegyere (1995:40) and Behrend (1999a).  They 
reason that Acholi’s collective and political identity was manipulated as part of the 
colonial project.   
Scholars of legal anthropology have discussed extensively the use of a 
legal construction of space and boundaries in manipulating identities and 
therefore governance (von Benda-Beckmann et al., 2009).  Interestingly, there is 
evidence within Acholiland that support these claims.  For instance, there were 
patterns of tribal wars before and during part of the colonial era that characterised 
marked political difference.  According to Okot p’Bitek, ‘at the turn of the [20th] 
century, Acoliland was divided into thirty politically independent units’, which the 
British administration refused to recognise as separate tribes.  On the contrary, 
the British created an “Acoli district” as a new political unit and proceeded to call 
all the people the “Acholi tribe” (p’Bitek, 1970:2).  In fact, Allen confirms that 
Sholi/Shooli/Acoli or Luo Gang was “officially” documented in the colonial archive 
as Acholi in 1889 when it was delineated as a political community with fixed 
boundaries and a specific geographical location.  The people were also called the 
Acholi (Allen, 1998 as cited from Finnström, 2008:54, 247).  
Constructivism viewpoints 
In the second school of thought, scholars contend that Acholi collective 
identity existed long before the first known foreigners arrived in the 1840s.  The 
proponents of this viewpoint (e.g., Crazzolara, 1950, 1954; Girling, 1960; 
Atkinson, 2010) have rejected the notion of Acholi as a colonial project, arguing 
that ethnicity is actually “lived, imagined and politically manipulated” (Finnström, 
2008:52), and Acholi’s collective identity “was formed from the early eighteenth 
century onwards”, when inhabitants politically manipulated kaka as a model of 
governance (Atkinson, 1999 cited in Finnström, 2008:52).  This suggests that 
Acholi identity as conceived by constructivists is dynamic and progressive, 
merely interrupted by the colonialists (see: Finnström, 2008:52). 
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F.K Uma, (1972) an Acholi scholar, wrote about the Acholi-Arab 
relationship prior to colonialism.  He asserts that mutually and reinforcing 
interactions existed among the various kaka Acholi prior to the arrival of the 
Arabs around 1840 (Uma, 1972:3-7).  He avows that inter-marriages occurred 
among families of rwodi kaka prior to the 1840s, suggesting that vibrant 
interactions existed, possibly as early as the 1720s as suggested by Atkinson 
(1999, 2010).  He further alleged that the two rival rwodi: Rwot Camo of kaka 
Payiira and Rwot Ogwok of kaka Padibe were both okeyo (see: Finnström, 
2008:208-211)187 of Rwot Bwomono of kaka Palabek (Anywar, 1954:11; 
Finnström, 2008: 208-211).    
The Acholi – the ogangi or the Luo Gang 
Most of the numerous Acholi “clans” claim to be direct descendants of 
the Luo, something scholars have contested (see: Finnström, 2008:32, 36, 38, 5-
53).  The Luo are Central Nilotic speaking groups.  A group of scholars, perhaps 
led by Atkinson (2010: 64), suggests some cautiousness in this claim, remarking 
“Luo played only a peripheral role in Acholi as a whole”- something that many 
Acholi elders highly refute (Atkinson, 2010:64).  The proponents of this viewpoint 
question the wisdom of those colonial ethnographers, like Father Crazzolara 
(1954:81-83) and Onyango-ku-Odongo (1976).  Onyango-Odongo (2011), an 
Acholi elder, says the Acholi are Luo-Gang – the Luo that were found in 
homestead, the gang or the ogangi - denoting a settled lifestyle (Onyango-
Odongo, 2011).  Southall agrees with the elders and sees some common pattern 
of similarity between the Acholi and the Alur, who both are considered Luo 
(Southall, 2004:5).  He particularly identified the localised segmentary lineages, 
which I have referred in the case of Acholi as gangi agnates.   Crazzolara 
(1950:75-77) avers that the Luo group who moved downwards from the present 
South Sudan was a fascinating lot.  In fact, he observes that their “swag”188, 
                                                          
187 In Acholi “okeyo”, which I referred to as nephew in this case are sons of one’s 
sisters.  This means that both Rwot Ocama and Ogwok’s mothers came from kaka 
Palabek and were sisters to Rwot Bwomono.  In English, these rwodi were cousins 
but in Acholi, they were omaro, sharing a common paneyo – which is a significant 
thing in the Acholi’s customs.  However, the two omaro were often presented as 
archenemies by scholars like Anywar (1947).  This suggests that lweny kaka was, 
in some instances, contests for power even among related groups who were not 
necessarily strangers to each other.  In this case, the Arab slave traders influenced 
the greed. 
188  “Swags” is slang used extensively in the present Uganda to denote some level of 
exaggerated pride and achievements.  In deed, the Luo were successful warriors 
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eloquence and charismatic leadership made other social groups that they came 
across on their paths even beg them to rule (Crazzolara, 1950:75-77; Baker, 
1873 as cite in Bere, 1947:6).  Brett (1954), Crazzolara (1954) and Girling (1960), 
in discussing the roots of Acholi ethnicity, stated that kaka Payiira, Patiko and 
Alero, who claim to be direct descendants of Luo migrants, were the founding 
“seeds of the Acholi people” (e.g., Brett, 1954). 
Finnström (2008), whose argument conforms to the constructivists’ 
viewpoint, stated that most Acholi view themselves as Luo.  So, Luo they must be 
(Brett, 1954).  However, legal pluralism deserves a central role in the analysis of 
the law of belonging particularly in the African society, where changing the 
community seems to be the preoccupation of the West.   Here, there are 
traditional, customary, religious, national and international laws that govern 
interactions in most African territories.  From my knowledge of these laws, the 
majority recognise that the Acholi culture is a patrilineal system.  The British 
colonialists, if anything, reinforced neo-patrilineal tendencies in its customary 
laws as part of their colonial innovations189.  As such, by the majority views, one 
can claim to be an Acholi by either birth if one’s father is or was an Acholi.  
However, one can be adopted into a clan as putative kin as a primary identity.  
Belonging, as viewed by the Acholi respondents I talked to and discussed in 
details later, has rights and obligations attached to it.  A feeling of belonging is 
good but, as argued above, not sufficient. 
The Acholi collective identity 
Acholi’s collective identity refers to an element of its identity that is held 
in common with a larger group - a collective social attachment (Vemit, 2002: 
Location 360-79).  The Luo connection, as Finnström (2008) articulated in his 
anthropological study, seems an important one that compels the majority of the 
clans that made up the Acholi society ( Finnström, 2008: 32-36).  Herzfeld (1997) 
calls this “cultural intimacy”, which is manifested in the common Luo dialects and 
the localised segmentary lineages.  This, in my understanding, represents 
common descent as one of the core elements of ethnicity I have talked about.  As 
                                                                                                                                                               
and in that the men had built around them the aura of victors that according to 
Crazzolara (1950) were the irresistible lots around the  
189 I have argued later in support of this view how they promoted male dominated 
education, failed to encourage the chiefs, as they did in other things, to educate 
the women of Acholi. 
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such, it is the Gesellschaft version, where out of multiplex, longstanding 
interpersonal relationships and familiarity, groups identify themselves as Luo.   
There is also a general agreement among identity scholars that 
collective identity is self-identified, not forced because it bears a sense of self-
determination and self-direction (Rapport, 2002: 37).  This assertion, however, 
puts to question the primordial and therefore patrilineal dimension of identity.  
Nevertheless, the character of relational attachment – which is an element of 
neighbourhood and locality - is as likely to be derived from multiple attachments 
that make them members as from contrasts with collectivity in which they are not 
(Rapport, 2002: 37-40). 
It is often the quality of self-identification that enables collective identity 
categories to share their individual identity claims to authenticity, while also 
making social and communal goals intrinsic to this authentic identity.   Allen 
(1998) said the same about kaka as a collectivity.  It was an obligation of the 
stakeholders to ensure its quality and meanings were worthy.   This business of 
worth or the governing image, in the case of Acholi, was manifested in the 
governance practices and structures that emerged as part of its history of political 
evolution since 1898.   This aspect defines the common history of the Acholi as 
an element of ethnicity. 
Studies elsewhere have authenticated that during stressful events 
similar to those experienced in Acholi190, collective demands, including that for 
peace, security and belonging, are foreseeable and organised around 
expectations, shared interests and based on its culture of entrustment, it also 
includes faith as a value.  Shared interests and expectations support the 
emergence of value systems – like institutions, courage, charisma – that often 
depend on the physiological ‘givens’ (see: Joseph, 1987:52).  This is the essence 
of collectivity as a form of communality that in the case of fragility is moderated 
by gen as an institution191.  It is a choice, and Acholiland, because of its political 
context, consented as a community to kaka as a model of governance. 
                                                          
190 Here I refer to the historical profile of shocks discussed in Chapter Two.  
191 Gen as we will see later is close to trust, although less firm than trust.  As a matter 
of fact, some elders indicated that the Acholi elders in the 19th century trusted 
(read as gen) the British based on their acquaintance with Sir Samuel Baker, who 
gave them the impression that his government would help the Rwodi Acholi 
against the troublesome Arabs.  Their part of bargain, which was for the British, 
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Thus, the emergence of special organisations, like kaka, is a condition of 
human actions and compromises “givens” like kinship, ideology and norms such 
as age groups, sex and numbers, and to a great extent, on socio-economic 
identities as testified by oral history in the case of Acholiland (see: Joseph, 1987).  
These sub-systems emerged as networks of internal power relations needed to 
facilitate governing activities of social-political actors, and for coordinating 
governing activities that resonated within such context and occasions (see: 
Fleetwood, 2007:25-30). 
Conversely, collective identity categorisation, one can argue, has been a 
major catalyst of change in the history of Acholiland.  At the turn of 1898, 
collective identity manifested as shared values – dong oromowa192 – when 
different groups (gangi) or categories (kaka) of the inhabitants of the area 
proclaimed unity or ribbe aye teko, influenced by the political context: the post 
war developments that followed the 1862 to 1875 displacements of the Acholi 
(see: Onyango ku Odongo, 1976).  It became a voice of reason, a legitimised 
factor in renegotiating post-war leadership traits in Acholiland, as was exemplified 
by significance preference given to factors like hegemonic acculturation, the 
courage and charisma of most of the rwodi Acholi of the post-war period.  Leys 
(1945) acknowledges that the hardship associated with the Acholi geopolitics and 
its complexity contributed to the shaping of leadership hegemonic acculturation 
as a virtue193.   
In summary, identity was principally coalesced around three parameters.  
One was as Amit (2002) stated, the neighbourhood and locality, which cultivated 
societal intimacy (see: Crazzolara, 1950: 70, 72).  Secondly, through descent and 
the associated ideation and hegemonic acculturation of the leaders, some 
common political and social principles like ribbe aye teko or unity is strength, and 
                                                                                                                                                               
to keep the Nubians away from their territory, was not fulfilled.  Instead, they 
used the Nubians to administer the Acholi, continue to torture and rape their 
mothers, daughters and wives (see:Onyango-ku-Odongo, 1972).  This action alone 
was sufficient for the Acholi to know that the British were not trustworthy 
people.  Meeting held in Roma Hotel in Kitgum, 2003 and Roma in Gulu in 2003. 
192 Loosely translated as, “it is enough” as in reaching a point when lineage identity 
became less of a priority to the groupings 
193 This resonates with the impetus discussed by Kurtz (2004), and others, and how, 
for instance in the case of China, hegemonic culturation propelled economic 
growth after protracted periods of oppression in its history.  Today, China is 
supposedly a beacon of liberation symbolising peaceful co-existence of its diverse 
people, which has been a questionable view in some aspects as well. 
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in some instances, gwoke pe lworo or self-preservation is not cowardice, became 
common virtues and values.  These virtues were products of historical trajectories 
and this makes a common history the third significant parameter (Crazzolara, 
1950:4).  Consequently, by 1898, the Acholi collective identity as a distinct tribe in 
Uganda was configured mainly on these narratives of history, cultural mixing and 
shifting of identities, largely from the three social groups but with a great push 
from their leaders.  However, there was also the shifting of identity formation 
through multiple and complex migrations, as well as interpellations of the 
dominant Luo identity (Ogot, 1967: 18; Crazzolara, 1950-54:10; Dwyer, 1972:16-
24.  Crazzolara (1950:69-72)194. 
Social-Political Organisation of the Acholi Macon 
As I have pointed out in the introductory section, the “African specialists” 
innovated hierarchical political arrangements in the homologous structures of the 
pre-colonial social groups that formed the Acholi.  However, the picture emerging 
from this research is quite different.  As elucidated below, what seem to be likely 
is that these pre-colonial structures were widely heterarchial arrangements of 
different gangi agnates that represented communal systems.  These communal 
systems in their collection formed kaka (see: Sanders, 1969: 521-32; Sutton, 
1968: 84)195.   Figure 4.1 presents a diagrammatic representation of the pre-
colonial community governance arrangements that were found in Acholiland as 
remembered by the respondents.  It shows a cascading image of relationship, 
with the most populace structures dominating in a kind of hierarchy that was not 
necessarily superior to the others but certainly stronger, respected and cherished 
(Dwyer, 1972:28-33).  
The social-political forms and characteristics of the Acholi macon 
epitomised networks of cascading levels of interwoven governing arrangements 
where male-based elders of the different agnatic communal groups, appeared to 
have led non-elders dominantly through regulations rather than command 
                                                          
194 Crazzolara (1950:69-72) like others have observed that central to the quest for 
state formation was the prescribed duties of relationships, which were readiness to 
support in physical, moral and social difficulties based on the principle of solidarity 
with each other. Hence, brotherhood or kaka spirit was entrenched as a motto for 
survival of the groups. 
195 Interview with Rtd. Bishop Ochola, December 2011 
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(Driberg, 1932:406).  The relationships were complex, respected but not feared, 
with matrices of both horizontal and some form of vertical levels, because elders 
were common features, found at all the levels of governance.   In explaining the 
complexities, I have presented the social-political organisations as two main 
political arenas in tandem with the prevailing authorities.  One is the agnatic or 
kinship governing arena  - which comprised the elementary families, the 
households (dog odi), the hamlets (dog ot or dye-kal or paco) and the villages 
(gangi).   This first level formed what I referred to earlier as the communal 
governance realm because of the often dominant aspects of primordial but also 
putative intimacy and social relations that were linked to common eponymous 
ancestor through abila, marriage and kith ship, in what is considered wadi 
remo/obeno.196   
Figure 4.1: Acholi’s Cascading Community Governing Arrangement 
 
Source: Field Data, 2013 
 
The second level is what Girling (1960:82-124) referred to as the 
domains and other scholars, chiefdoms (see: Atkinson, 2010:104-136).  I have 
                                                          
196 Discussions held at different time with elders, including Mzee Wilson Onyai of 
Gang Pakiri, Mzee Oloyi of Alero, Mzee Opoka Lamaca of Pailiec – all these was in 
Buyale-Masindi in 2005.  In 2006, with Mzee Tebere of Pabito, Mego Penina Amono 
of Purong Anaka  
Dye-Kal, a corporate 
family with dog odi 
as elementary 
families. 
Gang, first ethnic or 
communal level.  Also 
sometimes called 
kaka
Kaka or 
chiefdoms, second 
ethnic level
Acholi community 
as third ethnic level 
is also called kaka, 
created in the 19th 
century
  
 
137 
referred to this level as kaka, which is the Acholi description for the form of 
relationship exhibited before colonialism at the highest governance level197.  It 
was, until 1900s, the macro-level of the traditional governance system of the 
Acholi that came about through the consociations of the gangi agnates.  Kaka, 
therefore, was the macro-level of the political organisation of the Acholi macon.  It 
had much to do with shared governing interests, that is, choices and 
expectations, influenced by common sense and the environment198.  As such, 
political legitimacy was tied to the quality of governance interactions among the 
parties. 
Generally, it was difficult to deduce the difference between the levels 
represented in Figure 4.1 above or how they related to each other because they 
were homologous networks of Acholi’s governing structures.   
“How can one begin to write about the institutions of an alien society 
as that of Acholi?” (Girling, 1960:6). 
Okello-Pacuto (2012), a historian, submits that the anthropological paradigm of 
“Lineage Theory” that was promoted by Evans-Pritchard (1940) was misused 
when discussing Acholi’s social-political organisation (Okello-Pacuto, 2012).  
Richards (1969:41) had advanced that, because Acholi’s social-political 
organisation by the 1860s was best described as stateless, its historical 
progression could best be analysed through kinship relationships, something that 
was rightly contested as unfounded (Girling, 1960:3; Atkinson, 1985; 1994; 1999; 
2010).   
Behind Richards’ assertion was the prejudicial rhetoric that drove 
anthropological knowledge generation to show what were seen as stateless 
societies as politically less significant to the centralised systems (Mamdani, 
1984).  In other words, civilisation was correlated to authoritarianism.  Other 
scholars of African studies, including Thomson (2010: Location 327-336) and 
Southall (2004), show misconceptions in these arguments, arguing that 
                                                          
197  When we talk of kaka Alero or kaka Padibe in the political context of Acholi, we refer to a 
collection of agnates that formed that kaka-dom. It does not and was not in reference to the core 
agnates that were the nuclei of the consociations. 
198 The relationships I have discussed can best be argued as fiduciary because it had 
the core-agnates as the agents and the non-core as principles.  However, the 
relationship at kaka levels harboured self-interest while at the gangi levels were 
obligatory as I further explain in Chapter Five. 
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“stateless” societies had adequate, well-developed systems that served their 
people sufficiently.  By 1898, the Acholi community was familiar with the 
convergence and divergence of interest groups, having had over two hundred 
years of experience in history.  Its governing organisations while homologous that 
bore three noticeable characteristics – including quality of governing consent, 
diversity as a source of legitimacy, and entrustments – that I consider 
demonstrate morality in governance and are discussed here below.  
A blend of kinship and consent 
The origin of the Acholi ethnicity, it seems, was one of a family of “tribes” 
that became a nation by blending kinship199, kith-ship and consent.  This is 
notwithstanding the arbitrary borders that were later fixed by the colonialists, to 
explicitly give the area a name and use the legal boundaries to control the people 
inside the territory (von Brenda-Beckman et al., 2010) 200.  Through 
politiogenesis, the Acholi political system, it seems, was modelled to conserve 
the individual identities and diversities of the polities through autopoiesis.  This, it 
seems, was regardless of their sizes, compositions and ethnic bases (Pain, 
1998:12).   If so, then this was probably one important innovation at resolving the 
frequent contestations of boundaries, uses of natural resources and 
customs that were evident within these diverse groups prior to formation of 
kaka.   
While in fiduciary relationships201, one person would be in a 
position of vulnerability, in the case of the Acholi it has been presented as 
a relative situation, compounded with numerical figures.  Some agnates 
were larger in number and therefore, enjoyed the economy of numbers.  
                                                          
199 Kinship in this study is defined as a legitimate relationship recognised between 
social groups that share both genealogical and affiliate origins, through either 
biological, cultural, or historical descent with the principle intention of creating 
social obligations that are enforced through codes of ethics. I have also call this 
relationship agnates or gangi. 
200 von Brenda-Beckman et al., 2010 have discussed under legal anthropology how 
the construction of boundaries has been used to control people. 
201 In discussing fiduciary relationships and duties in framing this relationship, I am 
grateful to Father Joseph Okumu for his viewpoints.  His viewpoints enabled me 
to conceptualise the discussions on this concept at www.businessdictionary.com 
for this study. 
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This mutually inclusive situation or facultative mutualism202 justified these 
polities, as we will see later, to entrust each other because it was mutually 
likely that they would advise, aid and protect each other.  This is what the 
Acholi coined as a form of brotherhood or kaka.  As Dwyer (1972:33-35) 
observed, the allegiances owed by the weaker polities to the stronger were 
based on admiration, respect and zeal rather than conquest (Dwyer, 
1972:34) 203.   
However, at the corporate and communal levels, that is, the dye-
kal and the gang respectively, fiduciary relationships defined the custom.  
Especially in the cases of vulnerable dog odi, members of the lineage 
households dutifully supported these households or kin204.  In this 
situation, other than under facultative mutualism, the principal demanded 
higher than ordinary degrees of care, which kinship was obliged to offer.  
For instance, it was the practice to take care of vulnerable people to avoid 
their cen – which is the spirit of the dead – when they passed on.  Cen 
would bring all bad omens into the doorstep of the kin.  Hence, in 
safeguarding the numerical figures, no household would compromise the 
custom.  Facultative duties were imposed through competitive and 
comparative advantages, negotiated to ensure some equity, which in most 
instances, were reinforcing to all parties.  Non-core agnates were not 
compelled to take up the customs except when found as benefiting to 
them (Atkinson, 2010:84-86).  This was because there were other 
opportunities.  This made the practice competitive and market-based.  It 
was on the basis of this that normative behaviours for the partners were 
set. 
                                                          
202 Facultative mutualism is used in the study to describe a relationship that is 
empowering but not compelling, except when it is mutually benefiting.  
203 Speaking to some historians, this system distasted autocracy because every 
agnate would not serve the gods or worship the image of the others (see Daniel, 
Chapter 3, verse 18 in Holy Bible). 
204 In my interviews with three elders from Pakiri, Pailyec and Pujwani agnates in 
Lamogi, I was led to understand that wife inherence was obligatory, as it would 
serve particularly the homestead that lost a father.  Wife inherence did not hold 
any self-interest and often it was based on capability of the man to provide. 
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Kaka – as the macro-level governing realm of the Acholi by 1898 - 
had a variegated grid of politics for all the individual gangi agnates.  At most, 
each gang agnate was recognised as an equal in the consociation in its own 
right, with its own abila and the different and specialised brands of elders 
guaranteeing the identity of their individual lineages205.  There was a 
manifestation of what Locke (1690) terms, a state of nature, which according to 
Rawls (2007), was “a state of equal right, all being kings” (Rawls, 2007: 129).  
The Acholi expression for this is “an bene arwot ki i oda” - literally meaning-“I am 
also a rwot in my own hut”.  This form of individualised autochthony by the 
individual dye-kal or even gangi agnates proclaimed “originality” in links between 
these governing entities and kaka as a political institution and the territory.  This 
presented itself as “self-evident”, “primordial” or “natural” and therefore, 
immutable. 
Within such arrangements, the governing model did not permit a sub-
system like the core-agnates to rule or be an agent.  Rather, because of self-
interest and benefits, it acted as an agent-in-trust for kaka – thereby establishing 
a dominant realm of co-governance in which it was respected as a legitimate 
leader.  Besides, the core agnates were often more organised and populace 
(see: Atkinson, 2010).  Similarly, as Rawls (2007) avers, the non-core agnates, 
on the other hand, would not by design, be subjected to the core agnates, and 
with obligations to enforce the former’s authority when violated.   This is because 
both types of agnates were sub-systems of kaka political systems they operated 
in, a relationship that could best be described as a form of facultative mutualism. 
Hence, a possible option for governance, according to Rawls (2007), 
and one which, when applied in the Acholi circumstance, was where political 
legitimacies of the core agnates (luker) were subject to the fulfilment of some 
minimum conditions within the social contract.  This included, for instance, 
guaranteeing security and freedom for the non-core to retain their kinship 
identities (see: Girling, 1960:87-92; Atkinson, 2010:85-89).  This form of fiduciary 
responsibility to the weaker polities had an expectation from the core-agnates.  
Ribbe, which is unity, became obligatory in defining kaka as a fiduciary institution.  
                                                          
205 For instance, each elder was specialised in matters of their lineage not of the 
Acholi as a whole.  And since governance was about governing the lineage-based 
patrilineal agenda, elders were experts of their own lineage as passed on from 
generations to generations. 
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Reciprocity was, therefore, the image of justice.  Its moral compass was 
expressed by equity, balance, symmetry and fairness.  Peace, stability and 
harmony were also seen as the wellheads of the post-war Acholiland political 
thought in the twentieth century.  
Absence of an imposing authority 
Political power, according to Kurtz (2004), is subsumed in the form 
of material and ideation resources.  Most ludito kaka in Acholi were 
endowed with ideational resources and the most evocative convergence of 
leaders’ powers have been in the practice of what Gramsci (1971) referred 
to as hegemonic acculturation – the mechanisms by which they were able 
to practice “intellectual and moral” leadership with patrilineal culture 
(Girling, 1960:82-90).  It was in their abilities to mobilise, inspire and entrust 
the society that leaders differed in the case of Acholi (Girling, 160: 46-48).  
Material wealth including land, were of limited value.  However, the 
collective numbers of political allies that some leaders like Rwot Awich and 
Rwot Ogwok of Padibe had, the numerical figures of male inhabitants and 
later on, their access to wealth through the trade in slave and ivory, were 
seemingly critical (see also Girling, 1960:174-204; Atkinson, 2010:54-61). 
Dwyer (1972) presented the Acholi political system as lying 
between the segmentary type and the centralised kingdoms, thereby 
missing “hierarchy, the essential ingredient of the vertical scheme” that 
was the model of the time.  He states that this is a case of “diffused 
powers” (Dwyer, 1972:14).  Consequently, all the kaka that consented to a 
common governing realm were arguably, heterarchical in culture; meaning 
that they related to each other as “equals” (see: Atkinson, 2010:75-81; 
p’Bitek, 1972)206.  In addition, they were not internally cohesive and 
forcefully bound presumably because, as Shiffered (1987) observed, the 
“necessary conditions” for statehood formation sometimes would come in 
                                                          
206 Professor Atkinson - suggests that there were about seventy chiefdoms in 
numbers at the turn of the 20th century.  P’Bitek, 1972 - on the other hand, 
indicates thirty while Ker Kwaro Acholi (2012) gives fifty four.  
  
 
142 
phases, delaying the realisation of a full stage of evolutionary outcome 
(Girling, 1960:9).   
Conversely, the argument for a single authority in Acholiland was 
partly wishful thinking by imperial powers.  Rwodi, had attributes of 
authority that were commensurate with the models for governing their 
society – where governance was multi-layered and multilateral (Atkinson, 
1999:84-95, 103).  They clearly knew their boundaries of authority as 
demonstrated by political division created during the slave trade.  Perhaps 
the absence of a single authority in the area was the most frustrating 
feature of kaka governance, going by remarks from colonial 
administrators, who swiftly moved to rectify the anomaly (see: Speke, 1864: 
356; Girling, 1960:133). 
Transitional community 
There was a sustained state of social flux in the region mainly caused by 
both voluntary and involuntary migrations, famine, wars and insurgencies, natural 
disasters and diseases as further discussed in chapter seven.   Atkinson (1999, 
2010:75-81) comments that evidence for greater integration within the landscape 
started as far back as the seventeenth century, mainly triggered by the fragility of 
the conditions.  Most agnates, especially smaller one, began to form into larger 
political units, kaka, as a consociation against such circumstances.  Hence, by 
1898, Acholi could, therefore, best be contextualised as a society in transition, 
where integration was still lacking in most part.  Integration, argues Woolcock 
(1998), encompasses strong rather than weak ties; these are substantive, not 
formal, rational (Weber, 1978); Gemeinschaft not Gesellschaft (Tonnies, 1957); 
mechanical, not organic, solidarity (Durkheim, 1984); value-oriented, not interest-
based, action (Habermas, 1989).   
Thus, as a society, both integration – which ideally is the formation of 
institutions of hierarchical power - and linkage as forms of social capital were 
required and these need to grow and be sustained.  A state government as a 
legitimate authority was envisioned to integrate the various Acholi ethnic groups 
into a territorial community.  That has not and cannot happen, in the near future.  
Division is seen as a political tool, to help regimes survive the tsunami of change 
that comes with unity. 
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Gang as a Social-Political Structure and Institution 
Conceptually, gang (see: North, 2005:60)207 was a social-political 
organisation.  As such, it was both structural and geographical or territorial: the 
former describing its contents – the people and culture while the latter describing 
the patterns of settlement and organisation, as represented in Figure 4.1 and 4.2 
(see: Crazzolara, 1950: 6-7; Bere, 1947:3-5; Girling, 1960:55-80). Gang was 
exogamous, patrilocal and patrilineal, and was sometimes named after the male 
founders (Girling, 1960:120; Crazzolara, 1954: Chapter 4).  By 1898, an agnate 
had on average between one hundred and seventy to four hundred and eighty 
men.  And there were two types: gangi pa luker – the core-agnates; and gangi pa 
lwak – the non-core agnates.  Scholars often presented the two types of lineages 
as hereditary political class in which the luker were said to rule (see: Atkinson, 
2010:338-342; Bere, 1947:3-5).  Consequently, this bias in stratified societies led 
to most scholars giving undue attention to studying the core-agnates. 
The typologies of gangi Acholi 
Most western scholars wrongly interpreted the non-core gangi agnates 
as sub-clans, suggesting that these organisations identified with their own abila 
shrines were mere extensions of the core-agnates (Atkinson, 1999, 2010:81).  
Since most of the non-core agnates had small populations and numbers, they 
were mistaken as sub-lineages of the luker and, as such, shared common 
eponymous ancestors (e.g., Bere, 1947: 4; Atkinson, 2010: 262-266).   Allen 
(1989) referred to kaka - a constituency of governance - as made up of related 
gangi agnates.  In Acholi this would mean that the people were wadi obeno and 
therefore exogamous, which was far from the truth. 
While there could have been some cases of such, the majority of gangi 
as agnates, especially in the early twentieth century, were made of mixed 
                                                          
207 In this research I will use gang to describe the first level of Acholi’s ethnic polity 
instead of sub-tribe or clan. Gang is a meso level organisation of kinship-based 
families, all with full allegiance to one shrine and the spiritual leadership of its jok.  
Gang is appropriately selected here to represent a governance system that is 
more than family-based and thus the communal level of governance. In most 
instances, gang was more than just a genealogical representation but a “viable” 
unit of relationship that gives meanings to this study. In this way, gang can be 
looked at as an organisation, representing a group of individual families “bound 
together by some common objectives”  
  
 
144 
lineages.  With the Alur tribes, based on Southall’s (2004) observations, lineages 
lacked “effective” leaders and had no memories of their history as a result of the 
social flux, so they resolved to join others, paying allegiance to an abila of a 
common eponymous ancestor 208.   
Core-agnates or “gang pa luker” 
Girling (1960) used the term core-agnates to describe the central role 
the luker agnates played as the nuclei of change rather than emphasising class.  
The luker lineages, however, were often larger in number and arguably, have 
claimed descent from the Luo (Crazzolara, 1954:81-83; Dwyer, 1972:30; Pain, 
1998:5-12).  Ker was not necessarily in the domain of the Luo group because 
rainmaking, which was an important attribute of rwodi, was found also in others 
((Girling, 1960: Chapter 8)209.  Ker, when articulated as a derivative of community 
governance, is an Acholi word for a regime type, often stated as ker wa/mewa, 
which means “our regime”.  As such, it conveys a form of “fiduciary duties”, 
obligations and rights over a sect that seems to have some form of tenure.  This, 
however, with time became a form of class, a “royalty” - with regalia and drums - 
suggesting most likely innovative imitations from jo pa Luo.  Even if they were not 
imitations, they revealed a culture that was not common at that time in the area. 
As such, scholars referred to luker agnates as the aristocratic lineage, 
bestowing some levels of privileges on their charismatic leaders, the rwodi moo, 
in line with what existed elsewhere (Bere, 1947: 3-4; Crazzolara, 1950: 69-72).  
This effort allowed comparisons between the different traditional systems that 
existed in the world.  Father Crazzolara (1950:69-72) wrote about the courage, 
leadership skills and oratory traits of the Luo.   This is understood by most 
respondents to mean that many inhabitants on their path submitted to the 
leadership of the Luo migrants because they demonstrated having the dominant 
                                                          
208 During interviews with elders from kaka Alero and Payiira in Gulu town, we came 
across such an occurrence.  There are songs for bwola dance that give 
testimonies of groups that have been assimilated and have built on the strength 
of others. 
209 Rain making as an attribution of leaders was an important hereditary trait that 
was associated with some lineages among the three ethnic groups that made up 
the Acholi of Uganda. In my discussion, it was clear that it was not limited to the 
luker agnates as some non-luker were known as rainmakers.  It was also belived 
that an individual from the luker agnates who shifted or got married to the non-
core looses the ker identity.  Cases of non-luker rainmakers have not been 
associated with the movement I have stated above.  
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traits that was favoured under the circumstances.  However, their political 
legitimacy was conditioned on location specific demands of the people they 
consociated or colonised.  
Gang pa luker and gang kal formed the core agnate.  Kal in Acholi is 
associated with social justice.  Lukal, which were the households of rwot, were 
the custodians of social justice.  The wife of rwot, dako ker or daker in short, 
sanctified men to war when she approved of war that was sanctioned by the 
society (see: Girling, 1960: 86-87).  Within the luker agnates, there were three 
sets of settlements: dye-kal pa rwot or gang kal as Rwot’s own settlement, paco 
pa luker as his brothers and kin’s lineages and paco pa lubong as the lineages of 
the putative, those incorporated into the agnate (see Figure 4.2 below).  Girling 
(1960) observed that the task of rwot was to command the respect and allegiance 
of these two lineages, primarily, as the head of the luker agnatic lineage and 
therefore their cognate kinsman, but also through the ties of fictitious affinity 
(Girling, 1960: 83). 
Dye-kal pa rwot was where rwot moo and his wives, children and 
helpers resided.  The corporate family of rwodi moo, which are the families of his 
immediate brothers210 and other affiliates linked to rwodi, made up the other two 
additional settlement types – dye-kal pa luker and dye-kal pa lubong respectively.  
Girling (1960:90) for instance, recorded seven branches of the luker lineages in 
kaka Atiak, which included the one for Rwot Oliya of Atiak. These three 
settlements together formed kaka pa rwot, the luker, who were rwot’s inner circle.  
As Girling (1960) wrote, these settings were much larger than the ordinary gang 
agnate of the lwak. In addition, the luker were more endowed because unlike the 
other agnates, they were more stable and larger in number211. 
                                                          
210 Rwodi often had children with concubines and were too may ascend to the throne 
of leadership.  As such the numbers of brothers to any specific rwot can be large.   
211 Additional information from discussion with rwodi Acholi during the research 
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Figure 4.2: Diagrammatic Composition of Core Agnates by 1898 
 
Source: Field Date, 2013 
Non-core agnates – “Gangi pa Lubong/Lwak” 
The non-core agnates212 were of two types, and with diverse 
backgrounds and lineages - sometimes non-related.  One was the lubong, who 
were often captives, displaced or dissident individual households, and who as 
Girling (1960) noted, were putative to the rwot’s households or those of his 
brothers.  The other was the lwak agnate.  Unlike the lubong, the lwak agnates 
were clearly recognised and respected, and had their separate headmen, ludito 
kaka, who were in some instances, the landlord or wegi ngom for the entire kaka 
(see also: Girling’s (1960: 82).  This, arguably, suggests that territories were not 
open as Thomson (2010: Location 336) suggested of African situation, and that 
power in the case of Acholiland, was not actually broadcast, as there seems to 
have been clear governing constituencies.   
Gang Pamuca in kaka Lamogi was dominantly of Madi descent 
(Crazzolara, 1954: 333-334).  The people first settled at the foot of Guruguru hill 
much earlier than the Boro clan, which was the core agnate in kaka Lamogi.  
And, by around 1898 jo Pamuca or the people of Muca had the largest gang 
settlement in the said geographical space.  As such, the Pamuca , according to 
                                                          
212 There was contestetation over whether lubong lineages should be considered as 
part of the non-core agnates.  Often, the argument goes, they are assimilated 
within the core agnates and in some instances, some of them became rwot.  Those 
that joined the non-core are putative kin and counted as members of those 
lineages. 
Gang kal
•Rwot's own 
family, which 
was large
•is workers
Gang ker
•Rwot's brothers 
and kinsmen
•Their kith and 
friends
gang pa 
lubong
•Putative's kin 
•Friends and 
relatives
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oral history, remained the custodian of rituals performed in celebrating jogi at 
Guruguru hill.  
“An individual, possibly with his wife, who wanted to join up with a 
smaller or a larger group or clan, was always accepted and 
wholeheartedly welcomed, even if he originated from a different or hostile 
tribe” (Crazzolara, 1951:71). 
Generally, the non-core had smaller households, compared to the core-
agnates.  Additionally, because they migrated so frequently in search of security, 
they were less endowed compared to the luker.  Although Girling’s (1960:89-90) 
anthropological study discussed in some instances the organisations of the non-
core agnates, regrettably, most attention in the study of the socio-political 
organisation of the Acholi was focused on the core agnates (Girling, 1960: 87-
90).  For instance, rwodi were said to have had many wives, and therefore larger 
lineages (Girling, 1960: 97-98).  Rwot Langony of Kaka Koch for instance had 
eleven wives, one of them a daker and the others, concubines (Girling, 1960:98).  
However, overall, there were often few dye-kal pa lwak in total, especially in the 
larger chiefdoms (Atkinson, 2010:342).  For instance, Atiak had twelve agnates 
by the turn of the nineteenth century.  Seven of these were luker lineages and 
five formed the lwak agnates (Girling, 1960: 90; Atkinson, 2010:342).  
The political structure and composition of gang 
Gangi were more structural than geographical.  They were often named 
after eponymous ancestors at their core (Girling, 1960:120), although some 
gangi were also named after physical features or in commemoration of special 
events, such as gifts or even major quarrels213.  Girling, for instance, made 
reference to some names of gangi among kaka Koch that refer to territorial 
groupings (Girling, 1960:91). Ogoropii, a village in Palema in the present Amuru 
District, took its name from a water well that supplied the inhabitants, while Amii 
Lobo, a village in Palema Parish in Amuru District, was a settlement offered by 
clan elders to immigrants, and thus, amii lobo – I have given you land!214.   Gangi 
were also the production level and thus, the root of ethnic manipulation 
(Mamdani, 1999:21; Girling, 1960:55-81).  It provided the social, economic and 
ideological foundations of the Acholi macon.  Gangi were identified with an abila, 
                                                          
213 Some gangi, according to elders were named after physical features because they 
were made upm of a number of ethnic backgrounds arising from displacements 
and the respect for each other values.   
214 Focus group discussion in Keyo Displacement Camp, Amuru District, in 2005 
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which was a shrine of eponymous ancestors that embraced a number of 
lineages, sometime as many as thirty.  Although, gangi were heterogeneous in 
terms of composition and affiants, the organisational settings and functions were 
homogeneous (Girling, 1960:55-57).   
Political infrastructures of the village or “gang” 
Girling (1960) gave extensive narratives of the traditional gang life and 
settlement of the Acholi macon, which in this analysis describes the Acholi 
system that existed prior to but also in the early part of colonialism (Girling, 1960: 
55-81).  Regardless of the type, gang as a territory was a constellation of two 
homologous political units – dog odi or keno and dye-kal or paco.  These were 
social-political networks of mostly primordial groups, wadi obeno - with putative 
members including women married into it (Oruni-Oloya, 1994 cited from Opiyo-
Oloya, 2013:23; Shipton, 2007:12-20)215.  Figure 4.2 below shows a typical build 
up of a village or gang.  Gang, unlike the “chiefdom”, exhibited permanence 
because it was made up of lineages that recognised a common founder and thus, 
glued around primordial attachment and an abila that was an ancestral shrine 
celebrated by the entire group.  
                                                          
215 Philip Oruni-Oloya (1994) submits that wat is Acholi’s constitution.  However, wat 
is just part of the constitution.  As constitution addresses the different levels of 
the Acholi organisation, wat as a category of relations looks at the primodial (wat 
remo/obeno or kinship) and other related wadi.  It is not necessarily about 
trustworthy.  Rather, it is more about obligations and responsibility with or 
without trusts, that is, entrustment - as a given.  Remo or wat pek, meaning blood 
or kinship is thick – heavier than anything else, therefore, is the thing!  
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Figure 4.3: A Diagram of Pakiri Village with Internal Settings 
 
Source: Field Data, 2013 
 
There are two important features of gang settings; one is the 
significance of the courtyards or dye-kal in governing interactions within the gang 
political setting.  This is because dye-kal was a sub-system of gang that was a 
corporate or compound entity inhabited by primary wadi obeno (See also Figure 
4.3).  The compound family was a private holding, an inclusive group that paid 
allegiance to their kac, their immediate father, as their primary shrine.  The 
second is the patterning and the positioning of the different dye-kal lineages 
under gang as a political system that was not only a force but also “the internal 
environment in which a lineage is associated, continues, and provide the internal 
environment” in which the other structures developed (Girling, 1960:55). 
“Dye-Kal”: Organisations and Settings 
Structurally, dye-kal or paco was a collection of dog odi that identified 
with a kac of an eponymous ancestor.  This makes dye-kal a lineage or an 
extended family of the male children (awobe) of a forefather, living or dead.   In 
the past, dye-kal shared wang oor, a fireplace for evening social-political 
intercourse.  Often, the head – won paco - was the eldest son of the founder.  
Girling (1960) further noted that dye-kal, by the 1950s, possibly had between one 
and thirty dog odi (Girling, 1960:8).   To date, this has significantly changed.  
Southall (2004) refers to dye-kal in the case of the Alur tribe as compound family.  
This is because, typically, the unit was politically self-accounting to the kinship 
4. Dog Gang is 
collections of hamlets 
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1. "Dog keno pa" is a hut 
and therefore a 
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monogamy, it also 
represents "dog ot"
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pa 
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arrangements at the gang level.  It was a corporate family that was socially 
autopoetic.  Some of the Acholi elders I talked to confirmed that dye-kal were the 
foundation of gangi agnates.216  The number of dye-kal determined the strength 
of the gang polity.  The females from non-related villages who were married into it 
became part of it, especially once they attained social status – mego – that 
literally enthrones respect and trust in them as acknowledged insiders.  Through 
marriage, they became an item of the kac system of the compound family, to 
which they were ritually vulnerable when they diverted from the culture. 
Governing at the dye-kal levels 
Dye-kal was made up of the male children and their fathers.  It also 
included the women married to it and the daughters.  It was an operational level 
of corporate governance.  Contextually, dye-kal – sometimes in Acholi referred to 
as dog gola - was complex in the sense that it was a convergence point for three 
or more lineage-based authorities, with competing priorities, cultural and political 
dynamics.  These loci include won paco – who is traditional head of the lineage 
shrine, paneyo217 - as the alternate authority from one mother’s lineage, won 
gang – as the traditional authority of the kinship abila and the rwot - who for the 
non-core agnates was a distant authority deserving respect.  But a woman 
married into it would bring additional power sometimes, depending on the political 
power of her agnate.  Authority and order within this lineage level were built upon 
the values that are inculcated in the family.  
                                                          
216 Dye-kal was also called hamlet or paco.  Mzee Charles Alai gave an analogy of a 
gang as being a river and is fed by dye-kal, which represented the tributaries that 
fed the river and sustained it.  The capability of the familial authority according to 
him was the most significant aspect of the organisation.  
217 I have discussed the role of paneyo (relatives from one’s mother’s side: her 
brothers in particular but also their parents) on the child in the later section. If dye-
kal was corporate, gang was a communal level, while kaka was the political level of 
authority. 
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 Figure 4.4: Dye-kal Organisational Architecture by 1898 
  
Source:  Field Data, 2013 
Won paco was the agent-in-trust for the principals - the wegi odi or 
fathers of the huts, who were possibly his sons and his younger brothers.  
Girling’s (1960) case study of won from a lwak agnate’s household in kaka 
Payiira, demonstrated how pater, the jural, and the genitor on one hand and the 
physiological paternity on the other interface in the context of governance 
(Girling, 1960:31-33).  Won had a duty and traditional authority to act in the best 
interest of these principals.  Won paco ordered the practice of fiduciary duties, 
working with the various wegi odi to ensure lineage order and continuity in the 
lineage.  He had the power and privilege to order and preserve the kac of his 
immediate forefathers.  In the same manner, he had first and second order 
authority over the polity, which empowered him to protect, enforce compliance 
but also, to change or alter entitlements, including his own218.   
For quality, consistency and continuity of these important efforts, won, 
as a corporate leader, often used social power and curses to promote and 
enforce compliance, and to safeguard the integrity of the corporate family or the 
lineage.  Thus, part of the obligations was to enshrine constitutive rights into 
operational behaviours.  This ensured institutionalisation of social orders and 
                                                          
218 A lot of this information was, however, gathered from group discussions and later 
a meeting I had with two elders [Opoka, 82 years and Okidi, 76 years] in a funeral 
in Palabek Kal this year, 2015.  A married son from Opoka’s family died living 
behind three children and a wife.  I used family tree and historical profile to trace 
the history of wife inheritance in the family, to understand how it could still be 
practiced. 
1. dog 
keno
2. dog ot
3. dye 
kal/gang 
pa/paco pa
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behaviours.  Invariably, a child, it seems, was born idog ot but raised up idye-kal 
and igang.  Dog odi were the first levels of individual governing interactions and 
several of them interacted, often in a gender segregated manner, in informing the 
governing efforts of the entire corporate family.  These involved the self-
governance and co-governance between a man and his wife/wives.  Some 
interactions were gender-segregated, like hunting for the males, and thrashing 
millet for the females. Thus, governing interactions at this level took many forms.   
It was at the dye-kal level that the management practices - the levelling 
of patrilineal practices and influences – interfaced with the realities and power of 
“foreign” culture from the women married into it.  Often, these practices were 
contested, contradicted, and often reconfigured to reflect the elements of lived 
experiences that are moderated by marriages219.  In other words, dye-kal 
provided opportunities for democratic practices, innovations and change.  It also 
provided mentorship and fiduciary role to the households, educating, protecting 
and recapitalising the growth of dog odi/dog keno.   Dye-kal was primarily for 
production, mobilisation, socialisation, and provision of security to both the family 
and the community in a gender disaggregated manner.  It was self-accounting, 
with obligations to enforce compliance in patrilineal values and norms (Girling, 
1960:21-30).  Most of these tasks demanded individual governing efforts, but also 
shared, or collective governing interactions220.  
Some Important Features of “Dye-Kal” 
The elementary family, the dog ot according to Girling (1960: 21-44), 
was vulnerable, dispensable and easily decimated with the death of the husband.  
Wife inherence, therefore, was obligatory, to ensure continuity of the lineage and 
to retain the use of a housewife as wealth in the dye-kal.  Dye-kal was also a 
“legal” corporate holding, with settlement patterns embroiling strong cognitive ties 
around kac of the immediate ancestor.  As a common property of an eponymous 
ancestor, it was supposedly self-contained:  having its own economic, human and 
                                                          
219 A number of revealing and very detailed discussions on how dye-kal presented a 
very dynamic ground for cultural mixing in three areas: Pabbo camp in 2004, Gulu 
town and Kitgum town in 2006.  In all cases, it was certain that mothers had great 
influence on operational procedures and the contents of governance in Acholi’s 
culture. Dako oloyo nye ni, normally used by older men, lamenting how their sons 
“traditional” orientations have been distorted following their lives with their 
wives.  
220 Focus group discussions held with the various dye-kal in Acholi from 2004 to 2014 
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social basis that it could stake for partnership rather than be subjected to the 
powers of other homologous political units, including the gang.  Particularly, 
larger dye-kal like those of rwodi, were capable of influencing the contents of the 
gang’s democratic process.   
As such it was capable of evolving into a gang agnate, meaning, as a 
corporate entity, it was not obliged to comply with the other centres and in 
particularly, the gang.  There is history of splinters of gangi all over the Acholi 
territory, as a demonstration of autopoiesis tendency.  However, they retain the 
name of the gang221.  This is the essence of facultative mutualism where, 
together with his mother’s sons, won paco could form a new gang unit and 
institute the abila of the original gang to which they pay allegiance as an 
outgrowth of the founding gang compound222.  This raises two significant political 
issues.  One is the role of dye-kal in modernisation and two, the distribution of 
powers and the practices of governance including obligations by gang to these 
units – something I have discussed in Chapter Seven.  
The Construction of Gang as a Governing Polity
 
Several of the related and putative paci lineages, each under their own 
kac and ranging from one to twelve, who shared a common patriarchal abila 
formed dog gang (Ref. to Figure 4.1).  Gang was, therefore, first and foremost 
structural.  It was also patrilocal and exogamous, that is, a politico-territorial 
aspect that acknowledged traditional authority (Girling, 1960:62).  The oldest son 
of the majority, ladit who was won gang, was the agent-in-trust of gang as a polity 
and was also the head of one of the dye-kal that formed it.  Bere (1947) and 
others wrongly referred to gangi as sub-clans.  Sub-clans are lineages, which in 
this case are dye-kal or paci.  Put differently, gangi were special political 
institutions that mediated interactions of the lineages that formed it223.  Its political 
authority and legitimacy were demonstrated by what outsiders could observe. 
                                                          
221 My own clan, Pakiri is found in six different locations in Acholiland. In all these 
circumstances, they are recognised as Pakiri.  This is similar to other cases, which 
Bishop Ochola discussed with me. 
222 Interviews with Rtd. Bishop Ochola, 2004 
223 Rtrd. Bishop Ochola built on my earlier discussions with several other elders by 
illustrating these relationship based on his own clan, the Pabit 
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Gangi were also social institutions: networks of internal power relations – 
that embraced kinship, both primordial and putative, what the Acholi refers to as 
wadi obeno/remo224.   Gangi, therefore enabled, and constrained, the actions and 
the common intentions of the different dye-kal as governing structures.  This 
included things like relationships – who to marry and not, who to associate with 
and not.  As organisations, they uniquely defined their roles horizontally through 
bonds with the dye-kal as part of the fiduciary duty but also bridging ties with 
other gangi or kaka either through social interactions including marriages, hunting 
and trade – as part of its facultative engagement (Girling, 1960: 165).  However, 
gang, as an institution was incapable of changing or transforming the individual 
structures of the dye-kal as corporate families because these structures were 
political actors and corporate entities with distinct individual interests - with kac as 
their guiding totem.  For instance, Girling (1960), in recognising the institutional 
role of gang, acknowledged the role it played in socialisation and therefore the 
growth of children from the different homesteads.  In doing so, gangi facilitated 
the individual units of governance, by calibrating normative social orders and 
enforcing the habit through practice, mentoring and reward.  In other words, 
gangi were bonafide relational structures (Fleetwood, 2007:25-30).   
Nevertheless, because the governing structures were subjects of human 
actions and were, therefore, distinct in terms of interests, they were politically 
independent and were capable of making political choices.  For instance, it was 
very noticeable that adoption of agricultural technologies including enterprises, 
were mediated independently by the different homesteads225.  Similarly, it was 
also true that choices for education or religion affiliation were at the discretion of 
the individual units. These were some of the irreducible aspects of the network. 
Gangi were therefore drawn, reproduced and transformed upon by 
individuals within the different dye-kal as well as the dye-kal as political actors.  
However, as social structures, gangi could sometimes  - although often would not 
                                                          
224 Obeno is an Acholi word for a cloth used for carrying babies on their mother’s 
back.  Thus, a relative of obeno symbolises shared motherhood and that is why it 
is remo, which is blood or genealogical.   Wat obeno sometimes is also expressed 
as wat dot iwek, meaning a relative that you have shared milk from common 
breasts.   
225 In a number of focus group discussions, these issues were raised. For example, 
when the Christian Missionary Society established a church in Keyo in 1904, most 
people who were persuaded joined the church.  However, later with the coming 
of the Catholic Church and their latitudes to take away children and keep them 
within the missions, villages became divided in making these choices. 
  
 
155 
- transform or change the intentions or actions of the dye-kal as internal 
components.  This aspect became very evident especially during colonialism, 
when security of life became the object of the state and not the agnates.  Simply, 
public goods and, therefore, only public rules could be applied by dog gang in 
enforcing activities at dye-kal levels.  Thus, there were influences in decision-
making observed in the patterns of behaviour of local political actors, and they 
were not necessarily explicit in their public explanations of their actions (see: 
High et al., 2004).  
Governance at the “gang” level226 
Two specific governing tasks or practices can be identified at the gang 
level, namely: rituals and administrative tasks.  In both cases, the elders or their 
equivalents led this content-based practice - to communicate, preserve and 
inform the agnatic social-political values system, and enable fiduciary duties and 
relationships with other agnates and kaka.  The administrative tasks, however, 
were shared with members of the corporate level, involving older siblings, peer 
groups, nominated individuals like the sister of one’s father, wayo, and mother’s 
brothers, nero, who often were the first line administrators on cultural behaviours.  
Children played significant administrative roles in household governance, which 
modernity erroneously categorised as child labour. 
Noticeably, most governing interactions at the agnatic levels were 
gender and age disaggregated.  They included instructive, interference and 
interplay, because won gang was mainly a ceremonial leader, effectively 
supporting conflict mediation and resolution and responsible for traditional rituals 
at that level.  Gang, as a social-political level, represented two important traditional 
political authorities: one was familial authority at the dye-kal level and the second 
was kinship authority at the gang level.  It was also a convergence of sets of 
cognitive and patriarchal contents flowing from the lineages that made them. 
Politically, its major task was to ensure consistency in the social purpose and in the 
social content of what defined the interests of its principals, which were the 
ancestors.  As such, dog gang was a governing nexus where familial and kinship 
ideologies and practices converge with the politics of consociation at the rwot-ship 
level.   
                                                          
226 Most information regarding gang as an institution and organization was collected 
as primary data from elders, to validate what has been documented elsewhere. 
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Gang’s normative contents were expressed by kinship practices of 
socialisation and fiduciary obligations, as was evident in collective actions, 
including joint cultivation and hunting (Allen, 1998). Most interactions were 
collaborative, mainly among the brothers’ corporate families, but also hierarchal 
between the different age groups and sometimes gender.  There were often 
contradictions and governing praxis that demanded careful balancing and 
handling of the group.  The normative and purposive contents of gang as an 
identity often imposed obligations on its members.  Won gang, used 
combinations of familial authority, or social power and motivations, to garner 
followings and compliance.  Since dye-kal were corporate and “independent” 
communal holdings, some level of consent was desirable for soliciting their 
political participation227.   
When Crazzolara (1951:69-72) remarked that the history of Acholi clans 
was the history of quarrels, he simply illustrated the central role of consent as a pre-
condition for legitimacy.  An authoritarian won gang, which was also common, 
resulted in breakaways of the corporate families from the territorial settings of the 
gangi (Girling, 1960:63).  Those that left often retained the original gang’s name 
while in another domain or kaka (Girling, 1960:63).   Migrations, as we show earlier, 
were also triggered by a search for safety, fertile land and other binding reasons228.  
Gang, however, provided the forum for the articulation of kinship relations, authority 
and characteristics.  It was common to associate specific characteristics with gang.  
These included dancing, hunting or even beauty.  To this end, Girling (1960:67) 
acknowledged that while children were born at the dye-kal level, they were socialised 
and grew up in the villages. 
Governing activities were often shared between these levels, thereby 
requiring leaders who are interactive to be capable of handling each other with 
                                                          
227 Interviews with Charles Alai, Kwarmogi Anywar, Abondio Odiya of kaka Palaro, 
kaka Lamogi and kaka Patoko 
228 There are agnates with similar names spread across Acholi, which is an additional 
clue that there was interaction among the people who now occupy Acholialnd, 
namely west Acholi (Gulu) or in east Acholi (Kitgum). For example, there is Bobi in 
Gulu and Bobi in Padibe in Kitgum.  There is also Koc in Gulu and Koc in Labongo 
in Kitgum, Payira in Gulu and Payira in Kitgum, Lamogi in Gulu and Lamogi in 
Agoro, Lokung, and Madi Opei in Kigum. There is also Pachwa in Gulu and Pachwa 
in Mucwini in Kitgum, Parabongo in Gulu and Parabongo in Kitgum, Alero in Gulu 
and Alero in Madi Opei in Kitgum, Pabo in Gulu and Pabo in Madi Opei in Kitgum, 
Atiak in Gulu and Atiak in Madi Opei in Kitgum, Patiko in Gulu and Patiko in Madi 
Opei in Kitgum. 
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respect, balancing issues and forcing consent to rule decisions.  At all levels, 
senior elders were entrusted with such tasks (see: Burke and Egalu, 2011).  Most 
governing results envisioned at these governing levels were enhanced 
collaborative outcomes in security of life and social preservations and ensuring 
social justice.  In other words, the importance of an agnate was measured by 
their ability to provide food and protection to members as well as ensuring social 
justice to all229.  As such, governing activities attempted to promote the growth of 
political social capitals, higher networking and entrustments.  
Kaka – Social-Political Organisation 
Acholi’s expression for each of the governing levels is kaka230, which 
implies the qualitative description of the contents and context of cognitive 
relationships envisioned.  For instance, a man uses the term kaka to describe all 
forms of relationships combining his corporate, communal and political levels of 
governance (Allen (1998:56)231.  The man’s maternal gang, that is, his paneyo, is 
literally not his kaka, looked at from the patrilineal point of view.  Kaka in this 
study first refers to a consociation of gangi agnates, but also to the ideas that 
modelled the association.  A woman’s kaka, on the other hand, includes wadi that 
were from her husband’s (Allen, 1998:56).  This situated a woman’s support 
system over an extended domain.   Girling (1960:9) referred to kaka as domains 
while Atkinson (2010:69-70) and others (e.g., Allen, 1998: 54-60) referred to them 
as chiefdoms.  In this study, kaka is seen as the macro-level of community 
                                                          
229  Typically, the “mwoc” or flirtatious boasting by both male and female from a 
given agnate often expresses these form of achievements. Example of such 
flirtation boasting I came around was from Panyagira clan in Patiko – “Kabedo 
abeda yee, kamato cak lokulu mangic”.  This implies that when you are married 
to a man from Panyagira, you do not labour like in other clan digging.  Instead, 
you relax, enjoying cold yourghut because these were cattle keepers.  
230 “Kaka” in Swahili means brotherhood.  Key respondents indicated that kaka was 
used to describe the fiduciary duties of the different agnates that constituted the 
consociation.  Hence, brotherhood was the slogan.  Most, when informed of the 
Swahili version, felt that it is probable that the Arab slave traders might have 
introduced this word to the region. 
231 Tim Allen (1998) for instance sees kaka as restricted to genealogical lineages, 
which is not correct because evidence from some cases shows that kaka is more 
than relatives.  Similarly, kaka Acholi as a community is a collective, believing in 
common outcomes.  It represents all levels of relationship as further discussed in 
Chapter Five. 
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governance, before the Acholi identity was created.  It is used mainly instead of 
chiefdoms as explained later. 
Kaka like gang, were structural and territorial.  They were patrilineal at 
their core and also patrilocal (Girling, 1960: 8).  Kaka, however, were not 
necessarily exogamous as claimed by Atkinson (2010: 106-134).   Atkinson also 
avers that chiefdoms were “distinguished by recognised social, political and 
economic functions and were marked by the only explicitly delimited boundaries” 
(Girling, 1960: 262).   In other words, contrary to what Thomson (2010) 
insinuated, rwodi and ludito kaka did not broadcast power because their 
governing territories were well defined.  Each kaka was clearly distinguished from 
each other by some governing attributes that included size of population, internal 
cohesion and the form of fiduciary duties each agnates had with the others.   
Political structures of kaka 
In order to understand how social order was maintained and established 
territorially, this analysis looks at kaka’s political structures as comprising functions, 
relationships, responsibilities, authorities, and communications (see: Sexton, 
1970:23; Radcliffe-Brown, 1961:xiv).   Kaka varied in structures.  Some were larger, 
with average numbers of agnates of twenty-four to thirty-four.  Other, however, were 
small, comprising less than five agnates in total (Atkinson, 2010:339-342).   Thus, 
inter-kaka interactions that existed varied with internal powers, however, most aimed 
at resolving the contradictions in governance arising from both internal and external 
logics (Girling, 1960:120).   
Structurally, there were three polities, namely: gang kal – which was the 
homestead or lineages of the rwot moo, gang pa luker – which was the 
homestead or lineages of rwot’s kinsmen, and lastly, gang pa lwak – which was 
the non-core agnates, combined under different kinds of incentives, to form a 
political organisation, kaka (see: Figure 4.5).    
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Figure 4.5: Lineages as Components of Kaka Governance System 
 
Source: Field Data, 2014 
 
The rwot and luker homesteads constituted the core-agnates.  Except for the 
lubong lineages as a class, the three political constituencies that formed kaka 
had, supposedly, equal interests and significance in the territory (Girling, 
1960:51-52).  Each of these political blocks was governed under the jury and 
familial authorities of their individual lineage head.  It was the nature of 
interactions among the three constituencies that defined the political authority of 
the rwot (Girling, 1960:84). Where the luker as agnates were large, the facultative 
relationship they held with smaller non-core agnates, as seen in the case of 
Payiira, was varied with the rwot at the helm of the agreement. 
The luker agnates recognised the authority of their headman and agnatic 
kin, the rwodi moo.  The lwak agnates, on the other hand, accepted rwot’s rule 
only when it was in their interest to do so.  Rwodi, or the majority of them, 
struggled to restore order, rather than direct enforcement of laws, a contentious 
action that was best done at the agnatic levels (Girling, 1960: 104). In the 
circumstance, hierarchy and markets were luxuries that could not be afforded.  
Hence, effective ways of community governance was by the sharing of governing 
tasks, based on what can best be described as the competitive and comparative 
advantages of the governing actors.  
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However, the quality of the interaction, as Allen (1998) observed, was 
judged by a number of factors.  First is the internal political dynamics within the 
luker agnates.  In cases where the core-agnates were dominant, the non-core 
agnates provided some important balancing bodies in checking the ambitions of 
rwot’s brothers’ lineages within the territory (Girling, 1960: 121)232.   Atkinson 
(2010: 84-87, 90-103), however, contends that there were limited cases of 
internal rivalry in Acholi leadership struggles233.  It was jury and familial 
authorities, which determined the extent of ker as a political regime that defined 
the political realm of the nucleus agency.   
The ludito kaka constituted the governing council of the consociation, 
chaired by rwot, who co-managed the new outfit based on consents.  The non-
agnates would continue to choose their own leaders without interference of the 
core-agnates (Dwyer, 1972:30).   It was this council that interpreted to rwot and 
other headmen the lineage rituals and carried out dispute resolutions and conflict 
mediation in the kaka.   Daker was an important actor in the governing decision at 
this level.  She was the only person that could flag off warriors in pursuit of social 
justice, once the council had endorsed the action234.  This general and 
heterarchical relationship meant that specificity in governance existed among the 
political blocks that formed the polities.  As an organisation, the kaka 
establishment followed that of gangi in the politiogenesis (e.g., Allen, 1998; 
Atkinson, 2010:66-72).  Scholars assert that environmental pressure - successive 
droughts and the accompanying famine and civil strife – but also economic logic 
mediated the establishment of kaka as a higher governing organ (Atkinson, 
2010:261).  As such, kaka had some common element of governance that 
combined social-political and economic factors.  First, it was organisational in 
                                                          
232 It should be noted that individual households, compound families or villages could 
seek protection from any stronger unit and in return pledge allegiance as a real or 
fictional affinal relationship  
233 Within the kaka Payiira, Alokolum became a splinter group of one of the sons of 
Rwot Camo, who contented that his right to the throne was undermined.  
According to Uma-Owiny (2013) Alokolum – which means “I have changed the 
grass”, developed as a non-core agnate outside a kaka Payiira.   
234 Odongo-Onyango explained to me how such decisions were arrived at.  He stated 
that ludito from all agnates under the rwot-ship would attend the decision 
meeting in the homestead of the rwot (gang kal).  Rwot moo as the chair would 
call on each lineage (gang) by name and a stick would be passed to them.  Upon 
receiving the stick, the head of the agnate would hand it over to their 
spokeperson who would then present and argue their position as a unit.  And the 
rwot would inquire from such units if that were the position they hold as an 
agnate, to which either agreement would be reached or not. 
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which agnates related first and foremost to core-agnate, a relationship that 
defined brotherhood rather than subject-ruler realm.  Secondly, there were the 
contents of such relations that embraced economics, security and politics, 
allowing each agnate to practice its traditions of worship.  Thirdly, there were the 
public goods that were collective and effected by the heads of the different 
agnates on behalf of the rwot.  This included public relations for enhanced 
security with the neighbouring kaka and political entities, food security and peace.   
Some respondents felt that kaka was a “marriage of convenience”. 
Whenever the weaker agnates figured out better and more rewarding options to 
their pressing dilemmas, they were not forced to stay in the consociations.  
Atkinson (1999; 2010:70-72) agrees that memberships to the chiefdom were 
impermanent, as disgruntled agnates had the right to relocate to other territory as 
it so wished.   
Acholi leaders235 had a considerable preference for large groups.  Both 
large households and clans were seen as powerful as they were better equipped 
to overcome their tribulation, such as physical insecurity and famine.  The need 
for strength in order to address their adversaries also became an important 
incentive for swelling up numbers through consent and coerciveness.  To this 
end, zonal leaders emerged, the like of Rwot Camo, Rwot Olya, Rwot Ogwok and 
Rwot Aliker, who through accumulation of political power used their numbers to 
extend their leadership over the smaller kaka within the zones.  Their political 
power were largely portrayed as human resources, allies and ideation, the latter 
resonated into kaka as an ideology that accounted for the changes experienced 
in the culture of Acholi by 1989.  
It seems therefore that the political consociation of the agnates took 
mixed strategies, some violently.  However, based on the nature of the political 
legitimacy that ensued in the majority of cases, there were benchmarks of 
acceptability to the legitimacy of the core as well as some justification of political 
                                                          
235Leaders were generally considered as ludito or lutela as we will see later.  
However, “dito” was a descriptive label for status that was a continuum from 
weak to absolute.  Ludito’s political bases were unstable.   Other than as 
authorities of the patrilineal-based custom, they had a limited information base 
in some other specific areas.  This made the other leadership traits – the material 
and ideation - that were found elsewhere within the society, important.  Hence, 
there were different kinds of rwodi and ludito within Acholi, all recognised for 
their specific attributes as discussed later. 
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power or authority by the core agnates and the corresponding obligations to them 
(Dwyer, 1972:29-31; Girling, 1960:60-94; Atkinson, 2010:85-89)236.  This is 
because, whenever these conditions were no longer pertaining, the non-core 
agnates were known to have shifted allegiance or in many instances, refused to 
oblige to the authority of the core agnates (Girling, 1960:100-103; Atkinson, 
2010:92-94).  In other words, unlike in the case of despotism, where systems had 
outright authority over the others, here the dominant experiences were based on 
a mutually reinforcing demand for coalition (Atkinson, 2010: 84-87).  As such, 
kaka were “coalitions of the willing”.  Its process of fluctuation in the number of 
those willing was irreversible source of (dis) order.  While some, like was the 
case of kaka Payiira resulted in stronger consociations, in some cases, it led to 
disequilibria (Girling, 1960:111-113). 
Atkinson’s (2010:92-94,105-260) views are also that political legitimacy 
of the core-agnates emanated from the practical experience some of these 
traditional societies witnessed in the cause of their existence.  He argued that 
non-agnates had beliefs and faith in the political leadership of the often-larger 
core-agnates.  This emanated from their larger than usual political bases, the 
charisma of their leaders, and normally their long history of successful 
governance.  In such instances, the non-core agnates pledged total loyalty to 
these rwodi moo in return for their protection.  There were also cases of absolute 
assimilations by these luker agnates instead (Girling (1960:114-115)237.    
Kaka Payiira, like other larger ones, also used conquest in some 
instances as a moral justification of political obligation of the non-core agnates 
(Atkinson, 2010, 1999:85.   In the case of Payiira under Rwot Awich, this became 
a strategy in the late nineteenth century, which led to considering it as a de facto 
authority of the Acholi without being legitimate (Baker, 1874:Location 4898).  
Kaka Payiira perceived right to protect smaller kaka created obligations that were 
honoured by those kaka that benefited from it.  However, these actions, argues 
Uma-Owiny (2012, 2013), were met with consent, because Payiira is known for 
having not annexed these entities.  Rather, it set to establish systems following 
the exit of the Nubian troops, who had destabilised the area.  This, arguably, 
                                                          
236 This analysis was part of our dialogue with a number of elders but this same idea 
has also been expressed by Dwyer, 1972 and Girling, 1962 and Atkinson, 2010 
237 Often within the luker lineages, there are lineages that represent these groups 
who are generally grouped as lubong.  As Girling (1960:114-115) observed, they - 
like the rest of the luker agnates - can assume leadership of the agnates 
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suggests that kaka as a governing realm was championed more on the path of 
brotherhoods - heterarchy as a means to avoiding internal conflicts over 
governance.  
Implicit and explicit in the argument by Atkinson that underscores 
market-based consociation are the concerns about quality, form and type of the 
negotiation as well as the outcomes that emerged out of such a competitive and 
incentive-based approach to partnership (Atkinson, 2010: 86-89).  This is 
important, not only because it contradicts the hierarchical model discussed in the 
conceptual frame; but also because as an alternative form of civilisation, it proves 
that civilisation existed and grew out of diversity, pluralism and multiplicity, which 
supposedly was the core value of evolution (see: Kurtz, 2004; Claesen, 2014).  In 
this situation, non-core agnates retained most of their social identities and co-
governed the new political establishment with the core-agnates.  The 
politiogenesis took a long while, starting sometime in the fifteenth century 
(Atkinson, 2010: 89).   
Very few kaka, it seems, had a monopoly to dominate ethnic-based 
lineages for the reasons provided above.  This had its pros and cons.  For 
instance, Crazzolara (1954:459-474) writes that nine gangi representing three 
distinct language groups formed kaka Lamogi in western Acholiland in the 
nineteenth century (Crazzolara (1954:59-474)238.  These language groups are the 
Central-Sudanic, the Eastern Nilotic and the Central Nilotic (Crazzolara, 
1954:459-461)239.  This collectivity featured autopetic interest of the language 
groups.  The passion for ethnic independence made kaka Lamogi a fierce group, 
with combined war technologies and bodies of warriors representing these 
diverse groups240.   This pattern of consociation implies that kaka Lamogi, unlike 
                                                          
238 Lamogi as a clan group or kaka was the largest clan group in Acholiland.  Lamogi 
was found in several places in East Africa including Kenya, where they were called 
Ramogi.  This analysis refers to the Lamogi groups found in the western part of 
Acholiland.  It should be noted that following the amalgamation that started in 
1902, Lamogi found in western Acholi became a sub-county with eleven rather 
than nine agnates within it.  Smaller kaka of Pagak, Parabongo and Toro were 
incorporated, to make eleven entities. 
239 The nine agnates are: P’ojwani, Pamuca, P’okure, Boro, Pailyec, Koch Adacha, 
Pangur, Palema, Pagoro.  
240 This revelation was made in a meeting by an elder, who indicated that the mainly 
Madi and Moro groups used bows and arrows in addition to being smart 
blacksmiths.  The other lots from Eastern Nilos were very mobile and fast spear 
throwers.  
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Patiko or Pajule, was more decentralised at the ethnic level and therefore 
dispersed.  This feature of “diffused power” gave even the British some hardship 
in controlling them (Adimola, 1954). Kaka formation and development, particularly 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, had evolved into a number of models 
in response to the environmental and political context that had defined the eight 
political zones described by Atkinson (Atkinson, 2010:105-134).    
Territory and Geography 
Territory is lobo in Acholi. It is about belonging to lobo Acholi, or the 
territory of the Acholi.  On the other hand, ngom refers to soil.  Ngom, therefore, 
was more about settlements, the security and the use of lobo by the Acholi 
settlers.  As such, ngom defined the tenure regime, whereas lobo, or territory, on 
the other hand, explained the geographical space and aspects of Acholi’s 
settlement, which were a mix of neighbourhood, lineage and kinship-based 
(Girling, 1960:82).  
Girling (1960:84) contends that the social units – dog odi, dye-kal, gang 
and kaka241 - that made up the traditional Acholi political order were structurally 
homologous, meaning they had similar internal governance arrangements and 
were also distinct and separated from other units by some definite physical 
features.  This feature as we will see later, became the confusing factor in 
labelling of the various governing entities.  Earlier ethnographers and 
historians were forced to categorise some levels of governing entities as 
dog gangi, or kaka, without giving attentions to the core features of these 
levels (Atkinson, 2010:105-134). 
Rights to territory and land as property 
In understanding rights and shared responsibilities between the different 
and homologous governing entities, I present below my understanding of how 
these entities claimed interactions in the governance of land.  Rwot as father of 
kaka was won lobo, traditionally entrusted by the consociation with the obligation 
to determine occupation rights in the territory (Girling, 1960: 84).  This, however, 
                                                          
241 Dye-kal as a political unit was discussed in Section 4.3.1 and made up of dog keno, 
dog odi and presented as a corporate and self-governed polity under one 
administrative kac. 
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was obligated mainly in regard to the political security – an important function of 
governance that was also collective.  Nevertheless, most of the core agnates, 
particularly those with Luo background, settled as secondary inhabitants in the 
present Acholiland (Crazzolara, 1954: 55; Girling, 1960: 82). 
In such circumstances, Rwot and his clan members, were secondary 
settlers.  Together with their lubong agnates, the luker in such circumstance 
would settle but seemingly with strong influence over the indigenous group. 
However, the allodial ownership was with the indigenous social groups, the lwak 
agnates.  Girling (1960:82) referred to the leaders of such lwak groups as wegi 
ngom or the fathers or owners of the soil.   
In other words, ngom and lobo were two distinct aspects of the Acholi’s 
belonging.  They were firmly linked to community governance with both 
individualised and collectivised autochthony.  Ngom descriptively, was more 
about practices and uses of the soil.  As such, it delineated a tenure regime – a 
social relation that proclaimed “original” link between the individuals, territory and 
the agnates – which were seen as self-evident, primordial and/or natural.  Lobo 
on the other hand was the territory (Girling, 1960:82).  In most kaka, wegi ngom 
were the people and the trustees were rwodi / ludito gang, who were individual 
elders of the different clan systems that formed the territory.   
Ownership and political obligations 
The basic tenet of Acholi’s indigenous law was that all land (both in form 
of lobo and ngom) in Acholi had an owner (Girling, 1960: 231; Bere, 1947: 49, 
53).  This ownership, however, was tied to the different categories of claims and 
interests (e.g., security, hunting, food) and multiple holders (e.g., kaka, gang, dog 
ot).  In fulfilment of the latter aspect, elders – ludito kaka and wegi paco - held the 
land in trust on behalf of their members for the generations to come – man ngom 
pa likwayo 242.   
Rights and not ownership was derived from customs, norms and 
principles that were grounded in the political institutions of governance.  The 
individuals and / or collective status of members were constantly under 
                                                          
242 The view was that those who owned the land were the dead ancestors. “Ngom pa 
likwayo” literally means the land of the generations not actually born.  Hence, 
ownership was by the dead and the unborn while the living were users and 
entrusted by the dead to hold land on behalf of the unborn.  
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negotiation most importantly, at the operational levels - the dye-kal and dog gangi 
(Blocher, 2006).  This was especially true for the women who would exit and/or 
join the society.  For instance, pit – translated as feeding / raising and therefore 
construction of the society - was an obligation of the parents. It was generally a 
concern for livelihood security: education, health, and participation among others.  
It was one aspect of governance that was shared as a right.  All dependants see 
livelihood security as an entitlement that the community had to provide (Girling, 
1960: 231; Atkinson, 2010: 92-95).  Pit as a governing action, entailed 
mobilisation of individuals and households for participation. 
Won ngom, as won or father of the soil, together with Rwot, the political 
leader of the territory, were two important political actors in pito lwak.  As 
principals in the hierarchy of governance and with different rights and interests, 
they supported food security within the society by promoting group work - 
aleya/awak - as collective cultivation mechanism for pito lwak. Through continued 
negotiations, new rights of land use were acquired, including rights for new use 
types (cultivation, grazing, construction and giving) and for putative members to 
join.  
The right to lobo Acholi as a territory was possibly invested in Rwodi as 
wegi lobo together with wegi gang/paco at the agnate level.  To this end, they 
would vet all settlements of new comers into the domain.  Arguably, settlements 
were permissible when it would augur well with peace and security, which was in 
the interest of rwodi but also the individual agnates.  Although new entrants often 
came through members of the domain, rwodi had to consent to their 
settlement243.  Other practical and additional interests were governing issues and 
dealt with by the actors at the appropriate and practical governing levels.   
Land use rights and the obligations associated with them were, it seems, 
vested at the dye-kal and gang levels of governance more profoundly than at the 
higher level.  While use rights were given based on descent, birth and putative 
relationships, allodial tenure rights, seemingly invested in the clan leaders, seem 
to have been superior to any other tenure rights.  For instance, a protestant 
church site was selected at Keyo in 1904.  Although Pamuca, Palyec and Pakiri 
                                                          
243 However, I was informed that especially among jo Pabbo and Lamogi – because 
Boya and Mogi were brothers - clans from these two domains settled within these 
areas as they so wished. Often under such circumstances, the lower governing 
entities play a significant role in screening who can and who cannot. 
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agnates were the settlers in the area, it was the Palema people – the earliest 
settler and with allodial rights that had to consent to the granting of land use to 
the church. 
Revisiting Writings About Acholi’s Organisations 
The first written description of the social-political order of the Acholi was 
in the 1860s.  By this time, the imagined history of living in Africa and its realities 
were traumatic, conflated by economic interests, ignorance and arrogance from 
the western world.  The narratives of most events and their interpretations were 
conflated by what Finnström (2008) describes as a combination of European 
hypocrisy and bare ignorance (see: Thomson, 2010: Location 457-478).  In 
manipulating the realities of governance in the case of Acholi, the writers created 
a gloomy outlook of the arrangements, linking violence to an absence of internal 
authority.  Here I look at three major areas of distortions in the discussion of 
social-political governing structures of the Acholi macon.   
There have been difficulties in singling out the homologous governing 
entities by foreign scholars into the different contemporary anthropological and 
sociological terminologies, something that Girling admitted from the onset 
(Girling, 1960:8).  Additionally, others had viewed kaka as stateless, suggesting 
that kaka lacked the differentiated functions we see in the so-called modern 
states (Richards, 1960: Chapter 7 and 10; Mamdani, 1996:Chapter 3).  However, 
those who rightly disputed this claim sought to construct hierarchical relationships 
where they apparently were not logically possible (Atkinson, 2010: 138-139 and 
Girling, 1960: 166 figure 29).  This conflict between the reality in kaka’s 
organisational arrangements and the old age faith in despotism became the 
defining governing image of the Acholi society.  It sought to remake elders who 
were status leaders into symbols of hierarchical political authorities and yet they 
were the symbols of traditional praxis with respected moral values for that reality.  
Their authority was applied in a hierarchical manner but only in as far as they 
were “influencing the actions of non-governors” (Kooiman, 2003: 24-25).   
As such, scholars like Atkinson and Girling had to give undue attention 
to only one of the sub-systems - the core agnates – when discussing kaka.  First, 
they represented them as a class hierarchy believed to have the knowledge of 
the entire societal traditions, which was not correct.  Second, they were seen as 
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the archive of information about the other agnates because they were rulers.  
This distortion probably gave undue recognition of fiduciary duty to the core-
agnates that probably did not exist.  This is because elders were situated in every 
level of community arrangements.  Each of them had unique and authoritative 
versions of the culture and customs of those political units.  Thirdly, there were 
gross misconceptions of the Acholi political organisation.  Perhaps one of the 
most noticeable misconceptions has been an over reliance on kinship structures 
in reshuffling community governing realm - dog odi, dye-kal, gang and kaka.  
These structures as observed by Girling (1960), were homologous, with 
noticeable forms of autopoietic attribution as a sense of self-identity.  Certainly, 
there might have been some erroneous naming and re-naming of some of these 
entities, where larger households were considered as agnates. 
In Chapter Two, the main features of chiefdoms as one form of 
community organisation were discussed.  From the narratives, there are some 
incongruities with what pertained to kaka, which in most accounts, I have 
advanced as heterarchical.  As discussed in Chapter Six, while leadership culture 
was not an imposition but mostly grounded on kinship, the kaka was a coalition of 
the willing that embraced variegated forms of autopoietic political systems and 
organisations.  
Confusions in terminologies and meanings 
Atkinson (2010:41-45) submits that the organisations formed by gangi 
agnates were called chiefdoms (see: Girling (1960:8) 244.  He sees chiefdoms as 
hierarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal and exogamous, with rwodi moo – who were 
sacred and hereditary leaders – as the “despotic” headmen of the organisations 
(Atkinson, 2010:2010:81).  He further insinuated that chiefdoms were the 
extensions of the lukal or luker lineages, which were rwodi’s genealogical 
lineages (Goran Hyden (2006:81) 245.  He refers to luker lineages as clans and 
the non-core agnates that were sub-systems of the “chiefdoms” as, therefore, 
sub-clans of these luker agnates.  In a sense, he contends that sub-clans or the 
                                                          
244 Girling (1960) realising the complexity of the organisation actually preferred to call 
these domains rather than chiefdoms 
245 Goran Hyden (2006) actually provides similar argument that, historically, state 
was often a mere extension of the households of a king.  He further notes that 
welfare state, on the other hand, was an intricate creation in which citizens 
delegated their lives to bureaucrats. 
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non-core agnates were related to the core agnates and therefore, exogamous by 
principle of kaka governance.  
I have relied on Achol wordings that explain these homologous 
structures, the practices – which are interdisciplinary in context246 - and their 
technical and descriptive meanings and interpretations, to dispute some of these 
assertions for mainly two reasons.  Firstly, I have seen first-hand the damage 
done by categorising kaka as chiefdoms because it underplays the very principle 
of the consociations, which were brotherhoods rather than rulers-subjects.  
Importantly, classifying kaka as chiefdoms denies academia the opportunity to 
get the flavour of characters and personalities one sees distinctively with the 
Acholi as a people compared with those from chiefdoms like the Baganda or the 
Banyoro.  Additionally, the evolution of kaka as a consensual institution of 
governance should enable scholars like Allen to reposition their views on mato 
oput, which is a renowned conflict resolution mechanism.  Allen (2006) submitted 
that mato oput was an invention of the modern time, while in practice, it 
epitomises the strong history that links peace making and beliefs in a unity of 
purpose, which is the kaka governing principle (see: Finnström, 2008:229-230; 
Dolan, 2011:51, 2005)247.   The processes that Atkinson (2010:85-86, 148-152) 
has elaborated in the formation of kaka-dom, the ways the union was managed 
are quite suggestive of how negotiations and peace building were part and parcel 
of community governance in Acholiland. 
Gangi were dominantly the political feature that littered the present 
Acholiland by 1898.  These were human settlements that represented clan 
systems.  As discussed earlier, gangi had two or more lineages although the 
sizes of these settlements varied and the common denominator of gang was a 
common shrine or abila of the eponymous ancestors, to which every associated 
household’s kac was affiliated (Atkinson, 2010:76).   
                                                          
246 Here governance is seen in the context of legal, social and economic 
anthropologies as well as history, comparative politics and others. 
247 Tim Allen (2006) wrongly insinuated that mato oput was an invention rather than 
an age old practices of the Acholi people.  Dannis Pain (1998) and others 
Finnstrom, 2008, and Dolan, 2011:51, 2005 – have written indepth analyses of 
the practice for better consultation. 
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Kinships in Acholi are wadi obeno or wadi remo248.  These were 
genealogically and putatively connected and were exogamous.  In Acholi, one 
would not marry within their gangi agnates nor from the gangi where their 
mothers came from, that is paneyo.  However, there are many incidences of 
marriages within chiefdoms because the different agnates that formed it were not 
necessarily related.  That is why kaka was not so much about primordial 
attachments but, more importantly, about ideation (Allen, 1998).  Clans also 
varied by flirtatious names or nying mwoc, which are bragging expressions that 
described historical and political developments and connections of such a 
group249.  In kaka Lamogi, there were nine types of boasting slurs that resonated 
with the nine agnates that formed it.  Crazzolara concludes that kaka, which 
Atkinson termed chiefdoms, were actually akin to “tribes” and, hence, “clan 
groups” (Crazzolara, 1954:326, 546).  His view that tribes were “clan groups” 
supports my assertion that kaka, as a collective, were not limited to the core-
agnates, the luker as submitted by Atkinson (2010:41-45).  
There are several reasons to suggest that chiefdoms were not entirely of 
common descendants and were wadi remo/obeno and exogamous.  Chiefdoms, 
in most instances, had several abila designated to the different gangi that formed 
it.  In the case of kaka Lamogi, there were nine abila corresponding to the 
numbers of agnates that formed it.  This means that chiefdoms were formed by 
groups of different wadi obeno in the Acholi context and therefore were not 
exogamous.  In fact, some people interviewed were married within their 
chiefdoms because they came from different gangi agnates.  Atkinson’s 
(2010:66-72) position regarding chiefdoms, particularly with regard to his claim 
that chiefdoms were made up of wadi obeno and therefore exogamous, and that 
clans are the core-agnates, are highly disputable based on the clarifications 
                                                          
248 Kinship here is defined as a relationship that existed between legally recognised 
social groups that shared a genealogical origin; through biological, cultural, or 
historical descent with the principle intention of creating social obligations that 
are enforced through codes of ethics. This I also called agnates. 
249 Flirtation or mwoc were elaborate expressions of one’s identity.  In Uganda it is 
referred to as swag.  While it expresses ones belonging to the various clan 
relationships, it specifically identifies one with special traits in life.  These range 
from courage to wealth.   
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provided by Crazzolara (1954:325-326), my respondents and my own first-hand 
knowledge250. 
However, the existence of exogamous relationships did not simply imply 
blood relations.  In the case of Acholi, putative clans who for social reasons 
accepted to share intimacy with another may refuse marriage between them, to 
forge brotherhood or wadi obeno251.  In this sense, Atkinson would be right that 
clans that are affiliated as putative clans to the core-agnates became part of the 
core agnates as putative clans.  However, there is no case known thus far where 
a kaka is formed of such groupings.  From these observations, two things are 
certain.  One, that there has been confusion over what clans as an identity 
represented.  At most, clans as kinship relationships recognised an abila and as 
long as that existed, they would be clans rather than sub-clans of the core 
agnates.  Dye-kal or paco were sub-clans.  This is because kac as their shrines 
were subsets of abila, which united all paci under a given gang polity.  From 
Crazzolara’s (1954) point of view chiefdoms were clan groups, not clans 
supplemented by sub-clans, as I seem to understand from Atkinson’s works.   
Furthermore, in terms of organisation, gangi were not necessarily lineage-based 
as scholars have maintained over the years.  Rather, gangi were settlements with 
core and non-core lineages – even though in the case of gangi, non-core 
lineages were limited (see also Girling, 1960:21-44)252. 
Atkinson (2010), and other experts on Acholi matters used the term 
lineage-based authority when discussing village-based governing authorities 
(Allen, 1998; Bere, 1947).  For the reasons that I have elucidated, I have followed 
Spiegel’s logic, which Atkinson (2010:77) said was personally communicated to 
him, that “lineage” has a restricted formal meaning and tribal mixing is 
predominant and overshadows the genealogical establishments (Southall, 2004).  
Since almost all villages were multi-lineal, especially following the flux in the area, 
it would be convenient to use a term that is more encompassing, which I argue is 
                                                          
250 My father, a Pakiri from Lamogi was married to a woman from Pukure of Lamogi.  
Similarily, my father’s sister from Pakiri was married to a man from Pamuca from 
Lamogi. 
251 Based on interviews with Ladit Binoni of Pakiri and building on my own 
understanding of the two groups, the Pailyec and Pakiri agnates in Lamogi for 
instance until recently were exogamous.  In addition to some existing respects by 
each of the two agnates of the lifestyles of one another, the environment 
cultivated deeper and brotherlier intercourse that forced elders living within the 
territory, to impose anti-marriage Act within the two groups.  
252 Interviews with Ladit Binoni of Pakiri clan and Rtd. Bishop Ochola.   
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agnate.  This, too, underpins the importance of an interdisciplinary context as, in 
doing so the analyses underscore a broader context in societal groupings that 
endure systematic categorisation.  
The core agnates, Atkinson (2010) submits, were significant social 
groups, often numerically superior but also economically stronger (Girling, 1960: 
21-41).  However, they were not necessarily superior, or royal, as was the case 
of chiefdoms as discussed in Chapter Three.  The rwodi were sacred, with 
special skills for rainmaking in a drought prone area.  This trait of rainmaking 
made them unique and special leaders of the entire kaka.  These were 
cherishable traits of a leader under the circumstance: special attributes but not 
necessarily majestic as some scholars have attempted to portray.   
These clarifications, particularly regarding the political structures, have 
important implications on the actual number of chiefdoms and clans that scholars 
claimed existed in Acholi prior to or by 1898. The number of chiefdoms or kaka 
that supposedly existed by 1898 varies, based on the different sources.  Atkinson 
claimed some seventy eight, Okot P’Bitek talked of thirty-eight, while recently, 
Ker Kwaro Acholi, the reconstructed forum of Rwodi Acholi, argues that there 
were forty eight kaka by the turn of 1900 (see: p’Bitek, 1977 cite from Finnström, 
2008:54 and Atkinson, 2010:75-78).  
In closing, the reconstruction of the Acholi identity based on lineages 
after three episodes of prolonged civil strife requires some deeper consideration 
if, that is, lineages are primordial attachments.  Displacements, the interpolation 
and mixing of social groups, and both involuntary and voluntary migration, 
particularly in the mid to late nineteenth and part of the twentieth and now the 
twenty-first centuries, are good reasons for this assertion.  Unlike the recent past, 
there were no organised settlements – either in transit camps or internally 
displaced camps of displaced persons.  The 1902 to 1913 forceful dislocations 
were political and internal to Acholi and there was no support from the UNHCR or 
any GHROs in the identification and registration of displaced people253.  This is 
because they were not active in such matters then as they are today.  Even 
during the earlier displacement of 1862 to 1875, there is no information regarding 
                                                          
253 Non of the respondents I met with including the numerous visits I made to the 
people of kaka Payiira and Alero did I get any feeling that there were Red Cross or 
UNHCR engaged in supporting this project in the early to mid 1900 
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the returnees of the Acholi origin, who dispersed into Bunyoro, and their 
resettlements in Acholiland. 
Concluding Remarks  
This Chapter integrates interdisciplinary insights that draw heavily from 
the plethora of historical narratives on Acholi political history since 1898.  The 
Chapter uses historical facts to integrate political, social and legal anthropology to 
argue that traditional Acholi was complex and diverse.  It avers that kaka evolved 
as durable institutions through constant compromises and negotiations, 
constructive peace building and governing interactions among diverse gangi 
agnates.  The political context, experiences of disunity and the benefits of the 
economy of scales made this experience desirable.  
Diffused power, however, worked against centralisation and also 
weakened the macro-level decisions on some very vital issues, including security.  
It did, however, strengthen cognitive ties where jury and ritual authorities crowded 
out the political authority of the rwodi.  Most attractive incentives for 
consociations, it seems, rested on the combinations of descriptive and normative 
legitimacy – the charismas of the rwodi, the faith members of the agnatic 
societies had on the rwodi as their natural leaders - but all these depended on 
consent, courage and freedom for the agnates to continue to pay allegiance to 
their eponymous ancestors at the kac and the abila levels respectively.   
Where political legitimacy worked, as in the case of Payiira and Pajule, it 
was driven by regime type and by the capability of the regime to deliver on the 
conditions that forced others to join with them.  As such, kaka at the macro-level 
of governance should not be considered as chiefdoms.  They provided an 
innovative model that valued intellect and dialogue and abhorred repressive 
regimes.  In other words, kaka was a mode of community governance and a 
political ideology.  Its essence was the exploitation of social-political structures - 
the competitive and comparative advantages of the participating gangi.  The 
relationship was a form of facultative mutualism.  However, it was not necessarily 
symmetrical by nature.  Due to the fragile nature of the environment, entrustment 
rather than trust defined the relationship with economics and hegemonic 
acculturation as motivating factors.  
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Chapter Five – The Infrastructure for Community Governance 
Introductory Remarks 
The institutional infrastructure discussed here refers to the set of 
community governing arrangements that existed in Acholiland from 1898 to 2010. 
In this study, two fundamental distinctions have been used in assessing these 
institutional “realities”, one of which is an “institutional construction”.  Here, I have 
explored the shift in the governing image of the different political arrangements 
based on normative and cognitive values articulated by those who either lived it, 
or were told about them.  Hence, institutional construction reports on the factors 
and changes in the governing practices of the governing arrangements over 
these years.  The second distinction, on the other hand, is concerned with the 
functional mechanisms of these governing systems, namely, the norms, values 
and rules that mediated social-political interactions. In this case, I have explored 
how the Acholi have responded to new practices brought about by the differing 
political events that fall within the period under review. 
In exploring “institutional construction” in this study, respondents were 
guided to critically evaluate the quality of governance that was exhibited by the 
principals on one hand, and the governing arrangements, on the other.  This was 
based on some selected indicators as shown in Table 5.1, below. Quality in this 
case is considered a normative and cognitive value of community governance.  
Quality of governance in the study is the goodness of the rules; the fact that it 
was embedded in the society and therefore responded to their needs.  Even if it 
did not, it was understood by the majority that the principals and the society were 
in agreement that the experiences were inevitable.  Hence, the indicators explain 
how respondents perceived and/or felt the outcome of the interactions exhibited 
by different political systems and actors.  Where those interactions were mutually 
reinforcing, influencing and supportive of their interests, it was rated or reported 
as good – suggesting that a particular institution was well embedded in the 
community.  This is because these institutions were seen, felt or perceived by the 
respondents as having been responsive to the interests of the Acholi community. 
However, it was poor or bad when the contrary was reported as evident.   
I further categorised institutions in this study as traditional, informal 
and/or formal.  Traditional institutions refer to the indigenous kaka governing 
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structures and systems - the organisations, norms and cultures that directed its 
operation – noticeably, the fiduciary and the facultative mutualism cultures of the 
governing realms that categorised its practices (e.g., Alasuutari, 1995). The 
formal institutions, on the other hand, are imposed on the Acholi because they 
aim to transform the society into a political community that is subordinated to the 
state.  As such, they are seen as rational and therefore legal.  They include the 
contemporary organisations - the state and its analogues, the international Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs) and their kind.  These contemporary institutions 
were governed during the colonial era by what I consider were the colonial 
customary laws. These colonial rules, as was explained in the contextual chapter, 
fused some elements of the western democracies – particularly those relating to 
the ideals of political legitimacy - and the despotic traditional African versions 
found in the chiefdoms (Mamdani, 2002:1-5).  The subsequent rules that were 
enacted during the post-colonial era reflect in most instances, these founding 
customary laws but also some improvement towards what in the contemporary 
world is seen to enshrine modern statehood.  However, as a state, Uganda 
remains a neo-patrimonial outfit and as such, it is quite distinctive from a modern 
state (e.g., Onyango-Oloka, 1996).  This is because of the manner in which 
power is centralised and personalised by the governing political principals.  
Informal institutions are behaviours that are neither traditional nor formal.  Rather, 
they are innovations that have emerged to fill the void created by the 
inadequacies of the two primary systems.  
The significance of traditional institutions in this case is that they are 
indigenous male-dominated cultural practices.  Their ultimate goal was to 
maintain a status quo of lineage-based authority–ideally the autopoiesis of the 
dog gangi Acholi (Alasuutari (1995:25) 254. The informal institutions on the other 
hand, were dominantly networks of local and indigenous organisations and actors 
that exist within the Acholi system. Peer groups include the youth networks 
(bulu), private sector practices like the ajwagi –who were the healers and fortune-
tellers.  In the later years, these structures were reconstructed by donor funded 
international NGOs and they advocate for specialised interests of the different 
categories of the Acholi people.  Government and its functionaries, however, form 
                                                          
254Alasuutari (1995:25) for instance sees culture as “a way of life or outlook adopted 
by a community or social class”.  As such, culture is the knowledge, skills, altitudes, 
values, needs and motivations that shaped governance in the Acholi community.  It 
is the frame of shred values that defined kaka governing action, separating one 
from the other, articulating the common purposes and cognitive reasons. 
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the formal actors.  In addition, foreign NGOs and global human rights 
organisations (GHROs) as formally registered organisations are part of the formal 
political actors.  Within government, I have paid special attention to the executive 
and the bureaucrats because, as Fukuyama (2013) stated, they control and 
distribute power in formal systems.  
In the case of functional mechanisms, this chapter explores the 
contradictions and synergies perceived and/or felt by the respondents, arising 
from the different governing instruments – whether sets of principles and policies 
that regulated political relations and interactions of these different actors.  In a 
sense, the governing instruments denote the level of institutional embeddedness 
of these actors and what the respondent felt about them255.   By embeddedness, I 
refer to both perceived and stated extent of responsiveness of the different 
institutions and structures to their clients – both individual members of the 
community and specific polities, including gangi agnates.  
Explaining Change Outcomes 
In Table 5.1 below are the indicators for the governing areas 
(parameters), the institutions (perimeters) and their corresponding measurement 
of performances (governing indicators).  The quality of community governance for 
the year 1898 to 2010 was reported based on these indicators. Normative 
perspectives of the quality of governance were derived from standard viewpoints 
laid out along nationally accepted performance - a continuum of what is generally 
seen as weak or detached to strong or embedded interactions. Cognitive 
perspective, on the other hand, is societal measures of governing quality based 
on weights placed by the community groups along their own cognitive values. As 
explained in Chapter One, the quality of these parameters is a measure or 
reports the levels of group satisfaction with the institutions.  
 
 
                                                          
255In Chapter Two, “Approach to Research” I explained how change outcomes 
indicate change in perspective over a time line.   
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Table 5.1: Quality, Form or State of Governing Elements 
Parameters Perimeters  Governing Outcomes Indicators 
Governing 
Image 
 
Governing 
Instruments 
Political 
Institutions  
The qualities of governing institutions 
Carrying capacity256 of the governing entities 
Formal 
Rules 
Practices embedded in societal bases – safety 
nets 
Flexibility and responsiveness of the rules 
Specificity of rules in supporting governing 
actions 
Informal 
Rules 
Supportive to and complementing formal rules 
Relevance of the rules to emerging social 
problems 
Substitutability of formal rules 
 
Source: Field Data, 2014  
Respondents were asked to substantiate how and why they felt or 
perceived that certain regimes were comparatively better embedded in Acholi 
governance257.  The indicators in Table 5.1 were used to make these pair wise 
comparisons.  The results of the discussions were validated at   different events 
and functions, including funerals258. On the vertical axis, the extent of 
embeddedness, determined through pair wise rankings of the actors by both 
individuals and group opinions are stated as either cognitive or numerical values.   
The higher up the lines in the vertical axis, the more responsive the respondents 
perceive or felt the institutions are. In constructing the final impressions about the 
performance of these institutions, the twenty respondents – the trailblazers - were 
asked to comment on the results from the field.  As recently as March2015 when 
I attended funerals in Pakiri and Palabek Kal villages, I discussed the final 
version of the rating of my work with mourners259. 
                                                          
256I have used “carrying capacity” to describe both the number and skills or the 
availability of and the quality of personnel required by the governing entities, to 
deliver services for its members. 
257Regimes are categorized as colonial and post-colonial.  Post colonial was further 
divided as Obote 1 (1962 to 1971), Idi Amin’s (1971 to 1979), Obote II (1980 to 
1985) and Museveni (1986 to 2010). 
258 The embeddedness of institutions was discussed in all the focus group discussions 
but also at the specific interviews carried with individuals.  However, the findings 
reached have been validated in all follow-up discussions on the research with 
individuals and leaders from Acholi sub-region. 
259On March 3 2015, while undertaking a research on land in Pader, I met with elders 
(10 of which 6 were women), age limits ranging from 56 to 83 years and they 
both validated the conclusion of the analysis.  Earlier, on January 20, 2015 in 
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The underlying view is that supply-led or induced change is subjected to 
power politics (see: Dwyer, 1972; Ostrom, 2005:61)260.  Hence, distributive power 
as power over others obstructs partnerships and participation as other actors 
become subordinated to the power that be.  However, when power is collective - 
embedded within the society, the processes of change and the outcomes tend to 
embrace consensus of opinions.  This is because collective power engages 
representative intentions and is likely to benefit the entire society (Mann, 1986: 6-
7).  Thus, collective power that characterised the kaka model of governance is 
functional and was a shared responsibility.  It, thus, enables the achievements of 
differentiated outcomes for the good of the different actors (Mann, 1986:6-7).  
General Impressions of the Acholi’s Respondents 
Generally speaking, the majority of men and women who contributed to 
this study are fully backed by existing information and they concur that formal 
institutions - especially the state and its analogues, introduced hierarchical mode 
of governance that was much more distinct from the traditional one. First, the 
leader-follower relationships that characterised the interactions between ludito 
kaka and other governing entities, or between ludito and the younger generation 
applied hierarchy as a social status, based on regulations (Kooiman, 2003: 16).  
It, thus, recognised elders as archives of governing culture or regulations of 
demonstrable knowledge of a society.  However, the state on the other hand, 
introduced a legal form of ruler-subject relationship as functional mechanisms for 
community governance.  In this circumstance, the state is the principal source of 
distributive authority regardless of its knowledge base.   
Secondly, in order to enforce this new form of relationship, the Uganda 
state institutionalised violence and co-optive politics as a habit. This habit is being 
enforced by “independent” mechanisms that are external to the society, who were 
viewed as subjects. These respondents argued that the observed developments 
began the process of alienating outspoken political leaders like Rwot Awich 
during colonial era because he as a leader of the kaka Payiira had maintained a 
strong viewpoint that kaka Acholi were partners not subject of the Queen of 
                                                                                                                                                               
funeral rites, I also talked to some 8 people who also had similar views on the 
project. 
260 Dwyer (1972) observed that even when Acholi was not conquered, the superior 
power of the Arabs and the colonialists caused them to wilfully carry certain 
changes. 
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England (Anywar, 1948: 76). The subject-ruler model became a trademark of the 
contemporary community governance in Acholiland and has deepened the belief 
and practice of authoritarianism (see: Rubongoya, 2007:Chapter 1).  Various 
respondents from different age groups recalled the effects of ruler-subject 
interactions.  The older generation recalled what happened in the forced 
displacements that occurred in the 1912 to 1935.  The entire kaka Payiira, Alero, 
Bwobo and part of Lamogi and Koch were forced to leave the areas of the 
present Nwoya and Amuru districts (Uma-Owiny, 2013:20).  Similarly, native 
chiefs during the colonial and the early post-colonial eras used force as 
mechanisms for tax collection in the 1950s through to the 1970s.  Memories, 
particularly of recent political events during the NRM, including the revival of 
social torture by armed rebels, the use of the national army – the UPDF in land 
wrangles, were vividly expressed as manifestation of subject-ruler relationships 
(Refugee Law Project, 2010)261.   
Land grabs or selective knowledge of realities? 
In the case of the current waves of “land grabs”, the general view is that 
state agencies, the Wildlife Authority (UWA) and the Uganda Investment 
Authority (UIA) have continued to selectively apply legal framework to victimise 
the Acholi over their ancestral land262.  I have argued, however, that seen from 
legal pluralism, the claim of unfair treatment of the Acholi by government is 
contestable although it is factual that the state has misused its constitutional 
leverage in land transaction in Acholiland.  This is because the 1998 Uganda 
Land Act, unknown to the Acholi, has redefined the status of customary land 
holding by introducing ownership clause in the land parcels under the law 
(Anying, 2014).  Accordingly, the administration of customary land tenure regime 
- a system that dominates the Acholiland – has significantly changed and the 
state has a big stake in creating disequilibria (see: Rugadiya, 2008; Adoko and 
Levine, 2007: 36).  Particularly, the law provides for ownership of the different 
parcels of land under customary tenure regime - which was absent under the 
traditional system that governed land during Acholi macon.  Unknown to most 
Acholi, this provision links land use patterns to claims of ownership, arguing that 
                                                          
261For some of these discussions, refer to The Refugee Laws Project at 
<www.refugeelawsproject.org> 
262See for instance a recent discussion of the Apaa land grab in which two Ministers 
faced off with people from Amuru in the Monitor Newspaper of May 6, 2015 
<www.monitor.co.ug> 
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all parcels of customary land “unused in Acholiland” are owned by the Uganda 
Land Board (see: Adoko and Levine, 2007:27)263.   
In the old Acholi system, land was held in trust by the living for the 
benefit of the unborn.  As such, it is the ancestors not the living ludito kaka that 
claimed ownership of Acholiland as a territory (see: Anying, 2014)264.  This 
assertion gave current users only limited rights of ngom in lobo Acholi, with the 
Acholi elders – who were found in every household – as guarantors of the culture 
of its use265.  This traditional law of use allowed their occupants, most of them 
descendants of Acholiland, to occupy and use the land.  However, nobody seems 
to have owned any piece, even where they had settled for years266.  This 
situation has been changing and particularly now that the Acholi’s population has 
increased and also lack the cohesiveness that enforced the customs.  This is in 
addition to the fact that the elders that understood the said customs or paid 
attentions to them still existed and are committed to doing so.   
However, under modernity, the new laws have introduced pluralism in 
land ownership and in some instances, conflicting rights over land for individuals, 
families, community and the state, the latter represented by District Land Board 
(Mamdani, 2014).  The Acholi households under the new customary provision 
own the areas they are using effectively.  This technically, embraces areas under 
settlement – which are parcels of land used for constructing huts, cultivation, 
grazing and possibly the forest trees and water points.  Incidentally, open space 
of land or tim, which in the past serviced multiple polities and with multi-purposes 
– like hunting, grazing and collection of household construction materials, has 
                                                          
 263 During the colonial and post-colonial eras, most aspects of the traditional land 
governance were fused with the customary laws of the Local Government that 
governed land.  For instance, rwodi kweri, who was elected by the village system, 
often were ludito kaka with special leadership skills.  As such they fused 
modernity with stable values of the traditions.  One such value was the rights to 
access by members as well as the role of the society in vetting rights.  
264 Interview with Mathew Otto, a legal expert working for Ker Kwaro Acholi and also 
the District Land Officer for Kitgum District.  
265 I was informed in a number of interviews that elders in some of the known clans 
would guarantee that certain aspects of land use were not allowed in some of the 
parcels for custom as dictated by customs.  A case well remembered is where the 
abila are erected; nobody was allowed to cultivate the area. 
266  Discussions with some Acholi elites, who have considerable knowledge of land 
issues.  They include Hon. Okello-Okello, Fr. Joseph Okumu, Latigo-Otto, and 
other members of the Technical Committee of the Joint Acholi Sub-Leaders 
Forum. 
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under the new laws, been designated to the state and therefore, according to the 
law, are controlled by the District Land Boards (see: Anying, 2014). 
The notion of tim in Acholi as res nullus or open space is not attainable 
in its true sense.  This is because res nullus is an internal vocabulary among the 
kin. Only kinsmen and to some extent women considered tim as “open space” 
when the traditional communal use of such parcels were being forced to change 
under different circumstances that were internal to the rights of the users.  
Additionally, speculation advanced by proponents of “open space” that tim were 
not obvious to the various kaka and gangi that now claim rights over them is 
unfounded.  If anything, Acholi prior to 1898 and even as recent as in the 1980s 
had their dominant lifestyles as hunters.  The study by Oxfam-UK in 1998 
confirmed that the majority of men spent more than 75 per cent of their time 
during dry season hunting, implying that hunting as a dominant mode of men’s 
lifestyles – that required open space – is only slowly being restricted for settled 
cultivation and agriculture.  Under the new arrangement following the 1998 Land 
Act, however, customary land in Acholiland has become a source of major 
conflicts and misinterpretations (see: Mamdani, 2014).  Core in this is the 
misunderstanding of what is in the Law that has formally embraced the regime.   
Henceforth, the 1998 Land Act has reconstructed marked differences 
over parcels that constitute the customary tenure regime.  Like in the case of tim, 
increasingly, there are competing differences and interests in the use and users.  
Regrettably, most narratives dominating post-war land in Acholiland hover around 
mainly three key issues, namely: economic development, culture and politics – in 
line with the dominating themes of civil and political rights advanced under 
transitional justice (Shipton, 2007).  Unequivocally, government and development 
partner interpretations of post-war recovery and reconstruction are tied terms of 
wealth creation, human rights and peace.  This has moved land into the markets, 
to transform the households.  Additionally, transformative change has been 
viewed in terms of individual rights.  This has direct implications for prioritisation 
of gender and age group development.   In delivering on this, the politics of 
governance has to be reshuffled.  At least, seen from what is going on the 
ground, the state seems to have asserted its legitimacy in governing customary 
land. At best, the state and its analogues have consistently and undemocratically 
misused the constitution to disadvantage sections of the Acholi community in the 
name of poverty reduction (Atkinson, 2010: 4-7). 
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Additionally, most respondents of Acholi origin also contended that 
pluralism in governing institutions as observed in the introductory section has 
cushioned the adverse impact of the formal institutions, which are perceived to 
have had ill intentions especially in the last thirty years. Admittedly, the 
respondents have noted that both government and the community as a practice 
weigh the options of their decisions based on legal pluralisms.  This, they argue, 
has watered down technically based options in favour of politically correct 
practices in the governance that when applied, promotes peacefulness.  For 
instance, on matters related to land, the view is that ordinary community 
members prefer to use tradition and CSOs in land mediation - not necessarily 
because these options were the best.  Rather, these institutions are politically 
correct under the circumstance.  The elite, on the other hand, have relied on the 
formal court of law.   
First, the traditional and the CSOs lack bureaucracy.  Additionally, both 
systems are considered apolitical and respected even by government 267.  In the 
case of the courts of law, the elites contend that they are modern and therefore 
more relevant for dispute resolution as its decisions are respected by the state.  
Additionally, the same elite, who shares common lifestyles with the custodians of 
the courts of law, often compromises the courts of law. There are instances when 
those ordinary respondents made remarks suggesting that the elite would 
threaten them with physical violence, which they maintained they would pay off 
the courts of law to rule in their favour: agoyi acula acula [I will beat you up and 
pay the court for my innocence] or agoyi apida apida i court! – I will beat you up 
and face the court for the actions. 
Views regarding change outcomes 
In explaining the extent of institutional change, the processes and the 
reasons, two governing perimeters of change are discussed.  In the first case, we 
review how institutional change has structured relationships and enabled the 
emancipation of the entire community of interest, rather than the primordial 
                                                          
267 In 2001, the World Bank undertook a needs assessment in selected communities 
in northern Uganda, including in Acholi.  Part of the interest was to identify the 
main stakeholders that communities feel can work with them.  Based on 
stakeholder assessment, CSOs, traditional leaders and Religious organisations were 
preferred by communities in Acholi (World Bank, 2001).  Katie Missier (2012) also 
found out that within the Local Government, community prefer the LC1 instead of 
the others.  
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dimension.  The central sentiment of the analysis is linked to the moral dimension 
of change, acknowledging that in a fragile situation, governing models need to 
establish just peace, which is a moral situation. Henceforth, I examine the extent 
to which these governing institutions have been successful in promoting, 
protecting and preserving household livelihood security of the Acholi people 
(Figure 5.1) and how they have remained relevant under differentiated governing 
circumstances (Figure 5.2). 
Institutional embeddedness is evaluated along two dimensions as a 
continuum.  In the first case, it ranges authority from a point of disengagement on 
one extreme to normative engagement, at the other extreme (Chazan, 1994: 60-
97).  Disengagement, I have argued, would represent a condition in which the 
entire Acholi society or part of it as indicated by its representatives, felt detached 
from the said institutions.  Or, as Landau (2000) suggested, they are consciously 
distant from the political authority (Landau, 2000:na).  Normative engagement, on 
the other hand, would represent the extreme end in which there is a dynamic, 
responsive and consensual engagement between the Acholi society with the 
institutions - suggesting that the mode of interactions between them were 
supportive.  The second part of this dimension underscores the fact that a given 
set of relationships can range from coercion to co-option as a continuum 
(Landau, 2000).  Coercion, which is the other extreme point, explains the reliance 
on force as a form of authority to ensure order and to extract official commands.   
In this case, political authority can be applied even without any form of legitimacy.  
Co-option as another extreme end, on the other hand, is a neo-patrimonial form 
of relationship and entails rulers relying on their political power to exchange 
political favours and therefore retain popularity (Landau, 2000).   
The second dimension or parameter of change determines how these 
institutions, social structures and organisations related to each other over time, to 
influence change outcomes (Figure 5.3).  As discussed in the conceptual chapter, 
institutional rules, whether informal or formal, are both constitutive and regulative 
(Fleetwood, 2007: 10-12).  As constitutive rules, they not only regulate the 
actions of the organisations, they also constitute the actions that become the 
habits of the political actors (Fleetwood, 2007: 10-15).  This means that rules 
guiding the security of household livelihoods have a history of being accepted 
and are followed by the organisations or actors after they are internalised as they 
become habits.  The issue was to explore how these networks of governing 
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structures and internal power relations internalised the dynamics of the governing 
principles on human rights protection and ensured their habituation.  
Embeddedness of Governing Institutions 
Figure 5.1 below presents a histograph of “embeddedness of governing 
institutions” from 1898 to 2010.  Embeddedness is used to determine the quality, 
reasons and extent of institutional engagement in mediating interactions over the 
years.  As such, it is used as a proxy for understanding the politics of society-
actor relations.  This analysis is limited only to the two major categories of 
institutions I have discussed above – (i) the traditional, and (ii) the formal - state, 
local government and civil society organisations (CSOs) as they have been 
consistently the most active authorities on the ground.  Traditional institutions 
derive their legitimacies from the culture and norms of the people that have been 
in use for years (Mamdani, 2014).   The state, local governments and CSOs, on 
the other hand, are legal rules that derive their legitimacy from modern laws.  
However, the traditional authorities together with CSOs are categorised as non-
state actors (Smits and Wrights, 2012:22) because they do not have the 
monopoly of power.  However, some aspects of the CSOs – the youth and the 
women groups for instance - were in the past, fused within the traditional system 
(Rubongoya, 2007: 10).  Local government, on the other hand, is a delegated 
political authority of the state and as such derives its legitimacy from the state. 
The vertical axis shows the extent of embeddedness of these different 
institutions.   
Here, I use the contemporary definition of CSOs as the aggregate of 
non-state organisations and institutions that manifest the interests and will of 
citizens, individuals and organisations in a society, which are independent of the 
government (Thue, et al., 2002)268.  According to the World Bank, they articulate 
the interest and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, 
political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations.  CSOs, therefore 
                                                          
268The main actor, the Civil Society Coalition for Peace in Northern Uganda 
(CSCOPNU), has prominent local CSOs including the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace 
Initiatives (ARLPI), Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP), Concerned Parents 
Association (CPA) and the Refugee Law Project (RLP).  Also refer to the Report of a 
Study on Civil Society in Uganda for the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Uganda by 
Thue, N, Makubuya, AN, and Nakirunda, M (2002). 
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embrace a wide array of “moral” actors, which are both internal and external to 
the Acholi system.  Hence, community groups (see: Gertzel, 1974)269, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups (e.g., 
wadi obeno, interest groups), charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, 
professional associations (e.g., political parties), and foundations (World Bank, 
2008). 
Up until the 1930s, CSOs – like women and youth groups - and the LGs 
functions were fused within the traditional kaka system, hence, defining the 
governing image of the Acholi macon.  Ideally, each of the governing unit of the 
Acholi macon – the dog odi, dye-kal, dog gang and kaka–as layers of governing 
authorities acted as CSOs or LGs, given the different circumstances of their 
operations. For instance, dye-kal as corporate families represented the interest of 
their dog odi while interacting at the agnatic level, dog gang.  However, it was a 
lineage authority and therefore, the legitimate levels of the lineage-based 
identities.  As such, the respondents felt that these political structures were highly 
embedded within the Acholi society as part of the tradition until sometimes in the 
1930s (see Figure 5.1).  The state, on the other hand, as a colonial invention 
following the signing of treaties by rwodi Acholi and the colonial agents in 1898 
was rather disengaged in the beginning (see: Gertzel, 1974: 51).  Arguably, its 
core intents and interests were inconsistent with that of the ordinary governing 
structures of the Acholi during the early parts of its formation.  
Figure 5.1 depicts important memories and interpretations of governing 
interactions of these two institutions under the different regimes within Acholiland. 
Specifically, this figure shows how from 1898 to 1962, the traditional system that 
had fused the functions of LGs and CSOs took a downward trend from its 
epitome during pre-colonial time.  Those governing elements within the traditional 
realm of governance that had supported household livelihood security were 
reshuffled, leading to a downward decline in the role of kaka, according to the 
respondents. However, from 1962 to 1971, both the traditional and the formal 
systems gained grounds, possibly favoured by the “Africanisation” of the state 
governance that came with self-rule in 1962.  This trend, however, was reversed 
                                                          
269Kinship within the broader definition of the Acholi community defined by interests, 
the Acholi Youth Group formed by the Acholi elites in the 1950s and the numerous 
civil societies that existed in Acholi are viewed in this study as part of the civil 
society. 
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during Idi Amin’s era in 1971 to 1980 but also during the transitional period that 
arguably led to the capture of power by the NRM.  
 All these vital institutions slumbered following Amin’s coup d’état in 
1971 and never recovered until the mid 1980s.  From the views of the Acholi 
respondents, the Uganda systems failed to respond to Acholi’s political questions 
and continued to deny its emancipation as evident by low support to food 
production, increased injustice and human insecurity during all the periods that 
followed Idi Amin’s regime (World Bank, 2007a).  This weakness by both the 
formal – governments - and the traditional systems bolstered the growth of the 
informal system – and the legitimisation of the CSOs - in supporting the coping of 
the Acholi with the stress (World Bank, 2002).  This supplementation by the 
CSOs and informal system of the two major institutions remained visibly strong 
until 2010, with especially the foreign CSOs substituting and/or complementing 
the LGs and kaka in service delivery and peace building (World Bank, 2002). 
The Embeddedness of the traditional institutions 
Figure 5.1 shows that kaka governance progressively shifted from 
normative engagement – where it had for decades, shared a strong convergence 
of interests and goals with the community from 1898 to 1930s – to a 
disengagement in most parts of the post-colonial period including 2010270.  I 
argue that this perceived disengagement of kaka by the respondents should be 
seen in light of the reshuffled authorities of the traditional leaders when the British 
incorporated it into the Ugandan state in the 1890s (e.g., Wild, 1947).  For 
instance, the use of courts of law in enforcing social justice as defined in the 
modern context, the relegation of food security to state ministries and their 
corresponding analogues – all located far away from the community - and the 
institutionalisation of human protection to state-based agencies like the army and 
police forces, all created centralised and bureaucratised services for the people 
(see: Missier, 2012). In other words, the seemly-disengagement of kaka as 
perceived by the respondents was actually the effects of both the substitution of 
its mandate by the formal systems but also the ineffective service provision by 
the new system.   
                                                          
270Building on Girling’s (1960) viewpoints, I have defined these rules as familial at the 
family level, the ritual or agnatic rules that governed dog gangi and the kaka level’s 
rules that defined political authorities 
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Figure 5.1: Embeddedness of Governing Institutions, 1898 to 2010 
 
Source: Field Data, 2013 
While disengagement of the traditional system came as a result of 
substitution and unlevelled grounds with the modern system, there were 
additional complications caused in the shifting definitions and scope of these new 
functions.  For instance, cek cam, loosely translated as food security, was 
typically viewed in the Acholi culture as an entitlement.  While every individual 
legacy as a household was measured by food availability of staples all year 
round, better quality and quantity of staples for all members of the household was 
an entitlement. As an analytical question, it constitutes part of what Timothy R. 
Frankenberger (1996) referred to as household livelihood security frame271. 
                                                          
271 Household livelihood security is generally defined as adequate and sustainable 
access to income and other resources that enable households to meet basic 
needs including adequate access to food, portable water, health facilities, 
educational opportunities, housing, time for community participation and social 
integration, among others. Livelihoods are secure when households have secured 
ownership of, or access to, resources and income earning activities, including 
reserves and assets, to offset risks, ease shocks, and meet contingencies.  The 
means by which these households members meet these basic means are also 
important: [i] whether households can produce all or some of their basic needs 
[production means],  [ii] whether they can purchase all or some of their basic 
needs [capability], [iii] they have land, working capital, labour and management 
abilities [productive resources and assets], [iv] whether they know how to 
produce, provide or earn enough income to purchase all or some of their basic 
need [skills] and [v] whether they have adequate amounts of available time to 
apply to their skills or earn enough income to meet their basic needs [time]. 
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According to Frankenberger (1996), livelihoods consist of a range of on-farm and 
off-farm activities that offer a variety of procurement strategies and opportunities 
for food and cash.   
A typical Acholi household prior to and during the earlier part of 
colonialism relied on own production, wilo and caka, to sustain its family272. The 
capability and ability of a household or individual often determined the extent of 
its livelihood security. Thus, household would employ a range of strategies that 
included buffer of own production (dero mono and dero kec) [see: Oloya, 1998] 
and markets (caka, cuk and awak)273. Caka included both gifting and borrowing of 
food from neighbours or relatives, mostly done by women.  Additionally, use of 
available household labour could procure both immediate food for the households 
or a payback for what had been loaned.  In a way, dye-kal often had obligations 
towards dog odi under their jurally power.  Won paco would ensure availability of 
seeds and timely production in the corporate family. 
 This entitlement approach, however, shifted with an emphasis on 
market access as a key strategy with the introduction of cash crops in the 1930s 
(Leys, 1967:50).  Typically, Acholi smallholders moved into cash crop production 
with cotton and tobacco as the major enterprises by mid 1900s (e.g., Leys, 
1967:49; Pain, 1998).  The formal sector, because it was resourced and had the 
required transformative skills for the reforms, took a more engaging role in 
agriculture, co-opting rwodi kweri from the traditional sector as the lead in 
mobilising the households in cash crop production.  This reform in the agricultural 
sector reshuffled the roles of the traditional system to merely facilitative one – 
following the commands of the formal sector in cash crop production.  This shift, 
however, retained the benefits of traditions awak where farming groups worked 
for each of the members.  In this case, awak were used to target commercial 
agriculture to increase areas under cash crop production (Leys, 1967:49). 
Be that as it may, the households, as private investors, used their new 
founded agricultural skills and knowledge to increase the production of food 
crops, which were rotated with the cash crops.  Increasingly, households became 
                                                          
272Wilo as an action is to acquire by exchange or buying while caka is 
borrowing/begging, which can be free but often through use of free labour.  A 
housewife without enough grain to cover a period would go and help in the harvest 
in some other person who I turn, gives some portion in recognition of the labour. 
273 Caka is begging/borrowing. Cuk is market and awak is group work 
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more food secure, in spite of the hostile climate, and by the 1960s, the Acholi 
were largely food secured274. The involvement of LGs after independence, argue 
the respondents, changed the emphasis on cash crops production.  While cotton 
production, livestock rearing and food crop production benefited from modern 
extension services, they depended on Acholi culture of awak, social cohesion 
and fiduciary responsibilities.  This, however, changed in the later periods and 
especially during the NRM regime.  Respondents contend that ludito kaka of the 
1980s, as well as the re-invented traditional institution of Acholi, Ter Ker Kwaro 
Acholi; have no innovations outside what is in the modern vanguard.  They are 
detached, irrelevant and inexperienced in the ideation of the tradition.  The 
tradition might have as well gone archaic.  Nevertheless, these reinvented 
leaders also lack political power and will and are unworthy of any significance in 
the reconstruction of Acholiland.  This similar finding was echoed by Branch 
(2005) on his work in Gulu town. 
“These Ter Ker Kwaro [Acholi] people are politicians and opportunists.  
They will sell off land in Acholi in exchange for their subsistence living.  
They even do not know the simple ritual of tumu kir275…”  
Respondent from Gulu Town, December 2011. 
Similarly, on human protection, the police, the army and the courts of 
law overshadowed the effectiveness of the traditional systems during colonialism 
and thereafter.  This move delineated kaka as a system to mainly enable the 
formal system process protection of the society.  The majority of the respondents 
showed this change, as somewhat positive.  Kaka protection system, they 
argued, relied on the patriotism and goodwill of the individual ludito kaka to 
enforce kaka political dimension of human protection.  It demanded that dog 
gangi had first to consent and willingly contribute to the security demands of 
rwodi to whom they were obligated as discussed earlier in chapter four.  As such, 
traditionally protection mechanisms were influenced by the content and forms of 
                                                          
274In the absence of data from the Districts, teachers and retired administrators were 
quite positive in how these changes were effective and changed the lifestyles of 
households. 
275Kir is an Acholi word for abomination and is an act by adults that often results from 
stressful relationships that elders must redeem by purifying the act.  Failure to do 
so may cause illness to either party or their children. Purification or tumu kiiri s 
the mandate of ludito kaka, the elders. The fact that ludito kaka that constitute 
Ter Kwaro Acholi are seen as incapable of purification implies that they are even 
less knowledgeable of the Acholi traditions that should be the responsibility of a 
village elder. 
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political relationships that existed among actors at the different levels.  This often 
resulted in a continuous renegotiation of the meanings of political entitlements 
and entrustment within these political levels. The protection system practiced, 
adopted a more inward looking approach, in which wadi as kin got priority support 
in preserving and maintaining agnatic strength and respect.   
The state-based approach on the contrary, introduced what scholars see 
as rational - one that supposedly advocates for the rights of an individual (e.g., 
Rudolf, 2008) - a system that is articulated based on the western notion of 
democracy and not subjected to any form of bias, including kinships or tribalism 
(see: Ludwig and Rudolf, 2001:200).  As such, every citizen, regardless of sex or 
social affiliations, is subjected to a standard form of conduct, enforced by 
specialised and designated institutions mandated to act without fear or favour.   
This theoretical perspective has not been practiced in Acholiland under any form 
of governance (see: Rubongoya, 2007: 23-29).  However, the respondents 
acknowledged that specialised state organisations that were introduced capably 
ordered the fear and mistrust of the state system through institutionalised 
violence (see: Dolan, 2011: 107-108, 229)276.  It introduced mistrust of the 
enforcement systems rather than the desired respect that most elders 
commanded within the society.  The traditional system virtually collapsed 
particularly in the last thirty years.  With the coming of the NRM to power, a 
number of armed thugs mushroomed following the weakening of both the formal 
and traditional governing systems.  These armed groups included the notorious 
LRA.  Unlike the kaka-based systems of the pre-colonial era that had ethnicized 
security for its members, the events that started in 1985 and culminated into high 
displacements was rather complicated in processes and dimensions.  
First, unlike the kaka systems, these armed groups of disgruntled 
soldiers under the Uganda People’s Democratic Movement/Army (UPDM/A) and 
other unarmed civilians of Alice Lakwena, contested the capture of Acholiland, 
which occurred in March 1986 by the NRA, because the NRM was viewed as an 
“enemy force” (Lamwaka, 2002:26).  Two key features of these rebel groups 
need to be mentioned.  One is that unlike with the kaka system, these groups 
sought to strengthen an ethnic Acholi identity that was constructed by the 
                                                          
276  In four of the numerous focused group discussions, people remembered how the 
police enforcement system in the 1950s and the 1960s were said to have been 
effective in bringing down revenge among kinsmen and women and how force 
were used to extract evidence.    
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colonialists and by post-colonial governments for political exploitation.  This was 
an endorsement of the political Acholi as a product of political manipulation.  The 
second aspect is a creation of a new breed of rag-tag warriors that were neither 
traditional – as their oteka lweny and their mode of fighting were not consistent 
with the initiative of the kaka system.  Nor were they considered formal armed 
groups because their training and command structures lacked the state-based 
system.   These new social groups were, therefore, informally created and out of 
the inadequacies that dovetailed into both the traditional and the state-based 
systems of governance.  
Secondly, the accountability for the rights of individuals under the 
traditional system was significantly reformed both in content and context. The 
content of what these rights were under kaka were challenged in the context of 
globalisation and the politics of state construction. Broadly, respondents noted 
that new concepts and definitions - ownership and property rights that were 
specific to individuals– were introduced and they distorted the meaning of life 
within kinship.  While ownership as understood in Acholi were a continuum of 
collective rights over beings and were reinforcing and enabling to individual’s, in 
the case of modern time, it was seen as divisive, possessive and in most 
instances, greed.  In spite of the breakdown in kaka governance systems by the 
1930s, the traditional institutions – the norms and culture of entrustment, 
obligations and reciprocities that supported rights construction – became a strong 
impetus in facilitating the adoption of the new ways of living.   
Embeddedness of the CSOs 
In the case of Acholiland, the traditional system until possibly 1930s had 
fused CSOs with the governing system and with a wide range of moral concerns 
for their members.  At the macro-level of governance, which was kaka, wadi 
obeno as agnatic kinship and wadi as a form of relationships that emerged from 
various social interactions but not necessarily exogamous, formed the core of the 
indigenous moral associations of traditional CSOs277. However, at the meso level, 
CSOs that formed the agnatic governing levels included structures like dog odi, 
                                                          
277Kinship is defined within the broader definition of the Acholi community as CSOs 
that were defined by putative and primordial interests.  Incidentally, the Acholi 
Youth Group that was formed as a political pressure group by the Acholi elites in 
the 1950s (see: Gitzel, 1974), and the numerous civil societies that existed in Acholi 
are viewed in this study as part of the civil society. 
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dye-kal, gang that were primordial and/or collective.  They also included 
specialised community social groups like bulo, wayo, nero– who were special 
interest groups that represented societies with unique societal issues that defined 
their unique interests278.  
Contemporary CSOs, on the other hand, are formal and guided by legal 
provisions of the state.  They include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
labour unions, registered indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based 
organisations, professional associations (e.g., political parties), and foundations 
(World Bank, 2008). In the case of Acholi, Churches and their associated 
grassroots member organisations, political parties and the associated grassroots 
organisations and the cooperative movements were the three dominant 
contemporary CSOs reportedly dominant during the 1950s through to 1970s.  
Arguably, CSOs as presented in Figure 5.1 were seen as closely linked to the 
struggles of their member groups, who were modelled from the traditional sector.   
This participation of external CSOs increased with globalisation (Amit, 2002:14).  
Figures 5.1 to 5.3 show how respondents perceived how these CSOs responded 
to the societal concerns from 1898 to 2010.   
It was stated that mainly the churches and government actually 
supported traditional CSOs up until the 1970s.  However, the respondents noted 
that the emergence of cooperative societies and trade unions as formal 
organisations within the society, helped shape the articulation of members’ 
interests. This is because traditional social groups like the youth groups, bulu, 
that had in the early part of colonialism profiled their clan during hunting and 
lweny kaka became part of these new movements. Hence, in creating a new 
community bound by limited political interests, these new networks became 
significant in the exchange of cultures. However, by the 1980s on ward, 
contemporary CSOs emerged as diverse and in larger numbers.  Faith-based 
organisations like the Church, for instance, were one of the earlier foreign-based 
CSOs that have had significant influence in the politics of Acholi as far back as 
the mid 1900s.  Respondents also recalled that following the overthrow of Amin in 
1979, NGOs like Action for Cooperation in Research and Development (ACORD) 
                                                          
278These are categories of groups defined by age or sex and therefore interests. Bulo 
or bulu (youth with their headmen, rwot bulu), wayo or anyira is a title for girls 
from the lineage.  All girls or anyira are recognized as wayo in the lineages. They 
would form an interest group in advocating for their lots before the society.   
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came to support development in Acholiland. This, however, changed with time, 
as more NGOs moved into Acholiland following the recent violence, to support 
humanitarian work.  
There was distinctive presence of internationally funded CSOs and 
especially international NGOs (INGOs) all over the third world after the reforms of 
the state in the 1980s.  In the case of Acholiland, the numbers and types of CSOs 
drastically increased in the 1980s as it was viewed as a needy area following 
Amin’s targeting of the Acholi as political enemies (e.g., Thue et al., 2000).  
Except in the 1970s and early 1980s, respondents admit that CSOs were 
perhaps one of the most closely aligned institutions to the community.  Their 
embeddedness was based on shared objectives and purposes.  These included 
food security, social justice and peace.  The absence of significant INGOs in the 
1970s and early 1980s were political as Idi Amin’s regime viewed them as anti-
government 279. As an elder stated about contemporary CSOs, “they are 
responsive to our troubles because they link us to those who can feel our 
pains”280. Particularly in the recent past, CSOs showed their comparative 
advantages in securing funding from INGOs and donors, something that 
community leaders and even LGs could not easily do (Dolan, 2011:227).  
Embeddedness of the State and Local Government as an institution 
The state, as conceptualised in chapter two and further discussed in 
chapters three and four underscore authority rather than leadership.  Firstly, it is 
a legally delegated authority created to maintain order with a high level of 
impartiality and specialisation (Fukuyana, 2013: 361). Secondly, the logic of new 
governance that came into practice in the 1980s introduced legal pluralism that 
weakened the distinction between states and other domains of social order by 
recognising the importance of markets, networks and non-state actors in 
community governance (see: Bevir, 2010: 216-226). Thus, LG and other non-
governmental actors are empowered in the new reform as delegated centres for 
the administration of specialised or decentralised governance on behalf of the 
state (see: Ojambo, 2010).  As we will see later, in the case of Uganda, these 
new centres have often been legally interpreted by the official sources as only 
additional to the state rather than seen as separate and reinforcing partners. 
                                                          
279 Field information. 
280 A quote from a displaced person living in Byale, in Masindi in March, 2004 
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In the 1900s, the British colonialist reconstructed Acholiland into a LG. 
Acholiland became a territory of the colonial Acholi society and was subordinated 
to the District Commissioner – who was the representative of the state (see: 
Girling, 1960: 84).  This legal status, however, has continued to change since, 
and mainly in tandem with governing modes and policies of the different principal 
actors281. For instance, in 1914 a new district, Chuwa (Chua) was created by the 
colonialists and with a capital at Kitgum, to carter for the eastern part of 
Acholiland (Bere, 1947: 8). However, this situation was reversed again in 1937 
when the Acholi District Administration was reinstated with Gulu as the 
administrative capital (Bere, 1947: 8; Gertzel, 1974: 58).  In 1974, Acholi District 
was split again into two units and the former Chuwa District was named East 
Acholi District with Kitgum as the capital.  Then West Acholi District was 
administered from Gulu.  Acholiland remained divided into two local governments 
until later during the NRM era when East Acholi District was renamed Kitgum 
District and West Acholi became Gulu District.  To-date, Amuru and Nwoya have 
been created out of Gulu District as new LGs and Pader, Agago and Lamwo LGs 
created out of Kitgum District.  This has resulted in Acholiland being administered 
as seven LGs - a move that technically has re-established the traditional dialectic 
zoning of Acholiland prior to colonialism. 
Explaining the changing trends in governance mediated by formal institutions 
Figure 5.1 shows how the majority of the Acholi respondents perceived 
the contribution of the formal institutions to community governance from 1898 to 
2010.  Generally, the perception is that formal institutions played significant roles 
in the creation of chaos in Acholiland.  In the first instance, formal institutions 
reshuffled authorities of the governing actors.  From 1898 to 1940s, one core 
function of the traditional system - protection of rights of the Acholi –was 
reshuffled by colonialism and was delegated to the formal system.  From 
discussions, these changes were in some instances, inconsistent with the 
governing interests and goals of the Acholi community.  For instance, the forceful 
manner in which infrastructure were constructed, violated the culture of 
consensual engagement among the Acholi.  These contestations, which became 
protracted by early 1900s, led to many arrests of local political leaders including 
Rwot Awich in 1902 and later again in 1914, Onung Ting Traa from Lamogi in 
                                                          
281 Discussion with Prof. Morris Ongenga-Latigo – which have been continuous as he 
was my supervisor starting in 2011 when Professor Ginyera Pinycwa died. 
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1911 and other rwodi, like Rwot Aliker of Pajule.  The problem with such arrests 
of rwodi, who in most instances, were headmen of their agnates, did not 
significantly affect the entire kaka, except where these rwodi were popular.  In the 
case of Lamogi for instance, the arrest of Rwot Onung became mainly the 
concern of his agnate, the dog gang Boro.  
As Dolan (2011:39-68) intimated, it cannot be easily stated when 
violence actually began and whether it was about the many wrangles that were 
fought in Acholiland. Or rather, violence as remembered by the Acholi and 
discussed in chapter three, exists entirely on its own right.  This is because while 
during the pre-colonial time, violence is remembered mostly in form of lweny kaka 
- inspired by slave traders - all the other regimes that governed Acholiland since 
1898 have exhibited significant presence of varying typologies of violence. It is 
evident from Figure 5.1 that overall, local governance dovetailed with violence 
even more profoundly during the contemporary Acholiland.  The likely 
explanation is found in the mode of governing interactions that conflicted with the 
local interests.   
Pre-colonial era witnessed the growth of external interests in Acholiland 
and was discussed in chapter three.   In order to protect the built-up in commerce 
and trade by these foreign nationals, colonialists relied on military presence and 
pressures as the most viable tool for transforming the Acholiland282.  This was 
used to weaken kinship ties and building new and disjointed alliances among the 
traditional kaka Acholi.  The amalgamation of institutions of governance in 
Acholiland that started sometime in 1902 triggered the reconfiguration of ethnic 
groupings, taking advantage of these varied foreign interests (Uma-Owiny, 2013).  
It included merging of the different and most times unrelated kaka within a given 
territory into one administrative unit, the County283.  And, one of the rwodi from 
among those forced together became the County Chief while the other rwodi 
were subordinated to him. In some instances, as discussed later, County Chiefs 
                                                          
282  For colonial period, see: Odoi, 2010: and for contemporary Acholiland see the 
Uganda Vision 2040 and the overall approach by donors and governments in the 
various annual plans. 
283 Tim Allen and Ronald Atkinson wrongly felt that most of the kaka units were of 
similar decent.  In the context of Acholi, relationships are defined in terms of wadi 
as I have discussed extensively in Chapter Four.  This, thus, makes his assertions of 
relationship a very weak one.  Through inter-marriages, interactions improved 
among these polities.  Improved interactions in my opinion do not constitute or 
translate into becoming relatives.  It improves relations among friends and foes 
alike. 
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were posted into these new outfits, regardless of whether these administrators 
were like or not by the new groups (e.g., Uma-Owiny, 2013; Branch, 2011: 45-
88).   
This kind of governing actions escalated violence among the different 
political groupings in the earlier part of colonialism (Finnström, 2008: 208-211).  
Typically, the hatred that existed between kaka Padibe that was located in the 
northeast and kaka Payiira in the central zone, exemplify this development284. 
Kaka governance and especially the growth of these zonal polities– which later 
provided the limits for the original County in the nineteenth century - and their 
consolidation in the late eighteenth century, was partly in response to the need to 
overcome and survive the assaults of these powerful externally backed enemies 
(Finnström, 2008:52-55).   Hence, kaka as political organisations became 
synonymous with interest-based local governance.  This organic evolution of 
collectivity based on interest, arguably, led to the respondents giving a good 
rating of the traditional system at the beginning as reflected in Figure 5.1. 
The colonial regime was set to destroy the architecture of kaka model, 
and to replace it with a colonial system and society that was submissive to the 
Uganda project285.  The objectives of the two models were diverse and 
sometimes opposing.  Kaka, particularly after the 1875 conflict, sought to build 
harmony among like-minded gangi agnates by emphasising ribbe or unity.  In 
ribbe, rwodi and ludito kaka sought to collate resources from these polities for 
furthering lineage accentuation286. The strength of kaka therefore, was defined by 
pooling differentiated resources of the different agnates – pii pong ki jange.  LG, 
on the other hand, sought to create submissive colonial society that would 
respond to centralise authority (see: Branch, 2011: 46-47).  Figure 5.1 shows 
how this move set from the onset, legal pluralism and cultural entropy in the 
entire system of local governance and accountability.  Branch (2011:46-47) for 
instance made the observation that the British found it very hard to reconstruct 
kaka into hierarchal structures and had to apply violence, co-option and cohesion 
                                                          
284 Interview with Rtd. Bishop Ochola and Mzee Binoni Odwogo of Padibe Kal 
285See Rubongoya (2007) analysis of this situation in Chapter 2 
286  Most moves made by powerful kaka like Payiira, Padibe and Patiko point to the 
fact that the internal dynamics of these kaka were geared to peace making and 
scaling-up the consociations of core-agnates and their associated non-core, to 
reduce conflict with each other.  Kaka Payiira in particular but also kaka Pajule set 
to capture power of the smaller agnates by providing security of life and 
properties. 
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in coming with LG model that became synonymous with social torture.  Hence, 
both LG and the state were normatively disengaged with the community during 
the entire colonial period but also in the large part of post-colonial period.   
The Acholi youth groups during the colonial era set to define the tone of 
the late 1950s politics by embedding their political movements within the core 
values of the Acholi, leading to Acholi Local Governments becoming one of the 
strongest and people-focused decentralised systems by Uganda’s independence 
in 1962 (see: Gertzel, 1947: 28).  Post-colonial Uganda, however, had a mix of 
disheartening scenarios in community governance. From discussions that 
ensued, respondents felt that there was a significant divergence in interests or 
goals.  The general relations between the two systems were lower than 
envisioned because the formal systems to the contrary, aimed to gain grounds on 
controlling the Acholi instead of empowering them.  A discussion of the NRM 
regime, 1986 to 2010 however, was more engaging and lively as political events 
of the time were still vividly memorable. It set to suggest that social contract 
between the Acholi and the state transfers authority that the Acholi enjoy in the 
state of kaka to the state as a political body (see: Rawls, 2007: 129).  Typically, it 
follows that the political authority of the state and its analogues, when looked at 
normatively, exists in justifying why Acholiland ought to continue as part of the 
Uganda state.  The form of equity that supposedly exhibited by the culture of 
facultative mutualism among the gangi agnates is not sufficiently specific to rule 
in the modern time.  Simply: experience – as expressed in the previous chapter - 
showed that social contracts entered into under the kaka system could not easily 
be enforced when violated (Fablenne, 2010:5).   
Arguably, the majority of respondents view land grabs in Acholiland 
during the NRM as speedy and large-scale appropriation of “customary” land by 
the state agencies and the state house.  Like elsewhere, the logic behind land 
grabs in Africa seems to be based on commerce that are mainly foreign-based or 
backed by government agencies (see: White et al., 2012:624).  “Publivate” as a 
phenomenon in Uganda, manifests a form of predatory interaction and as such a 
form of slavery.  It demonstrates how international community links up with “local 
investors”, often people with political connections, to disfranchise rural Africans 
(Henri et al., 2011).  In the case of Uganda, the state - as Wiley (2012:757) 
observed of the growing trend in land grabs - uses the post global food crisis 
effects in the internationalisation of land markets and large-scale land grabs in 
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Acholiland.  Governments, especially the NRM, has smartly linked this issues to 
the poverty reduction and post-conflict recovery and has been able to get under-
the-table support of mainstream western donors in promoting “publivates” as a 
strategy for its political domination287.  These agencies are interested in the 
control of large chunks of land (e.g., Amanor, 2012:722) and thereby creating 
class of illiterate Acholi as unskilled labour (Wiley, 2012:751 and Woodhouse, 
2012:777).  Generally, government in this case, has used poverty reduction as 
scapegoat, to bolster its local sources of private funding.  This is because 
resource these strategies, relevant as they may seem to be, do not resonate with 
the local realities on the ground288. 
As a result, throughout the twenty-four years of the NRM regime under 
review, the state clearly failed to use post-conflict approaches to define an 
investment menu for Acholiland as part of its growth-oriented strategies.  It 
ignored local viewpoints as represented by MPs regarding the demanded local 
development and this contestations and differencing viewpoints between the local 
and government costs the government in four of the five national elections289.   
Development in Acholiland has continued to be elusive290.  Where firm results 
have been noticeable, it was in most cases, the work of foreign actors: CSOs and 
in some instances, churches, implying that real development is outsourced to 
other legal actors (Schupper and Gunner, 2011). The major argument from the 
World Bank and the Government has been that insecurity over the last twenty-
five years affected opportunities for development in Acholiland.  Additionally, it 
eroded local capacity to absorb resources (PRDP, 2007). Furthermore, poverty 
and violence are mutually reinforcing, having worked against investments in the 
north (NUSAF, 2004).  In the absence of national political will to analyse, listen to 
                                                          
287Recent agribusiness programmes in Uganda that are supported by donors are clear 
evidence of this move.  Discussing with other technocrats, there seem to be a 
consensus that the surge for class formation as an economic strategy by the 
current government points to desire of the government to push on with this policy. 
288 In the case of Madhvani Sugar Works, a reconstruction and recovery piece would 
have considered the local dimension, the boosting of the community-oriented 
interventions including out-growers components.  
289Past governments including Idi Amin used to undertake feasibility studies as pre-
qualifying steps for foreign investments.  When I worked in Uganda Development 
Bank from 1983 to 1991, the bank was one of such instrument that ensured that 
foreign investments were analysed for their technical, financial and social impacts. 
290 The amount of resources pumped in Acholiland from both private and official 
sources since 1986 is not commensurate with the visible outcomes seen on the 
ground.  In 2004, the CSOs undertook a study, which confirmed that there was an 
annual wastage of a 2.6 per cent GDP due to insecurity caused by the LRA. 
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internal options within Acholiland and implement pro-poor investments, the state 
– particularly in the last thirty years – has continued to think for the Acholi, use 
military democracy, co-opting strategy and its constitutional powers to maintain 
its agenda in development in Acholiland that in the long-run will see the poor 
succumb to the forces of market economy.  
First, the government applied pressure, intimidations and co-options 
where it had pressing interests within Acholi, as was the case of the Apaa Game 
reserve, where occupants were thrown off the land291.  It structured its 
engagement by use of its cadres, the Resident District Commissioners and other 
military forms of administration, to enforce those interests292.  This has resulted in 
the creation of fear, displacement camps, categorisation of people and violation 
of individual rights as they target those seen as political activists (e.g., Dolan, 
2011: 226-228).  In successful implementation of its interests, the NRM has 
mainstreamed the District Resident Commissioners and the security arms in the 
Local Government structures (see also: Missier, 2012)293.  These cadres support 
the military by priming and co-opting the civilian within its political parameters.  
Most of these cadres are Acholi who have consciously or unconsciously identified 
with the NRM goals.  Hence, the government has maintained its political power 
from within the formal structures as well as outside it by co-opting men and 
women, to identify and act on discrepancies in their line of actions.  By deploying 
unrestricted levels of coercion and formalised patronage, some divergence in 
interest was further introduced.  This development builds on the culture of 
honesty and resilience, which I have discussed in chapter eight.  It has led to the 
second significant effect, in which some Acholi in particular, the elite within the 
country and outside have chosen to disengage from direct support of the 
community.  Such forms of disengagement existed also during Amin’s era and 
perhaps are not signs of disagreement with the opinion or views of the 
community.  Rather, as some of the respondents have intimated, these are 
                                                          
291For an analysis of the Apaa Game Reserve eviction, see Refugee Laws of the 
Makerere University www.refugeelaws.org 
292 Discussions held with local politicians: Prof Latigo Ogenga, Norbert Mao - who 
have been subjected to harassments by the system. 
293 Interviews with scholars like Prof. Ogenga Latigo.  Also see scholarly work on 
decentralisation by Missier, 2012. 
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manifestation of fear and discontent – in what they refer to as “gwoke pe 
lworo”294.  
Interactions of Traditional, Formal and Informal Systems 
Interaction, I have argued, influences the type and mode of relationships 
that are exhibited among political actors (e.g., Kooiman, 2003: Chapter 1).  
Traditional institutions like kaka had developed norms and cultures as 
instruments of governance.  This enabled during the pre-colonial and the early 
part of colonialism the application of differentiated forms of facultative mutualism 
among the different agnates that consociated into a kaka.  The manifestation of 
facultative mutualism as a culture at the macro-levels of interactions was 
seemingly influenced by how the fiduciary cultures at the micro-level of 
interactions operated. For instance, smaller kaka like kaka Alero, were often seen 
to have demonstrated a highly equal treatment of each other when compared 
with those where the core-agnates were rather prominent like was the case with 
Payiira, Pajule and Patiko.  As such, the fiduciary culture of the gangi agnates, it 
is argued, did not in the extent possible, supported a development of a stronger 
identity at the macro-level.   To the contrary, it strengthened the lineage-based 
orientation and fiduciary duties of the compound families.  
However, formal institutions, on the other hand, are hierarchical and 
therefore, authoritative - often exude as instructive sources of knowledge and 
specialised authorities.   As such, they tend to create a form of ruler-subject 
dialogue and interaction.  Informal institutions are behaviours that are innovations 
developed to substitute, complement or reinforce, compete and/or enable the 
others. Figure 5.2 was developed through focus group discussions, to explain 
how respondents felt or perceived the legitimacies of the different institutions in 
their interactions with the Acholi community.   These results were validated with 
the trailblazers – the original twenty respondents but also it was discussed 
informally in various meetings with individuals and groups, including during a 
funeral in Pader.  The extent of how relevant the instruments were - which is 
provided on the vertical axis - increases as one goes up the axis.   The purpose 
of the dialogue was to gauge how respondents and other people met, actually 
                                                          
294This means playing safe is no sign of cowardice as it seems preservation has been 
elevated by the system as the only way to avoid being labelled an opposition 
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viewed the legitimacies of these pluralistic legal systems.  Usually, legitimacy 
both elucidates why the use of political power by a system is allowable and why 
there is a pro tanto moral duty for obeying the commands (Fabienne, 2010).  
Figure 5.2: Changing Legitimacies of Governing Instruments, 1898 to 2010 
 
Source: Field Data, 2013/4 
In the discussions, I both systematically and informally, laid out 
questions of sources and effectiveness of these powers, seeking to explore how 
the governing instruments under pluralistic systems were perceived to have 
responded to what the Acholi felt were their natural rights to protection, food 
security and social justice over the years.   This discussion builds on my 
conceptualisation chapter, where four outcomes of interactions were envisioned.  
These include complementing - where their efforts strengthen the achievements 
of outcomes by enabling them; and accommodating – where they facilitate the 
others.  Thirdly, is competing – where they conflict and thereby undermine each 
other and finally, where in weaker situation, they substitute each other.   
Pre-colonial and colonial era, 1898 to 1962 
The core respondents shared their views regarding the relevance of and 
effects of governing instruments or the legitimacies of the various political actors 
based on their policies and social rules in forming a pluralistic environment of 
interactions.   The questions were framed in the context of how institutional 
legitimacies of these various actors impacted on the rights to, access and 
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availability of food, human protection and social justice – which I have maintained 
is part of household livelihood security (Frankenberger, 1996)295.  Figures 5.2 and 
5.3 suggest that from 1898 to 1965, the majority of the Acholi respondents who 
engaged in this discussion conceptualised that kaka as traditional institutions - 
were normatively engaged in governance and were justifiably legitimate.   
As observed by Beetham (1991:11) when explaining the contradictions 
raised by scholars (see for instance: Raz, 1986, Simmions, 2001 and Buchanan, 
2002) in conceptualising legitimacy, there was a general view from respondents 
that the power relationship between kaka and the community was legitimate 
because people believed in it as a moral duty and were able to justify why they 
can and should do that (Habermas, 1979: 205).  The feeling was that actual 
legitimacy of kaka was tied to what was necessary for legitimacy, which included 
its obligations to the community (see: Fabinne, 2010: 3).  For instance, during the 
colonial era, the rights to food security, protection and social justice depended on 
understanding the context and historical trajectory of these rights.  The right to 
food and protection for a child, for instance, were historically the obligations of 
older people.  The respondents argued that from information passed on to them, 
kaka and ludito kaka generally offered better opportunities for implementing these 
rights. They argued that formal systems, like the courts of law, on the contrary, 
forces its legitimacy– which was seen as counter-productive.  They were also 
established within the society, albeit, in a kind of flux.  A case most referred to 
was violence against women, which the ludito kaka and the Church had worked 
to reduce through mediation and an equivalent charge to men, for “gathering the 
clan” to reconcile the parties.  However, the formal court, they noted, would fine 
men for such abuse in addition to imprisonment - thereby aggravating the entire 
situation for both parties, including the women296. 
                                                          
295 A full definition of food security includes the related concepts of access, sufficiency, security 
or vulnerability, and sustainability.  As such, it looks at the holistic approach to food provision 
and sees participation as an important element as well as health, education, energy, etc.  
 
296Older women noted that in the 1950s and 1960s, such offender may either be 
given a community task, which would include working for the County Authority 
by cleaning the roadside.  Often this interfered with men’s contribution to 
household labour.  In cases where they were imprison, the spouse would be left 
with no support for gardening, which in the long, undermined the capacity of the 
household in food production. 
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First and second part of post-colonial eras, 1962 to 1985 
Figure 5.2 also shows that from 1962 to 1986, kaka’s legitimacy while 
was still higher than the rest, was declining particularly in the 1980s.  In line with 
John Simmons (2001) argument, kaka’s political authority as a moral justification 
of its traditional role became vulnerable to the new mode of doing business. This 
is because elders and households, as the governing architectures of the Acholi 
society could not effectively prove the worth and moral values of traditions in the 
era dominated by western values. As such, kaka lost the political legitimacy to 
command authority that could change the declining trends or in generating 
political obligations (Simmons, 2001:137).   For instance, both the core and the 
trailblazing respondents from all research sites noted increase in theft of foodstuff 
from granaries since the 1970s.   
Even during kec abongo wang dako,297 we did not have a case of people 
in villages stealing from the granaries of others.  This is because it was a 
bad omen for one to do so.  
Interview with Mzee Juru in Amuru, June 2010 
This in part, symbolised moral degeneration in societal response in the present 
time, to the authority of traditions that sanctioned against such behaviours.   
The political authority of kaka in the early colonial era had sufficient 
claims in generating the obligations of the members.  According to the 
respondents, even until the 1960s, most huts in the rural Acholi had no 
permanent doors as custom prohibited anyone to enter into someone else’s 
house when the owners were absent.  The exception, however, was if one was in 
need of something specific from the hut that would be communicated to the 
owners of the home on their return.  However, security of lives and properties 
have also since changed, partly because people do not honour these customs, 
but also on the difficulties of relying on kin as most have no alternatives. 
The legitimacy of the formal systems according to Figure 5.2 was the 
lowest overall since the 1898.  This negative trend continued to decline further 
during this period under review.  In fact, while formal system, according to my 
                                                          
297Kec abong wang dako was a famine reported to have occurred between 1948 and 
1950.  The presence of locusts and drought reportedly cause decline in harvest of 
millet and other crops.  “abongo wang dako” literally means “feeling the face of a 
woman” to check when she was asleep so that one would go and check if there 
was still some food remaining in the cooking  pot 
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respondents, received a boost of legitimacy in the early 1960s, it declined in the 
1970s through to 1986, a period which coincides with Idi Amin and Obote II eras 
in Uganda.  In other words, the regimes that followed the immediate post-
independent government of Obote I, failed to galvanise legitimacy in Acholiland. 
This scenario attests to the view advanced by Simmons (2001:125) that political 
authority is distinct from its political legitimacy.  This is because the legitimacy of 
any political authority would depend on whether the transfer of such authority was 
democratically mediated (see: Locke, 1980:52).  In the case of Uganda, the 
Obote II era was considered by some as illegitimate.  This view was strong in 
Buganda and it gave ground for NRA to use Buganda as a battleground against 
the Obote regime and it eventually took control of Uganda state in 1986298.  
Similarly, Idi Amin’s regime, 1971 to 1979 was arguably, out rightly illegitimate.  
Hence, throughout these periods, the people of Acholi, according to the 
respondents, did not consent to the authorities of the state. Rather, the state 
governments that existed held effective authority but they ceased to be legitimate 
and therefore, did not command the obligations of the people of Acholi (see: 
Rawls, 2007: 124; Locke, 1980: 52).  This reaction created two significant 
outcomes.  First, it created the emergence of informal system of behaviours, 
including the growth of resistance to political authority since people felt not 
obligated to the state authority (see: Rawls, 2007: 124).   The rise of resistance 
commanded support from imagined communities and became a force against 
Obote II and Amin’s era.  Secondly, this granted political legitimacy as the 
justification of coercive power to agencies in the informal system.  
In the wake of these poor performances of both the formal and 
traditional systems as observed during this period, the informal institutions, it 
seems, gained credentials as depicted by the respondents in Figure 5.2.  This 
seems to support Simmons’ (2001:125) assertion that the authority of the state 
actually depends on its moral defensibility by showing causes for its existence at 
the realm of governance.  This, however, does not mean that Uganda state 
lacked authority.  From 1971 through to 1985, the Acholi witnessed increased 
state coercion, where respondents admitted that many leading Acholi men 
especially were eliminated (Branch, 2011: 53-58).  Raz’s (2006) views of effective 
authority are its ability to change the reasons that apply to others – which he 
refers to as pre-emptive reasons.  In this case, even without the political 
                                                          
298 Interviews in Gulu and Kitgum with Acholi politicians in August 1998 and in 2006. 
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legitimacy, the Uganda state during the time would use the state laws and military 
decrees to the Acholi to conform to its authority, changing their own reasons for 
even resisting the oppressions from the state.  A case in point is how many youth 
wingers from UPC party in Acholi, who believed in changing the Amin’s system, 
were ordered by fear to give up the struggle and even exposed others involved. 
The second part of post-colonial era – the NRM, 1986 to 2010 
Figure 5.2 continues to show how kaka’s legitimacy continued to fade as 
its relevance and political authority to confront the complex governing situation 
further weakened.  Ideally, the traditional growth of ludito kaka was halted by 
intensified formal education in the 1960s through to-date.  This is in addition to 
other globalised orientations that most leaders from Acholiland received since 
colonialism.  Ludito as an institution during that period depicted elders with cross-
modern views of the world.  Kaka, thus, in the wake of increased displacement - 
which started in 1986 but was officially launched in 1998 - could hardly impact 
positively on the rights of the Acholi people (Atkinson, 2010: Chapter 10). Kaka 
governing infrastructures by 1986 was fully subsumed within the formal governing 
system, disallowing localised form of effective mobilisation.  Ideally, kaka and the 
Acholi had reached a stage of entropy, having consented to a covenant of chaos 
that did not guarantee any meaningful protection (see; Dolan, 2011: Chapters 
3,5,9).  The Acholi ideally transferred their rights to a constellation of individuals 
and groups of sympathisers – in what Hobbes terms “sovereignty by institution” 
during this period (Fabienne, 2010: 9). 
Conversely, formal institutions – the international NGOs, the state and 
LG surged in importance from 1986 onwards according to respondents.  These 
organisations formed the constellation of legitimate actors that set to compete 
and sometimes support each other in renegotiating the rights of the Acholi people 
in the wake of societal entropy.   According to my respondents, the state’s 
political authority, however justified, did not sufficiently attain due legitimacy.  This 
meant that its actions did not generate sufficient obligations of the people, as 
evident in how it resorted to force in enforcing its authorities in the area299.  The 
                                                          
299  The respondents narrated evidents of these assertions.  They admitted that use 
of force during colonial time was institutionalized and ogwang gweno, a name 
given to local police at the local administration demonstrated how people viewed 
them.  Literally, this name explains how these local police were seen as wild cats 
who raid chicken in people’s homestead.  Typically, this was also the case during 
post-colonial period. 
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NRM legitimacy in Acholiland was tested in three consecutive general elections 
of 1996 and the subsequent ones in 2001 and 2006.  In all the cases, it 
overwhelmingly lost elections in Acholiland to the opposition.  The NRM’s use of 
de facto or effective authority aimed to change the reasons that apply to the 
Acholi people. Some of such reasons, which were picked by the LRA rouges and 
made key issues in their Juba negotiation, have hardly been addressed even to-
date bu government (Branch, 2011: 58, 76-77, 80).   
In the case of insecurity, the NRM maintains that the absence of 
“credible” leaders in Acholiland, discussed earlier in chapter three, was the main 
reason for prolonged insurgency in the region300.  To counter this, the NRM 
decided to hand pick its perceived loyalists from among the Acholi, viewing these 
as its “transformative” cadres, who would implement its change.  Dolan (2011:72-
106) discusses the ambiguities surrounding Joseph Kony’s LRA questions in 
clarifying the connectedness of this group to the Acholi people.  Overall, he 
supports the assertion that core in the UPDF’s strategy in Acholiland was the 
need to humiliate the Acholi for their perceived positions of opposition.  Needless 
to add that as demonstrated over those years, there were many mismatches 
between the NRM actions in Acholiland when critically seen from post-conflict 
recovery and development points (e.g., Dolan, 2011: 252-255). 
Many of my core respondents and some scholars have argued that in 
the last thirty years, economic growth in Uganda for instance, depicted a 
dichotomy that reflects the legitimacy of the NRM in northern Uganda, including 
Acholiland301.   As discussed elsewhere in this study, the number of the Acholi 
living in poverty, whether in Acholiland or anywhere within Uganda increased 
significantly during the NRM period from what it was at the end of 1985.  In line 
with Raz’s (1998:56) argument, because the NRM during 1986 to 2010 was seen 
as illegitimate and because legitimate authority is conceived as what serves the 
governed – service conception of authority –the NRM has conveniently failed to 
serve the Acholi people.  What it has continued to do, however, is to claim that it 
is doing its best, or that the Acholi are not supporting its course.  Together with its 
partners, government has demonstrated for the people in Acholi that it has power 
to ignore them.  However, the Acholi under the circumstance, have to comply 
                                                          
300 See for instance the report produced by HRPC in 2004 under the Project No. 
UGA/02/U01, May 03, 2004.  
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with the reasons government and its perceived partners apply to in their case.  
And, the question of leadership in Acholiland continued to be used by 
government.   By staking insecurity to poor internal leadership in Acholi, the NRM 
arguably, confirms that Acholi is a limited statehood as a geographical location – 
where it lacked the full oversight of the state.  
The informal institutions on the other hand gained significant grounds 
according to respondents in this phase.  These were behaviour changes that 
were practiced in response to the cumulative impact of the failing kaka and the 
legal systems in governance.  In practice, the emergence of armed groups, 
supposedly to provide security to the Acholi people prior to the fall of Acholiland 
in March 1986 to the NRA are some of the evidence given.  They also felt that the 
decline in the institutions of governance was exacerbated by the attitudes of the 
military regimes - which characterised Uganda national governance system since 
colonialism. From discussions, it was clear that the informal rules, that is, survival 
behaviours, substituted for both formal and traditional institutions in a number of 
key areas of physical rights, especially from the 1970s to 2010.  The traditional 
practice of caka, or borrowing/ loaning food from neighbours or the modern 
practice of money as a strategy for food security, were replaced by the informal 
and contemporary means, which included stealing and food aid302.  
During the LRA insurgency, two things happened that demonstrate lapse 
in the institutions of governance.  One was that a ruthless youth group, whom 
people referred to as boo kec, became a new form of authority in Acholi (see: 
Finnström, 2008:3).  Boo kec emerged in the vacuum of both formal and 
traditional laws that had constrained behaviours of groups or individuals in 
Acholiland.  Similarly, the emergence of the LRA is also seen as a behavioural 
change that signalled the lapse in culture as well as the absence of a state 
enforcement system.  In the latter case, it depicts Acholi as a limited statehood 
where the people were not protected by a sovereign state303.  The LRA thus 
became a behaviour that diverted from the norm, in the wake of a disintegrating 
social system, which since the 1900s, had relinquished the role of human 
protection to the state.   . 
                                                          
302Interviews and focus group discussions held over the periods in a number of 
locations that validated the information collected during CARE International study 
of 1998 carried in Kitgum District by the author. 
303Focus group analysis by the respondents 
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By 2010, Acholi as a society was virtually destroyed.  The primordial as 
well as the locality or neighbourhood social ties had significantly eroded, 
spiralling into more conflicts over land.  The disintegration of households as the 
foundation of the clan seems to have been the kingpin.  There were several 
parallel governance systems working in tandem, some against the re-
establishment of a traditional homestead or even the household structures in 
place.  The experiences in the camps, argued one elder, showed how the 
traditional meaning of domestic violence– daa me paco or daa me ot -were 
distorted by pluralism.  The rights-based approaches, advanced by the foreign 
NGOs, albeit with good intentions, escalated the interpretation of domestic 
disagreements to mean more than what the Acholi had practiced.  They further 
personalised the effects of the disagreements to mean individual violence to 
mainly women.  These new interpretations and meanings to daa paco dominated 
the legal and perhaps, the most preferred strategy in addressing the rights of the 
households in terms of food security, protection and social justice.  
While the call for peace and a return to villages resonated with virtually 
everybody in displacement, the expression of these views did not coalesce at the 
vital familial structures, especially with the newfound ideology of individual rights.  
The absence of viable political organisations or institutions within the community 
became evident.  The Local Council structures, however committed and aware of 
the realities, lacked the political muscle to enforce people’s will.  LCs is the 
statuary arm of the NRM government even where the NRM was not elected (e.g., 
Missier, 2012).  This leads to resource issues, both financial and technical.  The 
Council depended on central funds and they had to work with the bureaucrats, 
whose capacities were wanting, and the NGOs/CSOs, most of whom were ill 
equipped morally and technically to deliver save for emergency parameters. This 
confusion shed light on the working relationships between the different 
institutions.  
The Trends in Governing Interactions  
By governing actors, I refer to social-political actors, representing the 
multilateral groups, namely: those in the formal sector - the public and civil 
servants – as employees of governments, acting mainly based on formal rules 
(Kooiman, 2003: 15).  Their influencing actions have provisos attached to them.  
Then, there were the ludito as traditional leaders and actors, discussed 
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extensively in Chapter Six.  The third category were actors broadly categorised 
as informal – a group that included private sector organisations, NGOs and civil 
society organisations, who constitute the non-governmental actors.  While the 
private sector – such as professional societies, traders and others were guided 
by contracts, the civil society organisations – including community groups and 
local NGOs – on the other hand, used pluralistic approaches in resolving the 
livelihood insecurity of the Acholi people, for instance, by working towards the 
attainment of food security, protection and social justice.  
 
Figure 5.3: The Trends in the Governing Actors and Interactions in 
Acholiland from 1898 to 2010 
 
Source: Field Data, 2013 
Governing interactions in this case describe all types of governing efforts 
resulting from these diverse efforts - both internal304and external to the Acholi 
systems.  Kooiman (2003:1) sees governing interactions as exchanges that are 
mutually influencing relations.  Such exchanges include elements of sound 
                                                          
304 In Chapter 4, we noted that governance starts at the household levels, involving 
the husband (won ot or father of the house – plural wegi odi) and his wife (dako 
ne) or wives (mon ot ne) and the children (lotion or latin for singular), both girls 
(anyira or nyako for singular) and boys (awobe or awobi for singular).  It then 
escalates through to dog gang (dog gangi for plural) or village level and kaka or 
kaka madit (higher levels of clans or collective levels of clans).   
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social-political administration, and the management of community resources and 
democratic politics.  My sense of this following my work elsewhere and in 
Acholiland is that social-political interactions are often mediated by mistrust and 
trust.  As such, it is not necessarily mutually influencing305. Rather, trust and 
mistrust, according to the respondents, have continued to define the nature of 
social-political interactions in Acholiland.  In tolerating “outsiders’” mode of 
interactions, the Acholi have developed a process of learning, which enables the 
renegotiation of how long-term interactions can attain equilibrium that has defined 
the meaning of their co-existence.  The equilibrium might turn out to be one in 
which one side dominates the governing efforts.  Be that as it may, as an 
interaction, it is never a one-way relation.   
Most societal interactions within Acholi as a colonial society were 
informal, allowing exchanges that are mutually influencing and respected.  
However, most interactions are, according to respondents, formalised - including 
documentation as minutes or record notes – when engaging the formal sector.   It 
is normally in these formalities or informalities that trust or mistrust are defined.  
Figure 5.3 shows how the respondents interpreted governing interaction efforts of 
the political actors and how mistrust and trust influenced the achievement of their 
joined efforts.  
Trends in the rights of an Acholi under different systems  
From Figure 5.3, it can be stated that during the initial phase of the 
contemporary Acholiland306, the Acholi had more trust in the traditional 
institutions.  This entrustment of kaka obliged the community to comply with all 
commands of the colonial authorities.  This is because as Rawls (2007:129) puts 
it, even when the colonial authorities were considered unjust and morally 
illegitimate, they were the de facto or effective political authorities over Acholiland 
as a political territory of Uganda.  And, because legitimacy relates primarily to 
political institutions, kaka used its legitimacy to enter into a social contract with 
the formal political agents of the colonial authorities307. Locke (1980:63) notes 
                                                          
305I have also discussed gen – an Acholi word that is loosely used as trust - in the 
Acholi context, to explore what trust (gen) and mistrust (gen pe) actually mean to 
an Acholi. In the earlier chapters 
306Which I have identified as the colonial period, 1898 to 1962 
307For instance, in the 1898, some rwodi Acholi signed agreements with Major 
Radcliffe.  The respondents were not conversant with the contents of the said 
treaties.  However, rwodi Acholi signed many treaties with chiefs and District 
  
 
211 
that by kaka consenting to social contracts with the colonial authorities, it 
knowingly or unknowingly was bound to obey the orders of the colonial 
authorities.  In order to understand the dynamics of institutional mistrust and trust 
in the context of change, I have focused this analysis on one aspect of household 
livelihood security, the food security rights, as one example of how institutional 
interactions guided by trust and mistrust, have influenced the outcome of 
livelihoods security in Acholiland. 
Efforts during colonial era, 1898 to 1962 
On the basic rights – which are the household livelihood security during 
the colonial and first part of the post-colonial governments – respondents noted 
that a constellation of actors: the LGs, CSOs and kaka combined efforts resulted 
in improved agriculture production, which included livestock production (see: 
Leys, 1967; Pain, 1998).  Kaka, particularly at the food production level - dog 
gang and dye-kal - used its historically recognised legitimacy or what Kooiman 
(2003) terms as its political capital, to mobilise local CSOs for awak, a 
community-based collectivised service in response to colonial authority’s demand 
for increasing production (see: Allen, 1998).  Trusting in the leadership of the 
kaka, various social groups in Acholiland mobilised human capital and allocated 
land for agriculture, to exploit new agricultural technologies and extension 
services provided by LGs, private sector - like the British American Tobacco and 
the Indian Cotton Ginners - and the centre.  This resulted in increased agriculture 
production of cash and food crops (see: Pain, 1998 and Leys, 1967).   
This form of partnerships involving the traditional, formal and informal 
systems improved food availability when measured from the traditional baseline 
of 1898, although in some instances with significant challenges. Within this initial 
phase, LG exploited its de facto authority over the Acholi by using its own 
extension workers and messages in providing agricultural technologies that 
“revolutionised” agriculture in Acholiland (e.g., Ley, 1967: 51). Rwodi kweri as 
part of the traditional system, were co-opted into the formal system in compliance 
with existing social contract the traditional system had with LG.  Rwodi kweri 
were induced with new skills, to use their legitimate authority to effect change in 
the production system in tandem with colonial interests.  Coercions by the formal 
                                                                                                                                                               
Commissioners, which specifically tied them to working with LGs.  Such example 
included the posting of some rwodi like Rwot Olya as Sub-county Chief of Atyak. 
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system, it seems, were used to realign production to the benefits designated for 
the formal system (see: Pain, 1998).  
While the combinations of these reactions from the various actors 
improved the baseline position in food security, indigenous knowledge were 
marginalised under the new extension innovations - which were seen as a tool for 
modernisation.  In the aftermath of the structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s, the informal sectors – the private sector and NGOs – plugged into 
this sector, taking advantage of the limited statehood in Acholiland as mentioned 
earlier.  Albeit its illegitimacy, the state used its political authority to transform the 
livelihood security of the Acholi by exploiting its political authority and contracting 
the services of the NGOs, CSOs and private sector in the agriculture and food 
sector programmes.  
Post-colonial eras, 1962 to 2010 
These constellations of actors were obliged by social contracts entered 
with state agents, to deliver specific tasks.  The clarity of these tasks became 
more visible in the later periods of the Uganda state.  For instance, in the 2000s, 
social contracts were framed within Budget Support System of the Government of 
Uganda308.  This instrument bound all political actors to tasks that constellate into 
outcomes that contribute to a state-led agenda for poverty reduction framework, 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework.   
Particularly, during the NRM period, the new concept of governance as 
discussed in Chapter Two became very evident.  Respondents acknowledged 
that legal pluralism or governance as conceptualised in Chapter Two became a 
dominant feature in Acholiland. Particularly, from 1988 to-date, the international 
NGOs and the UN became synonymous with community governance.  These 
actors funded CSOs and special LG programmes with some innovations that 
included targeting of the women, youth and what other vulnerable households 
and their livelihood security (PRDP, 2007).  They also targeted training in new 
skills and in transformative behaviours and communications, targeting local 
CSOs, elevating them into locally based change agents in a more gender 
sensitive manner. These NGOs at the end, created within the community and 
                                                          
308Refer to the World Bank and DFID analyses of the budget support to Uganda, 
which can be found in World Bank reports available at: http://www.worldbank.org 
. 
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outside it, a “critical mass” of knowledge structures deciphered by their hubs and 
linked to the academics that were mainly externally mediated.  Their interventions 
changed the patterns of knowledge and ownership, cultures and their meanings, 
as the Acholi community became merely the unrecognised respondents.  
The respondents remembered that interventions of NGOs in Acholiland 
began way back in the late 1970s. ACORD, they indicated, played significant role 
in transforming agriculture and livelihood security in Acholiland.  They recalled 
how ACORD re-introduced oxen-plough technologies in the 1970s and 1980s in 
supporting agriculture transformation.  The style of their work, the emphasis and 
the intention of these NGOs, they argued, have shifted drastically over the years.  
While in the 1970s, they seem to have the lead in introducing new technologies 
and increasing production, in the later periods, they have been working 
particularly on the software of development: the gender mainstreaming and 
targeted groups. 
A report by the World Bank (2002) in which I contributed, concluded that 
communities in Acholiland had more faith in CSOs and NGOs than in any other 
stakeholders.  In fact the result of stakeholders’ analyses showed that 
communities in Acholiland did not trust government with their lives or household 
livelihood security, a constitutional function of the state309.  The main reasons 
advanced by the communities surveyed in Acholiland for their preference were 
tied to governance. For instance, they felt that these informal actors had better 
understanding of their situation, were technically more embedded and relevant.  
Additional support to these agencies through the Bank funding would improve 
their impact to the community.  
As reflected in Figure 5.2, this surge in legal pluralism involving non-
governmental organisations picked up globally following the reforms in 
governance in the 1980s, as discussed in Chapter Two310.   The activities of 
these actors in the case of northern Uganda peaked during the 1980s through to 
2010.  This demonstrated that Acholiland was a limited statehood – where the 
state had outsourced its core fragility mandates to foreign-based NGOs.  Ideally, 
Acholiland became a “protectorate” of the Uganda state.  
                                                          
309The same report interestingly found that communities in Kotido District that LG 
was the most trusted by communities  
310 See also works on Uganda led by the Norwegian Embassy (Thue et al., 2002) 
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CSOs and change in Acholiland 
Foreign NGOs are known to collaborate across-the-board - working for 
and with the community, but also for the public and private sectors as 
interlocutors for change311.  In Acholiland, INGOs like Save the Children Fund 
have directly or through local NGOs and CSOs worked with and for the state, 
providing specialised services and adding value to state-driven programmes312.  
Some of these duties include mainstreaming gender and environment as added 
values to existing LG programmes.  They also in some instances, target within 
existing programmes the “vulnerable groups”.  The latter, for various reasons, are 
situated in rather extreme and unattainable conditions that demand some form of 
fiduciary duties313.    
Here, these CSOs mobilised additional resources in some instances, to 
fill in these gaps, which are significant in national programming314.  An elder in 
Pabbo camp, however, observed that some of these specialised niches targeted 
by CSOs were supply led and new “technologies” developed by outsiders for 
change in the circumstance.  As such, foreign NGOs in particular, have in 
addition, introduced western values as part of the “global” input under the equity 
window.  These new areas, mainly seen as right-based approaches, became 
additional menu for driving recovery in the stressful northern environment.  
For instance, in advocating for children’s rights in conflict situation, my 
sense is that these humanitarian-cum-development partners decided to shift the 
tenor of national and local policies regarding children.  In a sense, they 
reimagined children in Acholiland from western-based themes of vulnerability, 
frailty, victimisation and incapability (see Drumbl, 2012:5-9; Boyden, 1997:125).  
                                                          
311In Acholiland, both the UN and INGOs - like Save the Children Fund, Norwegian 
Church Aid - humanitarian efforts were channelled through CSOs (women groups, 
youth, etc.) and national Nosing these cases, they work for government to 
implement its constitutional mandates in Acholiland. 
312Most state programmes do not budget for what today have become the niches for 
CSOs.  These are seen as crosscutting issues: gender, conflict sensitivity, 
vulnerability and environment matters.  NGOs and especially foreign ones have 
been instrumental in mainstreaming these themes in state-driven programmes. 
313 Discussion with implementers of the programmes. 
314It is important to note that having worked for over 14 years as part of the donor 
community in supporting budget processes in developing economy, I am 
conversant with these gaps.  In the case of Uganda, there was a donor sub-group 
designated to ensure that these significant activities that fall outside the 
mainstream sector-based budget lines, were considered together with 
government.  
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Needless to emphasise that these children lived then in an environment that did 
not guarantee most forms of human protection (Dolan, 2011: Chapter 4). The 
core assumption that children in Acholiland are victims and incapable, ignore the 
basic notion that a child in Acholiland is viewed as a human and living being – 
latin wai dano adana.  As Opiyo-Oloya (2013) alluded to while discussing child 
soldiers in Acholiland, dano adana is about humanity and denotes some level of 
capability and therefore responsibility that even a child can offer to their society 
(Opiyo-Oloya, 2013:123, 157).    In a sense, western-based conceptualisation of 
children wrongly exaggerates the passiveness and victimhood of an Acholi child 
(see: Drumbl, 2012: 18-22).  From the discussions held, this motive devalue 
some of the traditionally renowned roles an Acholi child played in their society 
(Opiyo-Oloya, 2013:17, 21-22)315.  
NGOs have also been conduits for the implementation of community-
based programmes316 and in disseminating whatever these programmes 
intended to do.  As such, they supported communities to articulate their own 
priorities317.   The role of CSOs and other non-state organisations, particularly in 
the last thirty years, in the quest for the preservation, protection or promotion of 
“universal human rights or values” in Acholi have received mixed responses318.  
While others have focused on their positive aspects, including supporting the 
Acholi community (e.g., Finnström, 2008; 134, 174-176)319, others have been 
rather unforgiving of the mistakes that CSOs have created in terms of 
undermining capacity building of the state institutions (Branch, 2011: 30-33).   
                                                          
315 In the traditional Acholi culture, a child mentor in form of a sitter or lapidi was 
allocated to a child during naming of the child, which was the third (boy) or forth 
(girl) days of their birth. Lapidi had a define role for the child s/he mentored, 
supporting the mother in raising a good child.  Later, pidi became a support 
service to households, including feeding of the child as her mother toils for the 
household.  As Opiyo-Oloya (2013:17, 21-22) stated, a child is thus, dano adana. 
316 Most community-based organisations were conduits for the implementation of 
socio-economic activities in the area 
317 Foreign–based NGOs like ACORD, Save the Children and Government funded 
programmes like NUSAF helped in capacity building for self articulation by 
community groups  
318 See: Discussion with Hon. Norbert Mao as Chairman of Gulu District.  
319 Seveker Finnström, 2008 - for instance observed that WHO released health report 
that was very telling, however, was until the time for his interview, was made use 
of by the responsible people.  The report was compiled by CSOs in the camps. 
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NGOs substituting traditional actors 
During the post-colonial era and especially from the 1980s on-wards, the 
NGOs normative engagement with community were, from Figure 5.3, inversely 
correlated to that of kaka as a political system, implying that foreign NGOs had 
subsumed kaka into their constituencies, thus, exploiting their political legitimacy 
in delivering on the expanded tasks that were morally available to the NGOs.  
These additional tasks for NGOs included provision of services for livelihood 
security, which are the designated mandate of LGs and the state.  State 
programmes are dominantly supply led in Uganda and they do not necessarily fit 
into the priorities of the local people320.  Some specific added value of CSOs 
interventions in government programmes are highlighted above and included 
targeted interventions by these NGOs in specific and specialised areas like 
conflict, gender, HIV/AIDS, and child rights.  
Since changes in the content of kaka are central to my thesis, I argue 
that because “universal human rights” as perceived by these western funded 
CSOs have had mixed outcomes, modernisation has had painful consequences.  
Unfortunately, CSOs have subsumed the functions of the traditional systems.  
The Church and religious organisations for instance, have substituted the kac 
and abila for spiritual nourishment.  In addition, they provide social and economic 
support to their followers, something that ludito kaka have failed to deliver. In the 
absence of meaningful government structures, CSOs have personalised the state 
of quagmire in Acholiland and pretty much co-opted families and individuals 
through gifts and materials that have compromised genuine acceptability.  This 
has halted the growth of agnatic and patrilineal hegemony. 
The primary objective of foreign CSOs, argued elders, is to usher 
cultural change, along the lines of the West.  
 “So, they have preyed on our weaknesses by targeting our women and 
children.  These two are the core of our society.  Poverty, ignorance and 
                                                          
320 A discussion of how particularly in the North, development grants targeting sector 
work have failed to address the internally displaced persons’ key demands, 
including security, have been discussed by both the Disaster Management 
Committees and donor groups that formed a discussion group on northern 
Uganda, to which I was a member for over five years (1998 to 2005).  Similar 
sentiments can be found in the Local Government Evaluation Reports of 2000 to 
2010. 
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suffering have been fused with Western ideologies with the outcomes that 
are regrettable.”321   
Not surprisingly, foreign NGOs, in collaboration with local ones, have not only 
offered better physical comfort to elders who, through them, have continued to 
enjoy sitting on “their stools”, as members of the CSOs would extract messages 
from them and share with others, something which in the past was transmitted 
through trusted youngsters322.    They have carefully taken over elders’ societal 
roles, including in mobilisation and advocacy in the field of traditional conflict 
mediation and resolution in the case of Acholi.  Hence, because of weak 
institutional capacity within the elders and kaka in general and the convergence 
of interests in reducing death and holding peace, I argue that the actions of these 
CSOs can implicitly be seen as a form of co-optive relationship.   
A set of co-optive relations is demonstrated by perhaps two or more 
elements of governance.   One is the shared interest or goal between the 
community and these actors, which in this case was the desire for peace (see: 
James, 1998).   They then, in turn, recognise this as an opportunity to gain power 
and stature because the situation in the north was a global catastrophe.  Since 
CSOs lack bureaucratic guidelines, they have applied co-optive mechanisms and 
captured the space once occupied by kaka as the voices of the oppressed.  In 
doing so, they in fact misinterpret the meanings of the community struggles, 
disarming them from articulating their collective issues, contending that they 
understand Acholi society better than even their members of parliament.  
There has been a consistent erosion of tradition due to lack of practice 
and guidance.  Mato oput, for instance, which Allen (2006) contends was an 
invention in the wake of the LRA insurgency, had lost legitimacy and relevance 
partly because the archives of knowledge of practice were disputable.   This 
certainly followed the continuing emphasis by these NGOs of what is seen as 
“best practices” or the blue prints of globalisation and peace templates produced 
by the international agencies (Drumbi, 2012).  The other dimension was the 
choice by donors to use CSOs in the agenda of developing the north.  Much as 
                                                          
321 Quotation from elders during focus group discussion in Pabbo camp obtained in 
November 2005. 
322Nuwagaba, Vincent (2014) is a human rights defender, researcher and life member 
of the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI).  His comments on the 
failures of NGOs and especially their wits in taking away the voices of the people 
makes sense particularly in the Acholi during Museveni period. 
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one can understand this as an indication of global interest to continue with their 
humanitarian roles in supporting the recovery of the north, one, however, would 
doubt the long-term implications of such strategy.   This is especially important in 
view of the under tone raised by elders, which insinuates that change being 
smuggled by foreign NGOs, conflict with local and customary ideals.   This is 
because the parameters of human rights in this fragile situation are complex, and 
demand cross modernism, considering the different capacities and relevance of 
the actors.   
The attacks by NGOs on patrilineal hegemony, however thoughtful, were 
often approached wrongly and left behind the feeling that gender is about 
women323.  However, it has become the niche of western supported CSOs, with 
shortfalls both in the actual meaning and consequences of their work. Hence, 
CSOs’ attempt to add value to recovery could have best been exercised in the 
presence of programmes with higher multiplier effects on the overall recovery 
exercises.  As a result, the emphasis on gender empowerment in the absence of 
larger decentralisation programmes, to uplift people merely created areas of 
conflict and violence.  This is because CSOs merely define the change that they 
can afford to fund but not necessarily achieve.  Mr Norbert Mao, who was 
Chairperson of Gulu District Local Government from 2006 to 2010, has faulted 
foreign NGOs for co-opting vulnerable people and by doing so, distorting the 
purpose of what was perceived as their role – to complement local government 
development324.  In many sense, the legitimacies of non-governmental actors in 
Acholiland were moral-based, drawn from the social contract entered between 
central government and donors, who provided more than sixty per cent of 
Uganda’s budget.  As argued by Raz (1995:356), the Acholi society, as a political 
subject of the Uganda state knowingly or not, consented to the effort of the non-
governmental organisations.  This consent became the main source of the 
current contract between the government and the NGOs. 
                                                          
323 Talking to the youth in one of my many engagements, it was interesting to learn 
that when they make reference as “my gender”, they actually meant their 
girlfriends. 
324In one of my many one to one discussion with Hon Norbert Mao, a Lawyer, 10 
years as a member of parliament for Gulu Municipality, five years as Chairperson of 
Local Council, Gulu District and currently president general of the Democratic Party.  
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Is Acholi a Case of Limited Statehood? 
In chapter three, I argued that Uganda, like all developing states, has 
failed the litmus test of a modern statehood (See: Rubongoya, 2007:4; Thomson, 
2010:Location 383).  “Governance packages” (see: Russel, 2011)325 for a modern 
state, which are the normative list of “good governance” used by western 
democracies, have not yet worked in all developing countries, including Uganda 
(e.g., Risse, 2011: 11-15).   Specifically in the case of Uganda, Rubongoya 
(2007:23-29, 39-41) and others (see: Tripp, 2010) have asserted how, through 
history, neo-patrimonial statehood in Uganda has worked against the 
development of the modern state.  As such, Acholi and most parts of northern 
Uganda represent cases of limited statehood because the ‘central authority’ has 
not been able to enforce good governance consistently.   In the case of 
Acholiland, the government failed for over twenty years to “implement and 
enforce rules and decisions…at least temporarily” (Risse, 2011:10-20).   An ideal 
statehood has full internal and external sovereignty but above all, the capability to 
deliver services for its citizens (Risse, 2011:18-20).  The majority of the 
respondents also agree “Government in Acholiland thus became virtually 
synonymous with police” (Sathyamurthy, 1986:343).   
“Direct” Verses “Indirect” Rule in Acholi 
The colonial product of institutional innovation - the corporate Local 
Government – was an alternative mask for an African governance model 
(Mamdani, 1996).  “Indirect rule”, according to the architect, Fredrick Lugard, 
aimed to work through “native leaders” and utilising native social structures 
(Lugard, 2008).  Under indirect rule, a British political officer would take charge of 
the administration and would use their discretion to make things work as he 
deemed fit (see: Dierburg, 1926).  Hence, foreign political officers technically 
were advisers to the native chiefs.  This is similar to current advisory situations, 
with foreign expatriates in developing countries.  The advisers had the latitude to 
create what they called “warrant chiefs”, who had no political legitimacy (see: 
Gilbert and Reynolds, 2008:327).  This was a positive attribute because they 
have no conflict of interest but do what it takes to make their employer happy. 
                                                          
325The package of modern state is the “good governance”, which is made up of an 
effective government, the rule of law, human rights, democracy, market economy 
and a degree of social welfare (Russel, 2011) 
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Acholi macon had no semblance of despotic rulers, and “indirect rule”, in 
the case of Acholi where such outfits were lacking, demanded the establishment 
of these genuine authoritarian structures.  Colonialists assigned “warrant chiefs” 
who were selected by them as real leaders (Leys, 1967:40-60; P’Ojok, 2007).  
They did this by applying the native policy that allowed them employ expatriates 
from Buganda and elsewhere to help redesign local governance, which mirrored 
their “modern governance” system, the Baganda model (see: Mamdani, 2002).  
As such, traditional structures were amalgamated, in some instances, piling 
enemy clans like the Payiira and Padibe together, and depending on the rwot at 
the helm of that kaka, the rwot could become a chief or sub-chief, or locally 
referred to as jago.  The action created hierarchical structures where horizontal 
relationships existed prior to 1902.   
In the absence of “real leaders”, JR Postlethwaite as Commissioner 
handpicked trusted local expatriates and trained them to carry out his orders, 
although some rwodi Acholi felt uncomfortable with the modus operandi of the 
colonial programmes and absconded from implementing the programmes 
(Branch, 2011: 46-49).  The young men selected from Acholi as clerks based on 
their ability, loyalty-traits and diligence became the first generation of colonial civil 
servants in Acholi (e.g., p’Ojok, 2007).  The majority of these “well” trained 
warrant officers were from the lubong agnates, who were putative kin in the luker 
agnates.  In 1914, they became the first warrant chiefs in the entire Acholi.  They 
were posted arbitrarily to replace the expatriates who had been hired to work on 
behalf of rwodi Acholi.   
The new system had nothing in common with the structure of 
governance that existed earlier (Branch, 2011:48). The result was that the British 
appointed these chiefs to run a new system that had nothing to do with kaka 
structures but existed to exploit the Acholi (see: Girling, 1960:9).   Those rwodi 
Acholi like Rwot Olya of kaka Atiak, who continued to work for the colonialists, 
were delineated by lwak (p’Ojok, 2007).  In other words, a new system was 
imposed alongside the old.  By the end of his regime in 1917, Postlethwaite and 
his agents had directly rolled out in Acholi a parallel governing model and mode 
operandi that competed in a number of areas but also supplemented the 
traditional kaka system.   
The chiefs had no native rights to the office of the rwodi Acholi.  They 
were, in most instances, aliens to the areas where they were posted to operate 
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(Branch, 2011: 49).  Thus, in addition to creating a governing space for the 
lubong as rwodi kalam or warrant chiefs, the colonial regime established a 
trifurcation of power in which the traditional Acholi system competed with a hybrid 
of the Buganda and the British system on one hand - the civil local authorities 
administered mainly by the lubong – and on the other, a number of kinetic 
politicians that formed the youth movements of the Acholi politicians.   This, I 
argue, was a fundamental change – one that destroyed moral governance and 
replaced it with a predatory system, the state that has failed in the whole one 
hundred and twelve years, to showcase its relevance. 
There were also other misconceptions.  In general, respondents showed 
the presence of the army in Acholi went beyond the mere demand for security.  
As reported in many instances, the national army since 1986 has had conflicting 
roles in Acholiland, some very demeaning and have been widely discussed 
elsewhere (see: Dolan, 2011: 22, 61-67, 109, 120 and Chapter 8; Finnström, 
2008: 174-180).  However, it has always been the non-state actors who 
manifested stronger engagement in humanitarian discourse in Acholiland. The 
consistent lack of positive engagement of the government in Acholi during this 
period was interpreted as its payback to the Acholi, who had consistently voted 
against the NRM in all the general elections carried then. Such arguments make 
sense in a neo-patrimonial system like Uganda, where patronage is dominant.   
“We are at the mercy of these foreign children.  We are certainly grateful 
to their governments.  They at least bring something for us, which even 
our local governments cannot do.  Where is the government?” 
  Respondent from Awach, 2006 
However, as part of multilateral and multi-layered engagements by 
actors in a fragile situation with limited political and technical capacity, Uganda 
state correctly relied on non-state actors.  However, this should have not been 
seen as additional because it was if anything more profound.  The absence of 
good coordination of these non-state actors, which Office of the Prime Minister 
was responsible for, justifies the claim that Acholi was a limited statehood.  At the 
local level, there were District Disaster Committees, whose leaders were top civil 
servants in districts.  Records show that their engagements were scanty, as they 
had to attend to their “core duties”, most of which related to their capacity building 
in the management of decentralised financing by donors.  In good faith, the non-
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governmental actors took a lead in the agenda of the recovery, at best, in the 
things they were good at (Odihambo, 2010).   
Arguably, emergency and humanitarian activities in the north were 
“outsourced” to non-state actors, who exploited the opportunity to stake human 
rights and democracy issues far over the central concerns about building 
institutions and structures that were deemed critical in enforcing good 
governance.  They exploited the absence of state coordination and ran their 
agenda of recovery, based on what appealed to them.  Danida, for instance, 
focused on the democratisation of the youth as an important engagement for 
recovery.  They put significant resources through civil societies to teach youth 
about human rights and elections326.  This effort had some disconnect with the 
realities. Not that the youth did not know their rights – to the contrary, they 
needed help to “lift off the burden of the big brothers who were taking away their 
space because these big brothers were more connected and were supported by 
the same Danida”327. 
There is certainly more evidence of Acholi’s claim as a protectorate of 
the Uganda state, based on the features of limited statehood but also on the 
basis of service delivery (see: Heldgaard and Givan, 2011)328.  The Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan, (PEAP) 2004/08, for instance, set as a goal under the 
Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC), that the NRM were committed to two 
relevant actions that were specific to the north.  One was finalising the Internally 
Displaced Person’s (IDP) policy and secondly, implementing the post-conflict 
plan that respected the rights of the internally displaced.    
While development partners helped the government finalise the IDP 
Policy within a reasonable time, there was insufficient legislation for effective 
implementation (e.g., Rugadiya et al., 2006).  The IDP policy was, according to 
government, diversionary.  It rubs against an important area of credibility for 
internal sovereignty, in which the NRM has laid claim of since it took power, that 
Uganda was a peaceful country under its rule - implying that the insecurity and 
the resulting mass displacement in Acholi were insignificant even when the entire 
                                                          
326 Discussion held with a political leader in Kitgum and Pader. 
327An interesting viewpoint from some of the beneficiaries of the Danida project. 
328 Human Right and Democratisation Project (HRDP) of the DANIDA started around 
2002 and it evolved into a five year Danida Human Rights and Good Governance 
Office.  
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community was displaced.  Admittedly, in terms of economic growth figures, 
things had improved following the NRM assumption of authority in 1986.  
Uganda’s economy grew by an average of six per cent per annum from 1989 to 
2000329.  This development alone had underplayed or even disregarded the 
devastation in Acholi, until a study by civil society examining the mortality rate in 
Acholi showed a different case (see: CSOPNU, 2006).330  The study made the 
point that economic growth was not a sufficient indicator of good governance 
(see: Fukuyama, 2013: 349-351).  However, both donors and the government 
collectively wanted to profile the economy to account for how aid works under 
authoritarian leadership.  As such, the PRSC action point demanding a policy for 
developing a post-conflict plan to address the issues of displacement and poverty 
in Acholi and the other northern Uganda became insignificant331.  
The members of parliament from the North I spoke to confirm that the 
PRSC action point required legislation that, among other things, would support 
the implementation of the IDP Policy, as resources could be channelled to the 
programme.  This would, however, acknowledge the right of the IDPs as a unique 
category of people who needed a special approach or programme.  The National 
Policy on IDPs had a good stated objective.  It aimed to integrate displacement 
issues in the mainstream government’s PRSP planning and programming.  
However, it needed corresponding legislation to benefit from funding under the 
consolidated budget.  The other manifestation of non-commitment by the state in 
supporting the human rights of the Acholi was in the land sector.   
Evidently, historical projections and research carried out as part of the 
poverty reduction analytical work had informed the NRM and its development 
partners of the central role land play in the livelihoods of the Acholi (MoFEP, 
2004).   Noticeably, both groups knew the question of land as a likely centre of 
dispute and controversy on the return to normalcy (Rugadiya et al., 2006).  In 
spite of this obvious outcome, the Land Sector Strategic Plan: 2001-2011, funded 
by donors, had no regard for the concerns of internal displacement.  While there 
were opportunities within the framework that could adequately enable Acholi to 
                                                          
329Ministry of Finance and Economic Development of Uganda Reports, 1989 to 2000 
330 A study carried by the civil societies showed that 3.2 per cent of the GDP was lost 
annually to the conflict in the north.   
331In one of my discussions with Robert Blake, who by then was the Country Manager 
of the World Bank, he asserted that the growth figures clearly supported the view 
that the North was not important in the recovery process of the country. 
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engage with the issues within the required time, this was not granted (Rugadiya 
et al., 2006).  For instance, a framework for decentralised land administration and 
dispute resolution was available within the sector framework that allowed the 
flexibility for specificity in consultation as well as in enabling the displaced 
population deal with this matter at the appropriate time (Rugadiya et al., 2006).   
When Mr Okello-Okello, the then Chairman of the Acholi Parliamentary 
Group, raised this matter on the floor of parliament, it was ignored (Okello Okello, 
2006).  The fact was that the principles of the National Land Policy allowed for 
the separation of the function of land ownership, land use planning and land 
development.  Considering that poverty reduction was the central piece of land 
reform through good investment, the rights of IDPs to land was clearly known as 
having been a key factor that had significantly caused food insecurity in the 
region (Rugadiya, et al., 2006).  Ordinarily, the need to restore stability in land 
relations and the resumption of livelihood activities in Acholi could adequately 
have been dealt with under the framework.  
The legislation on land, therefore, was short on how local institutions in 
the post-conflict Acholiland could be enabled to offer an option for amicable and 
reconciliatory ways of addressing land disputes and claims.  This was particularly 
true since the society or community that constituted the traditional system was 
destroyed by the LRA war.  Implicit in these are the continued failure of the NRM 
government and post independent governments to provide the devastated Acholi 
community with a more focused programme that embodied the principles of 
reparation and development of the region (see: de Greiff, 2009; Roht-Arriaza and 
Orlovsky, 2009).  Except during the 1960s, the Uganda state has acted as a 
protectorate of the Acholi society while dealing with the Acholi.  Evidence of this 
is seen in how the state is viewed in the region, especially by the increasing 
numbers of poor since 1970s.  
A regime that could turn around the north from the perennial suffering it 
has undergone over the one hundred and ten years of existence can claim 
success in nation building.  Evidently, the absence of effective state functions in 
Acholiland, save for the military, prompted the NRM in 2007 to design a 
programme that would “sell” the state to the people of Acholi (PRDP, 2007).  
Sadly, although not surprisingly, the money that was mobilised from external 
sources was diverted and/or misappropriated before it could be used (PAC 
Report, 2014).  This caused the major donors to withdraw resources from 
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national budgets and to use civil society organisations as the conduits of their 
funds instead.  As we will see below, I argue that the use of civil society 
organisations as a main conduit of development governance is misplaced as it 
lacks the hierarchal principles to make change work for the people. 
Traditional Institutions and Change 
Figure 5.2 and 5.3 show how the traditional governing systems remained 
vibrant even with the introduction of a formal system.  However, it plummeted into 
insignificance during the twenty-four years of the NRM regime, yet the NRM 
resurrected Ker Kwaro Acholi as a contemporary and legally recognised 
custodian of the Acholi traditions in 1995332.  There were evidently doubts about 
the credibility of the contemporary ludito kaka. However, seen from the benefits 
of indigenous knowledge, they withstood the test of challenging modern systems 
on practices that were akin to Acholi and placed them aside as a group of people 
with special customs. 
From the respondents’ perspective, the re-invention of Ker Kwaro Acholi 
was a political project.  First, in its current form, it embraces the colonial version 
of the restructured kaka institutions that lacked the culture of facultative 
mutualism (Ojera, 2008:103)333.  Secondly and most importantly, the content of 
what are seen as traditions and the mandate of Ker Kwaro Acholi are certainly 
not clear following all the past turmoil.  Third, it is doubtful if Acholiland, under a 
modern statehood and its historical trajectory, see its continued evolution as a 
political community within Uganda state as successful.  Consequently, the 
contemporary “tradition”, much as it might hold some values, is not well explained 
to mostly younger generation of the Acholi (see: Cagney, 2011).  As ceremonial 
figures, rwodi and ludito kaka are additional burdens to the community.  The 
constitution clearly states that they can “not join or participate in partisan politics” 
                                                          
332  Republic of Uganda, the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, Article 
246, Chapter 16 – Institutions of Traditional or Cultural Leaders, pg. 175 
333 While traditional Ker Karo as explained in Chapter 4 and 5  were organized around a core agnates 
and they were many, the colonial authority in the late 1950s created a centralized Ker Kwaro with 
Lawii Rwodi as the  paramount chief.  This model has been replicated in 2005 when NRM 
reinvented the institution.  This time around, there is also an office of a prime minister and of 
ministers for specific activities. 
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or “have or exercise any administrative, legislative or executive powers of 
Government or local government.”334.   
Today, some of the so-called traditional leaders are in elected 
government positions or civil service (Burke, 2011).  A good number of them are 
councillors, which are political positions.  Acholi might feel compelled to 
institutionalise kaka ideology because it is, in reality, worthy of the situation they 
are in, considering that Uganda is not a welfare state.  Having rwodi in the 
existing institutions raises serious conflict of interest.  The despotic arrangement 
from the Baganda system that was used to create local governance in the 1900s 
had this kind of arrangement.  Hence, it can be inferred that this would become 
ineffective or a patronage of the state. 
The Local Government Structures 
The Figures 5.1 to 5.3 generally show that Local Government was 
perceived as less embedded and more irrelevant during colonial time.  This view, 
however, changed in the 1960s.   This is unsurprising because it was an 
imposition with different approach.  It was created to implement decisions from 
the state and as such, it was a delegated mandate from the state.  Chiefs as 
Native Administrators had no direct relationship with the people (Gertzel, 
1974:15.  Local Government took root around 1914 following the posting of rwodi 
kalam as the new administrators of the colonial Acholiland.  However, LG by the 
1950s had assumed prominence as a governing institution capable of making 
decisions? (Gertzel, 1974:15).  In contrast to kaka, it was rated as detached and 
because of the application of hierarchal authority, some leaders of the Acholi 
community were disengaged from it as a principle before independence.  
The Acholi “traditional” governance system, as we know, was 
polycephalous.  This, as Girling (1960) observed, actually guaranteed balance of 
power between the mutually opposing governing actors that constituted the 
kaka’s governing realm.  From testimonies of those who lived it, social power, 
political influence and status were widely distributed, which gave the social-
political actors opportunities for both individual and collective efforts and 
                                                          
334 Republic of Uganda, the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, Article 246, 
Chapter 16 – Institutions of Traditional or Cultural Leaders. P.p. 175 
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satisfaction (Girling, 1960: 177).  However, by 1962, these features had 
progressively disappeared through manipulation, reconfiguration and over 
competitiveness.  The logic and rationale of these institutional reforms were clear 
and it was no secret that it was inappropriate for the conditions and purposes for 
which they should have been created (Brett, 1996).  However, it was a movement 
that had external forces and benefits, as was shown in Chapter Two.  
Democracy, it was believed, could best be achieved by adopting the western 
model governance system as best practice regardless of the historical trajectory.   
So, the formal system had large measures of imported, decentralised 
despotism that was intended to achieve a specific form of democracy in 
Acholiland (e.g., Leys, 1967: 9). Counties, Gombolola or Sub-Counties, Parishes 
and Villages were the new hierarchical governing structures that replaced kaka. 
Chiefs, Jagi, Mukungi and Nyampara were the corresponding administrators by 
the mid-1900s.  These structures were accountable to the District, with a white 
man as the District Commissioner who was superior to any other chiefs or rwodi 
Acholi (Girling, 1960: 61-62).  Power accumulated with the District Commissioner, 
who was a foreigner.  Rulers also replaced leaders.  Chiefs and the jagi also 
accumulated powers that rwodi Acholi never had.  The statutory basis for the 
authority of chiefs was the Native Authority Ordinance of 1919 (Gertzel, 1974: 
16).  Subsequent amendments under the Ordinance concentrated powers into 
their hands.  They were everything, from tax collectors, guardians of state laws to 
development agents (Gertzel, 1974:16). Figure 5.3,shows how Local Authorities 
were seen as insignificant in pursuance of participation of the Acholi as part of 
the household livelihood security during colonial days.  The participation of the 
Acholi did not improve much even during the post-colonial regimes, implying that 
the new system shuns participation of the beneficiary. 
Indeed, there seemed to be considerable irrelevance in the new 
governing architecture.  The creation of boundaries that divided organically 
formed communities was of significant inconvenience.  However, it did not, in my 
opinion, destroy nor delineate the territorial mandates of the clans.  For instance, 
kaka Payiira was split and scattered into a number of administrative areas335.  
The District Commissioner used his discretion to forcefully move some lineages 
from their original and ancestral bases to new locations.  This, I was told, was 
                                                          
335  For a detailed split of the pre-colonial setting see Uma-Owiny, 2013   
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from the weakening Rwot Awich of Payiira, who was seen as a rebel (Uma-
Owiny, 2013).  However, the ludito kaka, as well as the rwodi moo, retained their 
traditional status as leaders of their people, although their roles were reshuffled 
within the context of the reconstructed customary laws.  They were subordinate 
to civil servants, an imposed hierarchy that introduced authoritarian realities in 
the existing culture of governance in Acholi, to establish a new apex of 
governance, the Uganda project. 
There was a façade in the social-political content and context of the new 
administrations.  Unlike kaka that had purposive and social contents, which were 
inward looking with the intention to promote the growth of the individual agnatic 
lineages, the new structures that came during the 1900s, on the other hand, did 
the contrary (Beke, 2004; P’Ojok, 2007:4-9; Misier, 2012).  This is a case of 
formal institutions undermining the traditional ones.  The new governing system 
has continued to change, balancing its outward perspectives with inward 
preferences.  For instance, the Constitution of Uganda allows Local Governments 
to enact by-Laws that are more appropriate for the local governments.  This 
governing instrument, however, need not contradict the constitutions.  Even then, 
here the focus, unlike with kaka, is the new community defined by legally defined 
boundary.  Overall, the contemporary system demands that Acholi change with it.  
It sets new boundaries for community leadership, like the requisite practical skills 
in modern administration, and modern politics, that enforce top-down views rather 
than mentorship for advice.  In addition, the system is ever changing, to conform 
to global demands, consistently demanding shifts in local skills and capacities, 
thereby downsizing what is traditional to the margins.  For instance, the 
rainmaking skills of rwodi moo, if at all it was there, became redundant when the 
department of meteorology came into effect. Unfortunately, the new system did 
not make rain but they successfully use scientific knowledge as a source of 
information to substitute the claims of rainmaking – a role that was wrongly 
associated with the rwodi moo.  Similarly, conflict mediation and resolution have 
become a shared responsibility of the traditional and the state, with institutions 
like the police and the courts taking a key interest in human rights and social 
justice.  These forced traditions to the margin. 
Local Government might have been created in the image of the 
colonialists and with the core purpose of transforming Acholiland through 
sustainable local revenue generation (p’Ojok, 2007:8).  Different forms of local 
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taxes were therefore introduced by colonialists and further modified during post-
colonial eras (Leys, 1967:45; p’Ojok, 2007:4-9).  In order to raise these taxes, 
Acholiland had to invest in physical socio-economic infrastructure, sustainable 
management capacity and enhanced agriculture production and productivity, to 
break even (Priesthest, 1947).  Thus, a new agenda, arguably outside its 
traditional domain, was brought in that could best be mediated by what was 
hierarchal rather than hierarchical (see: Brett, 1992).  The idea of generating 
funds for local governance was a great idea in the circumstances and was 
partially achieved by the 1950s and 1960s, in spite of the attitude used in the 
implementation (see:  P’Ojok, 2007)336.  
Achievements of the New Reform in Local Governance 
These achievements, although applauded by Acholi, were the result of a 
top-down administration.  It drills in the point that community governance is a mix 
of many modes.  However, experiences show that the moral application of a 
hierarchical mode of governance in heterarchy cultures demands consultation337.  
Acholi was historically engaged in the Uganda project but mainly in two distinct 
respects.  It participated in agriculture production, and urban employment (see: 
Pain, 1998:15).  Acholi’s experience with slave traders dented their interest in 
casual labours for others and Girling (1960) did admit that rwodi Acholi never 
kept slaves as their counterparts in Bunyoro did.  The first post-independent 
periods - 1962 to 1972 – showed increased build up in human capacities with 
Acholi, at one time, having the highest number per capita of public servants per 
population number (see: Onyango Odongo, 2009; Gertzel, 1974).  This build-up 
of skills started in Acholi around 1946 to 1953, which was the aftermath of the 
World War period.  Droughts and famine had devastated Acholi in 1938 and 1939 
and this led to a number of young men joining the national army.   
                                                          
336 Respondents narrated how chiefs reacted when districts did not meet set targets 
of production.  Such failures offered opportunities for ethnic tortures and 
nightmares.  They also recalled how, before graduated taxes were abolished in 
2001, the beginning of every year was a time for unsuccessful men to change 
residence from their villages, in fear of arrest for defaulting payment for their dues.   
337 The World Bank has experiences supporting ownership of hierarchical governance 
by communities by encouraging states to deepen their consultations with 
communities, as was the case with the Poverty Reduction Strategic Credits (PRSC). 
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In addition, Acholi Local Government, from the 1940s onwards, had 
invested significantly in education (see: Leys, 1967:50-53).  These became the 
core of its human skills that had relevance in the new direction.  When Acholi 
District Authority assumed responsibility for primary education in 1962, its target 
for school enrolment in primary school education was fifty three per cent, far 
above the national target (Leys, 1967:50:53).  The District also allocated fifty per 
cent of its recurrent budget annually to education.  As a result, by January 1965, 
there were four secondary schools instead of three in Acholi out of the sixty-six 
countrywide.  
In the early 1960s, although Acholi was only 4.4 per cent of Uganda’s 
population, it had 7.2 per cent of the African employment (see: Leys, 1967: 49).  
The peak was in 1961 with some seven thousand, two hundred and fifteen Acholi 
employed in public service.  However, employment in the private sector was low, 
with four hundred and forty five African traders by 1963 (Mamdani, 1976: 208-
209).  These numbers, however, ignores the numerous cattle herders in the 
eastern plain of Acholiland and all other smallholder farmers, who by their nature 
are private holders.  Especially from 1948 to 1971, the education of boys was an 
important avenue for urban employment (Pain, 1998:15).  According to available 
statistics, Acholi ranked among the highly educated Ugandans in the early 1960s 
through to mid-1970s.  By the eve of Uganda’s independence in 1962, sixty 
administrators were required from the forty-eight tribes that made up Uganda 
(Onyango Odongo, 2009).  Acholi was able to provide eight of the total numbers 
required, far beyond its quota of two persons per ethnic group338.   
In fact, arguments in support of marginalisation of the Acholi in particular 
have always been promoted by the generalisation that the North was designated 
as a source of labour reserve for the central region (Ginyera-Pinycwa, 2002; 
Gertzel, 1974:9).  While the British had made such outrageous plans by delaying 
the introduction of cash crops in Acholi, the influx of the Banyarwanda from 
Rwanda and Burundi into Buganda in the 1930s and 1940s changed this 
                                                          
338 Acholi provided the first African Permanent Secretary and Engineer-in-Chief, 
Ministry of Works in East Africa. On the eve of political independence, the 48 tribes 
in Uganda had produced 60 administrative officers. Of the 60 officers, 8 were 
Acholi who were deployed as follows:  (1) Abednego Ongom, Kampala; (2) Eric 
Lakidi, Mbale; (3) Wilson Lutara, Moroto;(4) Ignatius Latigo, Soroti; (5) Justin Okot, 
Kitgum; 6) Anthony Ochaya, Moyo; (7) Alfred Okumu, Fort Portal; (8) Jekerani 
Odwonga, Kabale. 
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architecture (Branch, 2011: 49-50).  Additionally, Acholi’s culture and attitude 
towards engaging in farm labour for others was a significant deterrent (Girling, 
1960:61-62).  This mentality was entrenched following the slave trade regime in 
the late nineteenth century.  An Acholi would rather toil on his unproductive field 
than work for somebody else339.  In addition, Acholi’s economy that was based on 
small-scale agriculture and its human “carrying capacity” that was acquired 
during the 1950s and thereafter, were equally a significant deterrent.   
The years from 1950 to 1966 were the best for the Acholi of Uganda 
(Pain, 1998:3-17; p’Ojok, 2007: 5-12) and Figures 5.1 through to 5.3 supported 
this impression.  Although its agriculture has been predominantly subsistence 
oriented, it was modelled to produce primary products for both the colonial 
authority and postcolonial central governments.  Nothing much has changed for 
the better even today.  If anything, subsistence agriculture, including the rearing 
of animals, crashed during the LRA insurgency (World Bank, 2004).  Part of the 
on-going recovery in the food sector in my view, could include reviving 
agricultural productivity of the staples, to ensure food sovereignty at household 
levels. 
Cotton lint and to a lesser extent, flue cured tobacco, were the two main 
export-oriented crops that were promoted in Acholiland from the 1940s through to 
the present time (Gertzel, 1974; Pain, 1998; PRDP, 2007).   While cotton 
production was introduced in Uganda in 1903, it only arrived in the northern part 
of Uganda much later as a policy (e.g., p’Ojok, 2007; Branch, 2001: 50).  
However, cattle rearing and staples like millet (eleusine indica) and oil seeds like 
sesame and groundnuts were common from as far back as the pre-colonial time  
(Baker, 1874:Location 4966).  Subsequently, from the late 1950s to 1960s, there 
was increased production in the agricultural sector (Gertzel, 1974:12).  By the 
1938, income from cotton production within Acholi alone totalled Uganda Shillings 
1.5 million per annum and forty per cent of this income was transferred to the 
central government in the form of tax (Pain, 1998:16; p’Ojok, 2007).  However, 
cotton production was disappointing - often influenced by policies and natural 
factors.  For instance, the unfavourable international price of cotton lint in 1939 
led to a fifty seven per cent decrease in the 1939 production in Acholiland.  
Farmers did not pick more than twenty-five per cent of the cotton grown in the 
                                                          
339Discussions with Mzee Charles Alai (RIP), who had previously served in the Obote1 
as an Administrative Officer in Acholi District Administration in the 1960s. 
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previous year.  Wars, government policies and international market prices worked 
in combination, and in subsequent years Acholi desisted from producing cotton 
entirely (see: Pain, 1998: 16-18). 
Cotton production in Uganda, however, declined from its peak in the 
1960s, when it contributed 15.2 per cent to Uganda foreign exchange earnings, 
to a mere 5.5 per cent in the 1993/94 period (see: Lee and Oput, 2003).  During 
the NRM regime, cotton production in Acholi, like other commodities, actually 
came to a complete halt because of displacement.  Although the Cotton 
Development Authority has sought to revive it, it has never again been a major 
source of income. The agricultural potential of the Acholi is far more dependent 
on diversification and better policy frameworks, which are lacking. However, 
Acholiland is capable of generating revenues through agriculture, building on its 
traditional culture and organisations.  This is an example of how formal rules can 
complement informal or traditional rules.  Progressively, the Acholi had to buy 
into the principle of commercial production because it made sense and is 
inevitable.  The Acholi took to smallholder agriculture as a strategy since 
colonialism.  Smallholding is more resilient to poor weather and climate change, 
providing self-employments to many of its actors.  
Postcolonial regimes built on this enthusiasm, injecting some elements 
of local ownership and punitive incentives, and farming became a popular 
employment for the people.  Acholi also exploited its fiduciary culture at the 
production level of its governance system, to embrace agriculture production and 
education.  Although there are views that large landholding in Acholi was a 
necessary condition for private sector development, the logic is debatable 
(Mamdani, 1976: 208-209). First, land was never a constraint in Acholiland.  The 
capacity to till large areas, to overcome the erratic climatic and the absence of 
socio-economic infrastructure and skills were the bigger constraints.  Secondly, 
arguments for commercial bank credits are hypothetical and in the case of 
Uganda, make only political sense.  No banks honoured collateral from rural 
areas.  If they do, it is for a different motive that works against the borrowers own 
long range plans.  The working experience is that one can borrow for farming but 
will have to provide security in the urban areas.  Even when one had a title on the 
rural land for cultural reasons, no one would be willing to buy land that was 
located in a different society (Oloya, 1990: 40-45; Oloya and Fleming, 1991:1-
26).   
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The Acholi’s moral kinship system, however, invigorated politics, the 
education of boys and farming, especially in the 1950s and 1960s.  Families and 
clans would contribute for the education of “their children”, so that they could 
acquire knowledge, and strengthen their clan system.  Henceforth, there was 
convergence in this moral attitude towards initiatives like scholarships and 
bursaries introduced by Local Government.  These formal instruments 
supplemented kinship efforts, which was of significant benefit. The customary 
expectation that a good person would remain untainted by contact with 
foreigners, who included Local Government, meant that many men complied with 
the remittance of annual taxes.    
Confusing and Conflicting Roles of the New Institutions 
My definition of Local Authorities includes both the decentralised 
bureaucrats – the District Commissioners, the chiefs and jagi - and the 
Councillors. Their functions and relationships have continued to change during 
the post-colonial period.  The first Local Councillors in Acholi were established 
under the 1949 African Local Government Ordinance (ALGO).  Its main intention 
was to engage rwodi Acholi who, in spite of being marginalised, had a strong 
influence over locals.  The Council initially offered a forum where rwodi, their 
nominees and the native chiefs as county and sub-county administrators 
exchanged views on all forms of district issues.  In order to have the rwodi 
represented, the Provincial Commissioner used his discretion to have them 
included.  This was in an attempt to engage people’s representatives in local 
governance.  However, elected councillors came into being after the 1955 
Ordinance.  It was also at this point when sub-county and parish level councillors 
were established, to deepen local governance to a level that traditionally would 
represent clans, that is, the gangi agnates (see: Gertzel, 1974: 65).  The creation 
of Councillors was an administrative decision of the protectorate, providing space 
for native chiefs to air the growing discontent on governing matters.  It also 
became a platform upon which national and local politicians emerged (Gertzel, 
1974:65). 
The 1962 and 1967 constitutions on the other hand, entrenched a form 
of uniformity in the governing structures, which was based on the early colonial 
architecture.  This concentrated power in the hands of the civil service at the 
centre. This status quo meant that local governance remained predatory on the 
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society, a status set by the colonial authority.  Local Government in Acholiland 
exploited this arrangement and capably developed infrastructure and capacity for 
exploitative governance during the earlier part of the post-colonial era.  However, 
it became evident during the subsequent periods of post-colonial era that this 
was undermining participation of the people.  Particularly during the NRM, the 
neo-hegemonic features of local governance fused LG structures with the political 
functions of the other local administration (Beke, 2004: 16).  This has led to some 
confusion and conflict between political institutions and that of local 
administrations during the NRM regime.  Noticeably, governing structures have 
included outreaches of government security particularly in the rural areas.  Thus, 
the cadres recruited to “govern” the society by civil service were not necessarily 
qualified to provide the desired services under the Local Government Act.  
Rather, their allegiance is to the political patrons who recruited them and can pay 
them.  This has further disengaged people from these formal institutions.  Hence, 
CSOs and the incapacitated traditional systems were presumably the only 
accountable institutions that were trusted by the people based on a World Bank 
(2002) led study.   
Local authorities, except during the later part of the NRM regime, were 
appointed by central government.  Now, the people elect their councillors.  They 
became a beacon of patronage as the centre used the opportunity to co-opt 
clients and party faithful (e.g., Bahiigwa, 2004).  The Resistance Council (1986 to 
1995) as well as the Local Council (thereafter) did not work as envisioned for the 
Acholi due to the insecurities (e.g., Steiner, 2006; Missier, 2012).  In both the survey 
carried out by Missimer (2012) and in this study, evidence has shown that during the 
NRM governance, the key local actors in the region were formal– the army, the 
police, the camp commanders, LCs and NGOs.   The dominant focus of these state 
actors has been security related issues.  Missimer (2012) concludes that, while there 
is provision for the Local Council to address security and conflict issues, the 
displacement to and living in the camps, which officially began from 1998 to 2010 
has rendered these possibilities useless. 
She notes that in addition to the Local Government Act 1997, especially 
Part III, locally elected leaders could deal with security and conflict resolution at 
both the village and parish levels.  Furthermore, in 2006, a Local Council Courts 
Act was enacted that grants locally elected leaders powers to deal with cases 
including minor crimes, contracts, and damage to properties (see: Meissier, 
  
 
235 
2012).  In most instances, the three core political regimes after independence 
undertook further reforms of local governance, which merely consolidated the 
central authorities’ oversight of the local communities.  The NRM tried to 
empower locally elected leaders, thereby complementing the works of the 
“traditional” system.  However, it did not work as envisaged.   
For Acholiland, the past thirty years or so have shown improvement in 
their perception of Local Government with regards to governance (see Figure 
5.1).  The viewpoint has been that Local Councillors and part of the Local 
Authority as elected leaders worked with CSOs to ensure that the core services 
were provided especially in the camps.  In other words, the Councillors 
introduced the participation elements of livelihood security back into the agenda 
with the help of CSOs.  Much as most of these might not have been fully realised, 
they as a body, have shown great commitment to improving governance.  The 
community voted the work of the Local Councillors as exemplary in the search for 
a return to normalcy (Missier, 2012).  As it turned out, the creation of a new 
political system to empower local governance was actually aimed at the opposite.  
It was, on the contrary, designed to entrench the NRM as a political system rather 
than local governance.  The institutional architect had good intentions because it 
first and foremost, demanded that people elect their own leaders.  Had it not 
been overly politicised, and had the Acholi had the opportunity to implement it, it 
could have possibly complemented, reinforced and supported the “traditional” 
kaka system (Missier, 2012).  
Changes in perspectives 
The NRM’s National Agriculture Advisory Services Programme (NAADS) 
brought reform to the agriculture extension services in 2002.  It made decisions 
about the funding of agricultural services, and farmers were to select their own 
representatives. This allowed them to procure the agricultural services and other 
inputs on a co-funding type of mechanism with Local and Central Governments 
(World Bank, 2008).  Although it did not work because people were displaced and 
unable to benefit from it, NAADS had some positive direction.  However, like all 
nationally driven programmes, their failure was due to inappropriate inflexibility in 
a politically fragile situation. 
In some of the villages where I carried out my research, the current 
composition of the inhabitants has become more diverse than the previous 
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domination of one clan.  Part of the reason has been the new patterns of 
settlement following the 1986 to 2006 displacement/settlements.  In addition, the 
boundaries of villages have been adjusted deliberately to include more groups.  
For instance, Pakiri village had two major agnates, the Pakiri and Palyec of 
almost equal proportion by 1960.  This mix, by 1986, was still the same save for 
two other putative kin, one from Paomo clan and the other from Bwobo.  In 2010, 
after some sixty five per cent of the inhabitants had returned from IDP camps, 
and with the expansion of the border, there are now more clans including 
Pamuca and Payiira. 
Acting globally but missing local context 
The ideological orientation under the NRM, articulated in Uganda Vision 
2040, is driven by the commercialisation of agriculture.  Just as in the colonial 
time, commerce and trade are seen as the drivers of modernisation.  However, 
there is no clarity in how the Local Government, which is closer to the community, 
will play a role in commerce and trade.  The NRM’s perception of shared efforts 
on development has been a contested area (see: Bahiigwa, 2004).  A recent 
study that evaluated decentralisation in Uganda concluded that it is a political 
gimmick rather than an empowerment tool as the documents try to speculate 
(see: Ojambo, 2010; Missier, 2012).   
Subsequent frameworks for community governance show how local 
governance continues to be challenging. For instance, the Uganda 2040 vision 
under the NRM aims to transform agriculture.  In practice, agriculture is private 
sector-driven and requires huge public investments.  In Acholi, the majority of the 
private investors are households and a survey by African Network for the 
Prevention and Protection Against Child Abuse and Neglect, a CSO, in 2011 tells 
a story that investing in these households is the best option, if poverty eradication 
is the way to go (ANPPACAN, 2011). 
The framework, although not yet specified in detail, advances the 
transformation of agriculture based on the private sector.  However, current 
events point to a deliberate targeting of corporations and large foreign investors 
at the expense of promoting small and medium-scale agricultural industries or 
encouraging local investments, which other publications have shown, would 
contribute more in terms of local employment (UIA, 2013).   Top-down 
approaches tend to promote global fits, contrary to what kaka sought to do even 
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when both could potentially complement each other (World Bank, 2006).  The 
reasons seem to be that insecure governing actors, who are mainly global, strive 
to anchor their political survival via the global marketplace.  Secondly, the face of 
private investors in Africa, especially in very corrupt countries, has since 
changed.  In this project I refer to this as the African “publivate” sector. 
Is This a Case of the “Publivate” Sector in Acholi? 
Some forty thousand hectares of customary land in Amuru District has 
been allocated to a multinational firm, the Madhvani Group of Companies, to 
establish a turnkey, Amuru Sugar Works Project.  The project will produce sugar 
cane and also process sugar and other industrial products, which are within the 
realm of private sector investment.  However, unlike in the past, where feasibility 
studies would first justify such massive investment from a number of available 
options, especially in light of other possibilities including oil crops and ranching, 
the deal over Amuru Sugar Works (ASW) was political, and ignored the interests 
of Local Governments in the decision making.  Even with opposition from the 
locals, the project will proceed (Refugee Law, 2013).   
This is a case of acting globally without the minimum consideration of 
the local politics, context and the implications of such a huge investment.  While 
this should be a sound investment, it misses the strategic focus that resonates 
with post-conflict investments (Kaplan, 2008: 18).  Given that this is actually a 
sector investment, triggered under the vision 2040 and is private sector owned, a 
different message is nevertheless being circulated by the agents of the state 
house, which misses the logic – that this project is not part of the resettlement 
programmes of the Acholi people.  The point is that ASW cannot be part of the 
priority recovery programme based on the actions and the ideas that have been 
put in public thus far.  It does not create the kind of jobs one desires for a post-
conflict recovery because it, to the contrary, disempowers the locals by taking 
away their land and seek to employ them instead as squatters. 
Studies have shown elsewhere that reliance on out-growers who are 
small and medium scale producers has a wider impact on income distribution, but 
also builds desirable capacities for a post-conflict situation (World Bank, 2008).   
Even when this was to be less profitable move, part of the public-private sector 
partnership agreement would be to allow it to happen as a privilege for 
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reconstructing a diversified people.  Typically, the ASW goes for what the 
government terms a private-public sector partnership that the new aid model 
sees as a preferred option for poverty reduction (see: Wiley, 2014).  The design 
of the intervention provides few options for out-growers’ participation, which is the 
preferred option in the circumstances.  Rather, the industry hopes to benefit from 
the “abundance” of unskilled labourers that are going home from “protected 
camps”.   
Whether this will work, based on previous experience, depends on a 
number of factors (Girling, 1960:178-185).  In terms of policy, the government will 
have achieved two things once the project is implemented: first, it will have 
succeeded in delineating Acholi as a source of cheap labour, something that the 
colonial authority failed to do over the seventy years of their rule; secondly, it will use 
its trait of co-option to marginalise constructive opposition, thereby rekindling the past 
siege in internal power struggles that Acholi witnessed during the colonial time 
among the rwodi kalam and rwodi Acholi340.  
Engaging Change Through Interactions 
From the above, it is clear that kaka has transformed over the years into 
what scholars have often equated with monarchical governance systems (Raija and 
Phillips, 2002).  Particularly during the last thirty years, kaka has adopted ruler-
subject relations with the Acholi society being a subject of the modern political 
principals – the state and its analogues.  However, experience has shown that no 
one system of governance can be said to answer development needs particularly in 
fragile situation (Kaplan, 2008: 49).  Certainly, the top-down approach was endorsed 
by a number of respondents, acknowledging that it introduces innovations that 
support the integration of Acholiland in the global system.  Physical infrastructure, 
like roads were effective in linking Acholiland to the national grid in the 1960s.  They 
were achieved through top-down decisions of the State and the District 
Commissioner.  However, I contend that excessive use of social powers, as a way to 
coerce the Acholi into taking particular decisions is unnecessary for two reasons.   
                                                          
340 This analysis builds on discussions with various Members of Parliament from 
across Acholi as well as those in the Natural Resource Parliamentary Committee.  It 
also draws on my interaction with some elites who have inside information on the 
project development. 
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One, improved and strategic communication on innovative ideas can be 
passed through opinion leaders, and trusted systems and this can always achieve 
the desired centralised intention.  A case to prove this is the events during the follow-
up to the overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979.   Acholiland is known to have voted 
overwhelmingly for the return of Obote in the 1980 general election in spite of a large 
presence of non-UPC members in the sub-region341.  Some respondents attributed 
this to the strategic communication led by leaders like Tito Okello who, together with 
others who lived in exile in Tanzania, advised that it was the best political choice for 
the sub-region.  Those who know the stance of Acholi’s partisans would agree that 
without this, the region would have been split between the two major parties, just like 
it was the case in the 1962 general election342. 
Two, allowing people to see, touch and participate in their own 
development can change them.  The Acholi soldiers who fought in the World 
Wars came back from the frontline as changed individuals.  They met many 
people, saw and felt what happened in India, Ethiopia and many other countries 
they travelled to.  On return, they became the agents of change, promoted 
education, and led political struggles that show political parties grew in strength 
and reach in Acholiland.   The use of force contrary to mental engagement has 
been a trademark in the Uganda governing system.  It points to the structural 
dimensions of the parties involved.   Perhaps, a change of approach might work 
because coercive methods have thus far failed to make developmental impact, 
seen through a historical lens. 
Nonetheless, both the relational and constitutive contents – which 
defined relationships outside the cognitive groups and the associated normative 
contents like the rules and regulations - were reconfigured as a result of ‘Project 
Uganda’.  For instance, by 1962, Acholiland and its neighbours had developed 
stronger bridges and gained better understanding of each other through 
constructive engagements.  This can be said particularly with the Langi, who 
were Acholi’s traditional foes (Wild, 1947).  The late Daudi Oceng, who came 
from kaka Koch, joined a tribal party of the Baganda, the Kabaka Yekka in the 
1960s.  This opened a new alliance with the Baganda, which as a southern ethnic 
                                                          
341 Confidential interviews held with individuals during the years of field work in 
Acholiland 
342 Ditto 
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group, was viewed originally as foes.  This relational content, as we will see later, 
took an about turn during the NRM with devastating consequences. 
Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter uses insights from different disciplines to explain how 
politics in Acholiland dovetailed with violence. The view that economic growth are 
the main indicators of successful community governance – to eviscerate Acholi of 
its perennial poverty lines – are incorrect. This is because the modern economy 
is built on two characters – the humanity of the Acholi as a political community 
and secondly, the altitude of the private sector, which in modernity, is external to 
its logic.  This second aspect, however, has conflicted with kaka’s livelihood 
security measures and yet it is the most prominent discourses of modernity.  This 
is because kaka was a response to the reality of Acholiland and as such, a 
source of collective power that shared the obligations of equitable development. 
The new formal ones – the state and its analogues - on the other hand, have 
consistently manifested distributive power and therefore, are non-participatory 
and extractive by design.   
The study concludes that fundamental change in community governance 
happened during the colonial administration, from 1898 to 1962.  By centralising 
power in the hand of the state, colonialism reshuffled powers of the ruling elite in 
the traditional settings by creating a colonial society, and allocating, reconfiguring 
the political authority of community governance to colonial agents – the chiefs, 
who by design were outsiders and the Local Governments.  This realignment of 
political power to outsiders and non-leaders weakened the traditional practice of 
kaka - something that post-colonial governments have built on, as it set to control 
Acholiland and the people. Through these actions, the reforms set the governing 
infrastructure for pluralism, with the state legal system – the customary laws – as 
the modern. The others: the traditional kaka systems, the newly introduced 
religious systems and the “informal” ones – that developed to fill gaps created by 
the others - flourished alongside the legal system.  All these systems, from 
practice, differ in how they have framed and abstracted the Acholi society, their 
rights and obligations. 
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Hence, the introduction of multiplicity of legal contradictions and 
constructions of governing space has led to multiple arenas for misused political 
authorities and legitimacies.  It has also reconstructed new versions of local rights 
and obligations.  For instance, the Acholi rights of belonging are conditioned on 
the state of laws promulgated by Uganda and not by tradition.  This, it seems, 
has also resulted in the construction of multiple social relationships, institutions 
and structures characterised by variegated degrees of abstraction and moral 
orientations (Brenda-Beckmann et al., 2010).  This has led to a crisis of 
legitimacy and severe assault of the traditional governance system.  Increasingly, 
the society has confronted the reality of governance under two distinct governing 
principles.  On one hand, the desire for humanity as an approach, which was a 
well-developed practice built in the fading traditional infrastructure; and, on the 
other hand, a right-based approach that is market oriented and the corner stone 
of the modern system. The balancing of these views, it seems, have remained 
the major contestation in governance in the modern time, leading to a formation 
of an informal brand that have continued to promote survival in difficult times.  By 
the end of the colonial rule in 1962, this crisis of legitimacy resulted in a 
trifurcation of authorities that have sought in vain, to balance the impact of 
pluralistic practices.   
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Chapter Six – The Politics Of Community Governance 
Introductory Remarks 
The politics of community governance, focuses on kaka’s political worth, 
that is, its “business” and social results, and how it has changed, based on 
perspectives of the respondents.  By social results I mean the moral values that 
enhance collectivity, cohesion and equity in a society that was built on both 
primordialism and constructivism.  As such, this Chapter explores issues that have 
direct implications for community leadership, including how community leaders 
accumulated power, both for community growth and to enhance the governance of 
political community.  It also deals with the issues of incentives, tensions and 
conflicts that often energised political interactions.  These issues constitute the 
key elements of governing image, governing actions and governing 
instruments that are being investigated in the study.   They cut across the 
three parameters for governance as shown in Table 6.1 below.  
Table 6.1: Selected Indicators for Community Governance 
Parameters Perimeters  Governing Outcomes Indicators 
Governing Image Leaders The quality of the different types of leaders  
The capabilities of leaders 
The basis of their legitimacies 
Governing 
Instrument 
Policies Relevance with regards to governing actions 
Specificity regarding governing image and 
actions 
Governing Action Human 
protection 
Effectiveness of institutions and laws in dealing 
with human security 
Food security Effectiveness of governing actors and policies 
in ensuring food security 
Social justice Responsiveness and effectiveness of formal 
and informal system 
Sources: Field Data, 2013 
 
In contextualising the politics of community governance, the 
significance of the governing principles and the politics of entrustments and 
obligations that accentuated kaka’s governing realm are examined.  This is 
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because the communal system as conceptualised in Chapter Two, 
demonstrates in part what Shipton (2007) refers to as “fiduciary culture”, that 
is, a culture built on gen (read trust) and ribbe (read togetherness).  Shipton 
(2007) argues that trust and entrustment differ, and entrustment, which “is 
action with thoughts implied”, does not require trust (Shipton, 2007:33).  The 
Acholi communal systems prior to colonialism as discussed earlier, were 
kinship-based.  It thus, embodied norms and sentiments of the eponymous 
belongings, with shared responsibilities and rights of their territory (Shipton, 
2007:33).  This form of setting of wadi was both geographically and 
structurally defined and still remains visible even to-date.  The individual 
internal interactions were governed under familial and kinship authorities that 
defined the forms of fiduciary culture.  Elders were status and leaders with 
social power and jural duties, which they used to enforce the use of 
communal norms in line with traditions as a right.  In return, other people 
were bound by the authority of elders and were expected to comply with their 
guidance.  Societal obligations to others were demanded as a moral 
imperative.  Such regulations sometimes compromised the effectiveness of 
kinship343. 
In forming the consociations however, the gangi agnates with varying 
ethnic backgrounds seemingly agreed to a form of “facultative mutualism” as 
a governing culture of interaction.  This is evident by the fact that each gang 
agnate had power to relocate to another consociation as it found it 
appropriate.  This development renegotiated the meaning of gen and ribbe at 
the micro-levels of governance.  Kinship, it seems, became an organised 
communal system for the negotiation of rights and entitlement in community 
governance.  This demanded sets of strong leaders.  From interviews, we 
confirmed that elders within given kinship ties used their fiduciary 
responsibilities to enforce kinship compliance to the new kaka rules of 
                                                          
343 This view was collected from respondents who are the elites of the 1960s and 1970s.  
Their analyses of traditional manners of enforcing norms in the society gave me the 
feeling that kinship values were highly regarded because of the reciprocity it attracted. 
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collectivity and in mobilising large-scale support344.  This, however, changed 
when centralised authorities, new governance architectures and their values 
like Christianity were imposed in the early 1900s to inform the content of 
community governance.  It is such dynamism in the politics of making and 
remarking of trust and mistrusts that leadership were negotiated and the 
incentives that are associated with it are discussed in this Chapter.  
Contextualising Community Leaders 
Using embeddedness as an indicator of the quality of authority and 
legitimacy of these leaders, Figure 6.1 below shows actual and perceived views of 
the respondents during interviews on the performance of the different categories of 
lutela from 1898 to 2010.  This information certainly builds on earlier findings by the 
World Bank (2001)345 and Oloya et al. (1998)346.  Tela, which can be leadership, has 
been categorised into five main areas of legitimacy, representing decision-making 
levels and the nature of authorities they wield.  These are traditional leaders, opinion 
leaders, local authority leaders, political leaders and others as further discussed 
below.   Briefly, traditional leaders in the case of Acholi would include lutela who 
command traditional authority and are both male and female.  They are the 
custodians of the Acholi culture and are produced by the system.  They included: 
rwodi moo, rwodi, ludito kaka, and mego.   Opinion leaders, on the other hand, were 
respected lutela who are not office holders and are apolitical.  They were often 
kinsmen and women, and friends whose authorities come from their exposure, 
achievements and characters.  They are recognised by the community system as 
worthy of their attention.   Local authority leaders are office holders, elected and/or 
                                                          
344 Ludito in my own experience applied their jury duties and the power to curse in order 
to enforce compliance of their members.  The fear of curses as well as the 
vulnerabilities of the individual households often worked in favour of the elders.  This 
experience was shared with other peers and elders in three of the focus group 
discussions we had in 2004 in Gulu town, Keyo trading center and in Bwayale in 
Masindi. 
345 The World Bank and Office of the Prime Minister undertook a Need Assessment of 
the communities in northern Uganda.  A team visited Gulu district and undertook four 
community groups who were still settled at home by 2001.  The assessment involved 
use of participatory rural appraisal tools. 
346  Oloya et al. (1998) undertook a PRA baseline in the entire Acholi for Oxfam-UK.  A 
key product of the study was developing a historical profile of community leaders. 
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appointed by the people or by the systems, respectively.  They draw their legitimacy 
from their electorate or the appointing authorities.  Similarly, politicians are 
categorised as both formal and informal.  The elected leaders are politicians who 
hold offices.  However, Acholi macon had political figures as lutela who were 
generally seen as lugwok paco.  Like the other politicians, they draw their 
legitimacies from the people they represent. 
The underlying assumption is that supply-led or induced changes are 
dependent on the political power base (e.g., Ostrom, 2005:61).  Hence, where 
leaders are embedded within the society and coordinate the different governing 
efforts of the different actors, the change outcomes are broadly beneficial to the 
society.  This is because the outcomes of change result from genuine engagements 
of the beneficiaries and are based on shared practices that recognise the different 
carrying capacities and capabilities of the actors.  This is good practice in 
governance.  It is moral because it builds on diversities of issues, actors and 
interests.  In other words, collective power is functional, facilitative and often leads to 
better organisation and shared responsibilities that enable achievement of the 
different but important activities of the different actors (Mann, 1986: 6-7).  However, 
distributive power as power over others is predatory and restrictive. It disallows the 
ruled to exercise their rights.  Induced change, caused by distributive power, has 
undermined the potential of the Acholi because it did not involve them in creating 
change” (Dwyer, 1972:10-11; Dolan, 2011:224-226).  Even when Acholi leaders 
were not necessarily conquered during colonialism in light of the circumstances, 
they were compelled to accept new changes. In effect, the change outcomes were 
asymmetrical, in favour of those with social power. 
Viewpoints of respondents on lutela 
Figure 6.1 below, like those in the previous chapter, represents on the 
vertical axis, the rating of leaders or their embeddedness by the respondents – 
which were established by ranking the impact of the various types of leaders to 
community governance in a given period.  This pair-wise ranking of perceived or 
actual impact of embeddedness was carried in focus group discussions but also 
validated as in the previous cases, with other actors.  On the horizontal axis, it 
provides the range of time used for comparing the impact of embeddedness of the 
leaders.  The starting point for Figure 6.1 below is that prior to the 1930s, kaka’s 
governing realm was all-inclusive, fused within the community and was not 
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contradictory to it.  As such, there was no clear distinction between what was public, 
civil society or private as is the case in contemporary systems (Makau wa Makau, 
1997:23 cited from Rubongoya, 2007:12).  As such, lutela’s actions were fused 
within the kaka system, interacting within their different levels of governance on the 
basis of their perceived gender responsibilities, carrying capacities and capabilities.  
In other words, actions were more efficiently carried out when they were allocated 
based on interests, and competitive and comparative advantages, since hierarchy 
and markets were unaffordable 
Four important messages are conveyed in Figure 6.1, which need 
discussions.  One message underpins the importance of a multiplicity of efforts from 
multilateral leaders in governing efforts under fragile situations.  The reported mix of 
governing actions during conflict demonstrates the importance of competitive and 
comparative advantages of the varied actors.  The other important messages relate 
to; (i) the significance of political legitimacies in governing change as demonstrated 
by the role of the politicians, especially members of parliaments; (ii) the significance 
of the informal sector and their influencing roles in governing change because of 
their apolitical viewpoints, and (iii) the persistent and continued mistrust between the 
state and the Acholi community particularly in the 1970s and during the NRM 
regime. 
Figure 6.1: Embeddedness of Acholi Leaders, 1898 to 2010 
 
Source: Field Data Analysis, 2014.  
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Figure 6.1 above shows that a mix of interactions from lutela who have 
different interests, backgrounds and skills, are indeed conflicting and undermining.  
However, they are also supporting and when well managed, they can contribute to 
better results.  The ludito kaka, according to reports, manifested strong political 
legitimacy during the colonial era.  However, their legitimacy anchored on the strong 
knowledge base of the informal leaders, the opinion leaders, and to some extent, 
the formal leaders, and the politicians.  These three leaders worked collectively and 
influenced the impact of the proposed land governance reform in 1950s.  At the end, 
land in Acholi was not, as was the case in Buganda and Bunyoro, delineated to 
reflect the western view of property rights.  In the 1960s, on the other hand, the 
political leaders became prominent lutela, according to respondents.  This was in 
the period of self-governance as Acholiland began to claim its stake in the new 
Uganda.  The tripartite alliance with the local leaders found in the informal and 
traditional sectors helped them achieve the goal of the Acholi people and claim their 
rights within the new Uganda.  During the NRM, however, the formal system – the 
politicians and the LG – peaked, using their political legitimacies, political power and 
the authority of the state, to evoke change in Acholiland.  The formal sector leaders, 
however, depended on the opinion leaders, reinvented traditional ones in 2005, to 
front the agenda of the state347. 
Another noticeable thing is the overwhelming agreement by the 
respondents that elected leaders have remained consistently connected with the 
priority concerns of their community.  Elected leaders are formal and have both the 
political legitimacy and authority to act and be felt.  Hence, they have consistently 
positioned their interests and goals within the context of Acholiland348.  However, 
their disengagement during Idi Amin’s era was in my view tactical, as most of them 
were targeted by the system and many had to flee the country for safety or were 
killed (Branch, 2011:55-58).  Nevertheless, these lugwok paco have maintained a 
strong connection with the community even in their hardest times, and especially 
                                                          
347 This view builds on Dolan’s viewpoint that the re-emergence of traditional leaders 
during the NRM regime was politically motivated.  In several interviews I carried out 
including recently under a Danida funded TrustLand project of Aarhus University, 
Denmark, Ter Ker Kwaro Acholi is being used to advance the interest of the central 
government rather than those of their subjects. 
348 Focus group discussions during the study 
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during the NRM regime, when most western donors believed and supported 
Museveni’s agenda of transforming Uganda, even at the detriment of Acholiland349.   
With the introduction of the Uganda project in the 1900s, members of 
parliament in particular have been kinematic, vocal, articulate and especially forceful 
in elevating local issues within national priorities350.  The key cases that came out 
were land issues.  During the Dreschfield Commission on land in 1954, the Acholi 
politicians stood together with their counterparts in Lango to reject the proposal that 
land should be centrally controlled (Gertzel, 1974:66).  This same issue – where the 
state would like to take control of land - has resurfaced during the NRM era.  
However, the Acholi Members of Parliament have, as in the past, continued to align 
with the community, arguing that matters of land administration should remain with 
the community (New Vision, 2006)351.  Simply: land in the concept and 
understanding of the Acholi is a belonging that should be decided by the owners, 
who are the Acholi.352 
The third message is the sudden peaking in power by the formal system in 
the NRM era, where local authorities became significantly powerful in mediating 
change.  My reading of this conceptualisation of events by the respondents is more 
about how Local Councillors as part of the Local Authority, introduced measures that 
aligned critical issues during the NRM regime with the people. The Local Authorities 
in this study comprise the bureaucrats or the civil servants and the Local 
Councillors.  The former are state agents who, following the Local Government 
reform of 1997, are now appointed by the District Public Commission instead of the 
Public Service Commission (Missier, 2012).  Councillors, on the other hand, are 
elected members of the District Council and are politicians, drawing their legitimate 
power from the people.  The formal administrative systems, created by the 
Constitution of Uganda and enacted by Parliament, are partly made up of local 
                                                          
349 Focus group discussions 
350 On the issues of the LRA incursion and the approaches used by government, see for 
instance: Branch, 2011:52-53 and Finnstrom, 2008:122-130.  On the issue of land 
wrangles or grabs and the options of the Acholi, there are many sources articles by 
scholars and journalists including:  Lenhart, 2014 of Gulu University, Uganda and 
Walubiri, 2015 of the Vision Group, Kampala. 
351 See Hon. Okello-Okello submission to parliament on land in Acholi, arguing that the 
Acholi Parliamentary Group recommendations were for government to defer the land 
issue until after the camps were dismantled.   
352 See Oloya and Whyte (2015) on-coming work regarding this perspective. 
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authorities – seven of these currently represent Acholiland.  As such, they draw their 
authority from the state and are delegated levels of state authority.   It was 
interesting to see how respondents perceived the connectedness of Local 
Government to the community, arguing that the normative engagement seen in the 
late 1980s was mainly attributed to the political wing of the Local Authorities.  
Interestingly, in the late 1950s and 1960s, we noted earlier on that Councillors were 
equally reported as having been vociferous, assertive and pro-traditionalist (Gertzel, 
1974:51-52).  In essence, it seems to me that semblance of good governance, one 
that takes into context, the people’s viewpoints, are ethnicised and locally driven 
rather than nationally promoted.  
Lastly, both the traditional and especially the opinion leaders maintained 
strong connections with the community throughout these periods.   As discussed in 
the last chapter, traditional leaders are custodians of the Acholi culture that has 
been changing over time.  The opinion leaders, on the other hand, are informal and 
have broad-based knowledge and links to the entire systems, since they are drawn 
from all of them.  Firstly, as a group of lutela, they were apolitical, respected and 
commanded what Webster (1948) described as traditional and charismatic sources 
of legitimacies. They had control of information and knowledge that was both 
contemporary and historic and which, as discussed earlier, Kurtz (2004) refers to as 
hegemonic acculturation.  Conversely, being apolitical and the archives of local 
knowledge, they became an important source of inspiration upon which the 
community anchored.  They provided trustworthy information and knowledge to both 
the community and the agencies that worked with community.  Over time, however, 
the power / effectiveness of traditional leaders declined especially during the NRM 
period, a point that will be discussed.   
History of Community Leaders 
At the turn of the twentieth century, many of Acholi’s heterarchical 
governance structures were under siege, and in competition with neighbouring kaka 
(Atkinson, 2010:256).  This followed the alliance of some of these kaka with Arab 
and Ethiopian traders, who had superior and better-equipped fighters, compared to 
the traditional institutions.  The slave traders had the support of the Egyptian 
administration that was allies of the British (Behrend, 1999:14-19).  Invariably, “there 
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was never, it seems, any real political unity within Acholiland” (Girling, 1960:9).  This 
was not surprising.  The partitioning of current Acholi among the different private 
slave traders enabled kaka polities within a certain zone to redefine their sovereignty 
and with the help of the Arabs, treated each other as neighbouring ethnic groups, as 
was the case with the Langi and the Madi tribes (Girling, 1960:85).  In addition, the 
Acholi population was sparse and land was in abundance.  However, the absence of 
population pressure meant that change would be unlikely to come through local 
technological innovations, as has been the case in other parts of the world (see: 
Kurtz, 2004).  
I sense that there have increasingly been concerns and questions 
underlying the concept of community leaders in Acholi.  Latela (plural is lutela) is 
another word for a leader.  Tela, which is leadership, was both age and gender-
neutral.   There were young as well as female lutela.  Tela was practical, solving 
problems and knowledge-based, contributing to community issues.  As a concept, it 
was social-political and included ludito kaka, rwodi moo, members of parliament and 
councillors.  It was also context oriented (civil servants, NGOs), or expert oriented 
(e.g., oteka, ajwagi, doctors, teachers).  Tela was therefore both institutionally based 
and individually led.   
But tela is also an Acholi word for confrontational relations.  Tele indicates 
some form of disagreement and discontent. Additionally, tela as an act is to coerce 
or to “drag something – in this case, drag political units along”, both as a form of 
fiduciary responsibility, where leadership is seen as weak, but also as a collective 
good.  So, lutela applied a mix of governing modes to resolve these governing 
challenges and contradictions, some demanding coercion.  Coercion, evident at the 
kinship level where lineages with similar eponymous ancestors had communal 
interests and fiduciary relationships, was used to enforce what became as normative 
patrilineal values353.  Legitimacy, in this view, implies that such political actions 
actually held the right to create political obligations to the other political structures, 
the dog odi and the hamlets (see: Raz, 1986).  Particularly in what I have 
considered as the communal setting, political authority vested in ludito kaka, until 
                                                          
353 Rwot kweri as “chief of hoes” were colonial initatives to improve cash crops and food 
production. They were selected by the agnates to ensure that land areas and food 
production were in tandem with customary as well as civil orders. 
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recently, legitimised their actions as morally justified even when they were 
illegitimate in the western sense of democracy354.  
Table 6.2: Categories of Traditional and Contemporary Leaders 
Types of Leaders Traditional Contemporary 
Status Leaders Rwodi moo, Ludito kaka, 
Megi 
Rwodi, Ludito kaka, Megi  
Government 
Employees 
 Public servants - chiefs, 
teachers, soldiers, police and 
other employed government 
officials 
Civil 
Societies/Private 
“Lugwok paco”, spiritual 
leaders, healers, other 
rwodi, oteka lweny, 
traditional social groups 
like bulu 
Religious leaders, traders, 
NGOs, professional 
organisations, 
Politicians Lugwok paco,  Local councillors and members 
of parliament 
Opinion Leaders Paneyo or specifically 
mother’s brothers (neru) 
and father’s sisters 
(wayo), grand parents 
Donors, Acholi’s retired and 
respected professionals, in-laws 
from outside the tribe 
Source: Field Data, 2013 
So, lutela in the study are formal and informal, categorised into five specific 
but interlinked sets in Table 6.2 above.  These are: traditional or status leaders and 
the opinion leaders or lugwok paco, as two kind of informal leaders.  There are also 
the civil servants, government employees and the political leaders, who are formal 
leaders.  Tela, therefore, was multi-layered and multilateral, engaging a mix of 
governing skills and specialisations, from households as private individuals, to civil 
servants as a form of the state (Branch, 2011:47).  Leadership was either acquired 
through a competitive process based on capabilities (e.g., skills and characteristics), 
or it was bestowed upon one by virtue of one’s age, sex or heritage.  In the former 
case, leaders were valued, but were unstable over time as new skills through formal 
education substituted traditional praxis.  In the latter case, leadership was a social 
status – which were constructed based on moral amplitudes, personality and 
                                                          
354 See Simmons, 2001 for similar argument 
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tradition.  Onyango-Odongo (2009) refers to the latter groups as lugwok paco, which 
literally means “the custodians of the people”. 
The concept of rwodi and ludito kaka in Acholi 
Both the traditional and opinion leaders were what Kurtz (2004) termed 
moral leaders.  By traditional leaders, I refer to ludito kaka as a category, which 
included all wegi odi, wegi paco, wegi gang and rwodi moo.  They were 
transcendent and apolitical, mentored as leaders of lineages and, therefore, have 
binding attachments to their inner society.  They drew their legitimacy from what 
Weber (1964) refers to as descriptive legitimacy, that is, a form of societal beliefs 
and faith about their political authority and sometimes-political obligations (Weber, 
1964 cited in Fabienne, 2010:1).  Both lutela have what Mann (1986) referred to as 
collective power - which is functional and facilitative and enables society to indulge 
in shared responsibilities (Mann, 1986:6-7).  
Branch (2011: 62-71, 174) uses lineage–based authorities to refer to only a 
section of what I have defined as traditional leaders355.  Traditional leaders were 
specialised, multi-role – including arbitration and resolution of conflicts – and well 
diverse, largely experts on lineage issues rather than that of the entire Acholi issues.  
Lutela were not necessarily ludito although they were lineage-based authorities.  In 
Acholi, one became ladit after one was married, had children and was viewed by the 
system as mature and capable of taking care of others, including the children of 
others (see: Girling, 1960: 28-36).  Dito was about maturity and was a quality that 
could easily define the autopoiesis of a given lineage unit.  Ludito, therefore, were a 
collection of traditional leaders, having accumulated knowledge of their lineages and 
that of Acholi customs through mentorship and practices – that is, performing rituals 
and other governing duties as were deemed appropriate for the different occasions.   
Women, especially older ones, I am told, had a special place in community 
governance.  Daker, as noted earlier, was the official wife of Rwot Moo that headed 
the luker agnates.  She managed her co-wives in the kal lineage and was 
instrumental in indorsing and endorsing lweny kaka.  Mego, which is a respected 
                                                          
355 Adam Branch (2011) discussed lineage-based authorities in a more restrictive 
manner, isolating elders or “ludito” from the group.  In his discussions where is made 
up to 67 references to lineage-based authorities, he consistently made claim of these 
groups as homogenious and singular in function, which is not correct and true as 
further discussed in the chapter. 
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mother – married or not - was a social status for recognised and married women in 
the clan.  Mego, like ludito, were variegated and a mirror analogue of the male titles. 
These categories of women were respected leaders because they would have 
gained the trust of the agnates and believed to have been incorporated as insiders.  
“Tela” in the history of Acholi governance 
Max Weber states that “traditional authority” derives legitimacy from the 
ancient tradition of family inheritance (Weber, 1958, 1964: Vol. 1, 167-170).  He 
argues that the ruler had no administrative staff or any machinery to enforce his will 
by force alone – “Gehorchenwollen der Genossen”.  The ruler, in other words, 
depended on the willingness of the group members to respect his authority.  
According to him, the members stood in a personal relationship to him.  They 
obeyed him based on their belief that this was their duty and on the feeling of filial 
piety for the person who was master.   
This, however, as will be explained later, was not what we understood of 
the rwodi or ludito Acholi of Uganda.  At most, the rwodi were perceived or 
presented as a special mix of charismatic, and traditional with, in some cases, some 
elements of sacred leaders, linking the past with the present and the future (van 
Dijik et al., 1999:4).  First, rwot-ship, as a concept, was a “cluster of general 
attributes of, and attitudes towards, political leadership” (see: Atkinson, 2010:82). As 
such, it could be applied to whosoever possessed such attributes.  One such 
attribute was an inherent capacity in making rain, which considering the effects of 
drought that devastated Acholiland was an important virtue (e.g., Bere, 1947: 50).  
Another important attribute was what Kurtz (2004) referred to as the hegemonic 
acculturation, that is, the ability to provide intellectual and moral leadership.  The 
leadership of kaka Payiira, for instance, was attributed to the “change-inducing” 
force that radiated from both Rwot Camo (1807-1887) and Rwot Awich (1888 to 
1935).  They mobilised and represented the entire Acholi region prior to colonialism 
and Sir Samuel Baker, on visiting Acholi in 1862 and later 1875, mistakenly thought 
Rwot Ocama were the paramount chief of the Acholi (e.g., Girling, 1960: 182).  
Similarly, Rwot Awich of Payiira, on assumption of leadership after the death of his 
father Rwot Camo, set to pacify the entire Acholi, brokering peace among smaller 
and larger kaka (Girling, 1960: 361). 
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Secondly, the concept was not related to the size of the polity, nor gender 
or age of the person.   Even small agnates with a total of fifty males could have their 
rwot - through inheritance or bestowed upon them by the society based on the said 
attributes.  There were also other rwodi, like rwodi mon for women with leadership 
attributes.  Rwodi kweri were instituted during the colonial period for males with 
recognised attributes for farming or cultivation, while rwodi okoro were females with 
recognised attributes in women’s field activities.  There was also rwodi bulo, who 
were youth leaders.  As such, rwot-ship was not entirely in the domain of the luker 
agnates.  What was restricted to the luker, however, were rwodi moo, who were a 
sacred and hereditary trait of the luker agnates.  Rwot moo and ludito kaka were 
both similar save for some functionalities indicated above that rwodi moo were able 
to do more because they were sacred, belonged to the core agnates, and were 
hereditary.  One such attribute was the claim that most rwodi moo were rainmakers, 
an attribution that was perceived as important in areas predominant with drought.  
And if this is so, then it confirms the fact that as a trait, it was seen as more 
appealing in a leader to resolve the impasse of drought for farming.  
Ker was used to describe regimes.  As such, it becomes lineage-based and 
kal as a lineage of the core agnates often provided leadership.  Ker, however, was 
transferable through demise of the holder, conquest or consent.  In the case of kaka 
Padibe, I was informed that jo Pamot as a lineage took over rwot-ship from jo Patini 
by conquest356.  However, in the case of Lamogi in western Acholiland, I was 
informed that jo Boro kal lineage was given rwot-ship by jo Pamuca through 
consent357.  Two things are clear from the assertions.  One is that the quality and the 
logic of rwot-ship and ludito kaka or elders as status symbols were equally valued 
across Acholi.  However, certain traits of rwot-ship and ludito kaka were more 
appealing in some areas than in others.  While the myth of rainmaking, for instance, 
was an important attribute for leadership, not all rwodi moo were supposedly 
rainmakers358.  In a sense therefore, there were other binding attributes that were 
important for one to become rwot latela.  Both the literature and the respondents 
                                                          
356 Phone interview with Rt Revd. Bishop Mac Ochola on December 31, 2013 
357 Rwot Ociti of kaka Pagak additionally verified this information during our telephone 
discussion. 
358 My discussions with respondents from Acholi confirmed that some rwodi relied on 
their kin in rain making rather than them.  A case was Rwot Okello of Alero was not a 
rainmaker  
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enumerated that leadership praxis, authoritative ideologies and problem solving in 
the fragile Acholi situation were other important characteristics (see: Atkinson, 1999, 
2010:82-97).  There are cases in which the engagement of Rwot Awich in the 
pacification of other political entities in the late nineteenth century, were attributed to 
such praxis.  Similarly, the extension of rwodi’s generosity to deprived clans and 
individuals were regarded as important attributes (see: Atkinson, 1999, 2010:82-97).  
Secondly, rwot was qualitative, often dano makwiri – somebody who was a father 
figure with a good character, generous and who could mobilise and lead the people.  
Such traits were not limited to the core agnates.  To this end, Rwot-ship avers 
Dwyer (1972), was sometimes earned by putative kin found within the luker agnates, 
although I was not able to justify this in my search for evidence.  
Rwot moo was also rwot kaka of the luker.  He was not necessarily an old 
person.  Rwot Awich of Payiira, for instance, I was told, came to power when he was 
only in his twenties (see: Anywar, 1947).  The rwot moo position was hereditary 
within the luker agnates.  Subsequent to colonialism and in the wake of official 
renaming of local chiefs rwodi kalam, the colonial authorities generated a number of 
other rwodi titles for specific community functions.  They were both men and women 
as discussed earlier, appointed by their agnates, based on their capabilities.  For 
instance, there were rwot apoka, who was responsible for the distribution of items, 
and rwot okoro is concerned with traditional rituals, land use, and hunting359.  The 
first woman appointed to the position of Okoro /Mon, according to Burke (2011), is 
currently in Puranga Clan, located in the vicinity of Awere Sub-County in Pader 
District and Odek in Gulu District (see: Burke, 2010).   There was also rwot kweri to 
coordinate cotton growing, public health initiatives and the communal construction 
and maintenance of public infrastructure and they are not formally tied into the 
system of traditional leaders.  
                                                          
359 Apoka is an Acholi word for distribution while okoro on the other hand is the shells of 
snails.  In the case of the former, rwodi apoke were individuals responsible for 
distribution of communal items.  They were often symbols of transparency and 
honesty.  In the later part of the 1950s and thereafter, most Christians might have 
become candidates for this position, as they were trusted in characters.  Okoro, on the 
other hand, were the description of empty shells from snails and were used by women 
for weeding. Burke (2010) insinuation quoted above is entirelywrong because, these 
titles were titles I personally know and have equally verified with people like Bishop 
Ochola, Lapwony Yutiko Okello and Mego Lakor that they were strickly titles allocated 
to women.  It was more to do with work in the field. 
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However, my view is that the stock of traditional leaders, their 
understanding of what was tradition and how these can support contemporary 
governance and their commitments to society have declined significantly in the 
1970s and thereafter.  Partly, this is because the lineage-based production line of 
local authorities came to a halt, as larger numbers of children began attending 
schools instead of the daily ritual they would undergo with traditional leaders.  
Modern education was introduced in Acholiland sometimes in the early 1900s.  In 
the late 1950s and during the 1960s, modern education dominated Acholiland, 
inflicting losses to the traditional dimension.  This was led by the Church and in 
partnership with Local Government (Onek-Adyanga, 2011).  Additionally, the long 
spell of insecurity that began in the 1970s through to 2010 and the universal primary 
education brought by the development partners in the late 1990s that forced children 
to attend schools might have closed the chapter for the previous routes to becoming 
traditional leaders.  It, however, retained the need to recognise ludito kaka, as older 
generations of leaders. 
Thus, the ritual for identifying leaders, and enforcing their mentoring, 
socialisation and maintenance have since collapsed.  The practice of hunting, 
dancing and joining elders in performing ceremonies and rituals have all faded over 
time, harshened by more appealing alternatives.  The inability of the traditional 
system to prevail over abuses in their own entities, partly following its delineated role 
by the new system, and partly because elders were both physically and mentally 
incapacitated, shut them out of any effective engagement with the society.    
Particularly during the camp life from 1986 through to 2006 or thereafter, 
elders became irrelevant and dependant on and therefore, liabilities to the living kin, 
especially the younger generation.   Fiduciary culture as social investment of long-
term gestation is often sustained by continued reciprocity from the beneficiaries.  
This social investment has been in decline in the aftermath of colonialism.  
Particularly after the 1970s, except at household levels, elders had not adequately 
invested in their future benefits coming from the children born in the village, as was 
part of its obligations in the past.  Thus, elders during the LRA incursion had, if 
anything, nothing to offer gainfully to the younger generation who grew up in the 
camps.  They, however, were of great use to researchers and NGOs, who used 
them as respondents in their analyses.  This is also more significant when seen from 
the context that change after war was seen as a move forward, away from the past, 
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to which these elders belonged.  This perspective, which was dominant, made 
elders more the source for history, respondents rather than lutela in the sense of 
recovery and development.  
Opinion leaders as lugwok paco 
Opinion leaders, on the other hand, were respected individuals, including 
the women who are all referred to as ludito and mego respectively.  Their authority 
emanated from their impartiality, knowledge base, practices and experiences of both 
Acholi and the global world.  For instance, retired experts often are categorised as 
opinion leaders. These category supports both individuals and local institutions in an 
advisory role.  They are part of the lugok paco – those with exceptional knowledge 
and skills in philosophy, mentoring, provocative thinking and advice for the local 
content of governance.  Retired civil servants have always helped clarify to the 
community the intention of government and how best they can engage with them.  
Similarly, religious leaders and private service providers like ajwagi have done their 
part in advisory roles.  For a child growing up in an Acholi village in the 1930s to 
1970s, neru and wayo as brothers and sisters of one’s mother and father 
respectively, were mentors categorised as opinion leaders.  
 
From Figure 6.1, lugok paco appear to have had a strong standing among 
the community.  Especially during the NRM rule, retired and/or retrenched civil 
servants with valuable knowledge of the government systems have lived with the 
community and they were resourceful in the camps.  Most of those who stayed in 
Acholiland, save for those employed with the NGOs, became economically 
dependent.  Research that I carried out for the EU Commission in 2000, for 
instance, confirmed that most soldiers from Acholiland who were laid off during the 
1992-5 Demobilisation and Re-integration Programmes funded by the World Bank, 
remained inactive within their community and were not enrolled in the LRA 
insurgency (see: Ayoo and Oloya, 2001).   As part of their community, they have 
provided various supports to the community, including as lead facilitators of 
development programmes. 
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The public servants and agents of the state 
The other group of lutela are the Local Authorities and state-based public 
servants.  This group is what Fukuyama (2013) refers to as the bureaucrats or the 
political agents normally mandated by the state to execute its agenda.  They are the 
public service - the mainstream administrative officers.  They included the District 
Commissioners and chiefs of the colonial and post-colonial eras (1900 until now) 
and their contemporary equivalents, the Chief Administrative Officers (NRM regime) 
and the sector technocrats, including the teachers, soldiers, police and other 
specialists.  Then there are the political appointees, which in the past included the 
District Commissioners and their present equivalent, the Resident District 
Commissioners.  The latter were representatives of the central government in the 
district and coordinated security functions at the district level. These are what Kurtz 
(2004) referred to as office holders. 
These groups draw legitimacy from their appointing officers, and in a neo-
patrimonial state like Uganda, they are often recruited with that objective and are 
therefore compelled to work for the interest of their appointing authorities (see: 
Rubongoya, 2007:5-16).  They are also known for holding what Mann (1986) 
describes as distributive authorities, which is power over others, political or 
professional.  As such, it tends to be predatory and restrictive, and associated with 
what was external (see: Dwyer, 1972:10-11; Dolan, 2011: 8-15).  These authorities 
became more effective in the 1900s when formal leaders came into full force in 
Acholiland.  Today, the balance is tilted in favour of formal leaders, and their actions 
are guarded by formal procedures and engagements.  They are also diverse in 
terms of nationalities.  Colonialists preferred recruiting outsiders to lead change as 
public servants.  Hence, all administrative staff and most core technical staff at the 
district level were not necessarily Acholi speakers, since English was the formal 
language for official governance.  However, throughout the regimes, public servants 
in rural settings have been natives who can speak the local language.  
The core state bureaucrats in both the Local and Central Governments 
have been able to change traditions into modern procedures and systems.  Rwodi 
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kalam (literally, chiefs of pens)360 who were subordinate to the state-based colonial 
authority, the District Commissioner, had elaborate structures of repression from 
1902 to 1962.  These structures were established at the Sub-County, Parish and 
Village levels.  The Acholi regarded these civil servants as traitors of the customs.  
Most of them were from the lubong agnates, who were affiliated within the luker 
agnates and were technically foreigners within the lineages.  However, as chiefs and 
sub-chiefs, they claimed responsibility for the Acholi “traditions”, a system that they 
helped to craft in governing the Acholi as an appendage of the Uganda State.  
As bureaucrats with mandates from the state, civil servants were state and 
local government agents, trained as carders to create change in Acholi.  As such, 
they were not embedded within the approaches they deployed in changing the ways 
of the Acholi (see: Allen, 2010:253: Branch, 2011: 165-166).  They competed, 
undermined and overcrowded the traditional authorities in community governance 
systems (see: Gertzel, 1974:57).  The chiefs, for instance, exerted too much force in 
creating “order”.  Their mandates, however, progressive, became violent.  These 
were unpopular actions that detached them from their own societies.  However, in 
the 1960s, chiefs and their equivalents were more responsive.  These were 
appointees of a political authority that was popular in society.  As such, the 
bureaucrats tried to make amends with traditional leaders, hence the improved 
rating in the 1960s (Gertzel, 1974: 58).  By the end of the Obote I era in 1971, Acholi 
bureaucrats had significantly expanded in all sectors and particularly in the military 
services, both nationally and at the Local Government level (see: Pain, 1998).  The 
reform of the Local Government in the 1990s shifted the legitimacies of the chiefs 
and whatever their new titles became, to Local Councillors (see: Steiner, 2010).  
Working under the supervision of politically elected leaders, the rating significantly 
improved.  During the protracted civil strife in Acholi, they became one of the strong 
pillars of advocacy, working closely with civil societies and the kinetic members of 
parliament.   
                                                          
360 By 1935, chiefs were renamed rwodi, to align them to Acholi’s traditions.  However, 
the society referred to them as rwodi kalam because, unlike rwodi Acholi, they earned 
their rewards from training. 
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Kinetic politicians in Acholi 
Acholiland, undoubtedly, has produced some of the finest African politicians 
in the history of Africa.  Ambassador, Olara-Otunnu for instance, is the current 
president of the Uganda People’s Congress. He worked as senior manager with the 
UN and was later suggested as a candidate for the position of Secretary General of 
the UN.  The Government of Uganda, according to sources however, frustrated his 
appointment to this position361.  The core of the Acholi political base has been 
ethnic, understandably.  First, the ethnicisation of Acholiland resolved the internal 
bickering, which had characterised the kaka-based politics.  Second, as a 
geographically isolated community, it had been pushed at the margin by the politics 
of centralisation.  Hence, those who lived and have experienced the isolation, it 
appears, were pushed to articulate the very issues they understood as the things 
that set them apart from the others.  In articulating these political issues of the Acholi 
as a category of the Uganda community, it seems that they had to press for 
collective views of the constituency as a team even when divided in ideology.  In the 
recent past, during the eighth and ninth parliament under the NRM (2001 to 2011), 
the country witnessed as the parliamentary group from Acholiland stood with their 
society in a characteristic fashion that deepened the ethnic dimension of political 
governance. 
There are key features of Acholi politicians that can be identified.  They 
have consistently remained relevant to their people because of the desire to push 
for Acholi community’s influence and ownership of key governing matters.  Land 
matters as evident in the 1950s and in after 2006 are part of the examples.  Often, it 
seems, that the kinetic dimension of this action is the demonstration of the fiduciary 
relationships they hold with their community, which demand a higher than ordinary 
degree of care. 
There are possibly two levels of politicians - the national level and the 
“local” level or the local councillors.  Politicians with higher ranking are more 
longstanding, yet Acholi politicians have historically very diverse political affiliations 
that were largely influenced by religion.  Generally speaking, Acholi politicians have 
been effective and diverse since the 1940s.  Until the 1960s, Acholi had local 
                                                          
361 See for instance New Vision Newspaper 08/06/2009 by Olupot and Karugaba and also 
the Independent of 24/06/2009 by Matsiko wa Musooni, of 24/06/2009 
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councillors, who were split between the two national parties, the Uganda People’s 
Congress and the Democratic Party.  Respondents note that Acholi politicians 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s were vocal, courageous, grounded and relevant, 
something Leys (1967), Gertzel, (1974:62) commented upon.   During the said 
periods, these politicians championed the equity question of the Acholi as a colonial 
project and tasks the institution of local governance with matters of development, 
including education of the people.  By 1959, political leadership had established 
strong roots in Acholiland.  However, this was mainly at the local level.  As elected 
leaders, councillors, arguably, represented the interests of their constituencies.  In 
the 1960s, Acholi representation was elevated to both national and local 
representatives.  The interaction between the two levels were effective in the 1960s, 
leading to the growth of political governance – regular elections of representatives in 
the subsequent years until during the 1970s following the coup by Idi Amin.  This 
situation was not fully recovered in the early 1980s and Acholiland representation in 
the early1980s can best be said to have been a compromise.  Most elected leaders, 
said the respondents, were selected based on their parties but not capabilities as 
individuals.   
However, political leaders needed to balance inward and outward 
perspectives to remain relevant in Uganda politics.  In a way, the educational levels 
of leaders become a strong influence in this aspect.  While many respondents 
considered that education has affected the selection of leaders since the 1960s, the 
majority view is that it has become a predominant factor in the last five years or so.  
New practices, like individual wealth creation, or reading and writing, have enabled 
old concepts of age groups and fiduciary and collateral bondage become less 
relevant.  It seems that being able to maintain the livelihoods of the poor, because 
one has resources, has gained currency as an important trait in leadership.  The 
current MP for Gulu Municipal Mr. Christopher Acire is semi-illiterate but he is rich 
and he is a leader even when he does not participate in parliamentary debates.  
New traits of leaders have allowed the emergence of new categories of lutela, who 
are both outward looking and also patrons of the new kaka formation. 
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Politicking - Balancing the Actions 
The challenge is to carefully balance political dimensions – to promote 
politicians’ control over society, keep internal political equilibrium, and link internal 
interests to the world outside its territory.  In a neo-patrimonial system like Uganda, 
this can be a difficult task, as successful attempts must receive the endorsement of 
the political system.  The difficulty with projecting Acholi’s vulnerable position under 
the current despotism is that it undermines the image that the government has 
consistently attempted to portray.  In such a situation, where modern state is used 
for patronage, politicians need to engage more with the technical wings of the Acholi 
elite: the civil servants, the civil society and those in diaspora as opinion leaders, to 
elevate their voices.   
The experience thus far under the NRM, has been that local leaders who 
have been vocal, critical and embedded in the society have been labelled as anti-
development and attempts made to isolate and move them to the margin362.  This 
motive of isolating embedded politicians has created difficulty for them in 
supervising the technical civil service providers in districts.  While engaging with 
local politicians was the norm in the 1950s and the 1960s, civil servants today are 
frightened even to try to give advice on politically wrong decisions to peoples’ 
representatives.  Typically, land issue in Acholiland has gone a wry as politics rather 
than technical voices have carried the debate, as viewed from on-going wrangles. 
Regrettably, the level of articulating national questions by Acholi politicians 
has declined when viewed from the 1950s through to 2010, argues, P’Ojok (2006).  
Partly, the government in power today has created a situation that demands 
subordination of members of parliament to its ideals.  But most members of 
parliament from Acholi are mainly focused on local issues that affect their 
constituencies.  With the help of CSOs, members of parliament have been able to 
elevate their tribal agenda, rightly but perhaps too inconsiderably when viewed from 
statehood context.  The failure of the state to provide protection to the Acholi from 
1986 to 2010, the death and unhealthy living in the displacement camps, the failure 
                                                          
362 Katebe is the local Uganda word for those who have fallen out with the system and 
are sent on a retirement without benefits.  It merely signals that you have fallen out of 
favour with the system. 
  263 
of the army to restore peace in Acholiland, the current nodding disease scourge and 
the dispute over land in Amuru for sugarcane growing are some of the examples of 
governing issues that visibly and rightly rocked the relationships with the state.  The 
insistence by local politicians to formal approaches to resolving these issues, 
created a view that they were exposing a despotic system because they are mainly 
in the opposition. 
Discussion of Leadership Profiling in Acholi 
There has been some confusion in the nomenclature of lutela by some 
scholars, implying that leadership was hierarchical and therefore authoritative.  
Burke and Omiat-Egaru’s (2011) study for the United Nations, for instance, wrongly 
observed that ‘strict hierarchy’ existed amongst the traditional Acholi leaders363.  To 
the contrary, institutionally, heterarchy was predominant.  Hierarchy was seen 
mainly at the corporate family level, where fiduciary relationships prescribed duties 
and power to elders as mentors of non-elders.  The absence of hierarchy in the 
structures resulted in the persistent claims that Acholi lacked leaders because 
leaders are seen as authoritative.  Generosity, astuteness (Gertzel, 1974:63), 
courage, consent seeking and charisma have been seen as some of the dominant 
traits of political leaders in Acholi over the years (Onyango Odongo, 2009). 
Arguably, there were different levels of political authority, jurisdiction and 
responsibilities that were recognised, as discussed in Chapter Four.  These levels 
interacted institutionally to resolve social and political impasse.  Burke and Omiat-
Egaru (2011) found out that the majority of the cases of land disputes that traditional 
leaders presided over were successfully resolved.  This is because traditional 
leaders know the issues because they live within the community and have an 
intimate understanding of the details and context of such dispute.  
On the other hand, excesses of social power, arrogance and dishonesty 
from leaders often attract disrespect from the majority of the Acholi people.  As one 
respondent commented about excesses in authority: “we all have power as 
individuals, so excessive power from outside has no market in governance” in this 
place.  Within Acholi, some leaders are categorised as arrogant, detached and 
                                                          
363 Burke, Christoper and Omiat-Egaru, Emmanuel, (2011), Identification of Good 
Practices in Land Conflict Resolution in Acholi 
  264 
“inhuman” and some have failed to deliver to the political community, Acholi refers to 
them as ludito malam - valueless leaders364. They were still ludito because they 
have other virtues for being ladit, for instance, age and marital status.  Arguably, 
Museveni’s attributes fit into these negative attributes of ludito malam.  For close to 
thirty years, he failed to deliver on peace, he lied about his intentions and “behaved 
like the colonialists, who merely were extractive” 365.  
Museveni is undiplomatic about issues, whether he is wrong or right366.  He 
is also damagingly uncompromising on matters of governance - wrongly or rightly367.  
This makes him the soldier man that sometimes resonates with the Acholi passions 
for self-belief and fate.  He is courageous and moves things in his way when he 
wants, something that has characterised his relationship with the Acholi in the past 
twenty years (see Rubongoya, 2007:62-67 and Finnström, 2008:82-85)368.  These 
attributes fit him well as a leader for implementing change but not in the interest of 
the Acholi.  Museveni, it is argued, micromanages events thereby, denying 
opportunity for local innovations.  For instance, he would go as far as suggesting 
where drainage systems should be placed, arguably because he is a practical 
person.  However, even at the dye-kal level, the won paco’s powers and duties had 
“serious” checks and balances, something that people felt does not come out with 
the president369.  He did not fulfil his critical promises for peace, including eliminating 
the LRA, on time (see: Atkinson, 2010: Epilogue; Mwenda, 2010; Wanabe, 2014)370.  
These issues have disqualified him as a leader and earned him a title of lagoba, a 
                                                          
364 “Lam” an Acholi word as I know it and further discussed in a number of interviews, 
depicts the ability of someone to influence decisions.  Malam, therefore, implies not 
evidently influential.  But lam also means something else, which is relevant in this 
case. When it is not enought, when it is insignificant, it is said to be lam in Acholi. 
365  Confidential interviews with a number of respondents in both academia and in local 
governance with a broad understanding of Acholi governance system of the past 
366 See comments by Onyango-Obbo, editor of the Monitor paper 
<www.eatingchiefs.org> 
367 See Andrew Mwenda’s blogs http://www.independence.co.ug (Accessed: several 
times) 
368.  The issue of land grab in Acholi is one thing that has stood out as something 
Museveni will not allow the Acholi from Amuru to prevail over. 
369 See for instance, analysis of governance in Acholi by Danis Pain, 1998 
370 There are strong opinions among the Acholi during the research time that as a leader, 
he was not committed to resolving the issues in Acholi,  such as the killing of many 
innocent people in Acholiland, the destruction and stealing of assets, including 
livestock, and the failure to end the LRA war.   
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liar, and ladit ma pe gene, somebody untrustworthy.  These views were expressed 
in interviews and in the field371.  If decentralisation had worked well and peace 
prevailed, Museveni would have been made irrelevant to many rural Acholi people, 
who would have concentrated on what is closer to them and to what they could 
influence.    
My sense of these is that some respondents contend that the character of 
leaders at the national level is a reflection of what is desired by the Uganda project.  
Ideally, these leaders are merely stooges of the system regardless of how effective 
the system is in terms of delivering the envisage results.  The view that political 
leaders should be assertive, articulate, truthful, and have courage to speak about 
the ills in the community have continued to drive the choices of who can lead Acholi 
politically.  However, this particular virtue is being challenged under neo-patrimony - 
where leaders are expected to be authoritative, to work in the interest of the political 
principal, regardless of the implications to the masses.  To this end, the majority of 
Acholi politicians have been labelled as rebellious and uncooperative with the 
government.  Acholi society has been starved of new ideas because of this 
dichotomy.  The Acholi society has offered trust to partners, believing that their 
words can be relied upon.  Much as this has defined the perimeters of the new kaka 
in Acholi, it has equally diluted the quality of what stood out in kinship – which was 
an obligatory, fiduciary relationship.  The fundamentalism within kaka enabled trust 
because there was a responsibility to give to a kin what was due to them.  So, “trust” 
has remained core in the making of choices, and yet it has been, in some instances, 
deliberately misinterpreted for the benefits of kin.    
The continued elevation of trusts or gen, as an ingredient for truthfulness or 
lok ada and, therefore, reliability is, in my opinion, a hangover of the “tradition”.  It 
was common among those who grew up in the rural areas, where the “eyes of the 
customs” would see even at night and self-enforcement of norms were evident.  
These old memories of what used to be have provided the new informal system with 
some of what was in the old.  The so-called elders that have emerged since the 
1970s have that status merely due to old age, and they lack the knowledge base of 
                                                          
371 In several of the interviews and discussions regarding leadership over the research 
period, these views were clearly articulated.  In particular, in discussing the question of 
the LRA both in Gulu and Kitgum, these feelings were raised to justify why leadership 
quality is tied to trust and commitments to governing goals. 
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the tradition. Hence, they are ludito ma obabe or unworthy/stupid elders.   So, while 
leaders are still courageous and can speak their minds and are elected, respected 
and followed, they have systematically and irreversibly, been drawn into the popular 
national traits of corruptible ones – those that act in their own interests rather than 
those of the people they represent.  The opportunities that would have enabled 
“elders” and society to verify trustworthiness through practice have shown that the 
variant exhibited is corrupted by values that depict dishonesty. 
Stereotyping change oriented leaders 
The Anglican missionary, Lloyd wrote in 1904, and this was one hundred 
years later echoed by the NRM big wigs in 2004:  
“On the whole, one would call them [the Acholi] a fine race physically, but 
not warlike. Probably if they had a leader, they would make a fighting tribe” 
(Lloyd 1948: 84.).   
Recently, similar sentiments were reported in a diagnostic study funded by the 
USAID in Uganda:  
According to Eriya Kategaya [Deputy Prime Minister in the NRM 
Government], government undertook a study of the conflict and reached the 
conclusion that the problem in Acholi lacks of credible leadership to act as 
the pivot for the peace process (HRPC, 2004:64).  
In these two separate opinions, the architects of governance, although separated by 
time, contend that Acholiland desires leaders that coerce the masses rather than 
consults them for “national agenda”.  This view conforms with the hierarchical model 
of governance where ideas come from the top and are acted upon by the subjects, 
something that is contrary, as we have seen earlier, to the philosophy of kaka.  As 
such, it violates the norms of a society and as indicated in chapter three, constitutes 
violence.  In fulfilment of this perceived gap, the two regimes offered alternatives, of 
which the outcome in both cases was thoroughly disappointing.372   
 Stereotyping the Acholi leadership has been a form of violence.  It has its 
roots in the identification of leadership phenotypes - the culture and customs, 
argued Mzee Bodo, an elder from Patiko Kal.  For instance, their neighbours - the 
                                                          
372  HRPC gives examples of these in the case of the NRM era, while in the case of the 
colonial administration, this information is found in evidence, both published and 
unpublished. 
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Langi - referred to them as ogangi.  This was in reference to the Acholi settled 
lifestyle in villages or gangi.  Literally, it was a prejudice, discrimination as the 
wandering Langi envisioned that settled living was ridiculous.  However, the Arab 
traders and the European explorers escalated prejudices against the Acholi people, 
building on their ideological perceptions of African people (see: Finnström, 2008:55-
58, 65-67; Uma-Owiny, 2013).  As Finnström elucidated, European and Arab 
assumptions concerning Acholi were “uncritical and without much reflection, basing 
their conclusions on already defined ideological hypotheses” that looked at Africans 
as inferior (see: Finnström, 2008:31).   
So, Acholi’s real confrontation with stereotyping started with its neighbours 
and was picked up by the Arab traders in the 1840s and the first Europeans in 
Acholi around the 1850s.  Being ideologically constructed, and rooted in the 
derivatives of enforced power, it also became an important ingredient of the 
“modernity” project.  The stereotypes, however, became fully integrated during 
colonialism (1862 to 1962), under the guise of “customary laws” that set the Acholi 
apart from the rest of the “country” that made up Uganda.  In the recent past, 
particularly during the NRM regime, similar prejudices have been an important 
ideological weapon in dehumanising, ridiculing, isolating and instilling a sense of 
psychological fear and hatred of the Acholi of Uganda (see: HRPC, 2004:62-64).  
Acholi’s political history, as presented thus far, is muddled with 
controversies.  If Acholi is seen as a “limited statehood”, what roles do local leaders 
play in advancing its interests in the central system?  For historical purposes and 
relevance to this study, this discussion focuses on three major areas of narratives.  
These are i) the economic potential of the Acholi region because of its infrastructure, 
the people and the climate, since trade and commerce have been the driving forces 
of domination; ii) the internal leadership within Acholiland; and iii) the ability of the 
Acholi people to adapt to new ways of doing things, which requires leaders to 
conceive of and lead change.  
Acholi was considered as a “county with little or no promise of success” 
(Berber, 1952: 31) by the colonial state partly because it was looked upon as 
marginal in three key aspects: its climate was relatively dry for cropping, the 
population was sparse for plantation labour and geographically it was isolated from 
foreign markets (see: Atkinson, 2010:4-5).  Thomson (2010) agrees that the legacy 
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of   marginalisation by colonialists had a lasting impact on Acholi of Uganda 
(Thomson, 2010:50).  Additionally, the Acholi response to forced labour for peasant 
cash crop production and labour migration to the south was not enthusiastic, and 
hence, they were stereotyped as “naturally lazy” people (Berber, 1952).  Because of 
its political organisation, a model of diffused power and customs, the society was 
considered “of no threat” to the British rule (Berber, 1952: 32; Atkinson, 2010: 4-5).   
On the governability of the Acholi, viewed from an hierarchical model, Sir 
Hesketh Bell wrote to the Secretary of State on September 13, 1906 casting serious 
doubts that the Acholi were “unwilling to submit to domination by chiefs” and that 
they were lacking “powerful local authorities through which we might transmit our 
directions” (Berber, 1952:32) Such prejudices have been used extensively in the 
narratives about the Acholi, even in the present time373.  Seen from its historical 
context, one can say that these have been perfected in recent times, as tools of 
“modernity” or simply evidence of coloniality374.  Prejudice, as such, becomes a form 
of violence, which the Acholi continue to endure.  Internally, Acholi has grown to 
accept that political contests are arbitrated by social power, and prejudice is but a 
part of it.  Its politics, it seems, have been constructed on a very narrow front.   
Internally, social identity, based on social intimacy of neighbourhood and locality as 
well as kinship, has played significantly on how it lived thus far.  There has long 
been a narrative about the need to identify “credible Acholi leaders” to manage the 
Acholi community, from international and national political commentators as quoted 
earlier above.  They have defined such ideal leaders as being strong men and 
women who could help government get its agenda across to the people (HRPC, 
2004: 64).  Stated in this manner, “credible leaders” become, in the context of neo-
patrimony, political benefactors that see change as being driven solely by the state 
and its political principal. 
In a situation where the state ignores equity for national development, local 
leaders have often sought to deepen centralisation, to allow them gain some form of 
                                                          
373 Focus group discussions 
374 For analyses of how prejudices have been used to dehumanise the leadership quality 
in Acholi, one can read Finnström (2003) and Dolan (2009; 2011) and to some extent 
Odoi-Tanya (2010) 
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autonomy in decision-making375.  This feeling, in the case of Acholiland, builds on 
the local potential and the fact that when these potentials are managed correctly, 
could change the lives of the people.  Under these circumstances, political leaders 
from Acholi have led vigorously the need for decentralised decision making.  This 
however, has been seen by the central government as oppositional, rebelliousness 
and insubordination to the central authority (see: Berber, 1954).  This has been the 
guiding principle of the “modernity” project under coloniality and has been applied 
during contemporary governance as part of the reform agenda (see: Berber, 1954).  
It is neither new nor unfamiliar that those who seek to control Acholiland 
have concluded that they are rebellious and without “credible leaders”, due to the 
persistent resistance of leaders to the adoption of further centralisation in general 
and national government policies in particular.  Another perceived impairment of the 
Acholi people, notes Odoi (2009), has been their resistance against threats or 
excessive coercion and reluctance to submit to external authorities, which from 
practice, is a required precondition of the “modernity” project.  
For instance, most post-colonial governments have tried to work with what 
they see as “credible leaders” by sidelining elected or preferred choices of the 
people.  In order to divide the Acholi after the fall of Obote I, Amin preferred to work 
with members of the Democratic Party in Acholiland because they were in the 
opposition during Obote’s era.  So, most of them disagreed with Obote when he was 
in power.  Secondly, they had political authority in Acholiland, which they could use 
to promote any form of anti-Obote’s discourses.  When the NRM took over power, it 
associated also first and foremost with leaders that had no social basis in the region.  
It “shopped around” 376 for local compatriots from within Acholi, what Acholi would 
refer to as rwot ineka ki nyero, who became the “credible” option of leaders or 
                                                          
375 This conclusion was reached after an interesting discussion with a number of 
members of parliaments from the northern Uganda and later with friends from 
South Sudan on the subject of governance.  
376 The Europeans colonialists used the Nubians to administered Acholiland even though 
the Nubians were known to have mistreated the Acholi.  The colonial administration 
that followed used hand picked District Commissioners and native Chiefs of their own 
choices to continue with their rules over the Acholiland. Similarly, all other regimes 
thereafter appointed their own political representatives to manage expectations at 
local levels.  In the case of the NRM, it at the beginning used politicians with unpopular 
image to manage its affairs, something that ultimately challenged the motives of its 
governance.  Respondents listed leader that are seen as opportunists rather than 
genuine pro-people who are or have been in government.  
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patrons to work with the government with the high handedness of a military 
administration (see: Postlethwaite, 1947:17; HRPC, 2004).  
Governments have thus attempted to “think for the Acholi people” on the 
assumption that they know what is best for them, and this in turn, not surprisingly, 
generated opposition in both past and present.  In the same manner, it bolstered 
within Acholi the emergence of “a new brand of kinetic political leaders” celebrated 
for their courage, passion and clarity on local issues, unreservedly.377  And as Dwyer 
(1972:5) stated of the Acholi from 1890 to 1920:  “they were not a people who 
succumbed to the Scramble; they were not conquered in any classic sense.”  
The failure by the State to recognise the different “carrying capacities”, and 
“competitive and comparative advantages” of the different political actors as leaders 
in governance, have resulted in chronic corruption, disobedience, incompetence and 
the failure of regimes to make useful change. Co-opted leaders work for regimes 
rather than the society.  During most post-colonial regimes, co-opted leaders were 
rewarded with wealth, and supported by government in their campaigns to gain the 
seats they occupy.  Co-option has weakened the growth of genuine political leaders 
in Acholiland.  Failing to develop internal agreements within the ranks of Acholi 
politicians has failed them to strategize as a collective, rendering their negotiation for 
alternatives often irrelevant.  A case in point is the current wrangles in the Madhvani 
Sugar Works in Amuru.  As a private entity, the Amuru Sugar Works has no clear 
benefits for the Amuru people.  However, when approached from a post-conflict 
reconstruction context, the public-private sector partnership could have been 
negotiated to focus on some elements that would support local resettlement.  
However, the party faithful would, according to my respondents, disclose internal 
strategies in favour of self-interests.   
                                                          
377 Rwot Awich of Kaka Payira was strongly opposed to the British ways of 
administration, which failed to recognise the Luo Gang as an entity with capabilities to 
govern the Acholi of Uganda.  Most colonial administrators between 1889 and 1912 
considered him a traitor of civilisation; yet, he commanded respect from the majority 
of his people and Acholiland (See: Anywar, 1947).  Similarly during the NRM, young 
and vibrant leaders came into parliament from Acholiland on the ticket of expressively 
representing the issues pertaining to the violence. They included in Parliament 7 and 8: 
Hon Mao, Hon Oulanya, Hon. Okello-Okello, etc. 
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Internal disagreements among Acholi people 
There are also weak and uncoordinated linkages between the national 
leaders and those at the local levels.  While at the local levels, the Local Councillors 
are seen to respond faster, it has been very easy to dislodge initiatives by the 
centre.  The recent outbreak of “nodding disease”378 in the eastern part of Acholiland 
presented two important consequences.  Firstly, while it resurrected the 
understanding that local and national politicians can work and resolve situations that 
affect the people, it also helped to show the missing links in local governance.  This 
scenario was also seen in the case of the Madhvani Sugar Works, where national 
leaders have worked closely with local ones but have failed to galvanise better 
alternatives for the society. 
In these two examples, the Members of Parliament (national interlocutors) 
and their Local Councillors (local interlocutors) reached out to each other and 
redefined the social problems, which they then articulated to the outsiders.  In these 
struggles, the civil societies – the Acholi Religious Leaders in particular – played 
significant roles.  The responses and outreach, however, faded away with virtually 
little impact.   Perhaps this was because of the absence of the technical group with 
the power and ability to implement change.  Technical people are subordinated to 
the state from where they get their legitimacies.  The fears of collective responsibility 
to their government tend to reduce their visibility. 
The leaders are currently overwhelmed by societal problem that 
accompanied post-conflict recovery.  They also lack the drive and the capacity to 
push this through - resulting in an absence of collective problem solving.  In the 
meantime, the civil society organisations and especially the NGOs filled in the 
vacuum, driving an agenda of liberal governance that is not determined or even 
shaped by local leadership, let alone local participation.   
                                                          
378 Nodding disease is recognised by the WHO as one of the neglected tropical diseses.  
For the prevalence, history and continuing analyses of this neurological condition with 
unknown etiology that was identified in Northern Uganda in 2007, please refer to  
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Concluding Remarks  
I have used historical data and laid out the parameters and perimeters of 
leadership in Acholiland, arguing that civil, political and traditional leaders have 
attempted to work together to resolve the crisis of legitimacy in the region.  
However, the interaction between the state and the community has been stressful, 
at least for the community.  Based on respondents’ views of their leaders, I have 
concluded that Acholiland, as any case of limited statehood, has benefitted from 
some categories of local leaders who are embedded and articulate about 
Acholiland.  However, these very characteristics have also reinforced stereotype 
about them as being ‘tribal’ and conforming to stereotypes that have been used 
against the Acholi by outsiders since pre-colonial times. There is no convincing 
evidence to suggest that local politicians from Acholiland dislike hierarchical modes 
of governance.  Rather, there is overwhelming evidence that based on history and 
prevailing situation, ethno-governance in Acholiland demands local participation.  
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Chapter Seven – Community Governance Practices 
Introductory Remarks  
This Chapter discusses factors that mediated change outcomes, arguing 
that in some instances, these factors resulted in complete change in governance.  
These factors are viewed here as social-political problems because they are social 
constructions and are therefore subjective (Kooiman, 2003:136).  For instance, 
cattle raids have been a persistent and predominant feature of conflicts arising from 
culture and resource poverty.  They have been common within Acholiland but also 
along the South Sudan and their boundaries with Karamoja in Uganda.  In order to 
reduce subjectivity of these social problems, a process of validation was carried out 
covering the year 1998 to 2006, as part of this research379.   
This research reveals changes in the emerging governing practices and the 
growing perceptions about community governance.  Through group work380, an 
objective list of factors were ranked and prioritised by the respondents.  The list 
reflects the perception of the respondents regarding the significance of these factors 
in mediating change in governance.  These factors include: (i) political violence, (ii) 
governing environments, (iii) internal discourses, (iv) natural and (v) economic 
factors, as discussed below.  In order to objectivise the risks developed by the core 
respondents, both secondary sources of information (e.g., UBOS, 2004; 2010) and a 
process of risk validation were carried with other key respondents in government 
and other institutions.381  It was found out that most of the problems or risks 
identified were self-evident to people who know Acholiland.  This situation 
represented what Gusfield (1981) described as a “homogenous consciousness” of 
the community about the risks found in Acholiland.  In this chapter, I highlight the top 
                                                          
379 In 2008 I met three teams of (i) ten members of mixed youth group, (ii) ten women 
and men, aged 35 to 50 years, and (iii) twenty mixed groups of men (8 aged below 30 
years while twelve aged about 50, to validate the information regarding social risks in 
three focus group discussions.  Three additional groups of the same composition were 
met by a research assistant in Buwayale, in the present Kiradongo and Pader districts 
immediately afterwards.  
380 I made use of the participatory tools of historical profile, time trends and ranking to 
dialogue on the risks.  The definition of governance used in the research was 
developed from both subjective and objective views of the respondents.  
381 I am grateful to the World Bank staff in Kampala Office and the District Planners in 
the seven districts found in Acholiland, 2001 to 2009. 
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five risks or factors that were ranked by the respondents in the study with the 
highest importance.   
The Major Causes of Change, 1898 to 2010 
In defining, describing and discussing these factors, earlier analyses of 
risks or social problems were found to be complementary and supportive (see: 
Oloya et al., 1997; Oloya, 1998 and UBOS, 2004). Overall, droughts, diseases and 
pests (droughts and natural factors), deliberate destruction of crops/food stores, 
displacements and death of parents and political leaders (‘political violence’) and 
inappropriate policies and laws (‘governing environment’) were rated in the study as 
the most consistent and damaging factors that have affected Acholi.  Figure 7.1 
provides the result of pairwise ranking of the risk factors that I have enumerated 
above.  The vertical axis explains the intensity of the risks as compared with each 
other and all through the period under review.  Most of the earlier information 
especially during colonial period were compiled from various literature and later 
validated particularly for the 1940s by the respondents.  
Effects of political violence 
The first and most pressing of the political risks according to respondents 
was political violence.  This category included political threats, state-inspired 
violations, power-related issues that led to violent confrontations, the practice of war 
mongering, displacement, political arrests, murder, targeting of community leaders, 
tribal fights and lweny kaka.  The community also acknowledged that prejudice, that 
is, the labelling of Acholi as anyanya or primitive people, has a political implication 
and constitute a violation of rights (Finnström, 2008:74-75).  Additionally, historical 
events like the slave trade, cattle raids, destruction of food stores and food in the 
fields by both the LRA and the UPDF were included, although others felt that some 
of these were economically motivated. 
Although it was claimed that some elements of lweny kaka were legitimised 
by the society during colonial time, most respondents concurred that they were 
results of the absence of law enforcement in the community.  Political violence, they 
argued, destroyed social cohesion among the ethnic groups that were opposed to 
each other and it led to widespread distrust.  Accordingly, those polities that did not 
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trust the other used this to undermine governance in those polities.  The 
consequences of distrust were significant according to both observations and 
responses.   
Respondents noted that political violence and especially prejudices, 
coercion, political arrests and killings have been a dominant feature of all forms of 
governance in Acholiland since 1898 (Finnström, 2008:172-173, 238).  As such, 
political violence has been part and parcel of the entire contemporary governance 
system.  The people interviewed recognise that the colonial regime made a number 
of arrests of rwodi that opposed their rules and in some cases, these rwodi were 
never seen back alive (Uma-Owiny, 2013).  According to Uma-Owiny (2013), rwodi 
like Onung Ting Traa of Lamogi, Awic of Payiira, and Ogaba-Labwor of Pajule were 
arrested.  However, some of the rwodi that were arrested by the colonialists and 
never returned include Rwot Okwok of kaka Parabongo.  They for instance named 
Rwot Camo as one victim of political violence during the colonial regime.  The 
Nubian force for instance, killed Rwot Camo of Payiira in 1887 on the instruction of 
Rwot Ogwok of Padibe, who was said to be his cousin (Uma-Owiny, 2013).  
They also remembered stories of organised displacement of people of 
Alero, Payiira, Koch and part of Bwobo by the colonial authorities that lasted from 
1910 to 1935 (Uma-Owiny (2013:64-66) 382.  This was on account of tsetse fly 
infestation of the area that needed to be cleared.  They equated this move to the 
recent one during the NRM regime, which began in 1986383.  This new episode 
lasted officially until 2006, although from field reports, there were displaced persons 
until as late as 2011 in some instances.  Overall, the core respondents felt that 
political violence resulted in large migration of people, causing high death of 
children, instigated fear of and submission to the perpetuators.  Additionally, it 
destroyed the trust people had in the traditional systems as it failed to protect them 
(see also: UBOS, 2004).   
                                                          
382 Uma-Owiny (2013) discusses how jo Payiira were brought and camped in Unyama and 
because of the unhealthy situation; they lost a large number of its inhabitants.  This 
led to decongestion of the Payiira.  Some were taken under Rwot Andrea Olal at 
Otwak at the shore of Togi.  Some went to Loyobo and Awac under Rwot Obunya of 
Paico in the 1933 
383 Respondents argued that the Apar evictions, as well as those in other parts of Acholi 
following the discovery of oil, are on-going displacements 
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Political persecution and political violence were also remembered in the 
deaths of Perez Okoya of kaka Palaro, who was murdered in the 1960s, Archbishop 
Janan Luwum and Eremia Oryema, in the 1970s.  These were prominent Acholi 
leaders that were killed as a result of violence in governance.  In its survey of 2004 
in Acholiland, UBOS found out that following displacement alone, more than fifty per 
cent of households lost their breadwinners (UBOS, 2004: 34).  The report also 
confirmed an increase in the number of female and child-headed households in 
Acholiland following this episode.  For instance, it states that at least fifteen per cent 
of children below eighteen years of age lost their fathers and six per cent their 
mothers.  It further states that based on information from their sample population in 
Acholiland, at least six per cent of the children lost both parents (UBOS, 2004:34).   
The general feeling from the respondents was that political violence 
characterised three regimes: the seventy years of colonial rule, the Idi Amin era and 
Museveni eras.  Political violence has been the means of centralising power to 
political principals and it created networks of patronage in which the national 
security system finds itself entrenched and bringing together members of certain 
ethnic groups personalising national agenda.  It introduced the practice of 
highhanded subordination (e.g., Boas, 2001:700).  In the context of governance, it 
introduced favouritism, neo-patrimony and the manifestation of corrupt practices and 
illegitimate behaviour. 
Drought and natural disasters 
Drought and natural factors, including dry spells, epidemics, incidences of 
pests such as locusts and floods, were considered societal risks.  Annex 1 shows 
how significant and persistent they have been in the lives of the Acholi.  Drought and 
famine, triggered the formation of multiple villages or kaka in the past, and nurtured 
the growth of hegemonic acculturation in leadership (see: Leys, 1957).  However, 
they were also said to have caused displacement, famine, and death and, in many 
instances, spiralling migration of the people mainly during the colonial time.  The 
incidence of the 1938 to 1940 droughts, for instance, was devastating.  According to 
reports, ninety per cent of finger millet (eleusine indica) planted in eastern Acholi 
was destroyed and relief was required for around one hundred thousand people, 
which was almost the entire population of eastern Acholi.  The case for western 
Acholi was almost similar.  At least fifty seven per cent of income from cotton was 
lost due to bad weather (Pain, 1998).  Acholi ma malo was classified as more 
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vulnerable to drought than Acholi mapiny.  The situation was made worse in the 
following year with an invasion of locusts, which decimated all crops according to 
reports.  This precarious position forced young men in Acholi to enlist into the Kings 
African Rifles, to fight for the British in the 1940 World War.  According to Pain 
(1998), over sixty per cent of young men from Acholi sought employment in the 
army following these events. 
The UBOS survey confirms the significance of weather in the area, noting 
that it is ranked highly by the Acholi for the period 1991 through to 2004 (UBOS, 
2004).  There were reportedly severe droughts in the 1950s and 1960s, which led to 
the death of livestock and people.  The older generation also recounted these 
effects of drought during the colonial time and part of the 1960s, as provided in 
Annex 1.  Presumably because during much of the NRM regime, people lived in the 
camps and were dependent on food aid, in our discussion, they underplayed the 
role of drought particularly in 1997 and thereafter.  However, through memories of 
some of the events, they recalled the outbreak of strange alignments during the 
NRM regime that include Ebola, nodding disease and HIV/AIDS.  These, they 
argued, reinforced the impact of other natural factors in worsening their vulnerability 
as a society384.  
The community recounted some of the governing practices that emerged in 
response to drought and famine in Acholiland since the pre-colonial time.  Caka, an 
Acholi word for petty collection, became a common practice for weaker households, 
and was typically a symbol of vulnerability and reliance on the principles of 
entrustment and obligations.  Caka have evolved in various dimensions, some 
extreme cases include migration.  Ordinarily, it was a form of use of a woman labour 
in exchange for food, to fill the food gaps that existed.  Caka, according to 
respondents, has been a feature of all the regimes but was well defined in the rural 
areas during the colonial and the first part of the post-colonial eras.  Similarly, 
Acholi, through the use of awak, which were loaned labour for communal fieldwork, 
would engage in food production.  Each participating household established two 
types of granaries: dero mono – food reserve and dero kec - regular stores.  The 
                                                          
384 See: UBOS, 2004; See also: Uganda Radio Network (2015). Acholi chiefs’ demands 
nodding disease report, The Observer, 09 April 2015, n.a.   
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practice of establishing a food buffer became prevalent with the increase in 
production and productivity of agriculture.   
Governing environments as a factor 
The third category of risks was identified as governing environments, which 
are the conditions that facilitate political interactions.  These include policies, rule of 
law, institutions – all representing the governing instruments. It was the general view 
of the respondents that historically national level governing instruments have 
ignored the core issue of sustainability in household livelihoods security in 
Acholiland (see: Brett, 1992: 5-12).  As such, there was/is unsustainable delivery of 
services for growth in Acholiland.  They felt that governance - defined as social-
political - has been undermined by policy; rule of law and other governing 
instruments enacted forming the basis of contemporary administration (Brett, 1992: 
5-12).  
 
Source: Field Data, 2013 
Uganda governments by adopting massively neo-liberal policies that rely on 
market forces, down played the realities of imperfect markets that prevail in 
Acholiland.  The imbalance in the access of important information and other inputs 
for production, an approach that would have increasingly provided level-playing field 
for all to compete in the markets was desirable. This policy distortion has created 
dependency of Acholiland to the state and outside markets.  For instance, during the 
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colonial period, the native chiefs and their analogues were forced by the state to 
enforce cotton production.  Cotton production is dependant on the state 
mechanisms of supply of knowledge and inputs, which the Acholi had no control 
over.  Consistently, market-based interventions have continued to frustrate the 
efforts of Acholi farmers, as they are not participants but merely induced by-laws 
and policies to get involved. As Pain (1998) observed, the opportunity cost of cotton 
production was the unending torture of women, food insecurity and growing number 
of polygamous families (see also: P’Ojok, 2007).   
For instance, in the attempt to enforce modern statehood, the central 
governments sought to harmonise customary laws and their inward-looking 
perspectives towards what is seen as collective at the national level.  In doing so, 
they acted aggressively and sometimes unfairly.  From the discussion, it seems to 
me that the implication of the treaties that rwodi Acholi had signed in 1898 with 
Major Macdonald and Major Redcliff were not well explained to them (see: Gertzel, 
1974: 8).  This is more so when viewed from the immediate outcomes.  Some of the 
older respondents articulated the view that the Acholi envisioned that the British 
signed the treaties to help end the suffering of the Acholi people under the Arab 
slave traders.  They never knew that the British despised their politics of facultative 
mutualisms385.  However, by signing, Acholi became a subject of the British 
Protectorate, something that was later contested by them, as was evident by the 
Lamogi and Labongo revolts in 1911 and 1912 respectively.  Similarly, the policy of 
disarmament in 1901 to 1913, in which the Nubian forces were used to inflict 
suffering to the communities, was another policy prescription that was top down 
(Postlethwaite, 1947:51-52; P’Ojok, 2007).  This, together with the compulsory 
displacement of the lupiny in 1913 to 1935, demonstrated the push for change that 
never took into account the local context.   
The post-independent governments also varied in their policy 
prescriptions386.  For instance, the respondents contend that the Obote I era was in 
their view, the most conducive of the governing environment thus far.  Certainly, 
                                                          
385 Thanks to Charles Alai, Tiberio Okeny and Kwamogi Anywar for their insights based on 
various meeting and telephone discussions between 2004 to now with Kwamogi. 
386  These analyses are based on perceptions from respondents but are supported by 
objective analyses, some provided in Branch, 2011.  In focusing on perspectives, I 
wanted to build on how the Acholi people have been able to interpreted governing 
actions of the state in particular.   
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there were jobs for those with an education (Gertzel, 1974).  Education figures were 
up and household livelihood insecurity was isolated only in marginal areas as the 
agricultural technologies and extension were effective and transformative. The 
government also targeted state-led sector investments like the Aswa and Acholi 
Ranching Schemes, and the several other Group Farms that were jointly managed 
with local authorities.  Primary education was decentralised and Local Government 
made considerable and relevant investments and policy pronouncements that 
promoted education in the district, in partnership with the church.  These were 
supply-led, but also reflected local needs.  The UPC policies in the 1960s perfected 
the colonial legacy.   
The NRM regime on the other hand, sought to create fundamental change 
that was interpreted as sidelining the Acholi from its southern-led administration.  
The RC and the LC governing systems, however, resonated with the kaka form of 
governance. It allowed people to elect someone that would deliver services 
regardless of their political affiliation.  The empowerment seen in this policy, 
unfortunately did not work as most of the Acholi were in camps and therefore unable 
to participate.  Respondents stressed the contradictions in the policy and strategies 
particularly with regards to peace building.  In order to promote its claim that it 
introduced peace in Uganda, the NRM’s core policies ignored the element of 
facultative mutualism and imposed a new system of local governance that show the 
army and the NRM carders undermining the voices of the people, which were 
advocated by the members of parliament and CSOs.  
In 1997, as a consultant with DFID, I undertook a study of the draft Land 
Bill, 1997.  Together with Mr Mutiaba, who was the Chairperson for the Sessional 
Committee of Parliament on Natural Resources, we travelled around Acholiland with 
seven other Members of Parliament on the Committee.  When in Gulu, we were 
informed by the workshop participants that at that particular time, Acholi’s pressing 
issue was insecurity and not land issues.  This similar evaluation of governing 
actions by NRM, where the Acholi or other northern ethnic groups are identified with, 
is common.  During the same exercise on the Land Bill in Karamoja sub-region, 
elders and other area residents observed that government was not prioritising policy 
engagement in tandem with pressing local issues.  Particularly for the most insecure 
areas in Uganda, the elimination of insecurity was important.  However, the 
strategies used, according to respondents, disconnected with the realities on the 
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ground387.  The respondents discussed the 1991 to 1994 intensive military presence and 
actions in Acholiland under Major General David Tinyefunza.  Part of this was the Operation 
North.  They also talked about the failed peace talks between Mrs Betty Bigombe and the 
LRA in 1993/94 following a change of strategy by the president (see also: Dolan, 2005).  
These and other pronouncements by the NRM, like was the case of Operation Iron 
Fist, bred scepticism about intentions.  Dolan (2005) and Tripp (2010) have also 
highlighted contradictions in the strategy adopted by the NRM in bringing peace to 
Acholiland.  On one hand, the government showed good intentions, including the 
enactment of the Amnesty Act in 2000, the Presidential Peace Team in 2002 and 
supportive expressions from leading government officials for dialogue, but other 
actions would often override these good intentions (Tripp, 2010: 165). 
Acholi’s internal factors 
There were internal factors that were also seen as causes of change, 
including kinship, religion and the politics of lumalo and lupiny – the divide that often 
created a form of disunity.  These internal factors were occasionally subsumed by 
external aggression as Acholi had to pull together to face these challenges as a 
political unit as now discussed below.  Internal discourses, which pitched the lumalo 
against the lupiny but also one group of Acholi against the other, were manifested in 
many ways.  Territorially, the lumalo have historically felt and rightly so that 
economic developments, especially in the contemporary Acholiland under central 
government have favoured the lupiny.  Partly, developments are seen in terms of 
infrastructure development and Gulu town, as a regional centre, has progressed 
significantly.  This, however, are dominantly private sector-led investments that have 
their incentives tied to the economics of development.  This argument that underpin 
equity resonated with the principle of facultative mutualism that underpinned wadi in 
traditional Acholi belonging.  Under kaka as we have seen, wadi had to share and, 
thus, it recognised the need to balance material wealth between different 
households within kinship.   This too resonates with the principle of democracy 
under modernity.  From Figure 7.1, internal feuds that divided the Acholi and made 
them vulnerable to exploitation, were many and could be categorised as political and 
religious. Some major intra-Acholi discourses in its history include for instance 
kinship rivalries, which scholars like Allen (1998) contends were caused by power 
                                                          
387 General views expressed in interviews with elders across the region. 
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contestation.  Rwot Ogwok Ayaro of Padibe and Rwot Camo and his predecessor, 
Rwot Awich of Payiira for instance, had kaka rivalry that dominated the history of pre 
and early post-colonial time (See: Uma-Owiny, 2013:21.   
From literature, the rivalry between Rwot Ogwok Ayaro and the rwodi of 
Payiira - both were powerful kaka - escalated following Rwot Ogwok Ayaro getting 
support from the Arab traders.  The Arabs exploit this rivalry between the two 
leaders in order to claim control over trade zones (Girling, 1960 cited from Finnström 
2008:Chapter 2).   Later, the colonial authorities, to support their own interests in 
Acholiland, reconstituted this petty rivalry between Payiira and Padibe.  For 
instance, in the initial reform of the kaka governance, Padibe became one of the 
seven sub-counties subordinated under Lamwo County.  This in a way, neutralised 
Padibe’s ambition and direct link with Payiira, which was now found in another 
County all together but both of them, subordinated to the District.  In the 
amalgamation, Rwot Erasto Obol, the rwot of Padibe became the County Chief 
(Uma-Owiny, 2013:72-73).  Payiira on the other hand was divided into two separate 
sub-counties and both subordinated under Aswa County. Rwot Yona Odida of 
Payiira became the County Chief, while Yaconi Lugaca of another kaka Payiira 
called Awac, was a Sub-County Chief (Uma-Owiny, 2013:72-73).   Both Padibe and 
Payiira as kaka had no direct interaction rather than through their own County 
Agents or the District. 
In addition to political feuds, sometimes even among close relatives, 
Acholiland also particularly after 1904, was plugged in contestation of faith where 
Catholics and Protestant churches divided families and friends along their 
ideologies.  Typically, from mid 1910 on wards, the missionaries had established 
several schools that were used to transform the core of the Acholi elites.  From the 
experiences of some of my respondents and my own, both Catholics and Protestant 
schools were only accessible based on the orientations of ones faith388.  This 
created first and foremost patronage in education and favourism, which brought 
about imbalance and nepotism. 
                                                          
388 Because my parents were of the Protestant faith, I had to attend primary school some 
10 miles away from home and yet there was a Catholic school only 4 miles away and 
on a well-graded local government road. 
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  Uma-Owiny (2013: 70-71) observed that while the Protestant Church 
came in 1904, it targeted the households of rwodi Acholi and ludito kaka and most of 
these became candidates for the 1914 cadres that became rwodi kalam.  Some 
scholars admit that the Acholi Local Council in the 1950s was split between 
Catholics and Protestants, suggesting that the churches became a strong factor in 
shaping governance in Acholiland (Gertzel, 1974).   However, often in the face of 
challenges from the central governments, these politicians have shown great 
connectedness to each other for “ribbe pa Acholi” – the unity of Acholiland.   A case 
in mind is the 1955 land reform that was opposed by the Acholi and Lango 
politicians.  
Post-colonial Acholiland remained internally divided along ethnic, religious 
and political party lines.  Following the first parliamentary election of 1961, 
Acholiland elected three members of the DP to parliament against only one from 
UPC party (Uma-Owiny, 2013:131).   This clearly was a victory for the Catholics.  
Indeed, in 1961 the DP had won the national election with the majority but this 
changed when the Anglican-based alliance of UPC and Kabaka Yekka (KY) led to a 
formation of a government in 1962 before independence.  The first post-colonial 
regime under Obote was characterised by chaos and political contestations 
(Rubongoya, 2007:15).  In spite of this, Acholiland registered high economic 
development because local politicians placed strong interests in local governance.  
As a political community, the internal leaders attempted to unite the Acholi on core 
development values like education and agriculture.  
Some of the respondents argued that outsiders often used these internal 
wrangles to pull strings of discord that sometimes polarises the Acholi.  Those who 
agree to this view stated that these manipulations are historical and would make 
reference to how the Nubian forces prior to and during colonialism as was discussed 
earlier, were such manipulative (Finnström, 2008:37).   The colonialists used the 
Nubians to crack the whip in Acholiland, as they set the old enmity among the kaka 
to flourish during contemporary Acholiland.  In the appointment of chiefs after 1914, 
the British used these weaknesses in posting some chiefs to govern enemy areas or 
clans, like it was the case of Payiira under the different rwodi kalam – some were 
sent under rwot Obunya and others under rwot Andrea Olal, who both were 
traditional enemies of the Payiira (Uma-Owiny, 2013: 65).   
  284 
These actions undermined internal unity towards the colonialists as 
common enemies.   Apoka poka, or division also featured in the post-colonial era.  
Respondents noted that particularly in the 1960s, these apoka poka were embodied 
in religion and political parties.  Significantly, the difference between lumalo and 
lupiny flared around the question of development that seemly favoured the lupiny.  
This led to Idi Amin regime splitting Acholiland again into East (lumalo) and West 
(lupiny).  Ideally, the 1993/1994-peace talk initiated by Bigombe with the LRA in the 
early phase of the attempted negotiation was also, according to others, brought to a 
hold by internal wrangles around the leadership question and how Bigombe, a 
woman married from Museveni’s tribe, could be made to head the assignment.   
The devastating level of poverty following the return from the camps, and 
the politicised state interest in natural resources that are found in Acholi (as 
described previously), are now some of the issues that have set the Acholi elites 
against each other.  Following discussions from the national press and other media, 
a line is drawn between the NRM supporters or imposers and the rest of the Acholi, 
who are now generally grouped as the opposition.  The NRM supporters, most of 
them backed by resources, see the opposing viewpoints to that of the president as 
anti-developmental.  As such, those opposing voices, including those of the CSOs – 
some genuinely analytical and representative of modern governance models – like 
how the president’s assertions undermine decentralised governance, are all 
collectively seen as anti-government.  Like in the past, communal development 
issues tend to bring Acholi together.  For instance, the creation of several group 
farms, the Aswa and Acholi ranches as well as the establishment of educational 
centres all over Acholi in the 1960s and 1970s showed Catholics and Protestants, 
lumalo and lupiny converge in adopting a common stand for the good.  Similarly, as 
the LRA war commenced, questions of forced displacement, the destruction of 
properties and politicisation of the war as an Acholi phenomenon, were collectively 
contested by the society – who in search of peace, show the politicisation of the war 
as divisive and unnecessary.   It is my conviction that this same uniting spirits will 
prevail as poverty numbers worsen and deprivation through grabs and wrong 
policies become clearer to all stakeholders within Acholiland.    
Socio-economic factors 
While in the 19th century, Acholi had settled as agriculturalists – growing 
crops and raising small ruminants particularly the lupiny - and agro-pastoralists, the 
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economy was largely based on what is seen as subsistence389.  This trend has not 
changed much and whilst the economy remains agriculturally based and dependent 
on smallholders, its economic status has remained poverty stricken throughout the 
period under analysis.  Households remained the core production level with hand 
hoes as the major production tool that is used for household labour.  Akena p’Ojok 
(2007) observes that monetary economy was introduced in the 1910s with the 
introduction of awara (cotton).  Acholiland did not receive any support for major 
diversification in income sources and was unable to do much without government 
support.   
Generally speaking, cotton production advanced by 1924 and ginneries 
were established, reducing the dragger of farmers walking long distance to sell the 
lint.  While food production stabilised in the 1960s with staples like eleusine indica, 
and cajana cajan, with mixed farming as the predominant model, the hostile weather 
and the politics of the 1970s onwards failed to liberate the Acholi from poverty.  The 
emphasis of a market economy and market-oriented production as discussed earlier 
on, became a dominant feature of the post-colonial eras.  Particularly, after the 
1960s, and then later under the NRM regime, government attempted to create a 
primary enterprise for Acholiland.  Commercial cotton, which as P’Ojok (2007:8) 
enumerated, was introduced in 1911 as part of the protectorate agenda - to fund 
through taxes the colonial administrative expenditures in Acholiland and to supply 
Lancaster textile industries.  But cotton could not and cannot become the primary 
enterprise for the region for the simple fact that under free market operation, there 
are alternatives (see: Baffes, 2009).   In fact, the success of cotton in meeting 
administrative costs in 1915 was a result of suppressing “mailo-landholders” in 
Buganda in favour of the smallholders in Acholiland (P’Ojok, 2007:9).  Cotton was 
also closely supervised and was compulsory, even when in reality, its production 
and productivity has no comparative advantages to other enterprises like sesame, 
maize or groundnuts. 
To begin with, it resulted in a distortion of land use and labour priorities in 
families between food and income.  P’Ojok (2007:10) for instance noted that 
                                                          
389 There is often a misconception that under subsistence farming, there would be no 
trade at all.  My own assessment of the situation is to the contrary.  Most subsistent 
production is destined for exchanges, which are forms of trade.  If anything, because of 
lack of storage facilities by most households, their products are often put in the 
market.  
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because it was well supervised and carried severe punishment of up to six months 
imprisonment when one failed to plant cotton, it suppressed the production of food 
crops.  In addition, income that was received from cotton targeted specific areas of 
household expenditure390 and foodstuff did not feature prominently in these 
expenses.  Partly, foodstuff became the responsibility of women.  Respondents 
admitted that unstable livelihoods, limited opportunities in jobs and agriculture, and 
limited capabilities of the community to sustain themselves are the pressing 
concerns.  Gertzel (1976) submits that since the 1950s, commercial enterprises 
have been insignificant in Acholiland due to the absence of the private sector, 
implying that outsiders do not regard smallholder farmers and their cooperative 
societies as part of the private sector (Gertzel, 1974: 12).   
The framework for poverty reduction that became the feature of the 1980s 
going forward, have been informed by the lessons of the 1950s and 1960s.  Some 
of the priorities emphasised were inappropriate and misplaced.  For instance, 
market-based approaches dominated the scenery with, in the case of Uganda, an 
over-emphasis on large-scale enterprises.   In addition, the downside of 
emphasising monetised economies in a pluralistic system like Uganda is the risk of 
marginalising the non-monetised smallholders, who are the majority391.  Recently, a 
group of youth lost approximately US$1,000 dollars, which they stuffed in their 
pillows because the commercial banks in Gulu town are not flexible enough to 
respond to their working demands392.  While cash is important and desirable 
because it is fungible, it is not in my experience, the most appropriate instrument for 
resolving food insecurity in rural Acholiland.  In the interim, policies need to provide 
alternatives.  The sequencing of these policies, and especially placing a firm realism 
in the models for growth, remains an ideological battle that will most likely continue 
to see poverty deepen. .   
                                                          
390 In the 1950s and 1960s I learnt that the biggest expenses were education, marriage, 
taxes and assets like bicycles and occasionally construction.  However, as cotton 
became the main crop, most of the family labour was taken away from food crop 
production.  When universal primary education was introduced, Acholi were in the 
camps and had no sources of income.  Remittances from family members employed 
elsewhere were used to meet some areas of expenditure.  
391 In this particular case, I refer to the financial infrastructure and the link to safety, 
security and other related investment areas 
392 A group of youth from Pakiri established a revolving fund as working capital but 
decided to keep the money in a tin container because the banks do not offer good 
interest rates, in addition to being far away and inaccessible whenever they needed 
the money. 
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A report by the World Bank as part of its scoping mission in northern 
Uganda in 2002 confirmed earlier reports (e.g., UNDHA, 1997; IRIN, 2005) that the 
Acholi under the NRM regime were largely living on food aid (World Bank, 2002).   
This means that food sovereignty, as a policy is desirable and promoting own 
production by households demand flexibility in how work can be done.  Samples of 
studies by civil societies often contradicted the official information on poverty in 
Acholiland, which UBOS and the MoFED had continued to suggest (see: UBOS, 
2004, MoFEP, 2008).  There are well known criticisms of the official measures of 
poverty through expenditure on consumption.  For instance, a wealth ranking study 
carried out in 1998 on behalf of Oxfam-UK suggests that some ninety per cent of the 
population were living below the poverty line of US$ 1 per day (Oloya et al., 1998).  
Similarly, a wealth ranking exercise carried out in 2002 as baseline information for 
the design of the NUSAF project, states that ninety eight per cent of the community 
in Amii Lobo in Palema, in Amuru district, were ranked as poor (World Bank Report, 
2004).  These rankings are carried out by the community based on local criteria, like 
availability of assets such as land, housing, cattle, and a guaranteed source of 
support in case of need. 
Distilling Change in Community Governance Practices  
Commendable economic growth and social transformation occurred 
between the 1950s and the 1960s in Acholiland, predicated by political stability.  
However short-lived, it demonstrated the competence of the change agents in 
blending a “rights-based” approach and “African humanity” in priming economic 
growth for both collective goods and individualism (see: Woods, 2003:4) 393.  The 
immediate post-independence period demonstrated that in fixing community 
governance, one needed to promote group identities, fix capacities and business 
conditions (see: Kaplan, 2008: Location 279-92).  While colonial authorities 
introduced authoritative governing bodies, the first Obote regime made them 
politically accountable to the electorate394.  It tried to use the public sector to prime 
                                                          
393 Woods (2003:4) notes that the dominant discourse of “right-base” is the 
autonomous, rights-bearing individual and collective rights are recognized ONLY to the 
extent that they support the formation of autonomous individuals to be able to 
compete equitably in economic markets. 
394 Respondents felt that the initial period of the Obote rule redirected the role and 
politics of the Local Governments to local development as was evident by increased 
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local and private entities for the good of the local people.  In doing so, the regime 
cross-fertilised rationality that is embedded in modernity with the Acholi humanity 
brands that was enshrined in the kaka tradition.  The intercourse between these two 
models brought about changes in community practices, which however were short-
lived.  In Table 7.1 below, I summarise some of the key practices. 
Table 7.1:  Summary of Governing Practices Validated, 1998 to 2006 
Practice Areas Definitions and Description of the 
social issues 
Indicators 
Governing Image 
(leadership and 
institutions) 
The new institutions of 
governance, including those of 
local governments and for 
emergencies, have undermined 
the legitimacy of elders as status 
and respected leaders  
Undisciplined and social 
deviants have increased in 
society 
More incidences of domestic 
violence are being reported in 
the camps and on return to the 
villages 
Wadi are less tolerant of each 
other than before and 
especially after living in camps 
 
Governing instrument Governing interactions at both the 
intentional and structural levels 
have consistently been formalised 
in spite of the prevalence of legal 
pluralism  
Social categorisation along 
elitism, kinship, gender, 
households and individuals 
have emerged 
More daughters and wives are 
competing with their male 
counterparts for offices of 
governance 
Fear rather than respect for 
authorities has increased 
Governing Actions Mistrust and individualism have 
perforated fiduciary culture that 
was ingrained in kinship, 
neighbourhood and locality  
Wat obeno being replaced by 
formal contracts between 
individuals and service 
providers.  
 
 
Sources: Field Data, 2013 
                                                                                                                                                                    
number of educational infrastructure and the health system.  Acholi’s economy 
boomed, supported by improving services and co-operative societies. 
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The politics and fungibility of entrustments 
Kaka, as was discussed before, was not so much about primordial 
attachment or about what an individual contributed into it quantitatively.  Rather, 
kaka to an individual was about the quality of its inclusiveness – how it treated an 
individual among all others.  It was about its obligations to wadi as insiders – but 
also to outsiders, either as dano, wan keken or larok (see for instance Allen, 
1998:56).395.  Its quality and form of inclusiveness – the fiduciary duties - 
demonstrated both the normative and cognitive values of an individual right - the 
right bearing individuals as separated from the collective right of being.  Kaka, as I 
know it, supported both the collective rights of the consociates to the extent that it 
permitted an individual gang polity; to compete as an individual polity, claim its right 
to its eponymy.  On another hand, the gangi and dye-kal governing levels “freely” 
exploited their fiduciary capitals in supporting the growth of lineage-based 
authorities through kinship ties in form of entrustments.  
Hence, rwot-ship and wat obeno or kinships were two mutually inclusive 
tenets of the Acholi socio-political organisations.  Rwot-ship was political, built on 
the culture of facultative mutualism exhibited by the nature of interaction between 
the core-agnates and their non-core partners.  As such, it was contractual, with 
varying expression of consents, and based on clear governing interests. Thus, the 
political authority of the rwodi or their obligations, it seems, was conditioned on a 
number of governing standards without which they had no respected political 
legitimacy see: Fabienne, 2010:1).  Kinship, on the other hand was what Shipton 
(2007: 14) referred to as entrustment, which is obligations without trust.  First, 
kinship was/is primordial or in some instances, it was negotiated following elaborate 
evaluative exercises followed by ceremonies.  Such putative kinship (wadi anyoma 
or wadi agwara) was qualitatively strong.  
For instance, kinship demanded entrustment from the clan as an obligation.  
However, an individual’s entitlement was determined more by one’s own quality of 
                                                          
395 “Dano” is an Acholi for a human being and therefore a possible ally.  “Wan keken” on 
the other hand denotes commonalities and therefore collectivity regardless of 
genealogical attachment. “larok” is used to describe foreigners who may not 
necessarily be foes but are not insiders. 
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embeddedness in the system rather than that of their corporate families396.  There 
was some a minimum threshold of obligation that every member demanded from the 
clan and was entitled to.  It included for instance, burial on ancestral ground.  
However, some individual members had more entitlement because of their 
demonstrated quality of attachments, some enhanced by the social position of their 
corporate families in the clan system.  Thence, kaka mera or kaka na, which 
expresses one’s claim of belonging into a system, was more about what one could 
and could not expect from kinship.   Kinship at most, was not a choice of an 
individual.  It was a family set-up into which members grew, staking lifetime 
investments for its growth.  
From this perspective, kinship ties and values were a given, imposed by 
culture and the children born into it, were expected to live by the doctrine (Girling, 
1960:82).   It created networks of peers, mentors and advisors with varying 
authorities that made wadi obeno a unitary representation of the clan system.  The 
networks provided the insurance of the inward-looking system and assurance for 
remaining relevant and right for the sake of the clan.  And this involved practices 
that enabled continuity, provided social protection for individuals, but demanded as 
a moral responsibility, quality obligations to the group.  With competing opportunities 
in the wake of pluralistic systems prevalent in the society, some of the practices 
have changed for worse or for better.  Many respondents submitted that, with 
improved human security through the formal system, kaka’s legitimacy dwindled 
significantly.   
Practice and habits of reciprocity 397 
As a traditional norm, all known governing levels of kaka had specialised 
obligations to their members.  The ways these fiduciary roles were extended to an 
individual are said to vary. This form of entitlement to members concurs with what 
Bourdieu (1984) submitted in conceptualising social capital.  Bourdieu (1984) sees 
social capital as structural and constituting group identities and strategies that can 
                                                          
396 It was common to hear remarks from elders that so and so deserved more.  He has 
often stood up for the society.  Similarly, it was common knowledge that individuals as 
well as entities were publicly appraised as inadequate and deserved less. 
397 Materials for this discussion were additionally collected from interviews with elders 
including Rt Revd. Bishop Ochola, Charles Alai, Vincent Uma, Yotiko Okello, Okeny 
Atwoma and Mama Lakor, Margret Labol and others.  
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be misuse for exerting privileges.  Hence, individuals had varying levels of access 
as well as status in the community.  
 For instance, it was an obligation for all able-bodied and matured people to 
take care of their old parents and the elderly in the society.  The society was also 
obliged to parent children by providing guidance and in educating them about the 
good and bad of the world.  This form of obligation embraced the entire wadi 
obeno/remo networks that included the paneyo, the extended lineage-based families 
that made up one’s own clan.  This was symbolic, often viewed as kwiri tic, which 
was precedent398.  Obligations of this nature were honourable when fulfilled or were 
extended to elders who have no children of their own.   
This practice is reported to have existed during the colonial and most part 
of the post-colonial eras, when modernity had not substantially influenced the 
lifestyles of the Acholi people.  This was a burdensome practice both in terms of the 
size of the portfolio and time.  It affected negatively those immediate family 
members of the patrons.  This practice profiled kinship as familial attachment, close 
and an insider virtue.  For the few enlighten and sustaining kinship networks as 
entrustment without trusts, the meaning of reciprocity under modern regimes 
translated into individual debt burdens owing to the society.  
The intimacy of kinship was explained by how the entire network was 
stratified into women, children and men.  All women and girls in the village were 
either dayo (grandmothers), mego (mothers), wayo (sisters to fathers), lumego 
(sisters) regardless of whether they had children of their own or not.  Similarly, men 
were kwaro (grandfathers), wego (fathers), omego (brothers), regardless of whether 
they had their own children/ grandchildren, or not.  The basis of such familial 
attachment was the abila, the shrine of a common ancestor that was the platform of 
unity and faith for the lineage group.  Latin maber or a good child of the lineage was 
steadfast, self-accounting and one that demonstrated to the kin “his” maturity in the 
customs of his people.  He was the lapii among his/her peers.  Patronage, it seems, 
was built in the abila rather than individuals as a collective. 
                                                          
398 The Acholi statement: kwiri tic denotes exceptional behavior or best practice by its 
members that should be the standard for members to reciprocate. 
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As late as the 1960s and 1970s, most rural Acholi still viewed kinship as an 
extended family and by their actions and expectations.  It was very similar to the 
contemporary family settings399.  A kin-person had access to ones house and other 
personal goods in a similar way as one’s own child.   This manifestation, however, 
varied to different degrees across Acholiland.  For instance, some insignificant 
number of respondents from Acholi lupiny contends that kinship bonds began to 
fade by the 1930s especially among the elite.  Particularly, increased demands for 
the core elements of modernity and services – modern education and urbanisation - 
by the entire clan system weighed heavily on the shoulders of the few men and 
women within the clan, who trailblazed it. It was unsustainable and this triggered 
internal discontents within the system as early as in the mid 1900s.  
Fiduciary culture – the moral dimension 
The popular arguments advanced for fiduciary responsibilities to kin, and 
especially the elderly in the communal setting, as discussed before, were in keeping 
with the principles of humanism, equity and social capitalisation.  These principles 
underscore insurance of equity, reciprocation and obligation for humanity.  
Traditionally, raising an Acholi child was a risky and expensive investment especially 
due to its fragile context.  Typically, mass poverty, seasonality of lifestyles, cultural 
orientations and the competing needs of the system, overburdened households 
(Girling, 1960:61).   For this reason, children or litino constitute a significant 
component of community support system most part of the year.  Unpublished data 
capturing household seasonal calendar of work (Girling, 1960:61)400 generated 
during a research I carried on behalf of Oxfam-UK in Kitgum in 1997/8 show that 
children in Acholi play pivotal roles in community support system (see: Oloya et al., 
1998).   
 
                                                          
399 My father who died at 86 years in 2012 narrated to me how together with eight other 
boys from five different lineages in Pakiri village, they were educated by a Ladit Philip 
Okec, who was one of the first District Administrators in the 1950s.  Okech treated 
them just like siblings, and, in return, they helped produce food for feeding the family 
at the home of Okech.   
400 To be working in Acholi is considered as paid labour or tic.  Thus, nanny (pidi), 
agriculture labour (pur), hunting (dwar) are not typically categorised as work or tic. 
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Children and especially girl-children even today, co-manage younger 
siblings and bore heavy household burdens alongside their mothers or female 
relatives401.  While the trend is definitely improving, women and children were part of 
the wealth of an Acholi family and investing in them was a fiduciary responsibility.  
Generally, when all children became adults, they metaphorically, became a form of 
“working capital” that the society variety used at will.  The phenomenon created for 
each of the child, a form of indebtedness to a system - not to an individual – that 
contributed to its development.  Fiduciary duties by the society were moral concern 
and this created indebtedness to all the beneficiaries of the system (see: Shipton, 
2007:12-25).  The repayment schedules and currencies of social debts were 
variable both in amount and time.  Rather, a qualitative response - one that is 
normatively and morally justifiable, recognised and generally acceptable amounted 
to fulfilling one’s commitment.  Often, social debts, as Shipton (2007) observed with 
the Luo of Kenya, were a lifetime commitment.  However, vulnerable households 
had their obligations bought off or written as bad debts and transferred to the 
corporate or elementary family - including the daughters who could have been 
married into another agnates.  Based on this scenario, it was evident that legitimate 
authority actually rested at the corporate family level, not the ethnicity level – 
whether gang agnate or Acholi tribal levels - as many have insinuated (Girling, 1960: 
188-192). 
One form of commitment, which was morally patriotic, was for an able 
person to forfeit a personal assignment for the sake of a kin.  For instance, a woman 
leaves her food burning on the fire to serve a neighbour, whose house had caught 
fire.  Morally, she rescued some valuable properties and possibly life at the expense 
of a one-time meal for her household402.  It was a sacrifice that morally was seen as 
qualitative.  It was the quality of it not the quantity of what was received that counted 
(see: Allen, 1998). 
                                                          
401  It is always noticeable that large households were better governed in rural Acholiland 
when girl-children are older and would support their mothers.  Their interactions 
combine mentoring through practice and coaching.  My discussions with a number of 
analysts of Acholi origin conclude that camp lives have denied this mothers-daughters 
interactions and this has led to poor management of the emerging households in 
Acholiland. 
402 A typical household asset included pots as stores for seeds and other valuables, 
cooking pots, grinding stones and other stuff 
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Changing trends in lifestyles in the society 
Overtime, there have been disruptions and pressures, in part, due to a 
blending of rationality and humanism as two complementary principles.  Thus, new 
practices, alliances and support systems have evolved in Acholi, influenced by 
impoverishment, time and the absence of reciprocal benefits of wadi ties, particularly 
from the point of view of those who were on the giving end.  Reciprocity fizzled out 
much quickly in the urban areas and mistrust crowded the vacuum, as wadi obeno 
became more of liabilities because the mutuality that supposedly was ingrained in it 
was corroded by time and practice.  Especially by the 1970s and thereafter, many 
educated Acholi relocated away from home in search of work or were running away 
from political persecutions.  Their continued attempts to use kinship networks to 
maintain their interests in Acholi were frustrated because kinsmen and women 
misused these opportunities403.  To the contrary, such initiatives of modern values 
were misappropriated by kinship as ownership became challenging.  A case well 
discussed was where tin he 1970s and 1980s, the educated men in exile invested in 
livestock but through kinship decision, these were diverted for kin’s marriage by 
those at home. 
Kaka’s key function of safety provision also changed with modernity and by 
the 1970s, the traditional fiduciary duties associated with kinship recoiled effectively 
to dog odi, and dye-kal.  Supposedly, alternative social networks like the old boys 
(OBs) and girls (OGs) – those who attended same schools – became visibly more 
meaningful because it adopted the traditional virtue of reciprocation.  An OB or OG 
would employ or bail one out of financial problem, for which the beneficiaries would 
reciprocate when the opportunity arose.  The respondents also felt that dye-kal as 
lineages governing level lost the political legitimacy by the 1980s, mainly driven by 
market forces.  They further asserted that kinship or wadi obeno became a clear 
liability during the camp life, which variously started from 1986 to 2010.  The default 
expectation from kinship ties that drove kaka ideology in the late 1800s through to 
mid 1900s was overstressed during this period.  The large numbers of kinsmen and 
women and their demands and expectations were overwhelming under the 
circumstances. 
                                                          
403 There is a great deal of evidence, especially since the 1980s, of appropriation of funds 
sent by Acholi diaspora to invest at home by kin.  It includes misappropriating funds for 
construction work, or diverting remittance for parents who were in displacement. 
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Noticeably, only ten out of fifty cases considered kinship still to be an 
important issue today.  They claim that kinship is still effective in limited ceremonies 
and rituals, such as reburials of those who died outside the ancestral grounds, and 
funerals in general.  However, they admitted that, because of displacements, kinship 
has turned predatory rather than reciprocating, thereby burdening those with some 
resources.  The inability of those “who have” to support those who are worse off, 
has been taken as a failure by them to comply with lineage requirements.  One elder 
from gang Pakiri stated that tedo kac, which was a lineage-based ceremony was 
last performed in their lineages in the early 1970s.  Christianity, to some extent, 
helped end this practice.  Ladit Yotiko Okello, who is one of the few elders now 
remaining in gang Palyec, admits that tedo kac for his immediate lineage – litino pa 
Keri or the children of Keri  - was last performed in 1974 while tedo abila, which 
involves all lineages that claim same ancestor as gang Palyec, was last carried in 
Olwal in 1963404.  
Emerging social categorisation as a practice 
In discussing the patron-client relationship in the context of kaka, my sense 
is that patronage, as an old form of social investment, existed between the clan 
systems and the beneficiaries. The clans used individuals from the different 
households as mechanisms for aiding communal programmes.  Typically, 
beneficiaries of patronage were initially from the different dye-kal as corporate 
families.  Clan elders, particularly from the gang agnates at a communal level, would 
seek to balance disparities among the different corporate families by diversifying 
human investments across the agnate405.  For instance, by the 1940s up to the 
1960s, an educated and wealthy person would be expected to support virtually the 
entire kaka as a financier of a kaka patronage project.  Often, these local donors 
might have benefitted from the Church educational funding, and in particularly the 
Catholic Church, which supported most of education of the Acholi.   
Hence, by the 1960s through to the 1970s, there was an accumulation of 
human skills in public services and wealth around a clearly defined category of 
people and ethnic bases, prompted by the expanding training institutions, individuals 
                                                          
404 Interview at his house in Gulu town on March 15, 2013 
405 I thank Ladit Yutiko Okello of Pailyec, who was a beneficiary of this approach.  He 
gained access to school by staying with Ladit Pillipo Okech, who was from a 
neighbouring agnate, Pakiri 
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and kinship, in partnership with the church.  The individuals who benefitted included 
mainly children of civil servants, but also those who had a close association with the 
church406.  Although, scholars have advanced that by 1898, there was no significant 
categorisation among the luker and lwak agnates as social groups (Dwyer, 1972: 
30-32), the rwodi and those who collaborated with the Arab traders accumulated 
some form of wealth (Atkinson, 2010:261-273).  Rwodi and the luker lineages also 
received tyer, contributed by the non-core in fulfilment of their political obligations in 
the consociation.  These sources placed them at some advantage compared to the 
non-core agnates.  Girling (1960) avers that the number of wives the luker had were 
a manifestation of their wealth because wedlock was not affordable by most of the 
ordinary households from the non-core agnates (see: Drigberg, 1932; Burite, 2007).  
However, the balance in access to education as a new pathway for 
livelihoods levelled the playing field and there was no significant stratification in 
Acholi that favoured the luker as a group.  To the contrary, most lubong as well as 
the lwak agnates used the opportunity to educate their children.  It is also likely that 
the majority of the Acholi who joined the army in the 1930s and 1940s were from the 
non-core agnates – which were characteristically the poor - so that they would have 
the resources to marry.  
Movement in the cultural substratum 
As a result, new bridges have been built that embrace both legal and social 
contract systems rather than the division around kinship.  However, even this has 
proven precarious.  First, the enforcement of formal systems of justice is highly 
corrupt (see: Gloppen, 2014).    Secondly, practices that conform to formal rules are 
rare because for over thirty years, patrimonialism has created a system that is 
obscure.   Rule by law” or ”rule by customs” (Justice Resources, 2004: 23-40) where 
authorities merely use selectively existing rules to disadvantage their opponents, is 
rampant.  Cases of fault arrest, to intimidate diverse views from the official versions 
have been reported (Justice Resources, 2004:23-40). 
There is also growing evidence of corrupt practices in the national legal 
system, manifested in the manipulation of evidence and lapses in procedures for 
                                                          
406 A Telephone discussion with Mzee Tebere of Payiira, who confirmed that Keyo School 
and Wii Mucalaba, where Christianity was introduced in 1904, became two important 
catchments for formal education in the 1930s onward. 
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justice (see:  Okello, 2008).  The system failures have favoured the wrong doers 
who live in Uganda, as the Acholi living abroad do not have that ability to meet the 
demands of the corrupt legal system which requires being in situ407.  Conversely, 
there have been gradual changes in the “cultural substratum” leading to mixed and 
sometimes conflicting interpretations of governing practices by contemporary Acholi 
(see: MacAdam, 2000).  Of significance here are changes in interactions among kin 
as submitted above, and the distillation of gender and lineage-based authorities in 
the governance systems of the Acholi.  Particularly, younger respondents observed 
that foreign cultures have infiltrated hybridised customs with the consequence that 
post-kaka phenomena are so confusing and disorderly, it is difficult to suggest that 
the past contributed anything to the modern practices. 
Kaka Renegotiated, Rebranded, Repackaged 
Kaka traditionally as discussed in this study embodied humanism.  It 
employed facultative mutualisms to ensure the promotion of autopoiesis among 
participating agnates.  This principle enabled the growth of patrilineal identity, which 
was also a typical feature of all the governing sub-systems of the community 
(Girling, 1960).  Kinship – as a constituency of kaka - on the other hand, advocated 
entrustment as a form of fiduciary culture.  It demanded entrustment without trust 
because it was a given as it is both primordial and putative. The claim that kaka was 
associated with collectivity, obligations and rights explained the main features of 
kaka: a regime of shared governing efforts with an entitlement and rights for 
participating members.  In other words, kaka embodied gen more that primordial 
attachment as an ingredient for social-political interactions.  This was an opportunity 
where the nature of politics, and the arenas in which they were excised, enabled 
even smaller agnates to consent or to disassociate.  Those who lived it, that is, the 
older generations in the age bracket above 50 – contend that the unique benefits of 
kaka are now fading, if not already gone.  They argue that, while kaka as in 
chiefdoms had offered community protection in the late 1890s to the early 1950s, by 
                                                          
407  Since the late 1990s, complaints about judiciary processes have been in the media.  
See for instance: Anti-corruption court to stay 
www.newvision.co.ug/news/650757/ant-corruptio-court-stays.html (Accessed: 
04/06/2013); Ugandan prefer LCs to Judiciary System, says report 
<http://www.newvision.co.ug/…/655351/ugandans-prefer-lcs-to-judiciary-
system.html> (Accessed: 04/06/2013) 
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the late 1960s, kaka as in gangi, became more relevant for the formal systems in 
human protection and was fully taken up by the state408.   
Rationalisation of traditional governing entities 
Gang eventually used its fiduciary characters to invest in education, 
spiralling its lineage transformation and identity under the ambiance of the state.  
The introduction of Local Council level one in the 1990s as a political-cum-local 
government system supplemented the engrained philosophy of ludito kaka in 
resolving governing matters including security, land governance and domestic 
violence. Increasingly, particularly in the 1980s, dye-kal as corporate families and 
gangi as the parameter of kinship authority, also began to fade, living dog odi/keno 
at the micro-level of authority as the functional authority alongside the formalised 
structures.   
I see this development – the downsizing of fiduciary relationships within 
kinship – as an outcome of a hybrid culture; a situation born out of a blending right-
base approaches with the kaka philosophy of humanism.  Similarly, the hybridisation 
of kaka’s humanism also escalated the process of gender emancipation in Acholi, 
something I discuss later in the Chapter.  The education of a woman and her ability 
to embed in the traditional culture of listening, tolerance and commitment to a 
“foreign” culture, has emerged as a strong virtue for forward-looking Acholiland.  By 
2010, most youths – men and women – I talked to, confirm that gender segregation 
as was practiced under the colonial and post-colonial eras, is insignificant in their 
lives.   
Gang as an organisation of lineage-based wadi remo has also changed 
from its traditional centre of local governance as an authority, to a struggling forum 
that attempts to facilitate selective traditional functions like the burial of kin.  In some 
cases, gangi as lineages do collaborate to benefit from NGOs’ activities.  In such 
instances, they are recognized by NGOs as administrative territories that can benefit 
from social services like water points.  Occasionally too, gangi would come together 
in celebrating marriages of one of their lot.  In other words, the traditional governing 
structures that ordered patrilineal compliance during Acholi macon have changed – 
                                                          
408 An elder in one of my discussions wondered what would have been the consequences 
of the droughts and famine of 1938 to 1940, if the state did not exist.  He stated that 
kaka, as he knew it could have not mobilised food aid and medical support in the way 
the state did. 
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more in line with the state’s political delimitations of what they should be.   Similarly, 
the revised content of kaka, including the authorities, values and benefits of 
facultative mutualism have been renegotiated.  Those who enforced traditions in the 
past have been “retrenched” or simply made redundant under the new 
arrangements, where new institutions like schools, police and churches have taken 
over the responsibilities to mentor youth.  This change embraces the altitudes and 
mores of the society and it has continued to submerge the old culture, sometimes 
with devastating consequences to the people.  
Kaka’s core ideology of humanism has been further repackaged during the 
NRM. While in the past, its facultative mutualism as a principle involved a number of 
primordial agnates – within a common locality, neighbourhood and with interests, 
today kaka is symbolically rather than structurally inspired.  It is a multi-layered and 
a multi-purpose interaction that targets the Acholi, as victims of political 
circumstances by a number of resourceful foreign-based and local CSOs, INGOs 
and Local Governments who are new political actors.  This new alliance draws its 
strength from formalised contracts, global polishing and western democratic 
principles instead of a bottom-up demand of the people.  They constitute an 
emergence of a community where primordial attachments – where locality, 
neighbourhoods, intimacy, sociality and social mobilisation - are now insignificant.   
Rather, as discussed in Chapter Two, this development blends rationality 
and humanism and uses the legitimacy of the traditional system and that of the 
state, to address the globalised questions of local and individual rights – which 
ideally, from the look of things, entrenches the western viewpoints in renegotiating 
and redefining new boundaries in governing the Acholi.  For instance, it constructs 
the Acholi as victims of poor governance and sought to apply global standards to 
raise their stake and voices in state matters409.  It, thus, legitimises Acholiland as a 
politically vulnerable territory that is subjected to international terror.  These 
perspectives arising from the inter-marriages of ideologies demonstrate how shared 
governing efforts have symbolically constructed a new Acholi community.  The 
Acholi becomes an imagined community comprising a number of actors that are not 
linked socially or structurally.  In doing so, it has reconfigured the efforts of recovery-
cum-developing Acholiland based on the different “carrying capacities” of the new 
                                                          
409 For some of these viewpoints, most of which followed the LRA atrocities, see for 
instance the CSOs analysis of land matters in Acholiland in 2005. 
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community in negotiating violence and influencing new governing strategies.  The 
quality of the interactions, the forms and the states of successes are defined by the 
present conditions prevailing in Acholiland. Hence, kakanisation in Acholiland 
manifests global context as demonstrated by the project, the Invisible Child’s Kony 
2012.  This project set to exploit the legitimacy of the Acholi society as a victim of 
global disorder where state legitimacy has been challenged by rouge forces, the 
LRA.  Ingrained in this project is the kakanisation of the plight of the children of 
Africa.  This patronisation of the African society set to formalise the fight against the 
LRA and its allies in defence of the state.  The global campaign has been effective 
in portraying the villain LRA as devilish but not the state as a failure of democracy.  
Acholi Women and Wives and the Value-Chain of Change 
The view that women had no significant place in Acholi’s patrilineal system 
is as old and questionable as it is over generalised (Uma-Owiny, 2013: 58).  INGOs 
and the IHROs have given some insights in gender issues in post-conflict 
Acholiland, arguing that gender segregation in a patrilineal kaka system is damaging 
to women.  Girling (1960) and others, however, have mentioned how dar ker, the 
wife of rwot moo was a significant “commandant-in-chief”, signing off clan warriors in 
wars of social justice for their societies.  There were grandmothers, the dayo, who 
were acclaimed contemporary professors of indigenous knowledge, healers and 
specialised mentors of both boys and girls in the village.  In Acholi, this viewpoint 
that elders, like male clubs, made decisions that governed the clans, are also 
contestable (see: Girling (1960:31-32)410.  Political (e.g., tribal wars) and 
developmental (consociations with others) issues were often mediated by elders – 
who, building on lived experiences, guided democratic and informed decisions made 
by the entire society.  This approach, however, marginally changed following 
colonial rule.  This is because colonialism and coloniality encouraged patrilineal 
leaders to lead by example.  That the women wielded “hidden and coercive and 
non-coercive powers” behind the scene might have been true in the past.  Women 
apparently believed in patrilineal orientation because they benefitted from it.  
However, based on my knowledge of the system and the discussions held, they 
                                                          
410 It is evident that elders merely would give the maxims handed down from the past, as 
possibilities for influencing decisions of the society. 
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were also the change agents that every dye-kal experienced in their lineage growth, 
working through their children, especially influential ones.  
Being a mother in Acholiland has been tough because of its context.  
Historically, Acholiland is sparsely populated and with homestead dotted all over the 
area.  Services are hardly available and women have to trek several miles looking 
for firewood, water and foodstuff.  With two rainy seasons accounting for roughly 
nine of the twelve months, women are pretty much occupied throughout the year as 
most agronomic practices involved them.  While specialisation based on gender 
made sense in the past, it worked because the social-political system of kinship 
filled the void whenever one of the partners passed on.  This, however, has 
significantly changed.  As such, more households according to my assessment, are 
now female-headed, even in the rural areas, and women have to take what were 
previously “men’s decisions and roles”.    
The Acholi households are increasingly of mixed ethnicity particularly in the 
urban areas and the education status of the women married into it has since 
advanced.  However, the trend seems to point to the view that consistently, with or 
without education, women have taken front stage in community governance.  While 
the patrilineal orientations of the Acholi households are still in vogue, the content 
and actions that steered the system in the past have continued to change since the 
1960s411.  Women as lead or co-governing actors of both households and the 
community have come in force, demonstrating their viewpoints of the future that is 
clearly renegotiated with their full participation.  
The NRM has contributed significantly to women’s empowerment through 
targeted interventions as well as through positive reinforcement of women’s 
ambitions412.  Inevitably, in Acholiland where female-headed households constitute 
some thirty per cent of the households, woman’s autonomy to decide for themselves 
is not a demand but an inevitable scenario (UBOS, 2008).  This has created a 
salient stir in the debate about lineage-based politics.  A good example of this is 
seen in the debate about land administration, especially under the customs that 
                                                          
411 Some of the attributes for patrilineal orientation include patrilocal marriages of 
women to men in which the men pay bride price.   
412 Juliana Obika, a PhD student from Gulu University is currently researching on women 
and land in Acholiland, and she has been very emphatic about how women see the 
NRM government as their key allies in development.   
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have also changed.  Most efforts to feed households have increasingly shifted to 
women.  No one, man or woman, owned customary lands.  Rather, they both had 
access rights to use land and in part, to administered it for their own and the entire 
community's benefits.  Access was based on such strong relationship and women 
had more advance access rights to customary land compared to men because of 
their societal network, first as a wife to the clan but also as the main user and with 
extended link within the society413.  However, because they were putative clan 
members, their rights to communal land were limited until they were fully “grounded” 
in the customs, when they became mego414.   
The shifting politics of customary marriages 
Women’s historical trajectories have been influenced by patrilineal 
orientations of community governance in Acholiland as stated above.  The colonial 
perspectives of women and men have further supported this traditional orientation.  
Most respondents agree that gender issues during pre-colonial and colonial era 
merely emphasised women specialization, their responsibilities and significance at 
the community level.  As such, inequality at the household levels, where men as 
heads of households saw women as stock of wealth or property has been 
challenged in modern times.  In this context, it made sense that most fathers in the 
past valued larger households because the more sons in a hunting field meant a 
higher probability of getting meat on the plates.  However, the history of poverty in 
Acholi and the status one earned as a married person contradict the negative 
generalisation galvanised in the debate that women were inferior in Acholi’s 
patrilineal organisations (see: Girling, 1960:29-31) 415.   
The majority of Acholi households in the past, it was narrated, could not 
easily afford to marry women for their sons - a practice that would guarantee on one 
hand, the pater, the jural of won as a father and on the other hand, the manhood 
                                                          
413 My mother told me how she had several okang (a fallow plot that was evident of 
one’s user right) in Pakiri because a couple of the heads of households knew her 
father as a friend.  They would give her land to till and in some instances my 
grandfather was surprised how she was able to do that easily with some of his peers. 
414 An on-going research work that I am carrying in Acholiland under TrustLand project 
funded by Danida.  
415 Girling (1960) gave a case study of a young man from a poor household of the lubong 
agnates in despair to get a wife in order to gain adulthood.  His reaching out to 
create relationships that could fulfil his desire was the epitome of his determination 
in liberating himself. 
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and maturity of the son (Girling, 1960: 29-31).  Partly, women were very dear 
because they were highly priced as having one symbolised in the context of Acholi 
custom, maturity and responsibility.  These two issues – manhood and maturity – 
obligated the father and his kinsmen, on one hand, to extend their fiduciary roles to 
the boy, and on the other hand, for the young man and his mother, to demand their 
rights and entitlements of being part of the kinship.  As such, it was a form of 
negotiation between the two groups that signalled on one hand, the commitment of 
the father and by extension, that of the clan, to obligate to marriage that enthroned 
rights of being a member.  This signalled collective recognition of a boy or a girl 
maturing into responsibility but also that of the clan to deliver on their entitlements.  
On another hand, it showed how a system ridiculed by lack of material goods, 
struggled to place individual entitlements along kinship scale that can do or break 
households.  
Customary marriages certainly had economic motivations but economics 
was not the force behind it (see: Driberg, 1932).   Girls as daughters would be 
married off and their dowry in return would be used by the “sons of the soil” to bring 
forth women as wives.  Acholi marriages in the 1940s all through to 1960s were 
considered the domain and responsibilities of the clan system rather than the family.  
Acholi marriage today, however, is that of families and friends rather than clans.  In 
an economy characterised by poverty, this exchange was welcomed, as it became a 
relief in meeting clans-pater obligations to justify a maturity of one of them.  So, girls 
were economic wealth in that sense.  Their existence in a household was to a father 
who had many sons, a guarantee that his pater obligation and duty were assured.  It 
also meant that the girls were watched and seen to remain valuable to suitors. 
Customary marriages were distinct from sales of girls or even their being 
bartered for that matter.  Rather, it was a legitimate contract between the clans that 
provided for the filiation of the children and their lawful inheritance of the patrilineal 
culture (see: Driberg, 1932).  But it was also a declaration of maturity to the couple - 
graduating into lutela as a domain.  Progressively and with influences from other 
cultures, it has embraced additional social values.  Today, marriage has significantly 
changed as the meaning has also seemly taken a different expression.  At most, it is 
an exchange strictly for the individual and possibly their respective immediate 
families.  It therefore means that the kinship attachment to marriage holds no more 
as individual wills and interests have become predominant. 
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The familial system became conspicuously dominant in the 1980s with the 
clan more in support and performing rituals around the few remaining communal 
customs, such as funerals.   Progressively, we have seen the practice of marriage 
taken away into Churches and Mosques, with friends and workmates conspicuously 
replacing the wadi obeno.  As such, it has moved away from the traditional vivacity 
of social bargaining that was clan-based, with kaka’s indulgence into collective debts 
and the defalcation as a responsibility to one of its members, an act that was outside 
commercial deals but one that expressed the right and the ritual of motivating 
actions.  
The Triumph Of Lies… 
Acholi’s historical trajectory has been woven with sufferings.  Peace has 
eluded the Acholi of Uganda since its creation as a political community, that is, if 
peace is congruent with what their forefathers framed as they tracked southwards 
from Bahr-El-Ghazal in the Sudan, in search of it (Crazzolara, 1954).  The Acholi’s 
past ills are linked and are so connected with events of the twenty first century.  The 
facts are similar in terms of purposes, processes and outcomes.  The nineteenth 
century showed the aconya - the Arabs and later the British – use trade and 
commerce to transform Acholi into a subject, denying its organic evolutionary path of 
change, which had previously taken a path for equity and the democratic existence 
of lineage groups.  These induced institutional reforms failed to effectively create 
what the western world sees as “a modern society”, that is, a society that is a 
subject of the state.  Rather, the elders argued that to the contrary, the state 
became a patrimonial system symbolising a form of  “civilisation” that was immoral.  
While Acholi’s “original” pre-colonial political structures were not ideal, they 
were innovative and structured to deal with the political content of the time – 
including peace building among the kaka settings.  However, from experiences thus 
far reported, they were equally insufficient to sustain the desired regional peace in 
the territory.   The absence of a central authority, not necessarily bureaucratic, to act 
decisively on agreed agendas of the consociation was absent.  Kaka, it appears, 
remained a form of brotherhood relationship that encouraged bilateral dialogue 
rather than multilateral forms of intercourse beyond the polity. Subsequently, the 
options used in the transformation of its governance were driven from the top, based 
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on external agendas.  As Meijs (1997) observed, what would be desirable for 
Acholiland was a model that exploited the opportunities that had emerged from both 
interference and interplay as the dominant modes of inter and intra- agnatic 
governance. The potentials of this are clearly in the limits of what autopoiesis can 
contribute to multilateral governance.  
The indirect rules were more profound as they created new governing 
institutions instead of strengthening existing ones.  This reform ignored the kaka 
model of governance and the critical lessons that the kaka system accumulated for 
over three hundred years (Girling, 1960:195-199).  This action set the precedence, 
as all other continuing efforts by the different regimes to right this have been to the 
contrary aligned to global pressure, which continues to suggest that authoritative 
state structures have the solution for community governance.   
New associations, new ideas 
Kaka as a governing instrument now exists out of new alliances imposed by 
the markets and formal laws, and it includes relying on donors, the hands of the 
Local Governments and the civil societies, with the State as its referee.  The content 
of these new alliances are different: it varies from partnerships to subject-ruler forms 
and are often formal in nature.  The context of the new kaka, however, is creating 
unease in the society in many instances.  First, the new design of the governing 
structures at the primary level, the dog odi levels, has changed significantly (UBOS, 
2004).  This change has significant implications for the “traditional” structure of the 
Acholi society.  Dog odi in the “traditional” Acholi were composed of won ot as head 
of the household, and his dako (mon for plural) and litino or the children. Following 
particularly the LRA insurgency, the content as well as the configurations of 
households have changed.  The pater, as head, has changed and there are more 
children and female-headed households compared to the past.  The numbers of 
child and female-headed households have rocketed from a mere two per cent in the 
1970s to recent figure of thirty per cent in 2010 (e.g., Bjorkhaug et al., 2007, 
CSOPNU and Lemu, 2004:51)416.  Hence, the emphasis of the new kaka has shifted 
                                                          
416Regarding the recent statistic on female-headed household, see Civil Society 
Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU) and Land Equity Movement in 
Uganda (LEMU), December 2004:51). This estimates of 30% of households being 
female-headed should be compared with similar findings in the Northern Uganda 
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significantly from families to targeting children and the women, apparently 
delineating the men from the new arrangement. This apparent move, to dislodge 
both patrilineal authority and the leadership of men, much as might have some relief 
in some form, undermines peaceful recovery in the long run.   
It seems that vulnerable societies are prone to abuse by those who claim to 
support or work for them.  This is especially so with the Acholi, where believing in 
those who have come to fill the void created by kaka, might have gone too far.  
Acholi’s experiences with outsiders have often been cordial although not mutual.  
The Acholi had exceptional relationships with the churches, for instance.  On her 
part, she offered her soul, land and her children to be nurtured by the church.  In 
return, she received new names and whatever else the church felt were right, which 
often ignored Acholi’s indigenous knowledge.  Acholi’s culture was modelled through 
relationships but also through the use of force.  According to an elder, it has 
shunned forceful habits as a means to changing culture.  Even today, there are 
more Acholi children and places named after the Italian priests or the Bible than the 
Koran.  The elder observed that the Nubians and the Arab speakers created a 
situation that dehumanised them before the Acholi.  As such, even under the eight 
years of Amin’s forceful rule, Islam never took any root in Acholiland like it did in 
some parts of Uganda.   
Concluding Remarks 
It can be deduced from these analyses that institutional change in 
Acholiland was mainly induced but as well, was inevitable in some circumstances.  
Thee change resulted into new practices that are both forward and backward 
looking.  The state – with the help of CSOs - enacted some policies and laws that 
promoted forward-looking practices that include gender and women rights in 
governance.  This has moved the women into the centre of national dialogue, 
making Uganda one of the strong allies for global developments.  Most of these 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Livelihood Study which found that 24% of households in the Acholi land were female 
headed (n = 2,575); as published in the 2007 report entitled Returning to Uncertainty: 
Addressing Vulnerabilities in Northern Uganda (Ingunn Bjorkhaug et al., Kampala, 
Uganda: UNDP, 2007)  
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positive changes came about in the last fifteen years or so in Acholiland.   
However, there has been significant distortion in governing outcomes 
including those arising from unchecked innovations that accompanied development 
funding by foreign INGOs and the like.  Arguably, the simplistic view western donors 
often give to the African culture - as generally backward - is creating some undue 
consequences.  For instance, the weakening of kaka governance through 
subordination killed competitiveness in service delivery between formal, informal 
and traditional norms, leading to some unwanted and negative governing practices 
in Acholiland, including the creation of the LRA as a rebel group.   
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Chapter Eight – Concluding Comments 
Synopsis of the Research Findings 
In this study, I adopted peace studies as the intellectual frame to 
historicize changes in community governance practices in Acholiland by 
comparing contemporary governance systems with historical and 
contemporary kaka praxis.  My objectives were broadly three, to: a) explore the 
modes, quality and extent of community governance from 1898 to 2010; b) 
examine changes in the principles of kaka governance under the different 
political regimes that governed Uganda; and c) identify noticeable practices 
that resulted from mixes of governing interactions.   Specifically, this study is 
guided by the following questions: 
a)   What have been the impact of change in the quality of community 
leaders and ii) how do Acholi now conceptualise community 
governance? 
b) What has been the nature of change observed in kaka as community 
governance system, and (ii) what factors account for the changes? 
c) What have been the key changes in community governance practices? 
And, 
d) Why and how has violence remained a significant factor in Acholiland 
over the years? 
Why peace studies? 
Peace studies, as a field of inquiry is problem-driven and as such, is 
appropriate for examining a real world situation exhibited in the case of 
Acholiland417.  It is also interdisciplinary – allowing the integration of insights from a 
number of disciplines in giving new meaning to the political and governing events 
that I have explored from 1898 to 2010.    This study attempted to interpret data 
from different social sciences (political science, anthropology, sociology and 
psychology), humanities (history, laws, linguistics and poetry) and professional fields 
                                                          
417 In the study, I have emphasised that Acholiland is a fragile situation and it requires a 
mix of interactions, to enable the different social groups participate. 
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(geography) to openly interrogate the key phenomena of community governance 
and violence that have been associated with Acholiland over these years.  
Overview of change outcomes in community governance 
Institutional change outcomes, I submitted, are the governing precedence 
established or, governing practices introduced and/or the governing habits exhibited 
as a result of governing reforms418.  I have argued that since the creation of 
Acholiland in the 1890s, new governing habits and behaviours came into practice - 
some of them reinforcing to the moral governing habits of the indigenous system. 
Some of the effects of changes, however, escalated the weaknesses of the 
indigenous model and even transformed the human economic aspects of the 
patrilenal system to right-based and competitive system that wrongly emphasised 
individualism with a distorted context.  These changes, I maintained, have been a 
result of both internal and external logic. 
I began by exploring in chapter two recent and popular concepts and 
practices in community governance.  The purpose was to situate kaka’s governing 
realm within these governing practices discussed in the literature.  My conclusions, 
especially with respect to this study were that: i) there are different modes of power 
grids and political authorities practiced that negatively or positively influence 
governing interactions; ii) that the two common and competing modes of community 
governance widely practiced are heterarchy (example, kaka) and hierarchy as 
exhibited in the modern LG. For some reasons discussed in chapter two, hierarchal 
mode of governance - commonly associated with the habit of controlling others - is a 
predominant practice in modern times and has been forced to change kaka 
governance rather than to improve it.   
Kaka a manifestation of a heteroarchial-governing realm was a practice in 
which two or more “like-minded” polities - not necessarily related – consociated with 
one of them, by virtue of their longitivity and therefore, tested leadership, staked as 
the nucleus but not paramount, to lead – which is tela. Kaka, therefore, featured a 
situation of diffused and decentralised power with the different agnates, as the 
                                                          
418  Under kaka governing system, we observed that some of the presidence set by rwodi moo and ludito kaka 
was the decentralised and autonomy of the governing structures.  LG on the other hand, was a delegated 
authority of the state and complete contradiction of the kaka system. 
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communal governance system, relating to the core agnates (luker) and to the other 
non-core (lwak) in what I termed as a culture of “facultative mutualism”.   
This culture manifested an interactive management economy with sets of 
homologous governing structures – dog ot, dye-kal and dog gang - increasingly 
interrelating in a more reinforcing manner within a given consociation.  Typically, 
kaka had three levels of ethnic identity: First, dye-kal, which was a corporate 
governing level inclined to a kac shrine.  A collection of them formed the communal 
or gang governing level that recognised an abila shrine.  Each of the governing 
levels honoured cognitive but also normative leadership and they were free to shift 
their allegiance at the kaka level, based on prevalent governing incentives of the 
core agnates.  It was, thus, not about the size and/or numbers of warriors a given 
polity could contribute to the pool.  Rather, it was about how they valued and trusted 
the relationship with the core agnate within the consociation.  
The legitimacy of kaka as a consociation, rested in the qualitative value and 
the morality of the prevailing governaning interactions.   In principle, each 
participating polity in the consociation - the gang as agnates – was valued based on 
its “carrying capacities”, “competitive and comparative advantages”.  In a sense, 
kaka – which was wrongly framed by others as chiefdom - was about intimate 
patriarchal governance. However, this nuance and context driven governing 
principles were reshuffled partly by greed associated with globalisation but also, 
because of its internal shortcomings.  By the turn of 1950s, this heteroarchial system 
was inappropriately sucked into a foreign model that was more authoritative and 
centralised.  
Parameters and perimeters of change outcomes 
This institutional change outcome was analysed in chapters five to seven 
along three key parameters: Firstly, the governing image – which symbolically 
revealed the perceptions of actors regarding the inchoate practices of community 
leadership and how governing structures mediated governing interactions in the 
entire system.  Key in the observed change was in autopoiesis – that is, how 
communal governing forums - the gangi establishments – and those feeding into it – 
the dog odi and dye-kal – contested the rights to continuing celebrations of their kac 
and abila shrines, and also to pursue undisrupted growth of kinship lineage.  In other 
words, governing structures persistence on consent in legitimising political powers.  
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The second parameter, the governing instrument – examined the governing 
mechanisms (social rules and policies) and how new ones – whether as singular or 
in combination with the old - manipulated social and political contracts. The shift in 
the “rules of the game” that governed transition from diffused power in kaka to a 
centralised mode of governance under Local Government was linked to the history 
of violence in Acholiland.  Lastly, is the governing action - that is, examining and/or 
determining the levels of embeddedness of all the participating governing actors in 
the Acholi context and issues.  In line with this, I have examined the extent to which 
change over the years influenced the way ludito and their analogues as political 
agents interrogated political outcomes in governance.   
Recounting changes in the parameters of local governance 
Changing leadership and political structures 
Regarding the governing image of the Acholi as a system, the general 
conclusions are that: the governing principles (entrustment, facultative mutualism, 
etc.) that underpinned the articulation of the governing structures  (dog ot, dye kal, 
gang and kaka madit), kinship principles and the consociation trusts, were variously 
and systematically reshuffled under legal provisions during colonial (1896 to 1962) 
and coloniality (1962 to 2010).  The consequences of such change have been quite 
traumatising to the traditional society (1896 to 1962) and quite awakening for the 
postcolonial era as exemplified during the NRM regime as further articulated in the 
earlier chapters. Political authorities also increasingly became more distinct for 
purposes of exploitation, manipulation and control.  By 1962, there was an 
established and trifurcated power base in Acholiland. One base supported local 
exploitation using centralised planning (district local authority).  Then, there was a 
force rallying the Acholi political community for integration in a new Uganda state 
(Legislators and MPs).  The third were the rwodi moo, the spend forces of traditions 
that were gathering dusts of modernisation. The attempt by the state to centralise 
authorities also deligitimised kaka, transformed its heterarchy to hierarchy. However, 
this change did not lead to the creation of strong men within the traditional system 
as evident by the continuing absence of an Acholi dictator within the traditional 
system to bring an end to community-led insurgencies.  And Dwyer (1972) was right 
that even with their military might, the colonial authority did not conquer Acholiland.  
It, however, subdued it, weaken its bridges and logic for the NRM to conquer it by 
extended social tortures by 2010. 
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The assault on the image of kaka began all along in the early 1914 when 
local authority and the state government reshuffled kaka’s traditional mandates in 
human economic development.  At independence in 1962, kaka was found to be 
ineffective in most of its core governing activities, including provision of human 
security discussed in chapter four.  At the communal governing gang levels and 
below for instance, ludito kaka became pathways for conflicting cultures that pitched 
tradition, modernity and reality in a cocktail of confusion. On one hand, ludito kaka 
conveniently represented the fading tradition, imagining the abila as source of 
knowledge in community governance.  On another hand, they became increasingly 
disconnected from the society and acted as agents of the modern system - paid to 
transform the governing habits of the old system.  Their accountability was changed 
from people to rwodi kalam, who were rulers and agents of the state and thus less 
attached to the local.  
The rules of the game 
In terms of governing instruments, kaka was a non-partisan governing 
arrangement that was largely informal to the extent possible even when its social 
rules that were largely self-enforcing, habitual and widely tested and practiced 
prescribed some guidelines that demanded certain conducts and class of actions.  
Unlike state laws, customs and norms were gender biased and were practiced 
widely because they were instruments of advancing patrilineal orders in the society 
and people were knowledgeable about them. Formal rules, on the other hand, had 
limited engagement with the entire Acholi society and therefore, were alien and 
needed to be enforced by the new leaders.  This trend has not changed much by 
2010 because unlike customs, laws are enacted by the state to create orders that do 
not necessarily respond to the context of the locals.  Laws had large measures of 
imported, decentralised despotism that manipulated Acholi customs, creating some 
inconsistencies and contradictions in use for local governance.  This change created 
significant sources of conflicts, some of which became violent.  Lamogi rebellion of 
1911 was one such response to centralised ideas, to a social group that abhorred 
forced justice.  In the 1960s, the creation of numerous group farms and two large 
cattle ranches in Acholiland testify how dialogue based on legitimacy supported the 
state to introduced new developments in traditional communities. 
In terms of periodization, pluralism in institutional arrangement offered 
options for shopping by communities for justice – largely based on acceptability.  
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And, as such, this helped to weaken cik kaka (social rules) because the formal laws 
were seen as superior and legitimate.  It created disillusion in the roles of some local 
institutions particularly when coloniality embraced and continued with centralised 
forms of governance.  For instance, local structures: aunties (wayo), uncles (nero) 
and grand parents (kwaro/dayo) with significant social roles and responsibilities 
increasingly became irrelevant as social structures that mediated value systems 
especially as the state penetrated the rural zone through education.  With the 
promotion of universal primary education in the 2000, these traditional systems have 
almost been fully replaced by modern institutions by 2010.  
In terms of governing action, which is the quality of interactions between 
the actors and the society in the context of the region, it was concluded that key 
changes observed in governing actions was in the introduction of hierarchical 
decisions making based on a defined vision that was developed from above.  This 
created a form of relationship between traditional and modern system in which the 
former became a medium of misrules of the society by the state. Power became 
more significant in governance instead of political legitimacy. 
What has been the impact of change  
Institutional impact of change 
The impacts of the change were discussed under the three parameters 
above.  Noticeably, Acholi’s governing image was reshuffled along two dimesions.  
First, the cognitive quality of traditional leaders: their aspiration to resolve conflicts 
through restorative and transformative approaches were progressively replaced 
under the new systems by emphasising normative values system, often mediated by 
the courts of law. The new system demanded aggressive and modern education, 
submission to foreign languages, laws and social categorisation. This led to a re-
conceptualisation of local leaders.  In one typical case, the new concept delineated 
from practice the core values and roles of mothers and women in the traditional 
society as discussed in chapters four to six.  Secondly, the homologous kaka 
governing structures lost their traditional matrice arrangements to authoritarian 
models. This began a new dawn of repressive governing interactions and inter-
relationships within the entire system. The impact of these changes in practices, as 
discussed before, has been the substitution of legitimacy with political authority as a 
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significant governing variable. Acholi’s new image, hereafter, was confusing 
because it became a blend of both worlds: new and the old! 
The new “rules of the game”, on the other hand, was fixed in legal terms 
and enforced by external agencies that were accountable to the state.  It did not 
work, however, exactly like that. Increasingly, the philosophy of restorative justice as 
discussed in chapter six and seven was traded for criminal justice.  The thing about 
courts of law as footprints of colonial justice system is the appetite for punitive 
measures.  Police and other law enforcement became the “dogs of war”, the 
ogwang guji cracking on law defaulters with legendary impunity!  As it is, the state 
and its analogues have changed the meaning of local participation compared to 
what had been negotiated under kaka system. By 2010, community participation as 
used by NGOs and LGs was, foremost, used to solicit their physical involvement in 
recovery process.  The general notion of governmental and NGOs supports as 
noticed in the earlier chapters have been that development in Acholiland required 
external thinking and inputs, to make noticeable changes because what are 
indigenous are characters of backwardness, including the land tenure regime.  As a 
result, new structures of governance have been established more or less in tandem 
with what the colonial authorities did, and some of them – like the LC systems - are 
not effectively in used by 2010 because their focus and mandates are distorted.  
The nature of change introduced 
It is, however, important to acknowledge that colonial authority brought 
about “a fundamental change” in community governance.  First, it created a political 
territory called Acholiland, which increasingly has been further re-divided and by 
2010, there were six political administrative units bearing foremost, an imposed 
Acholi identity invented through legal framework. This framework coarsed the once 
difficult and sometimes opposing kaka into a meso level of ethnic identity within the 
Uganda state by 2010.  Acholi identity and political belonging surged by the late 
1950s to 1962 events was aligned to Luo as a universal and regional base. This, we 
show, supported development in the early part of independence as it enabled ethnic 
negotiation of a new political alliance and identity within the Uganda state.  This 
identity, however, became a liability in the last 30 years of the NRM rule.  
Increasingly, NRM has plugged a discourse in identity and more and more 
people in Acholiland look to being seen as Ugandan rather than Luo.  This induced 
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shift to identify with the Uganda state has delegitimised what previously existed in 
the form of kaka, resonating with the long-term vision of the neoliberals. 
Subsequently, by 2010 Acholi political identify remains tangled in violence, poverty 
and backwardness and the new generation that came back from the IDP camps 
have limited attachment to kinship, as they did not and have never benefited from its 
supportive instruments.   
The shift from kaka to LGs has also restructured governing interactions 
among the once equal polities.  In addition, it created new brands of leaders 
identified by their endowment in foreign credentials like: - academic achievements in 
renowned colonial educational systems and political orientations. Centralisation of 
power under the new system also has reinforced and realigned the role of an 
individual in an Acholi society as discussed in chapter four. Today, an Acholi is a 
subject of the state and by 2010; the state had begun to consider social protection 
for both the young and the old.  Under the kaka system, an Acholi child had three 
very significant social attachments: the first was to the father’s clan – where a child 
is deemed to belong.  Secondly, rwot moo - as a political leader of the entire 
consociation, kaka.  And, finally, to his mother’s brothers called nero, who were 
more or less the alternate father.   
Conversely, the new generation sees “self” as the whole and they feel 
obligated only to the formal system and network of friends while in the case of kaka, 
they argue, it is an outdated and competing inheritor of their political achievements. 
This emerging perspective has bred inter-generational mistrusts in Acholiland as 
much as it has also reinforced social bridges beyond the clan’s systems by 
downplaying the meanings of fiduciary roles of local groups and local practices.  
Noticeably, these traditional ties and old practices have not evidently supported the 
youth during the LRA insurgency.  It was not wilfully performed by the clan system 
as the traditional system was under sieged by the same insurgency.  Nevertheless, 
it showed how kaka competence needed to embrace the concept of imagined 
communities. 
Conceptual view of local leaders 
 Chapter seven explored tela, an Acholi word for leadership.  It concluded 
that rwodi as headmen of kaka consociations were respected and valued because 
they were providers: trustworthy, kind and reinforcing to their followers who were 
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mainly poor households, including the lubong – who were literally vagrant.  These 
leadership qualities legitimised rwodi and ludito kaka  - who generally were 
responsive not reactive to social problems and governing issues.  This was 
facilitating and empowering particularly to dog odi and dog gola or dye-kal.  
However, leadership at the meso and micro-levels, corresponding to the communal 
and corporate levels, manifested a hierarchical model in which senior leaders coach 
non-leaders – epitomising some forms of resilience, obedience, compliance and 
respect of age-old authorities. 
What changed? The new model is based on “hard authorities” inscribed in 
the laws of the state and emphasising normative rather than cognitive quality of 
leadership that are enforceable by the institutions of law.  While at the dog odi and 
dog gola levels, wegi odi - the husbands and pater as traditional leaders have 
remained largely inserted within the community space, living as part of the society  – 
their roles – which are largely in reaction to higher levels priorities, have qualitatively 
reduced their relevance, except in areas of governance where the state has scored 
positively, like in promoting security and gender sensitivity.  Thus, increasingly, 
politics since the 1900s, have entrenched authority rather than legitimacy of the 
pseudo informal and the formal leaders as a system at the expense of local 
relevance – which includes, nurturing the growth of local peace and connectedness.  
This has seriously influenced the way people conceptualise leadership in Acholiland. 
Surprisingly, in chapter six, respondents from Acholi comprehend leaders as 
benevolent agents of governments. Noticeably, political violence, governing 
environment, natural factors among other things – as explained in chapter seven - 
exasperated change in how community governance has been implemented.  
Violence as a historical trajectory 
Secondly, we can discern from the earlier chapters that colonialism and 
“coloniality” symbolised social domination – manifesting marked and persistent 
human displacement and the associated cultural humiliation, economic isolation and 
social tortures, especially for groups perceived as deviant to central authorities.  
While Acholi’s culture is dynamic, we sense that even as it is, it contests extreme 
authority in favour of more collaborative forms of governance.  Violence, as we see 
it, has been institutionalised in modernity as a mechanism to enforce compliance 
and it takes several shapes, generally agreed as social tortures.  This was evidently 
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high during colonial era but also during the 1970s military government and the late 
1980s to-date.  
The prolonged effects of the recent war have eroded the aspects of Acholi’s 
internal cohesion, which are most desirable for regulating political interactions with 
the outside world.  The extent of this distortion, I argue, has been profound.  In the 
last thirty years, the NRM has embraced a “rights-based morality” approach - which 
advocates for a focus on the individual, and has failed to recognize the intrinsic 
value of collective goods in a fragile situation like Acholi419.  In contesting this 
transition, Acholi culture have continued to face military enforcement, to comply with 
the new norms.  
I have also concluded that scholars misinterpreted the original logic of 
moralistic violence, when they observed the prevalence of violence within Acholiland 
during pre-colonial era. Generally speaking, the landscape of violence – whether 
predatory or moralistic - was visible, underlying the shifting grounds in community 
governance.  Most noticeably, the entire seventy years of colonialism was marked 
by violations that shaped Acholi as a political community but also created a kinetic 
form of lutela that redefined Acholi’s political landscape after independence.  The 
postcolonial era, was equally and violently repressive.  The violence was at its most 
extreme during the NRM regime, from 1986 to 2010.  The emergence of the LRA 
demonstrates the weakness in both local and national institutions.  The price of 
these mistakes still looms in Acholiland and is likely to remain visible for a very long 
time420.  Events related to the period of the LRA insurgency demonstrated the extent 
of “limited statehood” in Acholiland421.   
                                                          
419 The Vision 2040 that reflects the ideology of the NRM as noted earlier would like to 
see Uganda progress through private sector-led growth.  The social preparation for 
such strategy is missing and particularly for post conflict situation, this signals disaster.  
Since 2006, government has not made efforts to ensure that effective resettlement of 
the Acholi to claim back their past glory is supported under central programmes.  To 
the contrary, it has continued to build on the fears of most Acholi by relegating its 
roles to non-state actors.  
420 See: Finnström, 2008: 226-232 – where under “reconciliation gone bitter” and “so 
that life can go on” he makes some important points in shaping the true path to 
bettering the future, which is challenging. 
421 This has been the position of Acholi since the 1990s that violence has been used to 
suppress it. 
  318 
Research Contributions to New Knowledge 
This research deals with violence and fragility – which are the main causes 
of the world’s continuing insecurity and sufferings.  Its central contribution is in 
furthering an understanding of community governance in fragile situation as a 
concept and practice.  The Acholi case study, therefore, discusses how a condition 
of “limited statehood” in a fragile situation dovetailed with and impacted on 
community governing practices over a protracted period.  This study advances the 
viewpoint that in reality governing practices is deeply rooted and is linked to the 
social fabric of a given society.  That these practices are often multifaceted, lived, 
experienced and are vividly remembered by those that participate in the change 
processes.  In doing so, the study – while appreciative of earlier writings about 
community governance in Acholiland – strongly challenges the construction and 
interpretations of the political architecture of the Acholi macon by scholars like 
Atkinson (1999, 2010), Allen (1998) and Grove (1947) and as well, their meanings to 
local governance. 
Engaging with reality as visualised above in the context of conflict or in a 
situation of social flux, demands more than scholarly claim of objectivity – which in 
some instances, explains a situation of doubts in one’s own understanding and 
interpretation of local practices.  In circumstance of the sort, interpretive knowledge 
and the meanings of locally lived practices can best be subjected to interdisciplinary 
and lived experiences.  This thesis examines the history of political interactions 
between opposing governing structures and their link to violence in Acholiland from 
the late nineteenth century until the present day. The core argument is that both 
colonial and postcolonial regimes or “coloniality” ignored the appropriateness of 
kaka as governing philosophy and structures in responding to the complex and 
diverse context of Acholiland, by establishing antagonistic systems that have worked 
against an increasingly atomised society.  The research makes a number of 
important contributions to foremost, peace studies as a field of enquiry but also to 
scholarships of community governance: their meanings and interpretations by 
clarifying the social-political structures of the Acholi macon as further discussed 
below.  
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Conceptualisation of community governance 
The second important contribution is the conceptualisation of community 
governance.  In the study, I have advanced the viewpoint that community 
governance is a moral obligation and is social-political.  This is because a 
community is a constituency of different groupings or sub-systems - that is social - 
and with variegated political power - that is political.  Each of these categories has 
special wants, talents and “carrying capacities” and is desirous to live and contribute 
meaningfully to the overall goal of the whole.  The interactional dimension of 
community governance is therefore a mix of assorted governing efforts that is 
mediated through institutions of social rules.  As a multilateral and multi-layered 
practice, community governance is guided by these social rules that can constrain 
as well as facilitate interactive efforts of the individual sub-systems.  The moral of 
governance is in how these rules are developed and operationalized with the 
ultimate outcome that avoids violence, inequality and marginalisation based on 
capabilities, belonging or any forms of difference.   
I have maintained that community governance is a moral practice, since it 
seeks to define modernity as pluralistic and not singular, arguing that context – like 
fragility or conflict situation - is a specific condition that demands a special mix of 
rules and governing actions.  Morality, admittedly is subjective and a difficult concept 
to debate.  However, based on my knowledge and understanding of the Acholi of 
Uganda and other post-conflict societies, I maintain that governing practices that are 
interactive, inclusive and supportive can be enduring because they reinforce 
individual households’ efforts to govern themselves and in doing so, make good 
meaning and redefine the reality of locality and good neighbourliness.  The fact that 
an individual sub-system of the whole would see interaction with others as 
reinforcing their own, enshrines the moral value and endorsement of modernity as 
pluralistic and context dependant.   
Acholi’s social-political structures 
Thirdly, this research has contributed to four new interpretations of the 
practices of community governance in the Acholi of Uganda.  It avers that the 
“traditional” social-political organisations of Acholi macon were polycephalous and 
predominantly relational.  Kaka, which was a description of intimate relationship 
between political units all across the governing tiers, guaranteed balance of power 
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between mutually opposing governing entities, thereby enthralling moral elements in 
community governance.  Based on the evidence reflected in existing terminologies 
and testimonies of those who lived it, social power, political influence and social 
status were largely patrilineal and patrilocal but not necessarily patrimonial.   
Power was widely distributed, to accommodate the autopoiesis attributes of 
the individual governing structures.  This principle of brotherhood as we observed in 
chapter four, provided opportunities for the growth of strong patrilineal identity and 
the satisfaction of lineage-based polities.  Political legitimacy was understood as 
normative with gangi – the communal level - and dye-kal – the corporate level of 
governance wailing pater and jurial power embedded in the authority of the abila 
shrine - to curse and to bless. Beyond these two levels, the legitimacy of political 
authorities was subjected consents as we show in chapter five.  Political consent 
was, except where wadi were involved, evolving in nature and subjected to the 
performance of kaka madit or the higher-level consociation. Political authority was 
illegitimate, as it would out-turn the authority of abila that identified wadi as kin. 
 Thence, hierarchical relationships depicting bureaucratic governance, 
chiefdoms, as postulated by Atkinson (2010) and others, were not conspicuously 
evident as also observed by other (see: Girling, 1960:8, 181; Kabwegyere, 1995:63-
67).  Rather, the presence of social hierarchy with elders as authorities of tradition 
rather than rulers and stronger gangi as the big brothers of weaker ones merely 
permitted the elders to support one another and “control non-leaders”.  Elders did 
not have unilateral control of the governing system, nor claimed to do.  
Nevertheless, they were the archive of traditional knowledge and would use their 
lived experience, often relying on ongon to influence rational actions of the younger 
generations.   
The manifestation of autopoiesis, and therefore the absence of 
authoritarian governing realms at the kaka governing level has been supported by 
others like Dwyer (1972: 30-32); Branch (2011: 47-48); Bere  (1955:50).   This 
suggests that the kinship-based agnates that collectively formed kaka, enthroned a 
form of what I consider as differentiated facultative mutualisms – as differentiated 
brands and forms of community governance.  The absence of despotism in the kaka 
structures – that is, the insignificance of hierarchical and predatory regimes – the 
ephemeral nature of political relationships between the core and non-core-agnates, 
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the importance of consensual approach to political authority and the absence of 
economic class, make it difficult to justify that the traditional political arrangement by 
most accounts, were chiefdoms.  At most, the autopoiesis trait for self-governance 
at the gangi levels, with the interest of preserving lineage growth and identity and 
the arrangement of co-management under multiple villages, have significantly 
shown stronger evidence of the kaka political image.  This assertion constitute new 
knowledge of how the Acholi social-political institutions have evolved and worked 
and later violently transformed by autocratic interaction with the state over the last 
100 years.  As such, it provides valuable addition to the literature on governance on 
how “stateless” societies conceptualise governments and governance. 
Indirect rule were more direct in Acholi422 
Furthermore, this study has challenged the notion that the sixty fours years 
of British rule in Acholiland should be categorised as “indirect rule”.   This is because 
the features of the said indirect rule are very similar to the direct rules practiced in 
the present Uganda.  Conversely, as some scholars like Gerring, et al (2011:377-
433) do admit, there are commonalities across these various typologies of 
governance relationships.  In justifying a form of direct rule in the case of Acholiland, 
I have reflected on the degree of central control that was instituted by colonialism - 
something that was strange in the case of kaka governance as governing level for 
collective kin groups.   
The key concept to understand is the system of the typologies of these 
rules along a continuum that reflects a degree of control by the principal.  This is 
particularly so in the case of a fully decentralised governance system of kaka Acholi, 
where, as we have seen, the constituencies of gangi agnates held the majority of 
the governing activities.  Theoretically, direct rule features highly centralised 
decision making while indirect rule features a more decentralised frame, allowing 
important decision-making power at the periphery.   
Indirect rules might have applied in the context of Uganda state, where 
power was decentralised to the different tribal units.  However, in the case of Acholi 
as one of such tribal unit, indirect rules would have typically allowed the  
                                                          
422 The analysis of indirect rule in Acholiland was informed by the work of Kennedy, 
2013, 
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“independent” ethnic blocks, gangi agnates continued with lineage development, a 
decision that would have conformed to the existing kaka mode of governance.  But 
this was not the case as we show in Chapter Three and Five. 
The indirect form of rule could not be instituted within the new Acholi 
political setting because first and foremost, it lacked the despotic leaders - the form 
of state-ness that was considered desirable for a predatory form of governance that 
was desired by the colonialists (see also: Gerring et al., 2011:382; Iliffe, 1979; 
Thompson, 2003: 9-39).  The principal-agency relationship in a despotic system is 
concerned with hierarchy verses markets or organisations verses contracts.  Thus, 
for indirect rule, the various kaka that littered the old Acholiland would have been 
subordinated to the state - each expected to have the capacity to serve as a 
despotic agent of the colonial authority, a function that Branch (2011:49) indicated 
most rwodi Acholi could not imagine.  
By subordinating to the new Uganda state, kaka’s political legitimacy would 
have been compromised as this implied that these patrilineal organisations would be 
subjected to the authority of a non-Acholi and a woman at that - who was the Queen 
of England.   From unwritten narratives, I was made to understand that when Major 
Delme-Redcliffe in 1889 informed rwodi Acholi that he was a representative of the 
Queen of England, rwodi unanimously requested him to bring along the Queen who 
was their peers for a meeting because Delme-Redcliffe was a mere “oteka lweny” 
and with no blessed authority on matters of governance423.   
The colonialists had, therefore, to create new and despotic political 
authority based on the model from Buganda.  It necessitated first delegitimising the 
political authorities of the different kaka entities into a legitimate political society, the 
Acholi under the new Acholi District Administration.  Then the colonialists appointed 
“outsiders” to directly govern the Acholi as a colonial society.  These governors had 
no traditional legitimacy whatsoever and shamelessly, ruled the new outfit in a more 
                                                          
423 “Oteka lweny” were war hero and had no unique quality other than in war.  This was 
recorded in my meeting with Charles Alai in a meeting I held with him in Roma hotel in 
Gulu town in 1998.  Charles Alai was one of the earlier administrators in the first UPC 
government and quite knowledgeable of theAcholi history.  Infact in 2006, retired Col. 
Walter Ochora told me that Alai used a colonial map of Uganda, to inform and 
conclude contestation around district borders between two contemporaries: the 
Acholi and the Alur elders in the presence of Apollo Nsibambi, the Uganda Prime 
Minister. According to Walter Ochora, Charles Alai after presenting the map was 
unchallenged and the case was concluded.  
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obsequious fashion.  They followed the commands of the British principal agents, 
the District Commissioners, who were appointees of the colonial authorities.  As 
Gerrling et al. (2011:382) admitted, “This was indirect rule in name only.” 
Then there was additionally, the issue of political order, which was a 
prerequisite for the claim of sovereignty.  In order to claim sovereignty over the 
Acholi, the British had to institutionalise coercive power and political legitimacy.  In 
other words, its governing machineries lacked consent, which was the dominant 
feature of kaka governing authority.  By reshuffling kaka’s governance system 
through amalgamation of the governing different structures, colonialism evidently 
went beyond the principles of indirect rule.  It led to greater confusion and unrest 
with more open opposition, which forced the British colonial authority to resort to the 
use of force.  The undisguised power of coerciveness failed the establishment of an 
enduring system of rule, something which indirect rule would have preserved by 
benefiting from pre-existing political institutions424.   
Furthermore, indirect rule is supposedly a negotiated settlement in which 
local leaders actively participated.  In the case of Acholiland, Dwyer (1972:10-11) for 
instance contends that it was a political manipulation structured around the 
vulnerability of the Acholi people to both external and internal logic.  Girling (1960: 
Chapter 9), however, contends that externally, the Acholi had mounting threats 
resulting from globalisation that was fuelled by commerce and trade.  Hence, 
anyone who could guarantee stability and order in Acholiland would make a good 
brother.  Rwodi Acholi were made to believe that the British would.  Internally, as 
demonstrated by Rwot Camo’s initiatives, the demand for large numbers as political 
power was inducing political change towards the likes of Bunyoro Kingdom. 
By 1898, Major MacDonald, according to Gertzel (1974:57), had initiated 
the first treaties with rwodi in Acholi, which had a mixed effect.  The treaties, 
according to Gertzel (1974:57), were misunderstood by rwodi and later this became 
a point of contention when it turned out that by signing it, rwodi had forfeited a big 
part of their traditional authorities to foreigners.  According to Bere (1947:8), when 
Major Delme-Redcliffe started the identification of rwodi for indirect rule in 1889, it 
was evident that bargaining with these rwodi would be difficult and he felt that 
                                                          
424 Fisher, 1991: Chapter 1.  
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powerful rwodi like Rwot Awich had to be arrested.   As a result, the British adopted 
patrimonialism as a form of political authority and began to co-opt leaders instead of 
bargaining with them.  In effect, kaka Payiira, Lamogi and Labongo, which were 
outright rebellious were reshuffled during colonialism into new administrative 
systems, to reduce the powers of their rwodi and to humiliate their charismatic 
rwodi.  This is how land, boundaries and spaces were redrawn and later used to 
control natives, something that legal anthropologists have consistently advanced 
(see for instance Von Benda-Beckmann, et al., 2009: Location 318).  
It was certainly evident that a direct form of rule was applied and it was 
highly centralised at the district level with the District Commissioner as political 
principal.  This creation dealt a sizable blow to ludito kaka and rwodi who had to 
confront it, as was the case with Rwot Awich of Payiira in 1902 and Rwot Onung 
Ting Traa of kaka Lamogi in 1911.  As a matter of fact, the outcome for a number of 
these rwodi was, according to oral history, severe marginalisation of their people.  
Consequently, by the later part of colonialism, Acholiland had a trifurcation of 
authority. Two of these authorities: the Acholi Local Government – which included 
the parishes, divisions, counties and the district – and the constituencies of rwodi 
Acholi under the newly created lawii rwodi or paramount chief, represented two 
distinct mechanisms of local governance.  The former, however, was governed 
under customary laws while in the case of the latter kaka rules prevailed.  The third 
pillar, I would argue, were the members of parliament from Acholiland, who provided 
the link between Acholiland as a political territory to the new Uganda state in the 
articulation of its role and interests in the new, governing system.  I have referred to 
the latter group as lugok paco because of what their roles provided.  Lugwok paco 
were governed by state laws, which increasingly were applied to inform the 
customary laws. 
Finally, I have argued that political violence in Acholiland has been used as 
a “qualitative form of governance” and with time, this spiralled into derivative form of 
violence.  This is because political violence was applied as governing action in 
transforming the Acholi into subjects – something that we have learned that the 
Acholi consistently contested.  This assertion is distinct from earlier analyses that 
were limited in terms of ethnographic and historical depths and have emphasised 
violence as habitual to the Acholi internal logic.  Derivative violence, as Mamdani 
(2002) asserts, comes from the view that self-governance often makes external 
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governance difficult especially when it is aimed at controlling the local.  In a situation 
where governing interactions, either by design or by subjective choice, are mediated 
by social power, as has been in the case of Acholiland, there is a high potential for 
violence.   
This conclusion makes two important points with respect to governance as 
demonstrated in Acholiland.  One is that modern governing actions are normatively 
constructed with the aim to control rather than empower local actors, like ludito 
kaka.  As such, governing actions by the state have undermined indigenous 
knowledge of brotherhood, disregarded the relevance of local innovations to local 
context – which I have outlined in the case of Acholiland as multifarious by all 
means.  This departure by the state raised local contestations both as a natural 
response but also as legally framed under modernity.  Secondly, the growth of local 
endurance by the Acholi people over the years has been framed under what 
scholars dub as limited statehood.  In this situation, the state’s functions, or most of 
them, have been outsourced to other political actors and in the case of Acholiland, 
the CSOs.  Actually, most part of the economic development of Acholiland in the 
1950s through to 1970s, were championed in collaboration with the local 
Churches425.  This, however, shifted during the LRA wartime of the 1980s until now, 
to the CSOs and in particular, the faith-based organisations.  In all these governing 
efforts, local leaders found at the grassroots provided significant guidance and 
therefore have remained the most appreciated form of leaders in Acholiland.  
Simply, leadership in Acholi are decentralised even to-date.  As such, there are very 
limited incentives for the Acholi to look to the state - which obviously have often 
been associated with violence, stealing and burning local properties and are 
undoubtedly, the living enemy of fiduciary culture. 
The Gaps in Acholi’s Narratives 
The scholarly view that foreigners have more credibility to write about 
African issues, including its history, culture and stories of resistance, has, for a long 
time, changed the true meaning of what insiders see as an attempt to distort 
                                                          
425  Although not well research thus far, most of the educated Acholi in the 1940s 
through to the 1960s had the support of the missionaries.  The majority of the male 
respondents I talked to admitted to this. 
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qualitative knowledge generation that are premised on local reality.   My sense of 
this practice in the academia is that western scholars claim of impartiality in 
knowledge generation have led to innovation and interpretation of data on life as 
new knowledge about Africa based on these foreign point of views.   However, this 
unknowingly or knowingly has distorted the meanings of lived experiences, which 
scholars from non-western zones tend to have in abundance.  Nevertheless, 
increasing acceptance and reliance on the latter group has surged, to transform and 
dismantle structures of the existing knowledge.   This move has significantly 
improved the interpretations and meaning of knowledge in the academia.   
In the case of Acholi of Uganda, foreign scholars, colonial administrators 
and recently, sector advisors and NGO workers have mistakenly advanced new 
perspectives about traditional social-political organisations of the Acholi.  In 
particular, Professor Atkinson has over the years sold the idea of chiefdoms as pre-
colonial governance in Acholiland and most practitioners have plumbered into using 
it without much questioning.  This perspective, in my understanding, was used 
mainly to help compare governance in Acholiland with what was familiar in the eyes 
of western scholars.  This, I imagine, is great scholarship, but one that unfairly 
imagined that community governance systems have to conform, most of the time to 
centralised authority.  This seems not to be when one reads the case study of the 
Acholi of Uganda.   
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The study concludes that violence, as a concept is multifaceted and context 
mediated, embracing human and non-human factors.  Admittedly, violence and 
especially physical violence, has informed how Acholi community conceptualises 
leaders and community governance.  The majority of my core respondents see 
governance as governmental, having been subjected to camp lives for close to three 
decades.  They see governance as basically singular, hierarchical, resource-based 
and not necessarily knowledge-based and one that they are expected to submit to.  
As such, traditional authorities and especially elders have no place in community 
governance because they are poor and dependant on others.   Additionally, their 
knowledge base as seen in how the community feels about the restoration of Ter 
Kwaro Acholi, is irrelevant.  The majority of them see violence as a governing tool as 
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demonstrated in the number of reported incidences of domestic violence.  They 
argued that being articulate is provocative and is insubordination, which has been 
Acholi’s primary failure in life.   
“They [soldiers] say that we [Acholi] like argument even when there are no 
reasons for it.  They think we should rather follow orders without asking 
questions, even when things are not clear in ones mind.  Are we soldiers to 
follow orders all the time?”  
Respondent from Pawel in Atiak, March 2006  
The study also concludes that there has been a trend in the base and 
structure of political power in Acholiland.  The study notes that traditional power was 
mainly based on social status and therefore, was an ideational resource.  It was 
structured around patriarchal and lineage-based systems.  Its strength was in 
restoring social order in the community.  As such, it was largely confined to 
ideational resources, that is, the hegemonic acculturation as a practice of leadership 
through charisma, symbols and deep knowledge of tradition.  It never created class 
based on wealth but one that was categorised based on knowledge of traditions.  
This gave rwodi and ludito kaka conditional legitimacy that enabled establishment of 
orders. 
In the 1930s and especially 1950s to 1960s, the traditional basis of power 
complemented the emerging lugwok paco, who were considered the petty 
bourgeoisie. These were individuals who had material resources and knowledge on 
governance mainly through their employment in Local and Central Governments.  
With the surge for self-determination, the political elites, who came out of these 
groups, created ripples of hope as they launched and diversified hegemonic 
acculturation in political mobilisation and reciprocity based on their contribution.   
The trifurcation of power based in the 1950s and 1960s, although were male 
dominated, significantly changed the image of Acholi. 
The study concludes that since the 1980s and especially during the NRM 
era, there has been a surge in power and the bases have significantly changed.  
The powers of material resources – political allies, money, and other tangible things 
have come afloat.  Women as a distinct group have come in wielding both material 
and ideational resources of power, tilting the patriarchal dominance of the past 
decades.  They are more accommodating to Yoweri Museveni’s NRM, but they are 
also more embedded in the society, with commitments to their party and people. 
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Finally, this study concludes that the nature of political change in Acholiland 
has been mixed.   The introduction of the principal-agent dimension in the 
governance realm was essential in fixing the gaps that existed in kaka.  However, 
the politicisation of governance and the instituting of patronage and co-optive 
mechanisms have ruined the good it could serve.  Acholi as a community has had a 
good change because it reduced the tension that had deterred collaboration among 
the different Acholi ethnic groups.  As a society, Acholi has been able to influence 
the course of national politics and with marked consequences over the postcolonial 
era. It questions, however, the possibility of similar experiences at the higher level, 
where Uganda becomes more accommodating. 
Research and policy implications of the study 
This study of community governance has exposed a number of areas and 
issues for further investigation.  The growth of politics in Acholiland has been deeply 
inspired by its fiduciary culture – where entrustment has been largely self-
consciously enforceable  – and its moral attributes towards its society, a case of 
self-preservation.  This inward looking aspect of social protection gave birth to a 
strong modernity variant that shaped the campaign against torture in Acholi.  In my 
mind, it departed from the generalised notion that kinship is based on loyalty rather 
than on contractual and functional specifics role (see: Kopytoff, 1987:58:49 cited in 
Hyden, 2011:Locations 1055-68). Literature on kinship and fiduciary culture has 
been viewed from the notion of the modern state and therefore, biased against 
organic collectivity, including kinship Chatterjee (2011: location: 221-39 to748-50) 
426.  As such, it sees social ties among kin as destructive rather than opportunities 
for pluralism in modernity (see: Hyden, 2011: 1055-68427.  
The Acholi have demonstrated how “cultured” belonging, whether as 
primordial or imagined communities, permits a “vassal to owe obligations” to more 
than just themselves and how Uganda nation building should at all time embrace 
consent rather than consensus (e.g., Hayden, 2011:Locations 1055-68).  As the 
Uganda Vision 2040 reaffirms, Uganda is “committed to deepen” its stance as a 
                                                          
426 Chatterjee sees modern statehood as “governmental technology” generated under 
libral politics that contends in a creation of a “development form of statehood” that 
merely seeks to address the economic dimension of poverty.  As such, it is short of the 
gists of local governance ideals we see in post-conflict or fragile situation  
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“developmental state”.  With the unlevelled fields in poverty reduction that see ethnic 
marginalisation, the contribution of “cultured belonging” based on kinship begs to be 
reconstructed, building on the experience gained in peace building in Acholiland. 
Kinship has for a long time been seen as a damaging factor in state building but the 
Acholi case study shows strong elements of the good.  Africa as a terrain of kinship 
may be turned around not by destroying the kinship bond.  Rather, by using it to 
develop its resources.  As stated before, can state be an end view rather than a 
means to democratisation, one that does not necessarily conform to the western 
brand? 
This research advances an idea of community governance as a moral 
engagement.  It contends that governing actions are collective and vary with 
context.  Local governance, seen from state fundamentalists, is a delegated power 
that is accumulated in the constitution of the state and dispensed by elected 
governments.  While there is certainly a strong desire for centralised authority at 
some point, the search for relevance seems to outweigh the former.  We need to 
rethink about diversity based on the failure of past attempts to transplant 
homogeneity in a naturally diverse African context.  We need to think strategically on 
how, in a pluralistic environment, the western democratic framework of governance 
can only be an instrument of micro-level governance, and not one that is practiced 
at the macro-level successful
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Annexes 
Annex 1.1 – Model of Community Governance System 
Kooiman (2003:23-24) suggests three kinds of governing interactions 
based on the nature of relationship, namely: interference, interplay, and 
interventions.  However, interactions can be competitive, complementary, 
Interference, as a form of interaction, for instance, is seen as less organised and 
often the primary process of societal interaction in the system.  Interplay, on the 
other hand, is also largely informal, depicting exchanges between social-political 
actors who occupy same political levels.  As such, it occurs between governing 
actors as a shared action rather than independently.  This makes interplay a 
supportive and specialised forms of interaction that enabled and constrained 
intentions of actors. 
Figure 9.1: Model of Community Governance System 
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The last type of intervention is hierarchical and often formal.  Intervention carries 
with it authority, but interaction dwells on mutuality and learning.  Won paco as a 
headman of the dye-kal had both a duty and the authority to ensure compliance with 
patrilineal codes of behaviours 
Figure 9.2: Community Governing Elements and Outcomes 
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images interface effective results instruments 
Where governing 
images interface with 
governing instruments 
Means that the quality and form of the 
institutions is grounded in consensual 
viewpoint and thus legitimate 
Stability in the 
governing actions 
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Annex 1.3: Categories of Rules and Practices Studied 
Conceptual 
Areas 
Practices / Norms  Attributes Description of the Measurement 
Governing 
instrument
s 
1. General 
rules, 
frameworks and 
procedures 
derived from 
broad societal 
base 
a) The state and 
quality of 
constitutive 
frameworks, rules 
and procedures 
derived from 
broad societal 
base 
i) Enabling technical relevance and 
capacities for implementation 
ii) Enacting a combination of formal 
and informal procedures for 
selection of leaders 
iii) Enabling the mix of formal and 
informal rules on one hand and on 
the other hand, soft and hard rules 
b) Operational 
frameworks rules 
and procedures 
enabling 
predictable 
governing 
interactions 
i) Measures effectiveness, 
predictability and relevance of 
governing interactions 
ii) Embeddedness of the governing 
instruments implemented 
iii) Availability, accessibility and 
accumulated knowledge of use of 
governing instruments 
iv) Selection of governing 
instruments: deterministic or 
probabilistic 
2. Specific 
rules, 
frameworks and 
procedures 
derived from 
broad societal 
base 
a) The state and 
quality of 
constitutive 
frameworks for 
fragility and 
governance  
i) Availability of technical capacities 
in operating governing instruments 
ii)  
b) The form and 
state of targeted 
operational 
instruments for 
the north 
i) Quality of instrument used 
ii) Types and forms of the selected 
instruments 
 
Governing 
Actions 
1. General 
rules, 
framework and 
procedures for 
respect of 
human rights  
a) Constitutive 
framework for 
implementing 
human right 
 
 
 
 
b) Operational i) Types of leaders available for 
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guidelines for 
implementing 
human rights 
actions 
ii) Embedded and shared social-
political actions 
iii) Distributions, access and 
availability of social-political capital 
 2. Social 
protections and 
safety nets 
a) Constitutive 
framework for 
social protection 
and safety nets 
 
  b) Operational 
guidelines for 
social protection 
and safety nets 
 
Governing 
Images 
1. Institutional 
arrangements 
and Practices 
  
 2. Leadership 
Types and 
Choices of  
Instr. 
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Annex 2.2: Conceptual Discussion of Moral Governance 
Community governance is viewed as a kind of inquiry.  It focuses on how 
shared governing activities, that is, collective - the forms and modes - are structured 
by social-political analyses, moral dispositions, values and norms, and how in turn 
these are reinforced, shaped, compromised or overruled by the outcomes.  As an 
analysis it can be primarily cognitive or normative, although that distinction breaks 
down when dealing with matters of needs – as is the case of emergencies, demands 
and change.  In fragile situations, for instance, community governance as an 
analytical tool is normative, qualitatively and quantitatively determined.  
The moral is embodied in the norms and the active engagements with 
governing entities, namely – the households and other levels, to understand and 
redefine responsibilities and rights of each other and the entire society.  It is 
therefore concerned with the societal norms and the morals of acting without 
undermining opportunities for change that enable empowerment of all members of 
households in demand-driven and bottom-up perspectives.   As such, the analyses 
anchor on norms, conventions, values, dispositions, carrying capacities and 
commitments regarding what is just and what a community group perceives as good 
behaviour in relation to them.  As such it suggests certain broader conceptions of 
wellbeing, beyond what is typically known to the community.  It includes, for 
instance, concerns for ethical interactions and relationships of care ignored by much 
conventional moral philosophy.  In taking a very broad conception of the moral, one 
that includes conceptions of wellbeing, I propose a space for assessing moral 
aspects of community governance practices one that built on morality and aims to 
affects human well-being. 
Moral as opposed to immoral behaviours are culturally determined and as 
such contestable.  However, some forms of moral governance, for example, that of 
the patriarchal household, might be deemed immoral, and as domination disguised 
as benevolence and fairness. The study of moral governance does not have to be 
conservative but can expose and criticise such institutions of governance. In 
everyday life moral concerns can prompt resistance as well as conformity. By 
definition, a critical or radical approach cannot reduce motivation wholly to matters 
of interests and power, ignoring the pursuit of and concern for the good. Morality 
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cannot be wholly reduced to a front for power and interest. Contrary to prevailing 
alienated conceptions of morality in sociology, in which it is viewed as of minor 
importance and merely as an external system of regulation of behaviour, and an 
inherently conservative one at that, it is necessary to remember how central 
morality, as defined above, is to our emotional lives, commitments, identities and 
well-being.  
Although well being may be socially defined in various ways, and take 
many forms, not just anything can be socially constructed as moral or fair. There is a 
universal human psychological need not just for social interaction but also for 
recognition, and as Smith and Hume noted, its absence causes serious suffering. 
Some degree of recognition of and from others, if only minimal, is expected in most 
social interactions including those of economic activities. This pursuit of recognition 
is a component of what is sometimes called the embedding of economic activities. 
For example, although contracts invite the contractors to treat each other purely as a 
means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves, actors commonly demand 
some recognition of their standing as ends in themselves. Much worker resistance 
(both to bosses and customers) derives from this. As the Scottish Enlightenment 
thinkers stressed, beyond subsistence level, economic activities are partly driven by 
the pursuit of recognition, albeit often in the ‘corrupted’ forms of status and vanity. 
The ‘economic’ is taken to cover all provisioning activities, not only those of 
the formal, cash economy, but also those of the informal, particularly household 
economy. The economy should not be reduced to capitalist economic processes, 
nor should the latter be reduced to ‘the market’. In addition to studying directly 
economic activities and institutions, moral economies could also deal with 
economically conditioned and conditioning institutions such as educational 
organisations. All instituted economic practices embody assumptions about rights 
and the good, about entitlements, fairness and propriety, even though they are also 
often products of unequal power. Of course many economic processes derive from 
the unintended consequences of actions, but these are open to ethical evaluation 
and regulation too, since all economic activities and relations have ethical 
implications. 
Economic institutions embody conventions about moral-economic matters, 
in particular regarding property rights (for example, the treatment of the goods 
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produced by a capitalist firm as the property of the capitalist, not the workers), or 
regarding the legitimacy of usury, or the nature and distribution of rights and 
responsibilities, or the difference between gifts and entitlements or compensation 
(Zelizer), or the distribution of economic roles and rewards according to identity, and 
so on. While some of these may only have been established through long processes 
of struggle (as E.P.Thompson emphasised), once established they tend to become 
naturalised and depoliticised. In the case of capitalism, they do not merely constrain 
but enable and promote capitalist development. They may become part of the social 
imaginary. Gendered moral-economic norms have been also institutionalised by 
appeals to common sense assumptions of gender as grounded in nature. Political 
economy has sometimes contested but often legitimised these moral-economic 
norms (e.g. profit and interest as rewards for waiting, as compensation for 
contribution of capital, etc.), although once the economic practices in question are 
widely institutionalised, economic theory tends to treat them as parameters, marking 
their transition from contentious norm to quasi-natural fact, in so doing asserting its 
status as ‘positive’ economics. In other words there is a shift from the normative to 
the normalised, in which, as Habermas puts it, questions of validity are turned into 
questions of behaviour.  
At any point in time, we tend to notice the moral-economic issues which are 
currently being struggled over (e.g. whether to allow insurance companies access to 
individuals’ genetic data), but the subject of moral economy is also about all the 
moral-economic issues which have been forgotten but still help to constitute or 
‘frame’ economic practice. Thus, the right of capitalists to the ownership of not only 
means of production but their firms’ output, seem to be set in stone and 
unquestioned, although it was contested at the beginning of the industrial revolution. 
Some moral-economic conventions are open to continual contestation, for example 
those of the domestic division of labour, or those regarding appropriate behaviours 
and powers of capital/management and labour in the workplace and labour market.  
The formation of ‘the economy’ as a distinct sphere and as an 
institutionalised system is very much the product of a whole series of acts of 
framing, narrowing down possibilities and matters which are uncertain and 
contestable so as to create a determinate basis for economic activity and 
interaction, and techniques of ‘purification’ of economic activities to exclude 
interferences. These are achieved both physically through the spacing and timing of 
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actions, actors and materials, and techniques of discipline in Foucauldian fashion, 
and conceptually or ideologically through the normalisation and legitimation of 
previously or potentially contestable arrangements. Economic institutions also 
typically define the legitimate scope and form of negotiation and contestation of 
arrangements, for example, defining what trade unions may contest and what they 
may not. If too much is allowed to be contested, then efficient, regularised economic 
activities may be prevented, though the point of such normalisation is typically the 
defence of concentrated political economic power, not merely efficiency. (The 
common use in mainstream economics of folksy examples of informal exchanges of 
goods between ordinary individuals as a model of highly formalised economic 
systems is disastrous not only in reducing economy to exchange but in ignoring the 
complex institutionalisation required for efficient economic activity.) 
 
While the history of governance is very much about accumulation of power 
and controlling, struggles are also about the good, about justice and about what 
enables human flourishing. In both positive and normative modes, the project of 
moral governance is not only to address novel problems, such as commodification 
of land, but also to treat the existing normalised moral governance conventions as 
contingent social forms which embody normative assumptions, which in principle are 
still, are open to contestation.
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Annex 2. 1: PART TWO of Chapter Two 
Linking Community Governance and Institutional Outcomes 
The most commonly reported definition of institutions comes from North 
(1990) - the new institutionalism and post-Weberian sociology, which states that 
institutions are the “rules of the game” in a society, or a “regularity” of social 
behaviour agreed upon by the society (see North, 1990: 3-5).  This definition, 
however, embraces formal rules like laws and constitutions but not the informal rules 
like social norms and conventions (Hodgson, 2006:13).    
Conversely, Hodgson’s (2006) definition accommodates the informal basis 
of all structured and durable behaviour (Hodgson, 2006:1).  He draws insights from 
a number of disciplines and asserts that institutions are systems of “established and 
prevalent social rules”, not just rules428.  As such, they evolved through use and their 
stability is re-enforced through societal preference and replicated through 
behaviours to establish an equilibrium, which becomes the custom of a chosen 
community.  This quality of some sort can, however, be disturbed, hence the change 
of rules or institutions (see: Knight, 1992:2; Aoki, 2001).    
While there is some agreement between Hodgson (2006) and North (1990), 
the former pointed out some ambiguities on institutions.  For the purpose of this 
research, four aspects are crucial. First is definitional, and the relations between 
institutions and social structures with social-political actors.  Second is the distinction 
between organisations and institutions (Hodgson, 2006:10).  Third, the ambiguity in 
the term “formal rules” and “informal constraints” (North, 1990:138); Hodgson, 
2006:10), and fourth, what institutional change and change outcomes are all about, 
and how the theories support the emergence of a framework that can discuss the 
Acholi situation. These aspects are discussed within the context of social power, 
seen as a relation rather than a substance (De Angelis, 2000:10). 
                                                          
428 Institutions are commonly used in psychology, sociology, political science, economics 
and geography. 
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Debating the elements of institutions 
Fleetwood (2008) uses recent insights in contemporary sociology and 
institutional economic theory to highlight controversies surrounding institutions and 
social structures, which are further contextualised here, within the social-political 
environments of Acholiland (Fleetwood, 2008: 10-15).  
Fleetwood (2008:10) asserts that institutions have three basic components, 
namely: rules, conventions and habits, which he suggests are different things.  As 
rules, institutions mediate and coordinate interactions in a humane way and 
acceptable manner.429  Institutional rules, therefore, seek to establish equilibrium 
and are enforceable, while conventions are, according to Hodgson (2006:18), 
“particular instances of institutional rules” with the power to influence social-political 
actors and their actions.  Habits, on the other hand, are the constitutive material of 
the institutions and are context specific (Hodgson, 2006:164).  Hodgson further 
contends that habituation results in actors internalising the rules and transforming to 
them (Hodgson, 2006: 17).  
As such, institutions are systems of established and embedded social rules 
that structure social interactions (Hodgson, 2008:18).  Building on the works of 
Hodgson (2006) and other scholars he concludes that institutional rules are both 
constitutive and regulative (e.g., Giddens, 1984; Lawson, 1997; Hodgson, 
2003,2004; Searle, 2005; Elder-Vass, 2006).  Constitutive in the sense that 
institutional rule not only regulates actions of social-political agencies, it is also 
constitutes the actions of the agencies.   
Implicit in this argument is that rules have a history of being accepted and 
followed by social-political actors, who internalise them and make them their habit 
(Fleetwood, 2008:12)430.  As it follows, institutions consist of systems of rules, which 
are consciously or unconsciously embodied as habits and assist in coordinating the 
intentions and actions of social-political actors.  Institutions exist independently of 
the social-political actors, who draw upon, reproduce and transform them 
                                                          
429  In discussing these components as it is, I recogniseFleetwood’s (2008) submission 
that social norms, values, roles, laws procedures and regulations are traditionally 
considered as institutions. 
430 This is because rules are internal to the institutions and as such, they are external to 
the agencies and used to moderate their actions.  
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(Fleetwood, 2008:18).  Furthermore, institutions may, via a process of re-constitutive 
downward causation involving habituation and habit formation, transform the 
intention and actions of the social-political actors (Fleetwood, 2008:18). 
While North (1994:361) maintains that rules must be separated from 
players, Hodgson (2006: 9) argues that the organisations as players should be 
treated both as actors and as institutions, and therefore as internal to the rules.  As 
such, institutions, like gangi agnates, actually mediate social-political interactions, 
but also, under certain conditions, use their competitive advantages to act on behalf 
of their members431.  Whether institutions are agreed social rules of the game, or 
patterns of habits, they express to a large extent regularities, and within the 
definitional domain of this regularity, they both share a common limitation that they 
do not embody social change and the potential for change (See for instance: North, 
2001; Ostrom, 1999; De Agelis, 2000:17)432.  If human actions are articulated 
through institutions and it is institutions that are exclusively the realm of regularities 
– whether conventions, habits or rules of the game – the question then for scholars, 
argues De Angelis (2000), is to define how social change actually happens.  
Differences – institutional or social structures 
The central theme of this analysis is two-fold.  One is to understand 
whether social structures, which are akin to power centres, change or are static and 
how human actions can perpetuate them (e.g., Lopez and Scott, 2000).  This 
argument highlights a key distinction in the literature between organisations 
/structures, and institutions, something that is not always evident (e.g., Fleetwood, 
2008:12).  The second point is to highlight the similarities and differences between 
institutions and social structures and how together with social-political agencies, 
they are jointly supportive, recursive and constitute indissoluble unity, to support 
social change in Acholiland.  
                                                          
431 Thus, the ability of institutions to create stable expectations stems from their 
imposing form and consistency on human activities. They constrain, and also enable, 
behaviours, thereby opening new opportunities.   
432 In putting this argument, I recognise that in most African situations the majority of 
institutions are informal. But while the existence of informal institutions is well 
established in the new institutional literature, there is considerable uncertainty 
about them. This lack of satisfactory understanding of the informal institutions has 
forced scholars to focus on formal institutions as the locus for understanding 
institutional change. 
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Social and institutional structures are two terms that Lopez and Scott 
(2000) have used inconsistently.  Noticeably, both are the circumstances of human 
action. They facilitate achievements, activities, and intentions of the social-political 
agencies.  However, Fleetwood, drawing on interdisciplinary insights notes that 
social institutions are bona fide relational structures.  In addition, social structures 
are said to enable and constrain the activities and intentions of social-political 
agencies (e.g., Fleetwood, 2007: 9).   
Douglas (1986) reasons that institutional structures are constant and are 
grounded in recognisable practices of the social environment, the habitus (e.g., 
Douglas, 1986:92).  However, the habitus changes over time, and derives 
disproportionate weight from early experience (e.g., Bourdieu, 1990:54).  This 
position presupposes that the structures are static, and context specific.  North 
(1990:3), however, submits that these structures are organisations and therefore 
“players of the game”.  He maintains that they are changing constantly and are 
subjected to human actions.  Sahlins (1987), while in agreement with North, adds 
that personal interest, as part of human action, normally influences the reproduction 
of structures (e.g., Sahlins, 1987:152).  He calls this “an irreducible present” 
(Porpora, 2007:195 cited from Fleetwood, 2008:5). 
Both Fleetwood (2007:5) and Porpora (2007:195) contend that social 
structures are human actions and are sometimes used negatively to refer to social 
phenomena that “do not reduce to human actions”433.   North (1990:3-10), for 
instance has justified the desire for distinguishing institutions and social structures to 
enable analytical clarity.  Ostrom (1982:193) on the other hand has justified the 
distinction to circumvent the confusion between the ideal types and given instances 
of organisations.  
Fleetwood (2008:9) suggests that, fundamentally, both institutions and 
structures are phenomena that are drawn upon, reproduced and transformed by 
human agents.  However, unlike institutions, which are social rules, social structures 
as organisations can transform or change the intents and actions of social-political 
agencies. 
                                                          
433 Social structures have been used in very specific and general phenomena.  For 
example, a specific instance would be the clan regimes, or gender regimes. However, 
the general aspect that is relevant for this study includes un-named structural 
phenomena like social conventions, norms, or even regulations. 
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The effectiveness of formal rules, such as penal codes, the rule of law, and 
democratic governance, depends on informal institutions, such as norms and 
attitudes and existing levels of social capital (Fleetwood, 2007:8-12).  By focusing 
separately on structures as distinct from institutions, we disassociate our analysis 
from particular actors and therefore acknowledge that there are influences in 
decision-making which can be observed in the patterns of behaviour of local political 
actors, but which are not necessarily explicit in their public explanations of their 
actions (High et al., 2004).  
Since there is no agreement on the definition of institutions, there are 
equally varied interpretations of what institutions are for (e.g., Lin, 1989:6; North, 
1990).  However, three broad purposes can be identified: controlling, coordinating 
and mentoring.  North (1990) contends that, primarily, the purposes of institutions 
arose through negotiations, which are mediated through power relationships.  
Generally, there is the sense that institutions actually ensure stability of the systems 
by providing genuine control and that through coordination of the actions and intents 
of political actors, institutions ensure impact.  Furthermore, their mentoring functions 
support institutionalisation and sustenance of change outcomes434.   
Conceptualising Informal Institutions 
There are three or more specific ways in which scholars have continued to 
conceptualise informal institutions.  Some regard them as part of the community 
heritage - its culture embodied in behaviours of the society (Pejovich, 1999:166).  
This assertion is, however, problematic since some of these rules are not rooted in 
culture, like those norms related to legislation (see also: Soysa and Jutting, 2006).  
Another group insinuated that informal rules are self-enforcing, a viewpoint often 
advanced by modernists, to suggest that informal rules are part of the habits (e.g., 
Ellickson, 1991; Knight, 1992; Calvert, 1995).  However, scholars, including 
Langston (2006), disagree, arguing that cases of third parties enforcing informal 
rules have been cited in many instances (Langston, 2006).  
Yet another group of scholars have used the state-societal distinction to 
distinguish formal-informal relationships, suggesting that the norms and 
                                                          
434 It should, however, be noted that institutions are not necessarily established for 
efficiencies of the system, nor are they effective without the support of each other in 
enabling the change outcomes. See for instance: Fleetwood, 2007 
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organisations that constitute civil society form informal institutions, and the state 
forms the formal institutions (Boussard, 2000 and Tsai, 2002).  This logic, according 
to Helmke and Levitsky (2006: Location 97-101), misses the key features of 
organised corruption in the governing system that embodied arrangements within 
state power.   In other words, the two categories “interlocks with epistemology” of 
the study (Moran, 2010:13-14).  Southall (2004) and others (e.g., Stavelis, 2006) 
have argued that traditional societies tend to diffuse the functions of the state and 
civil societies within the various power centres in the system.  As such, the norms in 
particular and the organisational set-up in such instances were not easily 
differentiated.  There are states like South Sudan, which, based on its protracted 
history of fragility, have the civil society organisations and the state embodied in a 
relationship that defeats categorisation of roles and functions435.    
Typologies of informal institutions 
De Soysa and Jutting (2006) see two types of informal institutions.  One, 
are the customary laws and norms that govern traditional societies and two, there 
are extensions, elaborations, and modifications of the formal rules that are practiced 
by both traditional and modern societies.  These are something that others have 
been referring to as “informal rules”, to separate them from the “traditional rules” 
(see: Hohne, 2006:2) 
Fleetwood (2008) and others (e.g., Hemlet and Levitsky, 2006), conversely, 
refer to these modified formal rules as informal behaviours rather than rules436.  
First, I think that “informal rules” are extensions, modifications and elaboration of 
both the indigenous and modern rules.  Secondly, these “informal rules” `can be 
categorised as customary laws and traditional/indigenous rules or customs. I have 
used in this study, customary rules and laws in the cases where the practice is 
hybridised, blending selective traditional rules and laws with some elements of the 
modern rules. In the case of the traditional or indigenous rules, these are the 
customs of the indigenous groups.  Just like modern laws – they are legitimate rules 
                                                          
435 Personal observation as I worked for four years in agriculture and rural development 
in South Sudan 
436 Whatever the case, both types are recognised outside what are categorised as 
formal, even when their applications are more dominant in some instances.   As 
discussed later, I have argued that the LRA as a militant group is a behaviour 
modified from the formal institutions of defence. 
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of the game, social control437, or norms of operations normally regulated by 
traditional institutions and networks or structures, including clan systems438.  
However, informal rules – in this case, customary rules - derived from either the 
extension or modification of formal or traditional rules are, in most accounts, coping 
strategies by the community439.  They are behaviours and practices that should not 
be confused with the traditional rules (see also: Adeno, 1991)440.  
Noticeable scholarly definitions of formal and informal rules as noted 
above, ignore the important emphasis of application441.  In the case of this study for 
a long time, traditional laws and later together with customary laws dominated the 
practice of governance. In part, Acholiland, as we will see later, is a limited 
statehood where plural legal framework is practiced (see for instance: Finnström, 
2008: 40-45, 49-55 and Dolan, 2011:112-115).  
Working definitions of informal and formal institutions 
Helmke and Levitsky (2006: Location 2627-2631), submit that the definition 
of informal rules should be more inclusive and differentiated from non-institutional 
and informal phenomena.442  Thus, building from insights from other scholars, 
informal institutions are in reality “socially constructed behavioural regularity that are 
based on customs, shared rules and values [expectations], created, communicated, 
                                                          
437 Informal social control refers to norms of behaviour that exist in a society and which 
are used to reward or punish people for both acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour. They include the use of direct and indirect methods like ridicule, sarcasm 
or disapproving looks. 
438 In other words, these are the sets of social rules that are regularly applied and trusted 
because they are better contextualised by those who use them.   
439 Some of the social practices or behaviours in the project area included wife 
inheritance, and stealing. 
440 I therefore see informal rules as made up of (i) customary laws, which are 
modifications of the formal and indigenous rules, and (ii) indigenous or traditional 
laws – which are formal to a social group and are in use by the society.  Customary 
laws, as coping strategy is equally applicable for used in the case colonial regimes.  
This is because as discussed later, it supported their survival rather than effective 
governance 
441 Modern laws, including the customary laws have been crafted to replace or support 
existing traditionary regularities and habits that are in use.  Many of these indigenous 
rules that are in use are formally recognised by the society and are therefore formal 
in nature.   
442 Examples of these non-institutional behaviours or informal phenomena in the case of 
Acholiland include such statements like the Acholi are war-like and others that are 
substantially discussed by Finnström (2008: Chapter 2) 
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and enforced directly or indirectly by individuals, local or ‘traditional’ institutions” 
(Hodgson, 2006) 
A couple of points need to be said in explaining this position.  Firstly - 
informal institutions are tested constitutive rules and operational guidelines, 
sanctioned by legitimate systems, from generation to generation through binding 
social contracts – incentive mechanisms of obligations like networks of peers, 
kinsmen and women443.  This particular aspect consciously or unconsciously applied 
is what Cournot referred to as the Nash equilibrium.  This is a situation in which 
everyone is better off by following, and this aspect enlightens the habits that are 
established from the benefits of the rule (see: Stroke, 2006).444   
This point recognises that what are often categorised as informal 
institutions, in actual fact, represent regulatory and constitutive mechanisms that are 
developed and tested over many years by diverse sets of social groups.  So, like 
formal rules, they may hold limitations to society, as it has often been in patrilineage 
systems with the women and the young.  
Secondly, in the definition suggested by Hodgson, I substituted “value” with 
“expectations” because informal political institutions like kaka were value-based 
systems.  However, kaka had explicit and implicit intentions - which engendered 
shared expectations or beliefs that emanated from some core shared values. One 
such expectation was the autopoiesis of the gangi agnates as a means of practicing 
lineage-based cultures, including exogamous relationships.  This point is important 
in understanding why political alliances were sometimes forged even among people 
with differing social values.  As such, institutional change by reconstruction of 
political arrangements would be tantamount to change in shared expectations, 
rather than in shared values (see: Van Cotts, 2006: 23-34).   
                                                          
443 See for instance: De Soysa and Jutting, 2006. The study area also prides itself on its 
strong networks of age groups to enforce obligations, although the long period of 
conflict has significantly destroyed this capability.   
444 Typically, enforcement in compliance to governance seems to be largely self-
enforcing with the objective of exalting ones prestige in the society.  Good examples 
were rewarded with honour and songs that the communities would sing praises and 
dance to the tune of jubilation!  
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Social values are embodied in the organisations; assessing their daily 
routines, arranging their priorities, measuring their progress and pains as well as 
choosing between alternative courses of actions (Fleetwood, 2007: 12-14). 
However, expectations and beliefs, argues Van Cotts (2006), are the particularistic 
norms that bolstered kaka-doms as further discussed in the later Chapters445.  
Formal institutional rules and constraints, on the other hand, according to 
scholars (e.g., De Soysa and Jutting, 2006), are made up of constitutions, political 
systems, legal systems - laws, property rights, charters, bylaws, statutes and 
common laws, and regulations.  The enforcement characteristics include official 
sanctions, such as criminal punishment, fines, incarceration, etc.  These formal rules 
are generally thought to be codified entities that officials (rulers) ostensibly apply 
through regularised enforcement mechanisms.  
Some scholars of political science (e.g., Powell 2000; Przeworski et al., 
1999; Lijphart 1984) argue that formal rules foster accountability, more 
responsiveness, and promote representativeness as outcomes when compared with 
informal rules.  This assertion, however, is being subjected to many criticisms.  As 
Glaeser et al. (2004:26-27) contend, formal rules do not necessarily generate the 
exact same institutional outcome everywhere to similar degrees.   As Rodrik et al. 
(2002:24) conclude on the question of formal institutions and development, 
“desirable institutional arrangements have a large element of context specificity, 
arising from differences in historical trajectories, geography and political economy or 
other initial conditions”.  
Some African scholars of the communitarian’s viewpoints, like Adeno 
(1991) are deeply rooted in defence of the African “traditions” and cultures, arguing 
that formal institutions were imposed on Africans regardless of whether they work or 
not (see also: Kaplan, 2008: 49) and merely aimed at elevating Western authorities 
over traditional ones (see: Mamdani, 2002: 5).  This may not necessarily be the 
case because not all “traditions” were plausible and acceptable446.  However, 
                                                          
445 Van Cotts, 2006 - has extensively discussed this aspect in her work in Latin America. 
446 These imbalances in power, ushered by what is seen as global, were formalised into 
laws that became the core responsibility of the formal systems to uphold, like it is the 
case with the International Criminal Court (ICC).  The reaction of some African leaders 
to how these formal rules are being selectively applied on African leaders, gives the 
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evidence of how formal rules have undermined good intentions of customary laws 
are overwhelming, even in the case of Acholiland.   
The arguments against the inappropriateness of formal rules by some 
African scholars draw from the weaknesses in the way new rules were introduced 
(Mbeki and Mamdani, 2014).  Imposed change, they argued, has one key intention: 
to create and use imbalance in social power to introduce political change, which 
were formalised into laws that evoke political discontentment in the pluralistic tribal 
settings that reflects the African context.     
Explaining the Impasse in Institutional Change 
The study of institutional change has been invigorated in the recent past by 
the need to understand and explain the sources, dynamics, and the determinants of 
institutional change outcomes.  These change outcomes include, for instance, 
changes in practices, social identity categories and political structures (e.g., 
Wegerich, 2001:8; Todd, 2000; Badawi, 2003; McAdam, et al., 2000).  Through 
these scholarly efforts, there is noticeable progress in studying change outcomes 
(e.g., Hodgson, 2006a: 9; Fleetwood, 2008; North, 2009).   In the case of developing 
countries, regardless of the theoretical orientation adopted, questions about the 
origins of change in political structures (North, 2005:49)447, and their outcomes in 
terms of the landscape in governance, have received considerable attention (e.g., 
Assimeng, 1996; Beteille, 1971; Keulder, 1998; Mamdani, 1998).   
However, there has been an increasingly, tendency by institutional scholars 
to trade on simplistic epistemic focuses.  A typical case has been the focus on the 
determinants of positive institutional outcomes with the conclusion that “institution 
matters” for good political outcomes (see: De Angelis, 2000).  Moreover, the study of 
institutional change, particularly in the 1990s, focused on “formal institutions” at the 
expense of the “informal” ones (e.g., North, 1990, 1991, 1994:360, 1995:15).  A 
strict focus on only one type of institution is limiting, as it turns out that most of the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
viewpoint of this debate.  See for instance article by Tambo Beki and Mohamoud 
Mamdani (2014), 
447 North suggests that the institutional framework in a modern society consists of a 
political structure, which deals with the management of societal political choices and 
how it develops.  Others are property rights structures, social structures and 
institutional structures. In this study, I focus on change outcomes resulting from 
changes in political and institutional structures of governance.  
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“rules of the game” that determined the politics of behaviours, particularly in 
developing economies, are social orders that are not legally expressed or cast in 
writing (see: O’Donnell, 1996; Dia, 1996; Sandbrook and Oelbaum, 1999; Hodgson, 
2006:11).   
This makes sense because informal rules, such as value systems, 
influence the preferences of all social-political actors, thereby affecting the process 
of choices among formal rules (Wegerich, 2001:8).  With respect to the determinants 
of positive outcomes, the emphasis has often overlooked the issue of context, in 
which institutions are found, and the role of the executive.  In the former case, it also 
suggests in passing, that some institutions matter more than others, yet we now 
acknowledge that institutions do not work in isolation (North, 2009:15).   The role of 
the state authority, and especially its executive bureaucracy that distributes political 
power, have not been well interrogated with respect to change outcomes (see: 
Fukuyama, 2013:347-348).  
Badawi (2003:4), for instance, contends that the current motivations in 
debating change outcomes have not been taken on “their inherent scientific merits, 
but …to serve conflicting interests and ideologies”448.   This comment is not new, 
and symptomizes the mismatch in result expectations by both the bureaucrats and 
the politicians449.  The outcome of these misplaced actions, argues Badawi (2000:5), 
has been a mismatch between policy prescriptions and their expectations.   
Over the years, there has been considerable progress and convergence by 
institutional scholars on the definition and concept of institution.  In particular, those 
scholars, such as Hodgson, Fleetwood and North, have integrated insights in 
advancing knowledge in the study of institutions and institutional outcomes (North, 
                                                          
448Subsequent to 9/11, policy makers in the West have adopted a political stance that 
encourages the elimination of regimes that are considered, in their view, undesirable 
for global peace. This is based on the assumption that positive change can be 
enhanced through interventions of those who care about the world. This is the micro 
view of the policy.  A counter view, the macro view argues for a sustainable power 
restructuring and acknowledges that occupation forces are not a solution to 
institutional change.  
449 Several works along this line have been done in Africa [e.g., Mamodou Dia (1996); 
Richard Sandbrook and Jay Oelbaum (1994); Dennis Galvan (2002)] and elsewhere in 
Latin America (e.g. Donna Le van Cott, 2000) and Asia (e.g., Christian Gobel, 2001) 
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1990; 2009; Hodgson, 2001; 2006; Fleetwood, 2007).  However, there are still a 
number of areas that require more work and clarity.   
For instance, there is still no agreement on what institutions are, and how to 
improve methodological rigour, and how to ensure that outcomes of institutional 
change and policy expectations are better synchronised to address the expectations 
of clients.  Kingston and Caballero (2007) conclude, for instance, in an effort to 
clarify areas of consensus and disagreement, that the “appropriate model for 
studying institutional change may largely be a matter of context” (see: Kingston and 
Caballero, 2007:20)450 
Przeworkski (2004:527-540), for instance, provides a supportive argument 
by pointing out that the theory of the New Institutionalism makes important 
propositions in furthering this debate.  He further asserts that this theory 
acknowledges that institutions matter because they influence norms, beliefs, and 
actions, thereby shaping political outcomes (Przeworkski, 2004:527).   
Furthermore, institutions are endogenous, meaning that their forms and 
their functioning depend on the conditions under which they emerge and endure 
(Przeworkski, 2004:527).  The concern about political context is very much linked to 
governance, and governing interactions, that enable change and are also outcomes 
of change.  
The question for scholars, then, is whether it is actually institutions that 
really matter, or the conditions in which they operate451.  For example, it is easy to 
predict the effects of political behaviour under stable political conditions, unlike in the 
case of fragility.  This is because there are historical trends upon which successes 
and failures are predictable, which might not be the case under fragility.  Similarly, 
their relevance, on the other hand, has to do with pragmatism, since it is unlikely 
that change outcomes in the real world can be easily replicated.  
                                                          
450 In other words, within the environments where institutions are nurtured, the mode 
of governance is important because it moderates the outcomes of institutional 
change.   
451 This question is important as context or the conditions, in which political change 
occurs plays a significant role defining the outcomes of change, something that I have 
discussed later with respect to Acholiland.   
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While the reasons and intents of the resurgence of traditional institutions 
are many and often political, it is meaningful to examine the ways in which such 
changes in political arrangements - as part of change in institutional structures - are 
not only important in local governance, but are also linked to some political 
outcomes in a given society over time.  I therefore submit that political outcomes, 
whether positive or negative, should be understood from a pluralistic context as 
much as from other parameters.   
Presented in this way, it is possible to study how institutional change is 
linked to, for instance, changes in social identity categorisation and social practices, 
while at the same time keeping a focus on the limitations that are methodological, 
arising from concepts and definitions of institutions and institutional change.  
Kawaura and La Croix (2005:13), for instance, observe that political institutions 
cannot be organised as markets.  As such, it is not a guarantee that political 
processes can generate plausible institutional change outcomes.    
The debate brings to the fore, the core concerns about governance and its 
measurements.  Therefore, only theories that shed light on changes in the internal 
governance of organisations - the gangi agnates and the kaka – as well as those 
that deal with the overall societal change, have been discussed. This is mainly for 
the following reasons.  
First, it is important to understand what change actually occurred within the 
individual governing entities in Acholiland.  As the building blocks of macro-level 
governance in Acholiland, the various governing levels might have played significant 
roles in the societal change over these years.  Time, however, erodes or enhances 
social value and in doing so within these levels, it would most likely culminate either 
in conflict or in partnership, the former especially when forced from outside (see: 
MacAdam, 2001:22).  
Second, it is important to appreciate the dynamism and complexity of 
governing actions at the coordinating level of the political divide, where over seventy 
or so of the rwodi-based political systems, maintained vigilance – either collectively 
or individually - over powerful and somewhat autopoietic gangi agnates (Girling, 
1960: 82-124; Pain, 1998:3-9).    
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This particular aspect is important since it attempts to examine kaka’s 
internal logic and leadership influence in the wake of insurgency and political 
contestations that are both induced and evolutionary in nature.  Importantly, it puts 
into context whether kaka was actually more of an ideology, rather than a political 
organisation. 
Finally, this discussion reaffirms the importance of engaging informal 
institutions in the analysis of social change, arguing that governing actions – as in 
elaborating principles, policy prescription, and providing leadership – whether 
moderated by formal or informal institutional rules, are context specific and, in line 
with the principles of peace studies, require embedded autonomy, with the right 
dose of subordination to the society (e.g., Evans, 1995:8). 
Interactions between Formal and Informal Institutions 
Scholars have argued that both formal and informal institutions enable 
governing interactions by managing social relations among social-political actors 
(e.g., De Soysa and Jutting, 2006; Helmke and Levitsky, 2006:Location 41).  When 
social rules are ineffective, social frictions are likely to arise, thereby undermining 
the effectiveness of these institutions.  However, the effectiveness of the application 
of rules, it seems, can be improved by enforcement.  Some scholars, however, 
wrongly argue that informal rules have weak enforcement mechanisms because 
unlike formal systems, enforcement is a dedicated responsibility of a specific 
organisation (e.g., Powel, 2000:na).  Like formal rules, weaknesses in the 
enforcement of some aspects of the rules are known to exist, for example, the 
enforcement of formal rules against smoking in public places in Uganda. 
However, there are ways in which enforcement can be improved.  Helmke 
and Levitsky (2004:728), for instance, have suggested that there are four ways in 
which informal and formal institutions interact in affecting change outcomes: 
complementary, accommodation, competition and substitution.  Complementary 
interactions, argue Helmke and Levitsky (2006:729), occur when these institutions 
converge, and in the modern economy, the formal institutions are made effective. 
Informal rules, argue Helmke and Levitsky (2006), can accommodate 
formal ones when they diverge.  In this circumstance, the formal rules are effective 
and the letter of the law inviolate, although the spirit is violated (Helmke and 
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Levitsky, 2004:728).  In other words, norms within what they term as customary laws 
coexist with the formal rules and energise change outcomes. These outcomes, 
argue Helmke and Levitsky (2004:729), may not entirely be the intention of the 
formal rules452.   
Thirdly, Helmke and Levitsky (2004:729-730) note that informal institutions 
do compete with formal ones when formal institutions are ineffective and the two 
diverge.  This form of interaction occurs when formal institutions are poorly 
organised, less engaged with the traditional sector approaches, or their accessibility 
is poorly enforced or simply ignored by authorities.   Additionally, people resort to 
multiple sources of justice, particularly where inherited legal systems following 
colonial rule operate side by side with customary law (see: Helmke and Levitsky, 
2004:729-732).    Helmke and Levitsky (2004:730) suggest that an analysis of 
change outcomes in such situations should include accounting for state incapacity to 
enforce the operation of formal institutions. Finally, Helmke and Levitsky (2004:79-
731) argue that informal institutions can substitute the ineffective formal ones.   In 
other words, when formal institutions are incapacitated and do not meet the demand 
of the population, informal institutions substitute for them.   
Explaining institutional change and outcomes 
While most analyses of institutional change focus on development 
outcomes, political scientists argue that particular institutional types generate 
predictable political outcomes (e.g., North, 1990 World Bank, 2005:na).  For 
instance, some scholars accept that informal rules mediate the operation of the 
formal ones, and therefore affect the political outcomes (e.g., Cooter, 1994:na).  
Fleetwood has inferred to such political outcomes as practices, routines/habits and 
precedents (Fleetwood, 2008:7-8).     
While institutions are capable of changing or transforming social-political 
agencies, social structures may not have this effect. This is because social-political 
agents have sets of dispositions, capacities or powers, which are irreducible to 
them, but social structures have sets of values that are dispensable.   
                                                          
452 Cases of added value in the legal practices arising from the accommodating roles of 
informal rules are many and some related to the study are discussed later in the thesis.   
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It seems to me that when Fleetwood (2008) discussed the tripartite 
relationships between social-political agencies, institutions and social structures, he 
posits that the intentional dimensions of interactions by the social-political agencies 
were often aimed at compromises even when they held different interests.  
However, in the case of Africa, political agencies who hold power have tended to 
drive change to their advantage, regardless of the implications to majority of the 
people453.  
Institutions, and especially political institutions, have on many occasions 
been changed through force of arms.   In many instances, these were a result of a 
combination of both internal and external factors.  In the case of Uganda, changes in 
local governance were imposed based on the reasons for such changes in the need 
for effectiveness and efficiencies (e.g., Mamdani, 1996). Regrettably, studies have 
shown that service delivery and governance, overall, have not improved as 
envisaged (World Bank, 2008:na).  Kooiman (2003:11-24) contends that changes in 
the political arrangements, such as the case in Uganda, are both an outcome and 
political actions for change. 
Institutional outcomes and political contents 
Institutions, through institutional outcomes, affect the behaviour of social-
political agencies through incentives or restrictions (Hodgson, 2006:12; Fleetwood, 
2008: 24).  These, in turn, reform and alter their intentions and activities.  For this 
essay, I am concerned with the effects of both institutions and structures on political 
actors within and outside the Acholi political system.  In the case of Acholiland, I 
have argued that historically, the interest and purpose of the third party agencies 
diverged from those of the primary groups.  As a result, such conflict in interest and 
purpose has sometimes turned violent.  
Kooiman (2003:22) submits that formalised social interactions often exert 
formal influence with provisos that can either reinforce or delimit existing spheres of 
local authorities.  Where formalised rules conflict with existing provisos in practice, 
they can either be negotiated and resolved, or overturned by the use of force.  In the 
                                                          
453 In the case of Uganda, Mamdani (2002:3-16) discusses reforms during the colonial era 
while Adam Branch (2011:46-48) gives a flavour for the recent past. 
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second instance, formal rules may complement or reinforce existing informal rules, 
thereby facilitating institutional changes that are accommodating.  
In other words, public rules, when carefully designed to create change, are 
thought to facilitate governance454 in possibly two broad ways.  In the first instance, 
it enables governing intentions and actions of the third party and also enables the 
growth of the participating social-political agencies.  This instance demonstrates 
how culturally determined norms and attitudes, and the rules of the game prescribed 
by the regime, determine the success or failure of political undertakings (Hodgson, 
2006:11-14).   
In the second instance, competitive processes among the social-political 
agencies engender efficiency, and by extension improve service delivery. Since 
institutions determine the incentive structure for affecting individuals and group 
behaviours, the rules governing the political dispensation are subjected to a regime 
that is accommodative to all participants.    
Context of conflicts and change outcomes 
Political outcomes are mediated by both the intentional dimension of the 
interactions - namely: the interest, purpose and prospect of such governing 
interactions - and by the structural dimensions or context level which embody the 
cultural, material and power that mediate interactions (see Annex 2.1 for 
diagrammatic flow) (Kooiman, 2003:14-16).  Third parties have continued to harbour 
governing intentions, which are not fully consistent with the cultural norms and 
power structures of the Acholi (Garling, 1960:85-90).  These intentions affect 
institutional outcome arenas by either influencing the way internal interactions are 
carried out or by changing the content, including governing activities and actions. 
Some scholars maintain that there are often tensions between intentional 
interactions and the structural level of governing interactions (e.g., Burns et al., 
1985:na; Fennica, 2001:5; Kooiman, 2003:16).  Silva Fennica (2001), for instance, 
analysed the culture of conflicts in the natural resource sector in resource-rich 
societies across a number of countries (Fennica, 2001:8).   She submits that there 
                                                          
454 The key aspect of economic development, which is relevant for this study, is the 
growth of confidence in the leadership virtues that would lead to good governance, 
stability and peaceful co-existence. 
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are general frames in which societies respond to governing interactions that are 
mediated through social powers.  In some instances conflict culture – as a structural 
dimension of interactions – exists, but not in others.  She referred to these two 
scenarios as “conflict sub-culture” and “conflict culture” respectively (Fennica, 
2001:4-7). 
Fennica’s (2001) two concepts show that interactions with third parties can 
lead to either outright conflicts or can be negotiated and therefore managed if the 
parties have interests rather than positions in the relationship.  Where third party 
counterparts have diverse or weaker commonalities of interests and their internal 
controls are in disorder, more social control can be applied from outside, especially 
where greed drives the negotiation.  This situation weakens internal collective 
decision making by the counterparts (Burns, et al.1985: 107). 
Conflicting sub-cultures represent a situation of disequilibria.  They 
presuppose that the structural dimensions of governing interactions of the social-
political agencies - both internal and external - their goals, purposes and interests, 
contradict to the extent of creating violent conflict (Dwyer, 1972:1-10; Girling, 
1960:129, 136-139; Adimola, 1952; Pain, 1988:5-14) 455.  Under such scenarios, the 
most appropriate governing actions would be a negotiated / mediated position, or 
outright forceful overturning of the dominant system as the most viable option.  
Where this path is the preferred option, the intermediate outcomes would include 
creation of a completely new accountability process with new political structures and 
centres, although some studies admit that these often ignore existing “traditional” 
ones (see for example: Branch, 2011:52-53).   
Conflict cultures, on the other hand, express the general setting in which a 
social group like the Acholi society, given its structural context – the geo-politics, 
typical social, political, economic and resource capitals - tends to promote 
accommodating types of change outcomes, thereby adapting to new ideas in a 
manner that would eschew violent conflict (see also Fennica, 2001; Branch, 
2011:154-158).   In the words of Kooiman (2003), social-political actors with 
                                                          
455 Some of these authors have elucidated on the parallels in the intentions of other 
agencies that often led to violent conflicts. Some of the cases reported in the literature 
include parallels with slave traders and the Arab traders from “Kuturia”, the Lamogi 
uprising of 1911, and the numerous inter-tribal and inter-gangi wars that typified the 
emergence of centralised authorities in the region.  
  357 
enduring relationships most likely take one another into account while negotiating for 
change (Kooiman, 2003:16).  Hence, they apply self-regulating mechanisms, actions 
that have long lasting implications on the change outcomes, beginning with the 
process.  In other words, the elements that govern intentional interactions among 
the agencies are stable and enduring thereby permitting co-existence with peace 
and tranquillity.   
In both scenarios – the conflict sub-culture and the conflict culture - the 
intentional dimensions of interactions, which concern the specific goals, interests 
and purposes of the different social-political actors are at stake, except when they 
are similar (Kooiman, 2003:16).   A position of “stability” can only emerge when (i) 
both actors harbour respect for the other interest because they both do not hold a 
specific position; and (ii) when especially the weaker partner succumb to the power, 
unwilling to confront it but preferring to play the perceived role of subordination to 
the power. 
Kooiman (2003:19-24) asserts that the forms or structure of governance 
determine the forms of interactions.   In the case of kingdoms or chiefdoms, where 
authorities are hierarchical in nature, social powers are expressed in a more 
authoritative and instructive manner, often leading to contestations of the processes 
and outcomes, or the complete opposite.   However, because of enforcement 
mechanisms and the associated rewards for oppositional behaviours, structural and 
physical violence become the preoccupation of the subjects. 
Kooiman (2003:15) submits that when structural interactions – the 
circumstances that limit, broaden and condition the intentional level - permit, a 
successful condition will uphold.  In other words, the potential for conflicts, it seems, 
is found in the management of the structural dimensions of interactions, that is the 
behaviour456.  Hence, whether or not political institutions foster better governance 
and accountability, encourage trust, reinforce social relations, and avoid the 
exclusion of some sections of the population from benefiting from the development 
outcomes, is as much a question of the incentive and enforcement mechanisms of 
the institutions themselves, as the environment it operates in (see: Kooiman, 
2003:11-24).   
                                                          
456 Annex 2 is a diagrammatic representation of the institutional interaction model 
explaining this processes 
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The effectiveness of formal rules, such as penal codes, the rule of law, and 
democratic governance, understandably depends on informal institutions such as 
norms, attitudes, existing levels of social capital, or the patterns of interaction that 
individuals assume in any shared activity.   
Institutional outcomes and context 
Scholars have this conviction that a particular “institutional arrangement” 
can have different effects in different environments, depending on the context (e.g., 
Stiglitz, 2001:na; Soysa and Jutting, 2006).  This seems to suggest, for instance, 
that the institutional arrangements for governance do have different effects in stable, 
conflict and post-conflict contexts.  Soysa and Jutting (2006) for instance made 
reference to the governing practice that involves a reliance on entrustment, arguing 
that entrustment is both beneficial and a liability.  Soysa and Jutting’s (2006) insights 
emphasised especially the economic perspective, seeing entrustment as pervasive 
against accumulation of wealth457.  Shipton (2007), on the contrary, stated both 
negative and positive effects of entrustment on community governance, for instance, 
in areas of human and child rights.  Kaplan (2008:7-10), in a similar way, viewed the 
potential of entrustment as a practice embedded in existing social-political structures 
for economic development in fragile states, suggesting that they provide a good 
resource for transiting into modern society, raising additional concern as to whether 
modernity is singular or pluralistic? 
Often, there is a tendency to generalise certain benefits from some 
institutional outcomes.  Stiglitz (2001), for instance, suggests that it might be prudent 
first to define what nature of outcomes are envisioned as beneficial, and then 
correlate the relevant institutional feature (rules) with the outcomes eliminating other 
possible determinants of that outcome.  
Some scholars (e.g., Bardhan, 2001; Kooiman, 2003:24) and the World 
Bank (2011:20-22), do seem to agree that shared governing interactions, and 
therefore pluralism in governing efforts, between private and other non-state actors 
including the communities alongside the state, more often gain a better response to 
                                                          
457 Entrustment is as social capital embraces a number of disciplines, including 
anthropology, political science, sociology, history and psychology.  Integrating insights 
from all these fields allow the analysis to provide new viewpoints and products that 
explain the real view of the Acholi’s experiences  
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a fragile situation.  This means that non-state actors, because of their competitive 
and comparative advantages, sometimes do substitute, compete or supplement 
state actors in the reconstruction process458.  The international recognition of 
sovereignty over the territory albeit through shared arrangements, define the nature 
of a limited statehood for a particular sector or territory (see: Risse, 2011: 2-4). 
The effectiveness of formal law depends on how well the law corresponds 
with norms and the enforcement mechanisms therein. Overall, norms and attitudes 
do affect how well formal institutions can work (Posner, 1998:7-12).  Responding to 
the impact of informal institutions on political systems can therefore, considerably 
reduce the costs associated with poorly functioning formal institutions.  
Theories of Institutional Change 
Recent studies by scholars have highlighted both the importance and 
complexity of institutional change, particularly under imperfect markets (e.g., 
Hobsbawn, 1983:2).  In this case study, I seek to understand from a pluralistic 
perspective the sources, processes and outcomes of institutional change at the 
micro, meso and macro levels of political systems, and how they relate to each 
other.  In this section, I review theories that are concerned with changes in the 
institutional structures and arrangements of internal governance, in addition to those 
concerning overall societal change459.   
Subsequent to the 9/11 bombing incidence in USA, western policy makers, 
according to some scholars, adopted the micro and the macro theories of 
institutional change.  These two views posit that positive institutional change - one 
which the West perceives as leading to more efficient modes of political and 
economic governance - should be preceded by one type of elite change (see: 
Badawi, 2003:3).   Both views have great insights that explain the continuing change 
                                                          
458 See also discussion by Bardhan, 2001 on this point. 
459 I have looked in particular at theories that have explicit consideration of cultural and 
formal institutions with the view to discussing: (1) the causes of institutional change in 
the political systems of the Acholi community. The intention is to identify the 
outcomes of both exogenous shocks and endogenous processes in bringing about 
changes, which are important both in the short and the long-term; (2) the process of 
institutional change, which will support our understanding of the interaction between 
formal and informal rules; and (3) the outcomes of the institutional change and how 
this links to the history of Acholiland and why. 
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in the political systems in Acholiland over the years.  However, they also have 
limitations.  
I discuss the two views under the supply-driven models of institutional 
change below.  In the context of Africa, these are being applied in many countries, 
where regime change is desirable from the West and to install Eurocentric 
practices460.    
A society’s cultural endowments, such as its values and customs, are 
considered informal institutional arrangements. Like formal arrangements, they are 
man-made devices that are enforceable by the systems, to satisfy societal needs.  
Experience and research have shown that these cultural endowments change over 
time, in some cases, even faster than imagined (see: Hobsbawn, 1983:2).  There 
are three distinct views in the literature that dominate much thinking about 
institutional change and outcomes.  Theorists, including North (1990) and Feeny 
(1988) advanced the first view, which is popularly referred to as demand-induced 
institutional change.  This view treats institutional change as a bottom-up 
phenomenon, having been triggered based on some demand for improved 
institutional performance. The second view, advanced by theorists such as 
Binswanger (1978), Gibbs and Bromley (1989), treats institutional change as a 
supply-driven change that favours the elite.  The final view is a blend of the two 
views and championed by theorists like Schotter (1981), Aoki (2001) and Greif 
(2006).  These latter theorists, who conform to the epistemic view of 
interdisciplinary, recognise that demand alone is insufficient to complete institutional 
change.  Rather, an exogamous influence in reality is critical and inevitable.   
Within the viewpoints, there is recognition of the interaction between 
institutions and the agencies to create outcomes.  However, the sequencing, 
whether it is the institutions or the agencies that are first to create a critical 
determinant of institutional change, has remained a contentious debate (e.g., North, 
2005:59-61; Greif, el at, 1994: 773).  In the case of institutional changes aimed at 
economic growth, it is argued that such changes would aim to establish a set of 
values, or mores, that are congruent to economic growth (Lin, 1989:28).  
                                                          
460 However, the methods of implementation have been variously executed thus far, as 
seen in the cases of Kenya, Sudan and Zimbabwe.  One method has been the increased 
support and funding through civil societies for some opposition parties, seen as 
preferred alternatives. 
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Furthermore, most scholars seem to argue that such cultural endowments “will be 
changed when it is profitable to do so” (North, 2005:59-61; Greif, et al., 1994:773). 
Imposed institutional change view point 
The first view, which Lin (1989) refers to as an imposed institutional 
change, is a model that fits many key studies of a centrally driven change of rules or 
what others refer to as supply-driven institutional change (Kingston and Caballero, 
2008: 1-15; North, 1999:59-61).  In this model, modification or replacement of 
existing institutional arrangements, or the emergence of a new one, are centrally 
guided and executed by those holding power (see: Montias, 1976:20). 461.    
In this approach, theorists assume the process is democratic, with 
differentiated distributional consequences that would demand political action, 
negotiation, lobbying, and/or bargaining among the different actors, to attain 
equilibrium.  This, it is argued, is due to power differentiation among the 
beneficiaries of the rules (e.g., Kantor, 1998; Alston, 1996; Ostrom, 2005:18).  
Depending on the attributes of the transaction interests (Kingston and Caballero, 
2008:5), participants recognise the need for some guided rules and procedures with 
the potential to leverage positive impacts on the political systems (Williamson, 2000; 
Fenny, 1988:176).    
Within this model, theorists describe two or three possible routes whereby 
change outcomes can be achieved.  In the first case, multiple hierarchies of rules 
normally create winners and losers.  Depending on who the losers are, Ostrom 
(2005) contends that it would impede effective institutional change Ostrom, 2005:61.  
The second possible route considers the potential for multiple conventions, and 
theorists like Sugden (1989) and Knights (1995) interrogate the representativeness 
and quality of the outcomes in terms of selection processes.  While in novel 
                                                          
461 In this study, I have defined institutional arrangements as sets of behavioural rules 
that governed a specific pattern of action and a specific relation both in formal and 
informal settings. Households, local governments, etc. are classic examples of the 
formal institutional arrangements. These settings under formal systems constitute 
what I consider structural social capital.  They are relatively “objective” and externally 
observable. Values, ideologies, and customs are informal arrangements.  They are 
subjective and intangible and constitute cognitive social capital. Both can co-exist and 
complement the other but can also exist on their own accord. An institutional 
structure is the totality of the formal and informal arrangements in a society and in my 
view is broader than institutional environment. 
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situations, rules that govern some interactions are arrived at through bargains; the 
process is sometimes subjected to power plays (see: Libecap, 1989:16; Alston, 
1996:26-7; Kantor, 1998; Kaufman, 2007:16).   
The key implication of the existence of such multiple equilibriums is the 
likely possibility to select inefficient equilibriums to political reasons.  With this 
possibility, the institutional change is said to exhibit “path-dependence”, meaning 
that no fundamental change may be attained as the initial conditions and historical 
accidents can have a lasting impact on the institutions following this process 
(Kingstone and Caballero, 2007:4).  
The third path for collective action can be limited to a group with negative 
power, to change the objective of the struggle through institutional change.  The 
theories that discuss this viewpoint raise some pertinent questions.  For instance, 
the notion of whether there can be sufficient conditions for bottom-up change to 
realise desired outcomes in an environment with many different interests.  Hechter 
(1990:19) and Keohane (1983:146) for instance, argue otherwise.  They, together 
with other scholars contend that the impetus for demand-induced change is 
conditioned on both internal power relations and power bases and, more often than 
not, external hands play the larger part of defining the outcomes (e.g., Libecap, 
1989:16; Ostrom, 2005:61). 
The evaluation of the 1980s and 1990s economic reforms by the World 
Bank testify to deficiencies in the change process (Bevir, 2009:Locations 216 – 236; 
Branch (2011:46-53)462.  First, the processes are not mutually inclusive because 
institutional changes are often decided by external sources but are also targeted 
rather than holistic.  Second, where participation is used, to draw poverty action 
plans by involving the CSOs, the final decisions that are aligned to the budgets are 
dictate from the ministry of finance and economic development, who are guided by 
external financiers463. 
                                                          
462 Mark Bevir (2009) in his “Key Concepts in Governance” as well as Adam Branch (2011) 
in the case of Uganda, discuss the implications of reforms in governance that bring out 
the issue raised here. 
463 Personal interviews with development workers carried in June 2012 in Kampala 
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The other concern relates to how the theories are ill equipped to deal with 
issues of informal constraints.  Informal arrangements like conventions and social 
norms, which do not fit into these theories, are important in explaining why some 
formal rules are not actually followed. These are ‘rules-in-form’ and ‘rules-in-use’, to 
mean rules that are enacted but not operational and those in use but not formal 
rules, respectively (Ostrom, 2005:138).  
Decentralised institutional change viewpoint 
Demand induced institutional change is either a spontaneous or a 
deliberate internal change generated to bring about new change that was lacking in 
the old institutional arrangements (Lin, 1989:13).  In this model, modification or 
replacement of existing rules or behaviours, or the emergence of new ones 
(mutations), are supposedly uncoordinated, random and demand-led, organised as 
an internal discourse464 for betterment (Kingston and Caballero, 2008:3).  This 
aspect distinguishes the two theories because, in this case, there is no central 
mechanism to coordinate outcomes (Kingston and Caballaro, 2008:8).  
New rules and behaviours in this case undergo a kind of decentralised 
selection process, akin to Darwinian evolutionary principles of variation, and 
successful ones will spread.  Some scholars, however, note that these changes are 
conditional on the capacity of the beneficiaries on one hand, and the political power 
base on the other (see: Koeohane 1983:196; Hodgson, 2004:13-20).   
In this approach, theorists assume the existence of rationality and 
opportunism of the transacting agents involved465.  Depending on the attributes of 
the transaction interests, participants recognise sets of rules or governance 
structures with potential to leverage positive impacts on the political systems 
(Williamson, 2000; Feeny, 1988:176).  Through competition, the most efficient 
institutional forms emerge, in what Williamson (2000) terms “discriminating 
alignment”.    
                                                          
464 In presenting this as an internal discourse, I recognise the intricacies of an internal 
power struggle that, although it is considered a democratic process, is normally 
endowed with conflicts, strategising and bargaining processes that are influenced by 
higher level constraints including the constitutions and rules  
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Within this model, theorists describe three possible routes whereby change 
outcomes can be achieved.  In the first case, change outcomes are marginal and a 
clear outcome is known apriori.  The process of such change triggers relatively 
minor interest, and the scopes of the change are limited to situations, in which 
competition among institutional forms can weed out inefficient rules (Kingston and 
Caballero, 2008:3).  Typically, relative prices (North, 1990: 83), knowledge of 
possible gain (Feeny, 1988:176), and contacts with other polities (Lin, 1989:14) are 
examples of externally driven changes.  The second case is where power groups or 
insiders with special skills or interest in the change influence such changes.  
Depending on the context, the outcome can be contested for relevance.  The third 
possible root, argue scholars, is where a predatory ruler, the state, or politicians with 
predetermined outcomes, influence the process to their advantage (North, 1981; 
Libecap, 1989:20; Ostrom, 2005:34).    
There are limitations with the evolutionary theories viewpoints, however.  
This viewpoint, like the previous one, disregards the exogamous factors as a basic 
source of impetus for institutional change (Kingston and Caballero, 2008:13), and 
the model is only appropriate in studies in perfectly competitive markets, which is 
akin to developed countries.  It is also inappropriate for a study in which there is a 
deliberate attempt to design rules for the betterment of situation, a well-known 
phenomenon in developing countries, and Alchian (1950) explicitly recognised that 
the model has limited possibility for a global optimum. 
Equilibrium view point 
The third viewpoint, which Christopher Kingston and Gonzalo Caballero 
referred to as the “Equilibrium View”, blends the two theories of institutional change 
discussed above.  This viewpoint treats formal and informal rules together with their 
enforcement mechanisms, within a unified framework for coordinating the 
expectations of social-political agencies with specified behaviour (e.g., Schotter, 
1981; Aoki, 2001:24; Myerson, 2004; Greif, 2006).  Thus, although there are marked 
differences in how institutions are defined by these theorists, they agree about the 
patterns of behaviour, instead of rules that govern such behaviour  (Aoki, 2001:20-
25 and Grief, 2006). 
Thus, any modification or replacement of existing institutions, or the 
emergence of a new one, is subjected to some equilibrium patterns of behaviours, 
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mediated by both endogenous institutional rules and exogenous physical 
constraints, changing expectations rather than rules (Aoki, 2001:23).  In the model, 
most scholars argue that the endogenous “rules of the game” provide the strategies 
that ensure that the institution that emerges is an endogenous equilibrium outcome 
that reflects a socially constructed reality (Kingston and Caballero, 2008:18).  In this 
approach, theorists also assume the existence of rationality and opportunism of the 
transacting agents in maximising their welfare (Aoki, 2001:23).  Depending on the 
attributes of the transaction interests, participants recognise sets of constraints, both 
internal and external to the system, with the potential to stabilise expectations Grief, 
2006: 45.  In other words, the behaviour of the agencies, as specified by the rules, 
must be in equilibrium (Kingston and Caballero, 2008:18).    
Within this model, theorists describe two fundamental characteristics of 
institutional change.  In the first instance, institutional change results from a shift in 
expectations rather than in rules.  Hence rules, according to Aoki, are only helpful 
when they enable shifts in people’s expectations (Aoki, 2001:231).  In this case, 
rules are endogenous and facilitate behaviours of social-political agencies.  Only 
“rules-in-use” can shift expectations, while “rules-in-form” are quasi-parameters of 
the institution and could merely broaden the range of existing equilibrium in the 
pattern of behaviour.  The second route is when change in quasi-parameters of the 
institution undermines existing expectations leading to institutional disequilibrium 
and an impetus for institutional change.  
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Annex 2.2: Institutional Change Dimensions and Context Framework 
Institutions of Governance                  Institutional Outcomes Areas/Dimension     Structural Context  Political Outcomes 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Institutions: 
Constitutions, National 
Laws, etc. 
Informal Institutions 
▪ Social norms 
▪ Attitude 
▪ Morals 
▪ Customary laws 
Enforced by 
Traditional Authorities 
and also self regulated 
Formal Institutions 
▪ Constitution  
▪ Official Laws 
▪ Regulations  
▪ Standards 
Enforced by State 
Authority 
 
Governing Image: 
Effectiveness or embeddedness 
of leaders and social-political 
organisations 
Governing Actions: Relevance 
and effectiveness of policies and  
Governing Instruments: 
Appropriateness of social rules 
and laws with broad consensus 
Behaviours  
 
Incentives and conditions of 
enforcements 
Nature of societal interaction: 
intervention, interplay or 
interference 
Transaction costs 
Intermediate Outcomes 
or Effects 
• Emergent political 
structures and leaders 
• Nature and extents of 
accountability as a 
process 
• Effectiveness and 
relevance of governing 
instruments 
 
Final Outcome 
Either “conflict culture” as an 
enduring relation or “conflict sub-
culture” as oppositional 
Exogamous factors: Geo-political location, Historical 
context, Environment, etc. 
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Annex 3.1: Historical Profile of Violence in Acholi 
 
 
Periods 
Crisis Events Impact on Governance 
 Colonial Era 
1898 to 1950 Forceful disarmament and pacification of 
Acholi led by Major Delme-Radcliffe and the 
Nubian forces- 1989 to 1914 (Leys, 1965; 
Gertzel, 1974) 
Practices of violence promulgated as legal framework for compliance, expressing 
authority and in defining belonging from 1898 to 1962. The Nubian forces were used in 
the case of Acholi to enforce this order. 
Kaka Payiira and the whole of Acholi was under siege as Rwot Awich of Payiira was 
arrested in 1901 and 1910; (ii) political arrests, detentions and forced labour; (iii) the 
Lamogi and Labongo rebellion, 1911/12 leading to many death and displacement; (iv) 
destocking of leaders and clans; (v) reported high incidence of gender-based violence by 
the colonial forces 
Forceful relocation of Acholi from their land 
from 1902 to 1935 by Postlethwaite (Gertzel, 
1974) 
• Displacement, death and torture of mostly communities from particularly kaka Alero, 
Payiira, Koch, Lamogi and Pabbo 
• Reported high incidence of gender-based violence by the Nubian forces 
Death from drought, famine, diseases and 
pests.  E.g., cotton disaster 1938/39 
• Famine - ninety per cent of millet destroyed in eastern Acholi; 25 per cent of cotton 
produced in 1937 in west Acholi not harvested by farmers; 57 per cent of income from 
cotton lost in 1937 in Acholi; 
• Increased recruitment into national army, 1939 to 1940. Sixty per cent of male sought 
recruitment and 20 per cent were recruited into the national army. 
1950 to 1962 • Drought and famine in 1966/67 
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 Obote I – October 9, 1962 to January 25, 1971 
1962 to 1967 • 1966/67 drought and famine 
• The Buganda Crisis in Mengo 
 
• Army recruitment, 1966/67 
1967 to 1971   
1971 to 1979 Pax Aminca, January 26, 1971 to April, 1979 
• Amin’s overthrow of Obote’s Government on 
26th January 1971 and setting up of a 
military government in Uganda (Pain, 1998) 
 
• Targeted killing of Acholi’s leaders and creation of fears among the Acholi community, 
1971 to 1979; 
• Local governments and governance influenced with internal wrangles 
• Overthrow of Idi Amin Government in which 
Acholi played a significant role 
• Recruitment of young male into the new UNLF/A between 1981 to 1985 
1980 to 1985 • Severe droughts and famine particularly in 
eastern Acholi in 1979 to 1982 (Oloya et al., 
1998) 
 
1986 to 2010 Pax Musevenica, January 26, 1986 to 2010 
1986-1989 Phase 1-1986 to 1989: Capture of Acholi by NRA/M  
 The Crisis Events Reported Impacts 
• 25th January 1986 NRA took control of 
Kampala 
• March, 1986 NRA/M entered Acholiland and 
with series of reported violent incidence: 
armed robbery in Acholi and killings 
reported in press (e.g., The Standard 
newspaper, Nairobi, 21/1/87) 
• Disarmament: NRA/M launched a 
counterinsurgency without insurgency 
(Branch, 2004) 
• Targeted intimidation and tortures Displacements of Acholi into urban and internally 
displacement centres created by governments and NGOs; 
• Emergence of Holy Spirit Mobile Forces by Alice Lakwena as counter insurgency when 
the UPDA signed treaty with NRA 
• Emergence of the Kony insurgency in Acholiland 
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• September, 1986 army directives for people 
to go to the camps (Atkinson, 2010:297) 
 
• Corner Kilak Massacre in Kitgum on 
18/01/1987 (www.monitor.co.ug) and New 
Vision of September 7, 1998 and November 
01 and 16, 1998 
 
Phase 11: Implementing NRA Bush Agenda, 1988 to 1996 
• 1991 to 1994 –Major General David 
Tinyifuza Operation North (1994 to 1992) 
which bock out media (Tripp, 2010; Branch, 
2011) 
 
• Operation North by Betty Bigombe and the 
NRA 
• Militarisation of the population: mobilisation of arrow group in Acholi to counter the LRA, 
which later were abandon by the NRA (Atkinson, 2010:290-292) 
 Phase 111: Official Creation of Camps of Social Tortures, 1996 to 1999 
 • LRA insurgency 1987 to 2007  
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Annex 3.2: The Legacy of Violence and Violations in Acholi 
In summarising my views regarding current scholarship on conflicts and 
violence in Acholi, three strands of argument can be identified and they are 
interrelated.  The first strand sees the structural dimensions of the interactions of the 
Acholi people as the main issue – setting Acholi as a constituency apart from the 
state and its partners.  This argument presupposes that Acholi is a conflict sub-
culture (Refer to authors like: Baker, 1872; Speke, 1862; Allen, 2004; 2006; Berber, 
1962; Crazzolara, 1951).  It further sees violence, as bilateral interaction between 
the Acholi on one hand and the others, on another hand - which I contend, was not 
necessarily the case. 
The central point in this strand questions Acholi’s image in relating to other 
cultures and sees violence as linked to Acholi’s historical mistrust of the state and to 
the other non-Acholi (see: Lwanga-Luyiige, 1989; Kasozi, 1994).466  However, I 
argue that Acholi is a multi-ethnical society, however, initially bonded through 
consent and reciprocity467.  In fact earlier writings by travellers have often revealed 
that the Acholi were more friendly and dependable on than other neighbouring 
communities (see:  Crazzolara, 1950:75-77).  In addition, this viewpoint assumes 
that violence in Acholi is collective, motivated by hatred, directed by powerful 
authoritative leaders and that as a community, the Acholi are always on the 
offensive.   
A number of scholars have rightly disputed the narratives, arguing that no 
empirical evidence exists to substantiate this viewpoint (see: Whitmore, 
2013:Chapter 3; Branch, 2011:45).   Additionally, the dominant trend in the violence 
witnessed in Acholiland has been one in which some segments of the Acholi reacted 
based on lapii in self-defence.  In most instances, violence did not follow an 
interlude of conflicts especially with powerful outsiders.  Rather, violence – which 
                                                          
466 The divide-and-rule myth regarding northerners as warriors by the colonial 
authorities have been referred to in a number of scholarly writing.  However, as 
discussed in Chapter Seven, most scholars have persistently only made reference to 
this half of the story as I have further explained.  
467 Acholi’s known and reported behavior regarding strangers as earlier observed by 
Crazzolara, 1950:75-77 and later by public servants from the other part of Uganda, 
who served as government officials in the Acholi Local Government. 
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was multidimensional - was used as a language of defining the form of relationship 
that outsiders intend to establish468.  Also, the elders from Acholi argued that Acholi 
culture has always abhorred violence.  The way in which kaka in Acholi operated 
were the outcomes of compromises, consent and political legitimacy that brought 
different tribes together under an ideology for peace.  
Conversely, the culture, while admittedly has been dynamic, has 
demonstrated elaborate mechanisms for conflict resolution, mato oput, suggesting 
that it is a conflict culture – one that encourages confrontation in shaping the 
outcomes of interactions.  However, naturally, it has a “degree of elasticity of 
tolerance” beyond which it would be capable of holding up to its dignity469.  
Importantly, the Acholi as a society does not have a supreme leader because tela 
are categorised, diffused and transitional.  Acholi’s strength, as we discuss later, is 
at the agnatic and especially the corporate family levels. 
The second strand dominates political science and humanitarianism.  It 
sees violence in Uganda as identity politics, suggesting that it is rooted in the legal 
construction of space and boundaries as a means of governance.  Proponents of 
this school include Branch (2005, 2011) and others (e.g., Dolan, 2005, 2011).  As a 
constructed viewpoint, it does acknowledge that violence is supply-led, purposeful 
and has the capability to motivate the Acholi to develop an identity that promotes 
“us” against “them”.  Particularly, the postcolonial era has enforced identity creation 
in Acholi through the administrative boundaries, language and political 
categorisation.  Within this strand, violence is defined within the two constituencies 
of “primitive” as being the Acholi system and “modern”, representing the viewpoints 
of the outsiders and especially the rouge state.  The forms of such violence were 
political because they were concerned with issues, like natural resources, 
underdevelopment and governance.   
In other words, even though the Acholi are of varying political ideologies, 
violations of their rights have been applied as a geopolitical prescription that ignored 
                                                          
468 Uma-Owiny (2013) observed that the Arab slave traders would cause ethnic kaka to 
fight for resources even when there were no enmities among them.  Similarly, most 
of the violence seen in the last thirty years had no specific objective other than to 
subdue the community. 
469 Responses of some elders to what they see as cultural sensitivity in the diverse 
community in Uganda. 
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their differences.  Within this school, political marginalisation through policies and 
other governing activities manifest the instrumentalisation of this identity politics.  
However, Acholi is a multi-ideological society with a strong background of Catholic 
and Protestant faiths (see: Onek-Adyaga, 2011: 34-38).  In the first postcolonial era, 
the DP dominated the parliament of Uganda while at the Local Council, the UPC 
were predominant (see: Leys, 1967).  Its delineation as an ethnic group was based 
on some commonalities that Atkinson discussed, which does not conform them to a 
single line of ideology but was certainly nurtured by kaka collectively as an ideology 
(Atkinson, 1999,2010:40-45).  As a society they share interests around peace and 
social justice. 
The last strand, which emphasises economic dimensions, sees rampant 
poverty in Acholi as the cause of violence and also as its consequence (see: World 
Bank, 2004).  Colonial authorities defined this path by circumventing a 
comprehensive post-conflict recovery of Acholiland after some sixty years of 
damages inflicted by slave traders to its human, economic and social capitals, 
including promoting distrust between the different clans (Mamdani, 1996; Odoi, 
2010).  To the contrary, the British, compelled by their interests, set predatory 
structures and exploited the Acholi based on “business models” that lacked the 
moral ground of post-conflict recovery470.  By the time of Uganda’s independence, 
Acholi was ranked as one of the poorest areas in the country (Leys, 1967).  And 
now, fifty-two years thereafter, the Government of Uganda admits that the bulk of 
those living below the poverty line are concentrated in Acholiland (PRDP, 2007).   
Proponents of this view see institutions and governance as critical in the 
underdevelopment of Acholi.  They advance that the Acholi is an aggrieved society 
and is capable of abetting violence by indulging in surviving actions that inflict 
violence.  A true manifestation of this assertion came to pass within the last twenty 
years.  Motivated by negligence, poverty and the absence of alternative livelihoods, 
the Acholi household have destroyed over two hundred kilometre square of forest.  
Laker (2014:1-15) provides an insight into this environmental conflict, submitting that 
forest cover in Gulu district has declined from 371km2 in 1990 to only 200km2 in 
2014. 
                                                          
470 See for instance Graeber (2011:162) argument on how similar policy by the Spanish 
conqueres of the Indian tribes that culminated into a form of genocidal consequences.  
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While violence in Acholiland has been multifaceted and certainly predatory 
in most instances, social powers have induced violence driven by the political 
economy of governance and perceptions.  In some instances, especially internally, 
derivatives and moralistic violence, symbolising grievances, revenge and coping 
strategies are known to have occurred. However, mass violations or social tortures 
in Acholi have been supply-led, either by organised groups like the LRA or by state 
machineries, as was the case with Idi Amin and Museveni’s soldiers.  Rebellions like 
Lamogi in 1911/2 and the insurgency by the LRA did not represent a community-
wide response to social power (Finnström, 2003, 2008:138-144).   They were, 
however, political as they sought political solutions (Allen, 2006; Finnström, 2008:83, 
211-214)471.  The LRA’s violence, however, mutated over the years into forms that 
are difficult to categorise, and have become classified as terrorism. 
However, the three strands share common denominators, that is, that 
violence cut through Acholi as a community and it is about governance - something 
that I have discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven.  These viewpoints concur 
with Ndlvou-Gatsheni’s “The Logic of Violence in Africa” in which he sees “endemic 
violence” as synonymous with Africa’s governance because it has been the feature 
of both the modern and history of governance (see: Ndivou-Gatsheni, 2011:1).  For 
this essay, I see three important short falls in the current analyses of violence in 
Acholi.  
Shortfalls in the analyses of violence in Acholiland 
Firstly, current analyses have failed to identify the conflict potentialities of 
the parties involved as they seek for peaceful dialogue in resolving conflicts.  Since 
the Acholi are viewed as part of the Uganda state, resolving its perceived discontent 
with the state has often been delegated to the existing neo-liberal constitutional 
framework of statehood that gives government an edge in dialogue.  This approach 
has failed to heal the historical injustices the Acholi have inherited since 
colonialism472.  Just peace define, as “a dynamic state of affairs in which the 
                                                          
471 The Lamogi rebellion of 1911/2 has been discussed both by Crazzolara (1954) and 
Adimola (1947).  However, the recent LRA war has been discussed in several 
perspectives including by others like Finnstrom, 2004, 2008 
472 Conflict potentiality is defined by the sociocultural space, that is, the characters of the 
structural dimensions of interactions of the social-political entities.  There are 
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reduction and management of violence and the achievement of social and economic 
justice are undertaken as mutual, reinforcing dimensions of constructive change” 
demands a good understanding of these conflict potentials in order to appreciate the 
weakness of acclaimed global approaches to resolving them (see: Veal and 
Stravron, 2003:9 and Grove, 1947).473  The Acholi experiences, based on the voices 
of the CSOs, missed that constructivist dimension. 
Secondly, in a fragile condition of Acholi, defining shared governing 
mechanisms within the donors’ supported framework of decentralisation has been 
illusionary.  First, the institutional arrangements to ensure effective community 
governance have been weak.  Secondly, most resources for recovery tend to come 
through non-state actors, who have demonstrated a mixed of incapability and 
incompetence474.  Additionally, non-state actors have increasingly put emphasis on 
fiscal rather than to both fiscal and technical accountabilities of their work.   
The essence of shared governance in which the community is but an 
important stakeholder has not worked well in Acholiland.  Partly, although a 
framework exists, strong and effective political enforcement is missing, to deliver on 
the problems.  Incidentally, the observable emphasis on governance has been on 
decision-making, including disbursement of resources rather than on the ultimate 
outcomes.  This has created a gap in governance, side stepping the significance of 
the target community in the process (see: Oosterom, 2012).  
More glaringly, however, is the analysis of the recent violence between the 
Lord’s Resistant Army (LRA) and the NRM.  The build-up of this insurgency, as laid 
out by Lamwaka (2002), started somehow in 1986 immediately after the NRA/M 
came into power (see: Lamwaka, 2002:31).  There are disjointed representations of 
both the analytical and descriptive narratives of the political discourses and the 
realities found in Acholiland (see: Dolan, 2011:4).   While in the former, I am 
concerned with the politics of community governance, in the case of the latter I 
specifically refer to the narrative and the politicisation of violence in Acholiland.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
“conflict cultures” and “conflict sub-cultures” that I have discussed earlier in Chapter 
Two. 
473  Most analyses of conflicts and violence have made claim of underdevelopment and 
culture of the Acholi as the main reasons for continued conflicts. 
474 Interview and discussion with LC officials at sub-counties and district levels 
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The third shortfall in the literature has been the unequal attention given to 
the other forms of violence in Acholi by scholars.  The logic behind some forms of 
violence – for instance, xenophobia, criminality, rape, torture, and maiming - seems 
trivial and is sometimes difficult for outsiders to understand or comprehend.  
Importantly, these types of violence are often broadly categorised as war, since the 
actions are perpetrated during civil unrests.  
Thomson (2010:Location 404-414) and others (Finnström, 2008:37-40, 55-
58 Branch, 2011: 18-19), for instance, contend that colonialism as a policy and an 
instrument of governance has made significant contributions to violence in Africa, 
and therefore fits the description of an immoral form of governance.  Thomson 
(2010: Location 436) in particular suggests that in countries like Uganda, there was 
little interest by colonialists to ensure stability other than where self-interest required 
it such as in order to enable business, in which case such interventions were 
enforced by institutionalised force.  Branch (2011:52), like Thomson (2010: Location 
436), sees the arbitrary delineation of political boundaries and creation of ethnic 
groups as part of the divide-and-rule.  They suggest that post-colonial state and 
tribal identities have been in a dynamic, mutually dependent relationship that has 
maintained this divide, renegotiating and reconstructing the evils for the good of the 
governors.  For that matter, ethnic violence expresses the landscape of governance 
in Africa475.   
In my own experience, violence is a difficult and complex phenomenon to 
define if one has to preserve the reality that it evokes and to embrace its dimensions 
and specificity in life, particularly as reported below by a respondent: 
“You can hide from gun fires but not from humiliations!  Can you imagine a 
young man, who could be your son, forcing your wife, who should be his 
mother to undress and slept with her as you look on ...  Then he turned to your 
daughter …and you sit and watch helplessly, waiting for your turn to be 
sodomised!  Then they took turn, all seven of them on all of us!  Now, I know 
why I should have allowed them to kill me … I should have … because I am 
dead inside ”476 
                                                          
475 Twenty-two out of the forty-eight African countries are classified by the World Bank 
as fragile, meaning that they are post-conflict or are prone to violence anytime. 
476 Testimony from a respondent in Olwal, in Amuru district: July 1999 
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Galtung (1969:168-170) and Herbolzheimer (2009:1) feel that the use of multiple 
lenses as an approach is powerful in conceptualising violence.  The interdisciplinary 
approach not only appreciates the multicultural meaning of violence, it also enables 
better understanding of the importance and dimensions of violence.  
This is because culture as a form of collective social power gives different 
meanings to violence.  It can, for instance, legitimise violence as in the case of 
rituals or the way Acholi macon managed conflicts and implemented social justice 
(see: Mazarui, 1975).  Yet, in the case of Acholi, the most interrogated violence in 
the literature has been what Galtung (Galtung, 1969: 170) refers to as personal 
violence and what Zizek  (2009:2) refers to as subjective violence.  This has ignored 
the most damaging aspects of violence: structural violence and social torture (see: 
Dolan, 2010: Chapter 3; Whitemore, 2010).  With physical violence, the actors and 
the victims can be easily identified, and in theory at least, be held to account.  
Finnström (2008), for example, gave an insight into the history of 
provocations, misplaced arrogance and other dimensions of predatory violence that 
are latent and often misunderstood.  These writings have provided evidence that the 
colonial administrators, post-colonial governments and especially the NRM have 
conjured governance and extensively used force and prejudices against the Acholi 
(see: Dolan, 2011).  From these insights and observations, one acknowledges that 
the typologies of violence in Acholi reveal multiple expressions: some celebrated, 
others bemoaned, and probably most are implanted in the governing interactions 
and with prolonged effects.  
Consistently, one observes that violence was a legitimate tool of governing 
interactions used by those in power to extort, wilfully, governing outcomes that did 
not resonate with the beliefs of the society and were, thus, traumatic by nature and 
therefore immoral.  For instance, violations through so-called “protected villages” 
were, as narrated by Dolan (2009; 2011), institutionalisation of torture that aimed to 
provoke the Acholi either to fight back or to conform to the powers that be.  Some 
violence, however, was evoked as victims turned perpetrators under duress, in what 
Mamdani (2002) describes as derivative violence.  These forms of violence worsen 
the fragility of the Acholi situation, as Finnström (2008) discusses about the lworo 
boo group. 
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Violence from a local perspective 
In the case of Acholiland, I argue that political violence has largely been an 
expression of social power.  Social power is collective and a derivative of groups not 
of individual acts (see: Veal and Stavrou, 2003; Finnström, 2008:152-159; Dolan, 
2011: 220)477.  Social power, I submit, is a capacity and capability by systems, 
organisations and groups to generate effects on their victims.   In the case of Acholi, 
Dolan (2011:1) coiled the term social tortures to express the systemic manner in 
which human rights in Acholiland were widely abused by the armed forces and the 
LRA rebels478.  Through torture, the Acholi were caused to wilfully comply, even for 
the things that they would not otherwise do under normal situations (See: Rummel, 
1967; Dolan, 2009; 2011).   
It is important to note that violence includes intentions, processes and 
consequences of actions (see: Galtung, 1969:171-172).  As such, it varies in extent 
and nature.  In the case of Acholiland, violence embraced a multitude of intentions, 
processes and actions by corporate groups, individuals acting on behalf of groups 
and social groups with the view to ostracise, humiliate and cause feelings of 
unworthiness (e.g., Finnström 2008:100, Branch, 2011: 91-99).  Physical violence, 
including killing or imprisonment in police detention cells or IDP camps, actualised 
political intention as visible evidence.  Violence was also, in the case of death in the 
camps, were caused by negligence by government because it was avoidable.  
When actual violence is avoided, argues Galtung (1969), prospects for peace are 
likely as non-violence reduces the potential for violence. 
Overall, violence in Acholiland included a broad range of social 
phenomena.  It embraced ethnic exclusion – the anyanya (Finnström, 2008:90-91, 
155-156), racism and tribalism, and other stereotypes that excluded Acholi from 
being an equal part of the Uganda project.   It also includes the negligence of 
                                                          
477 Within the context of this assertion, I further argue that because of the organization 
of authoritarian regimes similar to what w have seen in the NRM since 1990s, the 
principal is capable of ordering a group, like the the NRM caucus or NM carders, to act 
in good fate.  
478 Chris Dolan makes reference to the persistent violence and violation in Acholi over a 
protracted time period as social torture because there are evidenced of widespread 
violation, dread, disorientation, dependency, debilitation and humiliation, all of which 
were tactics and systematic symptoms of tortures by the armed forces and groups 
engaged in the war. 
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responsibilities, the processes of violations and the outcomes (see: Mamdani, 
2007).  For instance, the so-called “protected camps” were not safe, as they became 
the centre for the abduction of children, physical and mental torture of the people 
and spread of HIV and other diseases (see also: Dolan, 2011:163).  The structure of 
domination that perpetuates violence and the societal values that trigger 
contestation of such political actions – like the courage to give opinions that 
contradict the official versions - existed, and explain why there has been sustained 
struggles by the Acholi for justice, which appealed to the use of force by the 
perpetuators of violence.  As Rummel (1963) and Coser (1967) noted the structures, 
strategies and intentions of these parties, and the dynamism of the conflicts over 
time, are traceable, well defined and articulated, some thing that Onyango-Odongo 
(2007) also wrote about the Acholi democracy. 
Acholiland as a case of political hybridity 
Contextually, Acholiland manifests hybridised political orders associated 
with what some scholars consider are signs of limited statehood (e.g., Boege et al., 
2009b).  Prolonged violence in Acholiland has dovetailed with increasing rates of 
poverty and human rights violations more than anywhere else in Uganda (See: 
Branch, 2011: 163-165; Dolan, 2011: Chapter 5; UBOS, 2013.  Its “customary” 
institutions and those of the state have virtually capsized – unable to withstand 
stress, whether from nature or political manoeuvres.  These situations, however, 
have worsened during the NRM.  This, I submit, have been a built up of effects of a 
prolonged neglect of the Acholi since the Idi Amin era.  However, that has now been 
further overwhelmed by inappropriate governing actions under the NRM regime (see 
also: Finnström, 2008:199-200 and Branch, 2011:58-61).  In particular, the induced 
societal displacement and the associated services provided to the IDPs that began 
in 1986, dealt the killer blow that engulfed the entire social-political system of the 
Acholi (see: Atkinson, 2010: Afterword; Dolan, 2011: 183; Branch, 2011:58-61).  At 
the peak of this phenomenon, over thirty eight thousand children were abducted and 
many more died in the camps from communicable diseases and system negligence 
(e.g., Opiyo-Oloya, 2013: 58-59; Dolan, 2011: Chapter 5).  Trivialising these 
inhuman outcomes of displacement within the national political and especially 
economic gains, the NRM and the donors wrote off the Acholi as a society. 
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There was prolonged and possibility inevitable humanitarian interventions 
in Acholiland since the 1986 (see: Kaldor, 1999:111; Mamdani, 2009:300).  The 
thing about humanitarian support, as Branch (2011: Chapter 1) indicated, is that it 
assumes that the beneficiaries morally approve the actions of these variegated 
actors, even when in most cases they do not agree with it.  Typically, these 
interventions involved partitioning the displacement camps among the different 
foreign-based NGO actors, who proceeded to created parallel administrative 
structures, to manage their agenda.  These agenda included provision of a UN 
standardised livelihood security packages that these NGO contractors could vary at 
their discretion.  The packages also included a complete reconstruction of village life 
- and overhauling the well-known community systems, to retrofit into the new 
budget-driven emergency architectures.  In these “new” arrangements, all 
beneficiaries of NGOs handouts were categorised as victims, and therefore 
vulnerable.  These NGOs in turn, became experts in prescribing local issues within 
the agenda of government.  
Subsequently, the political legitimacy of the local institutions waned as 
diverse and competing claims to power and logic of order set on during emergency 
period.  The overlapping and conflicting roles at most, became the norm for the 
eighty per cent of the new Acholi generation that lived accessing sub-standard 
services in the absence of standardisation that would be set by local or public 
institutions479.   The new political order introduced what Louise Wiuff Moe (2014: 38-
40) referred to as “hybrid governance” – a situation where Fukuyama’s (2013) 
symbolic state was limited in its core functions (Moe, 2014:26).    
However, hybridity in my opinion is Kooiman’s (2003:62, 139) social-
political governance - a normal political order that is prevalent in Africa and one that 
challenges the Eurocentric and normative version of an effective liberal-democratic 
state – one that experiences have so far shown as an utopia in the African context 
(Moe, 2014: 37-3).  This is because a modern state seeks legitimacy in democratic 
practices and avoids the pitfall of rampant discrimination in the African context by 
ensuring equity and human rights.  The emergence of these new political actors and 
institutions to fix the gap in governance in Acholiland, brought with it new issues that 
have dented the long tested practices of the fading traditional cultures.   
                                                          
479 Recorded in my interviews with the elders that lived in the camps 
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As Branch (2010), Smits and Wright (2012:22) have discussed with regards 
to fragile situations, these new political actors set by Global NGOs became patrons 
of confusion as they lacked the bases and legitimacy of local governance.  They 
proclaimed new and unchecked packages of change agenda for people in distress 
and largely mentally compromised.  One such technology is the gender concern at 
household levels.  The sole purpose, from the footprints, has been to cause change 
in the patrilineal culture in line with their concealed agenda of change – and not so 
much whether these changes were sensitive to prevailing local situation at the time.  
In the absence of state oversights for both contents and quality of services supplied, 
some of these new technologies caused considerable harms to the people480. 
Kaka as a governing realm was a response to local context – which was 
diverse and complex, demanding innovative governing situation.  It aimed to 
preserve and maintain some of the core agnatic growth and identity and gender 
sensitivity was not so much part of the societal value.  The colonial regimes if 
anything, strengthened the gender insensitivity of the Acholi culture.  Sadly, its 
interactive governance approaches – the principles and the practices that evolved to 
retain intra-kaka peace and promoted bridges and co-existence of diverse societies, 
was rudely interrupted by western form of modernity.  The humanitarian approaches 
merely used its mandate and assumptions of local consent, to stifle the growth of 
primodialism in the name of emergency (Branch, 2011:23-26). 
New wars and unused mechanisms for moral change 
From political events unfolding since the 1890s, the Acholi needed some 
form of bottom-up and top-down institutional change.  Leaders like Rwot Camo and 
his predecessor Rwot Awich of kaka Payiira are said to have initiated this move 
(Uma-Owiny, 2013).  That path, however, failed as new systems were induced that 
ignored the participation of the community (p’Ojok, 2007:3; Finnström, 2008: 29-36, 
168-169).  All through the colonial and postcolonial eras, State-driven reforms set to 
undermine the traditional and informal system, to the detriment of developing 
Acholiland (see: Kaplan, 2008: Location 279-94; Benequista, 2010; Haider, 2011). 
                                                          
480 My discussion with enlightened people in the camps in Awer, Lacor, Keyo in the 2005 
confirmed what similar discussion and experience I had in Kitgum in 1997/98 – that 
most of these actors merely focus on accounting to donors instead of the beneficiaries 
and that more helpful local NGOs that have a better understanding of the people are 
often ignored in the exercise.  
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When the war against the LRA was officially declared over in 2006, people 
slowly began to return to their homesteads (see: Kalyegira, 2012).  Only then did 
they begin to appreciate the complexities associated with return and resettlement 
(see: Adoko et al., 2008).  A new dimension of conflict was ushered – clustered 
around land, as a non-negotiable landscape of space, economic resource and a 
place of belonging in which intra- and inter-homestead conflicts became a 
manifestation of new wars (Opio and Oketch, 2011)481.    
Kaplan (2008:9) asserts that there are a number of mistakes being made in 
addressing fragility by the so-called development specialists.  He contends that 
social cohesion and society’s shared, productive institutions are two important 
requirements to establish development in fragile situations.  He rightly maintains that 
these two requirements have been missing from most analyses of the tripartite 
relationship between formal institutions, informal institutions and governance.  This 
relationship, I argue, determines the social interactions that are necessary for 
governance.  In a way, Kaplan (2008:17) endorses kaka’s governing model.  Shared 
governing interactions enable identity politics, which, Kaplan (2008:17-20) argues, is 
important in the formation and functioning of institutions.  This is because identity 
history has shown that culture is critical in nation building.  
Cullen and Colleta (2004), on the contrary, submit that identity can be 
destructive as it was in the case of Rwanda prior to the genocide in 1994. The Hutu, 
they argued, relied on their ethnic ties to perpetuate genocide in Rwanda.  Thus, 
cultures that promote inward looking behaviours undermine the growth of cross-
cultural social capital demanded in the so call modern state.  Branch (2011: Chapter 
5) while discussing ethno-justice as a philosophy of traditional response to violence 
in Acholiland, provided support to Kaplan’s (2008: Locations 400-415) emphasis of 
social-economic parameters.   
Emerging Challenges in Local Governance 
Violence of whatever nature impacts on community governance severely 
through the institutional contexts and quality.  It influences the politics of governing 
                                                          
481 See for instance the Monitor Newspaper of Thursday 6/10/2011 written by 
Emmanuel Opio and Bill Oketch in which they admitted that many more people were 
not willing to return to their ancestral homeland in fear of conflicts 
<www.monitor.co.ug>  
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interactions and outcomes.  The LRA insurgency  - which many agree, presented 
the most poorly understood system failure in Uganda – was long in terms of social 
torture; for close to fifteen years, the Acholi political space was shut out of the media 
(Finnström, 2003, 2008:71-75; Branch, 2011:189-190).  In many ways, the events of 
the war and the purposes are comparative with two other similar events of the 
nineteenth (from 1862 to 1875) and twentieth (from 1912 to 1936) centuries, (Uma-
Owiny, 2013).   
As Charles Onyango-Obbo’s commentary482 in the East African 
summarises, the LRA war “has broken” the Acholi people, who found themselves 
sandwiched between the two warring maniacs -, both targeting the innocent civilian 
for the wrong reasons.  There have, however, been a number of scholarships 
regarding the effects of violence on the governing image, governing instruments and 
governing actions as measures of community governance in Acholi (Finnström, 
2008: 91,156 and Branch, 2011: 58-61)483.  
“Removal from their land to the IDP camps disoriented the people in the 
north.  But what finally did it were the conditions in the camps. Once fairly well to do 
farmers, cattle owners, business people and school teachers, they were reduced to 
begging for hand-outs; sharing the same huts with their children (and having sex 
stealthily); and watching the camps degenerate into drunken fights and waste. You 
would speak to some of the elders, and they would just break down in a torrent of 
tears” (Onyango-Obbo, 2012).  
Political institutions and governance 
These wars certainly undermined the construction of the desired national 
social capital - the norms, values, and relations that bond all communities in Uganda 
(Afako, 2002:3-4; Weeks, 2002; Atkinson, 1999; Kasozi, 1999: 23; New Vision, 
1994:7).   For the majority of Acholi people, the last thirty years that define in large 
part, the NRM/A politics in Uganda brought forth a new meaning to the Acholi 
                                                          
482 Charles Onyango-Obbo’s analyses available at <http://www.nakedchiefs.com> 
provide a journalistic viewpoint that comes from the frontline, combining the views 
of the Uganda soldiers as well as Ugandan civilians.  The fact that government did not 
agree a lot with it makes his judgement an interesting piece. 
483 See for instance from the development context, World Bank Appraisal Report of 
2001.  
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“corporate” identity and “independence” (see: Dolan, 2011:192; Atkinson, 2010:393-
300)484.  The NRM era has literally re-invented the emancipation of fear in the Acholi 
community who, as individuals, are fused into the Ugandan society as tortured 
citizens of the country (see: Dolan, 2011:10-11, 258; Atkinson, 2010: 276-335).   
This is for two reasons.  First, it failed to bring peace to the Acholi, a contractual 
obligation enthroned on it by constitution (Okudi and Lawino, March 2014), and 
secondly, it betrayed the Acholi by insisting that Uganda was in peace, implying that 
Acholi was outside the state territory. 
It propagated the birth of informal behaviours within the Acholiland.  The 
metamorphosis of Joseph Kony’s LRA - a product of fear and hopelessness by 
disgruntled youth and ex-soldiers - was an institutional failure that devastated the 
image of the Acholi and that of Uganda.  Branch (2011:66-71) argues wrongly 
though that Kony and his rag-tag troops provided alternative leadership that Acholi 
needed, to measure up to the NRM/A advances.  On most accounts, the NRM/A 
victory was certainly an existential threat but Kony did not represent any leadership 
values to the Acholi, even under such desperation.   
Leadership, as we discussed in Chapter Six is not about waging wars or 
proving the obvious, like for a fact, the NRA soldiers based on oral accounts, had 
planned to revenge on the Acholi for the evils of the Obote II era (see: Lamwaka, 
2002:31; Whitmore, 2010).  To the contrary, leadership in Acholiland have sought to 
dialogue and articulate their positions on matters of governing nature.  As for the 
LRA war, it was certainly a sign of collapse in the political system where youth took 
it upon themselves to wage war on behalf of the community.  Branch’s (2011:66-71) 
viewpoint suggests that the Acholi was in favour of war against the NRM/A 
(Lamwaka, 2002:32-33; Allen, 2006:na).  It also wrongly suggests that the Acholi 
resort to violence when provoked even by superior forces.  
The politicisation of leadership along the dominant orthodoxy of masculinity 
and centralised authority has often faulted the Acholi leaders.  This is because, as 
the LRA war continued, the Acholi still had the quality of leaders in the national 
                                                          
484 Chris Dolan puts an intellectual spin on this in his chapter: Social Torture and 
Continuation of War (2011:219-248). And, Ronald R. Atkinson covered significantly 
this issues under “A Perspective of the Last Thirty Years” in the new edition of the 
“Roots of Ethnicity:  Origin of Acholi of Uganda” 2010:282-335.  
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parliament and Local Government that measured up to standard (Nalugo, 2012)485.  
As displacement and torture became the central Acholi reality – perhaps the only 
place in the world where it is possible to lead a complete and authentic Acholi life, 
"warts and all" – these leaders stood up and made these cases, albeit 
unsupported486.   
In a similar manner, from 1910 to 1936, the British administrators – 
according to Uma-Owiny, (2013) - used their unlimited decentralised power to 
enforce encampment in Acholi. This programme discriminated against the sick, the 
old and disabled, who, from narratives, were left in the villages as the rest, were 
herded into ‘protected’ camps487.  Enslavement, both under the British 
administrators and then under the NRM regime, lasted in each case more than 20 
years and ignited population expulsion that culminated in the separation of families 
and disintegration and erosion of “traditional” social norms and values.  The NRM 
era featured unprecedented displacement in Acholiland – both internally within 
Acholiland and externally, including outside the country.  The “modern environment” 
in the displacement camps and in Acholi, in turn, constructed an identity reform and 
reaction, which nurtured exceptionalism on one hand and submission on the other to 
the authorities that continued to treat people with suspicion.488    
Thinking locally and acting globally 
Finally and most importantly, the posterity of Acholi political emancipation 
rests with the younger generation taking charge, yet the staggering unemployment 
levels and impact of the war undermine their representation and contribution.  The 
                                                          
485 See for instance article in the Monitor Newspaper by Nalugo, 2012 following the 
diversion of reconstruction funds meant for the north by the Office of the Prime 
Minister  
486 While Atkinson (1999, 2010:292-301) covered the significant roles of traditional 
leaders in governance, Leys (1967) and Gertzel (1974) cover some aspects until the 
1960s.  The profiles and the achievements of recent politicians particularly in the last 
30 years can be found in Finnstrom, 2008:104, 115-117; Branch, 2011: 71-74.   
487 On the policy that gave the native chiefs unlimited power, refer also to: Dieberg, 
1927:155-171.  On the treatment of the people, stories from those who lost their 
people, folk lures and songs exist as testimonies of the treatment. 
488 Even after people returned to their villages from the camps, news of continued 
harassments by security agencies continued and in some cases these were linked to 
land issues but in other cases to politics as will be discussed in Chapter Six   
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population of youth those below the age of 35 years are over eighty five per cent of 
the Acholi population489. 
According to World Bank, human capital is the foundation of social change 
and it must come out of strategic engagement with the outside world (World Bank, 
2011).  For Acholiland, this demands that local leaders, hopefully with the help of the 
state, focus on skills provision and targets self and regional development to 
complement national and global habitus. However, the core of Acholi youth490, 
representing over seventy-five per cent of the current Acholi population, is sadly 
disenfranchised.  This generation, born in the last thirty years, pose serious 
challenges in the post-conflict context in determining the future of Acholiland as a 
political entity.  It is both good and bad news as further discussed below. 
There are a number of scholarly analyses of the impact of “social torture” 
and violent conflicts on the youth (e.g., Garbarino, 1991; Boyden, 1994; Braken, 
1998; Abdullah, 1998).  Most of these studies are linked to governance and have 
discussed the negative and positive impacts of armed conflicts on the behaviour and 
lives of youth.  There are also specific analytical works carried out in Acholiland, for 
instance in the health sector (e.g., Annan & Blattman, 2006a; Bayer, 2006; Pfeiffer, 
2006).  Additionally, Harlacher (2009) also studied the status and impact of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder in Acholiland and highlighted some key governance 
issues.  These studies sculpted frightening evidence of the negative impact of social 
torture, including alarming increase in mental illness on the population491. Harlacher 
(2009) for example, recognises the positive impact of “traditional” efforts in 
addressing these problems. He further observes that there is an overwhelming 
                                                          
489 This estimate was given to me in a discussion with the Chairperson, LC 5 – Gulu in 
March 2013.  I verified this information with the UBOS projection for 2013. 
490 Most western-based organisations, including the UN, consider youth as people in the 
age bracket of 13-24 years of age (Sommers, 2011a: 3).  However, in most rural 
Africa, the definition of a youth is a “matured child” and a “young adult”.  In this 
context, the age group I have considered for this study is between 15-35 years.  
Please also refer to work by Marc Sommers and the discussion of a youth project in 
Kenya (Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2005:3)  
491 This analytical work adopted “the dominant trend” that emphasises the vulnerability 
of the youth rather than their resilience (see: Eyber and Anger, 2004).  Although the 
war’s negative impact on the youth cannot be denied, the reality in Acholiland is that 
they cannot be passive in moving the agenda forward.  Most of these western 
funded NGOs like to maintain their patronage over such situation, for their own 
continuity.   
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magnitude of trauma among the young population and recommends urgent scaling-
up of the other relevant approaches, including the use of modern techniques.   
It seems therefore that the current state of youth unemployment, following 
the twenty-five years of insurgency in Acholiland, and other negative effects of the 
wars, are early warning signs of potential criminality and renewed insecurity.492  This 
is strengthened by a large number of children, who were born in displacement and 
raised without much parental guidance493.  Thus, the impact of war, particularly on 
the youth and children, demands that local leaders are empowered to engage more 
widely with local communities, to deepen and effect an internally focused 
reconstruction agenda that is able to address the peculiar situations that do not 
necessarily register on national development barometers.  
Scholars like West (2000) and Gable (2000), on the other hand, discussed 
some positive outcomes of the direct involvement of youth in armed conflicts, which 
include their direct contribution to liberating their countries from repressive regimes, 
and gaining skills in workmanship that they could have otherwise not experienced.  
Branch (2005) also discussed some similar sentiments coming from his survey in 
Gulu town (Branch, 2008: 9-12).  Both women and the youth particularly 
acknowledge increased accessibility to banks and other amenities that have 
enhanced their resourcefulness in business.  Overall, the youth, with the 
advancement in technologies like cell phones, the Internet and transport, have, in 
some instances, used their new found social capital to effect social changes in their 
communities that previously had not been achieved under traditional circumstances 
by their earlier generations while they were “in the village”.494  
                                                          
492  The Economist Paper in the World in 2013 Print Edition observes that globally around 
75m people aged 15 to 24 are jobless.  The International Labour Organisation, 
according to the Economist, is quoted as having said that this dismaying 
unemployment rate of almost 13% will rise.  Acholiland inevitably will be a major 
part of the increase, going forward. 
493 Analysis and discussions were collectively done with the respondents in Pakiri in 
Amuru during marriage ceremony in April 2011. 
494 This statement recognises that there has been a deliberate targeting of youth and 
women by NGOs, which was not the case prior to the war.  But overall, having 
worked with youths in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa, these developments have 
been reported and are true of Acholiland as well.  However, one needs to note that it 
did not require war of the magnitude experienced in Acholiland to introduce such 
change in the living conditions of the poor. 
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Henceforth, the collapse of the institutions of governance and services, 
including education, the growing youth unemployment, the high prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS and the rise in youth and children criminality, attest to a crisis for 
pluralistic and specialised forms of community governance.  It is for these concerns 
in general, and the current context of Acholiland in particular, that I have discussed 
this case study within the realm of community governance as a theme in the 
premise of peace studies, emphasising the moral aspect of this efforts.  
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